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This thesis analyses the competitive aspects of bank merger transactions under the law of the 
United Kingdom (‗UK‘) and the United States (‗US‘), including the applicable law of the 
European Union (‗EU‘). This thesis, also, covers bank mergers and competition in view of the 
financial crisis 2007-08 that is known as the Global Financial Crisis (‗GFC‘). 
 
The analysis under UK and EU law focuses on competition issues in the banking and 
financial sector, notwithstanding that competition laws in these jurisdictions apply broadly to 
all sectors of the economy. The US law analysis is based on competition law from federal 
antitrust and bank regulatory authorities, case law, as well as consumer protection regulation. 
  
This thesis establishes a comparative framework for understanding the competition 
provisions, examination methods of mergers, administrative proceedings, and case law 
development among the UK law, applicable EU cases, and US agencies and courts. It 
highlights potential improvements in the analysis of banking competition and the financial 
sector as whole.  The ultimate goal of any proposed improvement should be to make banks 
and other financial institutions provide more efficient services and less costly products to 
consumers, while reducing systemic risk and preserving the soundness and safety of the 
financial system.   
   
The GFC led UK and US policy makers to introduce a number of laws and regulations 
aimed at addressing excessive bank risk taking and improving financial regulatory 
enforcement. The increasing interconnection between competition law and bank regulation 
means that the competition and banking regulators are well positioned to play an active and 
wide-ranging role.  
 
The actions taken by the UK, the US as well as other national and international bodies, 
upon the occurrence of the GFC, were arguably necessary and perfectly justifiable on 
regulatory and financial stability grounds.  The GFC revealed a number of significant 
regulatory and central bank failures, and especially in terms of defective regulation, 
supervision, resolution, support and macro prudential oversight.  A substantial amount of 
iv 
 
work has been undertaken to correct all of these.  It is arguable that sufficient action has been 
taken to remove the worst threats that arise with ‗too-big-to-fail‘.   
 
This paper takes a comparative approach and examines the applicability of 
competition laws, policies, and methods in bank mergers in the UK and the US.  It, also, 
discusses how to improve these laws, polices and methods to make them more efficient and 
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Of all the human powers operating on the affairs of mankind, none is greater than that of 




CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION   
 
This chapter discusses this thesis‘ principle purpose: the research scope, issues, arguments, 
and the benefits to society – namely, the consumers‘ benefits from competition in banking.  
 
1.0  Bank mergers and competition concerns in Anglo-American economies 
 
Traditionally, competition policy concerning mergers in the banking sector has varied 
between efforts to suppress rivalry and to promote liberalization and competition.  The 2007 - 
2008 global financial crisis (‗GFC‘) raised new questions about the relationship between 
financial competition and stability, and hence between bank competition policy and 
regulation.
2
  The emergence of extensive systemic risk created from the GFC reopened 
concerns about the role of competition policy in the banking sector.   
 
There are different ‗schools of thought‘ regarding whether competition is good for 
banking and bank mergers. Some experts argue that competition undermines the stability of 
the banking and financial system.
3
  Other experts argue that competition in banking is good 
for stability.
4
  The GFC, and especially the post-crisis period, reignited the debate of 
promoting bank competition and preserving financial stability.
5
   
 
The GFC made governments in the UK and US revisit regulation and competition 
policy in banking and financial industry. Massive public intervention and significant 
undermining of competition challenged the naïve view that banking is like any other sector 
                                                        
1
 Henry Clay, American Statesman, Secretary of State and Presidential Candidate, speech to the US Congress, 
1832. 
2
 J A Bikker and M van Leuvensteijn, A New Measure of Competition in the Financial Industry (London: 
Routledge 2014), pp 1-7. 
3
 J H Boyd et al, ‗Bank Competition, Risk and Asset Allocations‘ (2009) International Monetary Fund, Working 
Paper, ch 5.   
4
 S Claessens et al, Crisis Resolution, Policies, and Institutions: Empirical Evidence in P Honohan and L Laeven 
(eds.) Systemic Financial Distress: Containment and Resolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005), 
pp 169-96.   
5




vis-a-vis competition policy. The fundamental concern about competition in financial products 
and services is a lack of customer focus on the part of providers. 
 
In the last decades, the number and size of bank mergers have been on the rise in the 
UK and the US.  This may be related to several connected factors, such as, regulatory reform, 
globalisation in both financial and nonfinancial markets, financial distress, and technological 
innovation including the development of electronic banking.
6
 
   
For too long, competition in the UK and US banking industry has not functioned well.
7
  
Since then, there have been interventions by competition authorities, consumer bodies, and 
regulators in both countries.
8
 Even where these interventions have had positive effects, 
progress has been too slow and incremental.
9
 Fundamental issues of the competitive structure 
and performance of banking markets in the UK and US remain unresolved, notwithstanding 




In terms of new participants in competition, the UK and the US banking markets have 
already seen the entry of new and smaller banks. New technology may provide increased 
competition from outside the traditional banking model, for example, from mobile and on-line 
payments or other innovations. Whether these new competitors will be successful, remain to 





Banks directly affect consumers and businesses because the latter use banks to deposit 
money and borrow capital. Once a bank is merged or consolidated, the business of customers, 
in particular for individuals and small and medium-sized enterprises (‗SME‘), is affected.  
                                                        
6
 M Burton et al, An Introduction to Financial Markets and Institutions (New York: Routledge 2015), p 364. 
7
 See generally, S Battilossi and Y Cassis, European Banks and the American Challenge: Competition and 
Cooperation in International Banking (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002). 
8
 X Vives, ‗Competition and Stability in Banking: A New World for Competition Policy?‘ (5 March, 2009) IESE 




 A Bowman et al, The End of the Experiment?; From Competition to the Foundational Economy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2014), p 86.  
11




Overall, consumer opinion is that banks fail to provide sufficient disclosure and transparency 
of the costs of consumer services.
12
        
 
An important issue is the role of the regulatory process on barriers to entry. In bank 
mergers, regulators are responsible for reviewing the application to ensure that new entrants 
and smaller banks are not disproportionately affected. Competition from outside the 
traditional banking model creates new challenges for the process to grant authorization. 
Regulators, often, unduly constrain bank competition by implementing the business model of 
incumbent and traditional banks, as the starting point for the design of new rules.
13
 This 




Many of the issues that competition authorities have been grappling with stem from a 
lack of customer focus on the part of financial services providers. But, if regulators make 
consumer welfare the goal of regulation, and take account of the benefits of dynamic market 
change through competition, authorities can use their rule-making powers to tackle 




The UK and US governments‘ legislative power in a bank merger to overstep concerns 
about competition in the name of preserving financial stability appeared justifiable and 
necessary.    
 
The recent financial services reforms
16
 in the UK regulate, among others, competition 
aspects in banking.
17
 Some regulatory initiatives, like the separation of retail banking 
activities from investment activities, enhanced supervision on capital requirements, 
                                                        
12
 S Lumpkin, ‗Consumer Protection and Financial Innovation: A Few Basic Propositions‘ (2010) 10 OECD 
Journal: Financial Market Trends 1.  
13
 C England, Governing Banking‘s Future: Markets vs. Regulation in E J Kane (eds.) Tension Between 
Competition and Coordination in International Financial Regulation (Massachusetts: Kluwer Publishers 2013), 
pp 33-48. 
14
 D Harrison, Competition Law and Financial Services (Oxon: Routledge 2014), pp 75-80.    
15
 D Singh, Banking Regulation of UK and US Financial Markets (Hampshire: Ashgate 2012), pp 30-42. 
16
 For an in-depth discussion of the financial services reforms in the UK, see the following chapters in this thesis: 
2.4 (‗Vickers‘ Report and the government‘s response‘); 2.5 (‗HM Treasury blueprint report‘); 2.6 (‗Financial 
Services Act 2012‘); 2.7 (‗Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013‘); and 2.8 (‗Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform Act 2013‘), pp 18-30. 
17
 R Kellaway et al, UK Competition Law: the New Framework (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2015), chs 4 
and 6; For a detailed discussion of the role of the recent financial services reforms and its effects on competition 
in banking, see chapters 2.4 - 2.8 in this thesis, pp 18-30. 
4 
 
improvement of account switching, reducing entry barriers, combined with State aid 
divestments, and new entrants, appear to be a step in the right direction. However, this thesis 
addresses whether these developments are sufficient and go deep enough to properly enhance 
and preserve competition in banking.   The Brexit referendum result of 2016 has thrown the 
UK towards unchartered waters in terms of the future relationship between the UK and the 
EU, including implementation of EU provisions and the UK‘s access in the EU market.   
However, the foregoing is not part of the analysis in this thesis, notwithstanding its 
importance.  
 
In the US, each bank merger must comply with antitrust laws. The regulatory 
approvals require that before a merger goes forward regularly refer to those laws. In 
measuring banks against the relevant antitrust laws, the test laid down by the American courts 
since 1960s continues to control.
18
 The courts hold that the relevant geographic area that 
defines a bank market is local in nature. The market that is tested to establish whether a bank 
merger violates the antitrust laws can be as small as one or more counties in a metropolitan 
area.
19
   
 
Accordingly, the largest bank in the US can merge with the third largest bank.  The 
resulting bank can cover a dozen of US states and involve billions of dollars. Whether the 
merger violates the antitrust laws, however, is a question that can ultimately turn on the 
situation in a half-dozen counties in a state.  There is something wrong with this approach.
20
     
 
No bank merger in the US has been derailed by an antitrust review in the last several 
decades. Occasionally, local branches will overlap in an undesirable manner. The solution is 
to sell off a few bank branches and, thereby, resolve the problem.  The antitrust laws are a bug 




                                                        
18
 The landmark case concerning competition aspects in a bank merger is United States v Philadelphia National 
Bank (1963) 374 US 321.  For a discussion of Philadelphia National Bank case law, see chapter 8.1 of this 
thesis, pp 219-23. 
19
 C Felsenfeld, ‗The Antitrust Aspects of Bank Mergers‘ (2008) 13 Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial 
Law 4 (‗Felsenfeld‘), p 508; see, also, E Ellinger et al, Ellinger‘s Modern Banking Law (5th edn, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2011), pp 3-29.   
20
 Felsenfeld (n19), pp 5-24.   
21
 L Sullivan, The Law of Antitrust: An Integrated Handbook (3rd edn., St Paul: West Academic 2015), ch 1; see, 
also, A Lista, EU Competition Law and the Financial Services Sector (New York: Routledge 2013), pp 17-9. 
5 
 
One sees the process continuing. Massive multi-national banks like HSBC, Barclays, 
Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds Banking Group, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, 
Citigroup, and Wells Fargo are gradually becoming the norm. There seems no practical limit, 
except for proposals to break banks up;
22
 to how far the market and regulators will go to allow 




The obvious question is whether the concentrated market structure of banking sector 
due to bank mergers remains a concern? One way to consider this question is to look at the 
current competition law and its enforcement from banking and competition authorities in the 
UK and US.  This thesis addresses this issue.  
 
1.1 Thesis’ research scope, issues and arguments; Benefits to society  
 
This thesis‘ research scope concerns the competitive aspects of bank mergers in the UK, the 
EU, and the US, and seeks to identify current concerns in each jurisdiction that require further 
consideration in the light of bank consolidations and developments in financial markets due to 
the Global Financial Crisis (‗GFC‘). 
 
 It also offers a comparative analysis of the approaches to the UK and the US 
competition policies in the context of bank mergers, with the aim of making recommendations 
for enhancing banking competition and improving consumers‘ banking services. The term 
‗competition‘ and ‗antitrust‘ within the scope of law that are used throughout the thesis bear a 
similar meaning.  
 
Another important characteristic of this thesis is that although some laws and 
regulations could be applicable to mergers in all sectors of the economy, for example, in the 
                                                        
22
 There have been numerous proposals of breaking up the banks, such as, separation of commercial from 
investment banking, but none of these proposals has come into fruition.  Breaking up the banks might shield 
commercial banking and thereby the economy to a certain degree.  However, it cannot ensure financial stability. 
A Dombret and P S Kenadjian, Too Big to Fail III: Structural Reform Proposals: Should We Break Up the 
Banks? in A Dombret (eds.) Cutting the Gordian Knot or Splitting Hairs – The Debate About Breaking Up the 
Banks (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 2015), chs 1.1 - 1.5; see, also, S Bair, Bull by the Horns: Fighting to Save Main 
Street From Wall Street and Wall Street From Itself (New York: Simon & Schuster 2012), p 328.  
23
 M Dewatripont and J Rochet, Balancing the Banks: Global Lessons from the Financial Crisis (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press 2010), pp 101-7. 
6 
 
UK and the EU merger and competition legislative system,
24
 this thesis narrows its discussion 
of their legislative applicability strictly within the bank merger‘s aspects.
25
 This is particularly 
seen in the competition laws and regulations in the UK and the EU, which, unlike most of the 
American laws and regulations, regulate merger transactions of business across various 
sectors of the economy.  
 
 The author seeks to discuss and answer issues about: (i) the actual efficiency of 
competition laws for bank mergers in UK and the US; (ii) whether are there no significant 
legal impediments to banks seeking to merge; (iii) whether the review process of bank merger 
cases by the courts shaped bank merger competition laws in the UK and the US, or they 
changed over time; (iv) the role of bank regulators and governmental authorities in the UK 
and the US in harmonizing and regulating bank merger transactions; (v) the effects on market 
concentration as a result of bank mergers within particular markets and in markets across the 
Atlantic; (vi) elements of current competition laws in the UK and the US that need to be 
improved, changed, or implemented to make them more efficient and effective; and (viii) 
whether the goals of competition law are undermined when regulators approve of bank 
mergers intended to reduce systemic risk and whether more rigorous enforcement of 
competition policy can prevent banks from posing a systemic risk in the first place? 
 
 The author, also, seeks to develop arguments within the frame of the foregoing 
antitrust bank merger issues by analysing each specific jurisdiction‘s legislative framework, 
institutional structure, case law analysis, and empirical examination of competition analysis 
methods over the markets. Thereafter, the author discusses common issues affecting both the 
UK and the US banking system as a result of the ‗too-big-to-fail‘ (‗TBTF‘) aspects, 
governments‘ bailouts towards large banks, and whether competition policies should be 
sacrificed in the name of the asserted financial stability.   
 
                                                        
24
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25
 Ibid.  Unlike the US law (such as, Bank Merger Act 1960, 12 USC § 1828), the UK (such as, Competition Act 
1998, c.41) and the EU (such as, EC Merger Regulation, Council Regulation 139/2004 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings OJ L24/1) laws that regulate the competition issues in bank mergers are 
applicable to all sectors of the economy, including banking sector.      
7 
 
Further, the arguments are developed over a comparative discussion of the 
specifications between the UK and the US over the bank merger competition systems, with 
the aim to identify elements that one system may embrace from the other system, as well as 
what each system, respectively, needs to modify and improve in the interest of the present 
reality of the bank consolidations market.   
 
The goal of the foregoing arguments is not only to identify issues in each jurisdiction, 
but also to provide modest recommendation to contribute in the efforts for enhancement of the 
competition methods in the areas of bank mergers. 
 
 The author provides a framework of the existing EU legislation, competition authority, 
and the case law development over the bank mergers within the EU context.  However, such 
framework is provided only as a natural extension within the context of the discussion over 
the competition issues in the UK bank merger transaction, considering the UK, as a member 
of the EU, sustains implementation duties over the EU legislation, EU courts case laws, and 
the EU competition regulatory authority. It is outside the scope of this thesis any 
comprehensive discussion of the EU antitrust policies over the bank mergers. 
 
 The comparative aspects of this thesis will be developed against the background of the 
GFC.   
 
1.2  Thesis structure 
 
This thesis is principally structured in four parts. 
 
 The first part
26
 of this thesis focuses on the UK. It analyses the role of competition and 
financial authorities in implementing competition provisions, in particular different methods 
of applicability of the bank merger competition aspects.
27
 This thesis, also, will look closely at 
certain important bank mergers in the UK and the EU that have occurred in the last decade 
and beyond, analysing the methods employed by the competition agencies to examine bank 
                                                        
26
 See chapters 2 through 5 in this thesis, pp 10-177. 
27
 See chapters 3 and 5 in this thesis, pp 50-79, and 132-177. 
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mergers in the light of any potential competition issues, as well as the remedies applied by the 




The Brexit referendum result of 2016 has thrown the UK towards unchartered waters 
in terms of the future relationship between the UK and the EU, including implementation of 
EU provisions and the UK‘s access in the EU market.   However, the foregoing is not part of 
the analysis in this thesis, notwithstanding its importance.  
 
 The second part
29
 of the thesis deals with the tests implemented by competition and 
banking agencies in relation to the application of antitrust laws in the US, looking closely at 
the evolution of American legislation concerning competition in the banking system.
30
 It seeks 
to determine whether this legal evolution has led to a competitive and efficient banking 
system in the US. The research focuses on the important role of the American courts in 
accommodating the realities of the banking industry, and on analysing steps taken by the 




 The third part
32
 of this thesis focuses on the aspects of bank consolidation, with 
emphasis on ‗too-big-to-fail‘ (‗TBTF‘) banks and other financial institutions during the 
Global Financial Crisis (‗GFC‘) and the role of the UK and the US banking and competition 
authorities.  The author analysis issues whether the actions taken by officials on both sides of 
the Atlantic were necessary to correct problems exposed by the GFC in terms of defective 
regulation, supervision, resolution, support and macro prudential oversight; whether sufficient 
actions has been taken from the foregoing authorities, and elsewhere, to remove the worst 
threats that arise with TBTF; and whether it was worth sacrificing the implementation of 
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31
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 The last part
34
 of the dissertation discusses substantial differences in the UK and the 
US approaches to bank mergers in relation to competition. In addition, it looks for 
opportunities where one jurisdiction might learn from the other jurisdiction; whether one 
jurisdiction may adopt, within its own specifications, a certain approach or policy from the 
other jurisdiction in order to enhance its review of the competitive aspects of bank mergers; 
and whether there are possible recommendations to improve cooperation and coordination 




 Finally, it appears that presently there is not much significant academic or scholarly 
work that provides a comparative analysis of Anglo-American approaches to competition in 
bank mergers.
36
 As such, considering also that the UK and the US are, and remain, the two 
most important centres of financial services in the world, the role of competition in bank 
mergers in the UK and in the US, deserves analysis.  This thesis endeavours to accomplish 
that.
                                                        
34




 The foregoing conclusion is drawn, based on the author of this thesis extensive research.  
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CHAPTER 2 – APPLICABLE COMPETITON LAWS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM        
     PERTAINING TO BANK MERGERS  
 
This chapter discusses the applicable UK and EU legislation, including important legislative 
initiatives taken by the lawmakers and the Government, which regulates the competition 
aspects in bank mergers in the UK.  Prior to the foregoing discussion, the author analysis 
theoretical issues pertaining to the nature of the relationship between competition and 
financial stability, including the ‗public interest‘ exemption. 
 
Competition laws in the UK apply not only to banks and other financial institutions, 
but also to other businesses in the economy.  Nevertheless, for the purpose of this thesis, 
discussion of these laws is made only in relation to banks and other financial institutions.    
 
2.0  Theoretical issues concerning the nature of the relationship 
between competition and financial stability; Public interest exemption  
 
Competition policy in the banking sector considers the interplay between financial stability 
and competition, which is more complex than a simple balance between competition and 
financial stability.
1
  However, a good starting point would be to understand behind the reason 
that when competition increases, it might reduce economic stability.   
 
A suitable balance between financial stability and competition assumes a structure that 





Generally speaking, banking system presents oligopolistic fabric.  However, it does 
not, necessarily, mean such system do not lead to competitive results.
3
  Some of the broadest 
approaches that define and evaluate competition in banking are (i) the structure-conduct-
performance (SCP) model; (ii) contestability - centres on conduct dependent on latent entry; 
and (iii) price responsiveness to cost shifts.
4
  
                                                        
1
 M Canoy et al, ‗Competition and stability in banking‘ (2001) IDEAS Working Paper Series from RePEc.  
2
 W Arnoud et al, ‗Can relationship banking survive competition? Centre for Economic Policy Research (UK) 
1997, pp 20-35. 
3
 A N Berger et al, Competition in banking (2
nd
 ed., The Oxford Handbook of Banking, Oxford, UK), c 25. 
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The SCP approach connects the structure of a market to the behaviour (and 
performance) of financial institutions in that market. Especially, the SCP model asserts that 
there is a growing relationship between the level of market concentration and market power, 
exerted individually or jointly through collusion. Either way, market efficiency would be 
supposed to languish.  Pursuant to the notion behind the SCP model, pure competition is the 
sole market structure where the financial institutions competing lack any level of market 
influence.
5
 Genuine monopolists, in contrast, and banks functioning upon conditions of 
oligopoly or monopolistic competition acknowledge their own product decisions can have a 
non-trivial impact on price. The SCP model is based on the notion that the latter group will 
indeed exercise their market influence. Several measures of market structure have been 
conceived and are largely utilized in empirical work. For instance, banks‘ holdings of deposits 
and assets are characteristically used to create measures of concentration in the banking 
industry,
6
 asserted for example as the share of the biggest three or five institutions. Rises in 
concentration ratios are broadly interpreted as indications of elevated consolidation. The 
interpretation given to contractions in a concentration ratio is less forthright. A drop in the 
ratio might echo a drop in the share of the biggest banks, owing possibly to new entrants 
securing some customers. Yet, it could, also, be the situation that consolidation has, indeed, 
increased, but concentrated among smaller banks.
7
 
   
A contestability
8
 approach evaluates competitive conditions not regarding 
concentration but rather concerning the theory of contestable markets that has placed 
importance because easing competitive entry can avert the market power exercise. 
Concentration, among other structural pointers, is not a good substitute for competition in 
financial services.
9
 A market can have a high level of concentration by conventional 
measures, still however be perceived competitive, in the event the existing firms are 
dynamically competing with each other and with likely new entrants. Though financial 
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Intermediation 5, pp 23-38. 
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institutions with market influence may earn rents, they do not need to do so. Even in the 
situation of monopoly, the degree where output can be limited to affect price will depend on 
the level of the existence of obstacles to entry and, more commonly, on the extent of 
‗contestability‘ of that specific market portion. Hence, contrary to the predictions of the SCP 
pattern, more concentrated market structures might still experience appealing results from a 
consumer welfare outlook.
10
 Competition policy, which deals mainly with restricting the 
creation, augmentation and exploitation of market influence, considers clearly this prospect. 
As competition regulators utilize structural measures to carry out an initial examination of 
competition, these measures are solely a first step in considering whether concentration in a 
particular market will form or boost the exercise of market influence. This evaluation needs 
that the existence of entry obstacles, as well as activity limitations and other supply and 





The approach of a price responsiveness to cost shifts can be used to evaluate 
competition in financial services assesses the strength of competition directly, by measuring 
the reactions of prices or outputs to changes in costs. Several studies of banking utilizing the 
so-called H-statistic based on the methodology
12
 that proxies the response of output to input 
prices.
13
  This methodology implements firm-level data. It examines the level where a change 
in factor input prices is echoed in (equilibrium) revenues earned by a particular bank. The 
basic concept is that profit-maximising banks in equilibrium will select quantities and prices 
such that marginal cost matches their apparent marginal revenue. Under ideal competition 
situation, a rise in input prices would increase total revenue and marginal cost by the same 
amount as the increase in costs. For a monopolist, nevertheless, a rise in input prices would 
escalate marginal cost, but lessen equilibrium output and so decrease total revenues.
14
 The 
model renders a measure (the - H-statistic) of the level of competition, with a value of zero or 
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less suggesting a collusive (joint monopoly) result, a value of one implying ideal competition 
situation, and intermediate values suggesting monopolistic competition. Some studies 
utilizing the H-statistic method show no connection between competition and concentration.
15
  
Nevertheless, several studies indicate that such outcomes are inconsistent by misspecification 
issues.
16
 For instance, the H-statistic foists constricting assumptions on financial institutions‘ 
cost operations. Its conclusion that rises in input prices in unsoundly competitive markets 
cause marginal costs and total revenue not to move together is solely valid, in the case the 
concerning sector is in equilibrium. Its distinct measure, also, disregards variances among 
financial institutions such as size, product, size or geographic distinction. Yet, this method is 
gradually utilized in empirical research as it measures banks‘ conduct and so competition 
directly.
17
 The studies centred on indicated models indicate that competition has weakened 
over time, as concentration has increased, meliorating the market influence of big financial 
institutions, and that the existence of abundant small financial institutions does not decrease 
that influence. This latter conclusion could be connected to the fact that small financial 
institutions are unable to compete in the range of sophisticated products, especially, products 
linked to derivatives.
18
   
 
Most of the traditional models or approaches concerning the relationship between 
competition and financial stability assume that financial institutions function in an ideal 
competitive setting or in a monopoly situation.
19
  In both situations, systemic crises or runs 
emerge in equilibrium due to co-ordination failure among depositors or as a balanced reaction 
by depositors to the coming of negative information of banks‘ future solvency.  However, 
some models tackle the relationship between competition and liability risk. Some authors 
examined
20
 this issue in a context
21
 in which financial institutions compete to attract 
depositors, which have diverse prospect distributions over the withdrawal dates.  In the event 
of occurrence of an adverse selection problem, depositors only know their own prospect of 
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withdrawals.  In that situation, may not exist any equilibrium. The equilibrium contract, either 
separating or pooling, is destroyed by the likelihood of financial institutions offering positive 
profit contracts to a particular part of depositors. In that situation, the banking system is not 
stable.
22
 Therefore, competition for deposits makes financial institutions weak in an 
environment of adverse selection issues. Some authors argue that this issue can be resolved by 
suitable regulatory standards, like upper limits on deposit rates.
23
  Competition by itself does 
not necessarily produce instability. Other authors argue that financial institution vulnerability 
to bank runs can emerge, also, independently of competition, and can, thus, ensue in any 
market structure.
24
 This outcome is reached in a model enhanced by bank failures, duopolistic 
product differentiation, and network externalities.
25
 Some authors argue that the distress 
likelihood of a financial institution is decided by depositors‘ anticipations that can be self-
fulfilling, considering the presence of scale economies. A financial institution assumed to be 
safer commands a larger market share and a higher margin that in turn makes it safer due to 
better diversification. The self-fulfilling character of depositors‘ anticipations implies 
manifold equilibriums. Potential equilibriums contain corner solutions in which only one bank 
is active and even equilibriums in which no banks are active. The latter situation is defined as 
a ‗systemic confidence crisis‘ that is due to a co-ordination issue among depositors that arises 
for similar reasons to those met in the network literature, regardless of the level of 
competition in the deposit market. In the model the co-ordination failure can be resolved by 
introducing deposit insurance.
26
 Nevertheless, by warranting that all financial institutions stay 
in business, deposit insurance may impede the achievement of desirable variation and 
encourage intense competition for deposits that in turn escalates the failure probability of 
financial institutions. The net welfare outcomes of deposit insurance are unclear and cannot be 
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Other authors discuss more directly the consequences of bank mergers on the 
competition and liquidity risk in the banking industry.
28
  They create a model in which 
financial institutions compete for loans and participate in interbank lending to deal with 
liquidity shocks on the liability side. The competition consequences of mergers, as determined 
by the degree of post-merger loan rates, depend on the corresponding importance of 
augmented concentration and prospective cost reductions.
29
  Mergers tend to lead to higher 
loan rates, when the market influence outcome dominates, and to lower loan rates 
alternatively. The stability outcomes of mergers, as determined by the likelihood that the 
interbank market experiences to amass liquidity shortages and by the medium size of 
shortages, rely on the liquidity shocks structure, the proportionate cost of retail deposit 
financing as related to interbank refinancing (determining reserve holdings) and the post-
merger distribution of market shares (depending on the competition consequences created by 
mergers). The examination shows numerous situations where a merger elevates competition 




Speaking of the theoretical literature on the consequences of competition, in the 
deposit or loan markets, on banks‘ risk taking conduct, the literature (the so called ‗charter 
value‘) focuses especially on the incentive consequences of high charter values for bank risk 
taking.
31
  In the context of relationship banking, some authors show that augmented 
competition prompts banks to select riskier portfolio approaches.
32
 In relation to the bank‘s 
rapport with their borrowers, banks obtain private information, which produces informational 
rents. As long as banks utilize, at minimum, part of these rents, they are motivated to limit 
their risk vulnerability so as to relish the value of the relationship.
33
 Though, when the 
banking sector becomes more competitive, relationship banking drops in value and banks 
become more risk takers, especially, when deposits are supported by a risky insurance 
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 conclude comparable outcomes in a two-period model where 
financial institutions can amass funding-like reputational advantages and improve their rents 
over costly monitoring.
35
 Other papers address how competition for deposits influences 
financial institutions‘ risk taking and on how suitable regulation can improve the relation 
between competition and disproportionate risk taking. Other authors
36
 tackle the connections 
between competition for deposits, banks‘ risk taking conduct and diverse deposit insurance 
schemes in a model of multidimensional competition in which banks select privately their 
portfolio risk. They indicate that with fixed-rate deposit insurance, improved competition 
surges deposit rates and risk over lower product distinction and lower margins. However, 
when deposit insurance premiums are risk-adjusted, deposit rates and asset risk are lower than 
under a flat-rate pricing arrangement. Consequently, when risk-based deposit insurance 
premiums are applied, banks are compelled to lessen asset risk, so lowering the cost of funds 
and enhancing their comprehensive performance notwithstanding competition on deposits. 
Other authors
37
 look into the relation between imperfect competition in the deposit market, 
banks‘ risk taking and deposit insurance in a model in which banks are prone to limited 
liability and their insolvency entails social costs. One outcome ensues of the model is that in 
the lack of deposit insurance deposit rates are disproportionate (and thus bank asset risk high), 
when the insolvency costs are high and competition acute.
38
 Another outcome is that when 
deposits are insured over a flat rate arrangement, competition prompts to disproportionate 
deposit rates, even without insolvency costs and banks take the utmost asset risk. Deposit 
regulation and investment constraints are required to remove the obstructive consequence of 
competition. In the event deposit insurance premiums are risk adjusted, deposit rates and bank 
asset risk are lower than in an economy without deposit insurance. Nonetheless, both may yet 
be disproportionate, so that it may yet be optimum to introduce deposit regulations. The 
rapport between competition for deposits, excessive risk taking, and regulation is, also, 
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examined by some authors
39
 in a dynamic context in which banks select privately their asset 
risk and compete for deposits.  In step with the charter value literature, competition wears 
down profits and consequently makes banks to risk in their investments. A likely alternative to 
reinstate prudent bank conduct is to introduce capital requirements. Yet, in an active 
environment, they emerged to be an inept policy.
40
  As long as deposit rates can be freely 
established, in an active condition, banks are incentivised to increase them in order to grow 
their deposit base and profit a higher margin from risking (market-stealing effect).  Adding 
deposit rate controls as a regulatory instrument permits optimal results in this model. By 
augmenting charter values, deposit rate controls avert the market-stealing outcome, therefore 
increasing augmenting banks‘ incentives to conduct pragmatically. A different regulatory 
mechanism to form charter value and control banks‘ risk taking in competitive markets is 
examined by some authors.
41
 They created a duopolistic model in which banks compete in the 
deposit market and can invest in sensible or speculative lending. If a bank becomes insolvent, 
the regulator has to determine whether to wind up the failing bank or to merge it with another 
financial institution, which can be an incumbent or a new entrant. Either a rescue or entry 
merger policies entail a balance between competition and stability. By lessening competition 
and augmenting charter value, a rescue merger concerns monopoly inefficiency and prudent 
bank conduct, as well.
42
  In contrast, entry merger entails more efficiency, but riskier bank 
conduct.  The ideal policy mechanism is a blend of active rescues ensued by entry. This 
causes ex ante motivations for financial institutions to stay solvent to takeover failing banks, 
while confining the ex post market influence, which surviving institutions receive due to the 
rescue. Hence, the implementation of dynamic merger policy and temporary entry constraints 
can advocate stability.
43
 However, not all papers find a positive connection between 
competition and risk taking. In a model where banks compete for loans and can utilize costly 
monitoring or credit rationing to cope with a moral hazard issue on the part of the 
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 argue that a monopoly bank may confront a higher risk of 
collapse than a competitive bank. The concept is that a monopoly bank utilizes more 
monitoring and less credit rationing, while dealing with the borrower‘s moral hazard issue. 
This could prompt a monopoly bank to lend more monies than competitive institutions and 
consort to a higher likelihood of failure, due to the fact that loans are prone to multiplicative 





While most papers conclude for some balance between bank competition and stability, 
the assertion they are commonly negatively pertinent is not essentially potent.
46
 There are 
situations where raised loan competition decreases asset risk-taking or rises the capability of 
the interbank market to insure counter to liquidity shocks. Although ill-designed policies may 
produce or bolster a balance between competition and stability in banking, such as static 
capital requirements, risk insensitive deposit insurance, theory advocates there are policy 
alternatives that would ensure competitive and unwavering banking systems, such as mixed 




Competition v public interest 
 
Besides helping attain sustainable development goals, like poverty relief (decreasing prices 
and raising consumer election) and economic progress (forming enterprise rivalry and 
encouraging productivity),
48
 a solid competition policy structure can, also, specifically seek 
public interest objectives.  These objectives may often conflict with the essential competition 
objective: a public interest test may allow an anti-competitive merger or limiting trade 
practice to ensue or a pro-competitive merger or trade practice to be remedied or barred, to 
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serve the public interest.
49
  Most of competition watchdogs do not typically look at elements 
that go past the essence of competition goals.
50
  Competition regulators that consider public 
interest factors normally implement them narrowly.
51
  Public interest considerations sustain 
more importance in emerging economies
52
 and accordingly, such economies tend to utilize 
public interest considerations more.
53
  The argument whether or not to contain the notion of 
public interest in competition law is under way.
54
  Public interest objectives are mostly broad 
and hence challenging to define and implement in an independent, clear and steady manner. 
Their inclusion consequently forms risks of legal ambiguity and unpredictability in the 
application of competition law. Many authors argue that public policy issues such as 
preserving the financial stability can be undertaken better by sectoral regulation
55
 or direct 
policies
56
.  Integrating the analysis of public interest considerations in merger control might 
cripple the basic competition assessment in mergers, accordingly impairing the broad ‗public 
interest‘ that competition policy intends to uphold.
57
  Commentators who argue in support of 
competition law and policy going further than the crux competition objective indicate that 
competition cannot exist in a vacuity.
58
 Competition regulators are responsible to 
governments that seek policies in addition to the furtherance of market competition.
59
  The 
comprisal of non-competition criteria permits countries to project their competition law to suit 
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 and may also, in some instances, improve the standing of the 
competition watchdog.
61
  There are no impact analysis of the consequences of competition 
enforcement decisions based only on public interest basis, most likely due to methodological 
snags, like the failure of transparent and comparable results and assumptions.  Hereafter, 
whether the comprisal of public interest objectives in competition laws counterbalances anti-
competitive outcomes in the market has not been analysed provisionally.
62
  Maintaining the 
suitable right trade-off between competition and public interest criteria is not always easy; the 
analysis of the same merger on the grounds of both competition standards, and the public 
interest that contains socio-economic and political considerations,
63
 may not always achieve 
the same outcomes.  This may trigger to an anti-competitive merger being approved, or a pro-
competitive merger being barred on public interest basis.
64
  The research shows there are more 
instances of public interest basis ensuing from an anti-competitive merger being approved 
than of a merger approved by the competition watchdog being forbidden.  In the specific 
competence model, the proper authorities might encounter an arduous trade off exercise in 
weighing public interest benchmark against competition associated components.
65
  Public 
policy goals may be inclusive, diverse and alter over time that makes the interpretation of 
public interest provisions challenging.  Such provisions are occasionally relied on in 
foreseeable conditions such as a financial crisis that makes it even harder to interpret and 
apply them.
66
  Obviously identified and articulated provisions
67
 may help predictability and 
transparency of their interpretation.  Also, the interpretation of public interest provisions can 
be made more objective, clear and foreseeable over soft law documents (guidance, notes, 
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  Also, to permit judicial review of decisions, their reasoning and the interpretation of 
public interest in the precise case requires to be actual, comprehensive and in writing.  
Competition watchdogs mostly pursue a progressive way in merger control, meaning that 
analysis aim to decide the prospective consequence of a merger on competition in the medium 
to long term.  Merger examinations based on public interest basis usually reflect present 
public policy considerations, and might pursue to remedy short-term issues.  An intervention 
that may seem a good resolution in the short term could result in harmful effects for consumer 
welfare and competition in the long term.  Mergers that lead to very concentrated markets 
especially are nearly unattainable to reverse.
69
  The trade-off between short-term gains and the 
long-term benefits of nourishing competitive markets is not easy.
70
  Merger specificity is a 
standard of merger control enforcement, which needs an adequate casual connection between 
the merger and its asserted consequence before a competition regulator intervenes.  
Questionably, public interest considerations should, also, be merger-specific, which is the 
situation in which a merger is blocked or cleared on public interest basis, these bases require 
to be soundly connected to the plausible consequences of the specific merger
71
  Nevertheless, 
when implementing public interest provisions, pertinent authorities may tackle policy goals 
surpassing the specific merger. 
 
Even if public interest considerations are surely characterized, not all circumstances 
where public interest is called upon can be covered by law or soft law, the role of competition 
law in situations of financial crises demonstrates there have been arguments for holding off 
competition rules for span of the crisis.
72
   
 
Pursuant to the theoretical survey, the notion that competition is something perilous in 
the banking industry, since it normally creates instability can be dismissed. In view of the 
significance of the market setting for the prosperity of industrial countries, competition 
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aspects are required to be cautiously considered, also in banking. One implication is that there 
should be well-defined measures of the respective roles of supervisory and competition 
regulators. The empirical and theoretical literature suggest that the stability effects of changes 
in market structures and competition are particularly case-dependent. It seems that there is 




The theoretical literature does not appear to be irrefutable on the rapport between 
competition and stability.
74
 Theories of bank runs and systemic risk essentially neglect the 
effects of different bank market structures for the safety of the industry.
75
 Theories based on 
the notion of ‗charter value‘ assert that market influence alleviates bank risk taking, since high 
margins act as a shield against portfolio risk and increase the cost of bankruptcy. 
Nevertheless, a more recent literature indicates that stronger competition does not inevitably 
impairs stability.
76
  In relation to bank liability side risk, it argues that coordination issues 
among depositors triggering bank fragility can surface independently of competition. Also, it 
demonstrates that some bank mergers can make liquidity shortages in the interbank market 
more possible. Concerning asset side risk, it argues that there can be situations where a 
concentrated banking industry would be riskier than a competitive industry. Finally, it is also 
indicated that some policies, like risk-adjusted deposit insurance premiums, could alleviate 




Explicit features of financial intermediation, like switching costs in retail banking, 
information unevenness in corporate borrowing, or network externalities in payment systems, 
take the banking sector outside the regular structure-conduct-performance pattern.
78
 In 
addition, the structure and concentration undertakings do not measure correctly competition 
among banks. Competition in banking is characteristically imperfect and many obstacles to 
entry could generate rents. In retail banking, switching costs for customers are quite essential, 
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and reputation and branch networks act as entry obstacles. In corporate banking created 
uneven information and lending relationships offer banks some market power in relation to 
firms and investors.
79
 Stability and competition can exist side-by-side in the banking sector.  
Competition makes the banking sector more effective and ensures that stimulus and rescue 
packages advantage final consumers. The results of the analytical studies connecting 
competition and stability are vague, though.
80
 Structural and non-structural undertakings of 
competition are deemed to be both positively and negatively affiliated with financial stability, 
depending on the country and the sample assessed and the measure of financial stability 
utilized. In the final assessment, the blueprint of financial regulation matters, at minimum, 




           The concept of a simple negative balance is, again, too simple: often competition 
reduces stability and often perfect competition is harmonious with the socially ideal level of 
stability. 
 
2.1    Competition Act 1998 
 
The Competition Act 1998 (‗CA98‘)
82
 is currently the most important UK statute in the area 
of competition law across all sectors of the economy, including the banking and financial 
services sector, other than the Enterprise Act 2002
83
.  The CA98 creates a new system of 
regulation in order to identify and deal with restrictive business practices and abuse of a 
dominant market position. Synchronization of the CA98 and EU competition approach is 
demonstrated by the content of the CA98. For example, chapters I and II of the CA98 
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The CA98 regulates restricted methods or practices by banks in the UK that damage, 
limit or destroy a competitive environment in the financial system. These practices mainly 
take the form of horizontal agreements, being arrangements contrived between businesses 
(like financial institutions) providing the same services (for example, wholesale or retailer 
banking operations). The purpose of a horizontal agreement varies.  It could be created to curb 
output, fix prices, share deceitful information, make joint offers, or surreptitiously divide 
markets. 
 
The Financial Conduct Authority (‗FCA‘)
85
, as the Governmental watchdog for 
competition issues in the financial services sector, concurrently with the Competition and 
Markets Authority (‗CMA‘),
86 
is authorized to take necessary actions to prevent banks, other 
financial institutions and businesses in other industries in the UK from carrying out these 
activities.
87
   
 
The CA98 addresses situations of financial institution dominant position abuse 
involving the following types of method or practice: predatory pricing, refusals to supply, 
discriminatory pricing and vertical restraints to boost profit, exorbitant pricing, obtaining 
competitive advantage or otherwise restricting competition. 
 
The CA98 includes two prohibitive provisions, under chapters I and II. The chapter I 
prohibition relates to agreements between financial institutions (or other businesses), which 
prevent, restrict or distort competition in the UK to a considerable degree.
88
  The chapter II 




                                                                                                                                                                             
Competition Act: A New Era for UK Competition Law (Oxford: Hart 2000), pp 26-36; For a discussion of the 
enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in bank mergers, see, also, chapter 2.10 in this thesis, pp 31-47. 
85
 For a discussion of the role of the Financial Conduct Authority, see chapter 3.2.2 in this thesis, pp 62-3. 
86
 For a discussion of the role of the Competition and Markets Authority, see chapter 3.1.1 in this thesis, pp 51-7. 
87
 The Financial Conduct Authority can acquire concurrent functions under Part 1 of the Competition Act 1998, 
so the powers will be exercisable by both the Financial Conduct Authority and the Competition and Markets 
Authority. However, the Competition and Markets Authority is the principal enforcer for the purposes of ss 211 
and 212 of the Enterprise Act 2002 pursuant to the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013.   
88
 CA98 (n1) s 2. 
89
 Ibid, s 18. 
25 
 
In the vast majority of cases, whether the provisions of the CA98 or TFEU apply to 
competition aspects of banking mergers is of little practical consequence because the 
substantive provisions are broadly the same.  
 
2.2   Cruickshank report 
 
Significant competition law-based scrutiny has been applied to the UK banking industry due, 
in part, to its reputation with politicians and consumers.  Following this pattern of scrutiny, in 
1998, the UK Treasury began an assessment of competition aspects of the banking industry.  In 
2000, this review process culminated in a published report entitled ‗Competition in UK 
Banking‘, by Sir Don Cruickshank (the ‗Cruickshank Report‘).
90
     
 
The Cruickshank Report noted that banks were making substantially more money than 
their capital costs.
91
  In the event that such a trend continued for any length of time, customers 
were bound to pay banks considerably higher prices than what the banks were paying the 
customers in exchange for the banking services and products provided by the banks.
92
  The 
report highlighted that both personal customers and small and medium-sized enterprises 




The Cruickshank Report indicated that the banks‘ costs to service their customers were 
likely to decrease in the near term.
94
 This would occur due to excessive profit absorption.  
However, if profits in the short to medium term were not excessive, the report noted that costs 
to service customers would drop further.
95
 The Cruickshank Report, also, outlined a series of 
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 in the banking and financial market; finding such market to be largely concentrated 




 In addition, the Cruickshank Report noted that banks provided insufficient information 
to individual as well as SME customers about their bank accounts‘ rights and restrictions.
98
 
The report, further, indicated that banks‘ customers experienced substantial difficulties in 
transferring their current accounts between banks.
99
   
 
The Cruickshank Report, also, highlighted that financial institutions were in full 
domination of money transmission services.
100
 As a result, this created entry impediments for 
smaller banks and financial institutions, imposition of high charges and unsatisfactory level of 
services in money transmission and related banking services. Furthermore, this also 




The Cruickshank Report, also, stressed that the money payment systems in the British 
banking system would require thorough modernisation and restructuring.
102
 In addition, it 
noted concerns regarding the applicability of competition law to banking services for SMEs. 
However, the banking services market for personal customers appeared to be relatively 
competitive.
103
   
 
The Report, in the end, recommended an inquiry into the competitiveness of the entire 
banking and financial market in respect of the flow-in of banking services from payment 




2.3 Enterprise Act 2002 
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In the early 2000s, the Enterprise Act 2002 (‗EA02‘)
105
 was enacted as part of an ambitious 
plan to bring UK competition law further into line with EU competition law.
106
 The EA02 
transformed British merger control provisions, improved enforcement procedures applying to 
restrictive agreements, and introduced de novo measures regarding market review processes.
107
   
 
 The EA02 included three distinctive and significant developments in relation to merger 
control, namely elimination of the political impact of merger determinations, a significant 




The EA02 regulates competition aspects not only in banking and financial system, but 
also in other sectors of the economy. Due to its important role in the economy, bank merger 
control has been vulnerable to political pressure. Pursuant to the merger provisions of the 
EA02, the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills (‗SoS‘)
109
 has final decision-
making power as to whether a merger is approved following primary assessment or is to be 
handed over to the British competition authority to carry out a thorough examination.
110
  Prior 
to the EA02, the relevant competition authorities were originally the Office of Fair Trading 
(‗OFT‘) and the Competition Commission (‗CC‘).
111
  However, following certain legislative 
amendments introduced in 2013, and effective from 2014, the OFT and the CC were replaced 
by one competition authority named the Competition and Markets Authority (‗CMA‘), which 
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The EA02 created a new competition-related test for the analysis of merger situations, 
known as the ‗substantial lessening of competition‘ (‗SLC‘) test.
113
 The SLC applies a public 
interest standard so that a bank merger will not be approved where it is shown that the 
proposed merger could operate contrary to the public interest in preserving UK ‗financial 
stability‘.
114
   
 
The EA02 deals with two specific kinds of merger case. Firstly, those that contain 
public interest considerations, such as, financial stability related institutions, defence-based 
businesses, mass-media businesses, water entities, sewerage businesses, and ‗special merger 
situation‘ relating to British government contractors.
115
  The second type of merger situations 





In addition, a number of legislative and administrative provisions include specific 
‗carve outs‘ in order to facilitate mergers and takeovers in particular sectors of the economy, 
such as banking and financial sector, or in specific defined situations, such as preservation of 




 The enactment of the EA02 added considerable ‗teeth‘ to competition regulation of 
mergers in the UK, such as rooting out forms of anti-competitive behaviour,
118
 and redressing 
injured parties in distortions of competition.
119
  Although more requires to be done to 
ameliorate enforcement of this legislation,
120




2.4 Report on banking services for SMEs   
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Early in 2002, the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills (‗SoS‘) and the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer presented a report entitled, ‗The Supply of Banking Services by 
Clearing Banks to Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises‘ (the ‗Competition Commission 
Report‘) to the UK Parliament.
122
 The Report was part of a broader investigation into the 
supply of banking services to small and medium-sized enterprises (‗SMEs‘) by banks. 
 
The Competition Commission Report‘s analysis of banking services included business 
current accounts, short-term bank deposit accounts, overdraft facilities, commercial lending to 




Markets appeared to be defined by an unwillingness of SMEs to switch banks, the 
reasons for which included the apparent difficulty of switching banks for small financial 
rewards, the recognized importance of retaining relationships with a specific bank or bank 
manager, and the tendency of banks to offer lower charges in the event of a possible customer 
banking provider switch.
124
   
 
The Report also noted confusion regarding access to, and the rate of, overdraft 




The Competition Commission Report identified a series of particular practices that 
limited or altered price competition.
126
 For instance, there was a similarity in the pricing 
structures of the clearing banks, including interest free current accounts, distinctions in costs 
applied by the clearing financial institutions, with free banking broadly limited to particular 
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 The Report identified obstacles to entry for new players and for access of liquidity and 
commercial lending markets.
128
 In part, this resulted in reduced and misuse of price 




In relation to prices set by the clearing financial institutions for SMEs, the Report 
analysed the general range of disproportionate prices and profits related to services for the 
SMEs.
130
 The ratio of SME‘s deposits to business lending deposits increased so that these 
categories were at the same level overall. The Report did not clearly connect extra charging 
for banking services to SME customers and the lack of banking services competitiveness.
131
   
 
            Although the Report noted the disproportionate prices and profits of the largest 
clearing financial institutions rendering banking services to SME customers, it found that this 
did not create a contrary effect on the conditions upon which banks lend funds to their 
business customers.
132
 However, the Report found no reason for the clearing institutions to 
raise money transfer prices or lending interest rates, or decrease loans to SME customers.
133
   
 
Finally, the Report directed that after implementation of its recommendations were 
completed,
134
 the competition authority would assess, if additional undertakings were 




2.5   Vickers’ Report and the government’s response 
 
After the Global Financial Crisis (‗GFC‘), the British banking authorities revisited oversight 
of banking activities, including the need for further required modifications to the current 
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banking and financial system. The financial downturn reinforced the already existing need for 




In 2010, the UK Government announced a review of the banking system with the 
objective of producing a proposal to reform the supervisory structure of the British financial 
services industry.
137
  As a result, an independent commission, under the chairmanship of Sir 
John Vickers, on the banking sector was formed to look at the structure of banking industry, 
the level of competition in the banking sector, and how consumers could obtain improved 
services for reduced costs.
138
  The result of this review was the publication of a final report by 




The Vickers‘ Report concentrated broadly on questions regarding the ring fencing of 
retail banking, being the division between investment banking, on one hand, and lending 




The Report proposed that structural reform could end the regulation of banking under 
one unified system, and instead introduced distinct regimes for retail banking and investment 
and wholesale banking, with each service being provided by different financial institutions.
141
  
The policy objective for this suggested course of action was to separate retail banking services 
and individual consumers from the more hazardous wholesale banking sector.
142
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The Report, also, found
143
 that systematically significant financial institutions would 
need to maintain at least a 10 per cent equity capital buffer to safeguard against losses, and 
they should have a primary loss-absorbing capacity of at least 17 to 20 per cent.
144
 In this 
regard, banks are required much more equity capital, and their debt must be capable of 




In relation to the structural cornerstone of access to capital, the Vickers‘ Report saw 
strong reasons for ring-fencing domestic retail banking.
146
 This approach requires global 
financial institutions to hold an adequate retail capital ratio.
147
  These institutions would not 
hold less than the capital that they require to underwrite their UK retail banking operations in 
the UK. The public interest consideration and desire to reduce risk should be considered along 




As for the issue of competition in banking, the Vickers‘ Report saw the need for 
reform across the banking system.
149
  Measures to curtail implicit state guarantees, enjoyed by 
‗systematically important financial institutions‘ (‗SIFIs‘),
150
 are good for competition and 
financial stability, in terms of ensuring that these organizations face the consequences of risk-
taking activities.
151
  However, further measures were required to address the crippling of 
competition in the British retail-banking sector following the GFC.
152
 In its findings, the 
Vickers‘ Report made three ambitious proposals beyond the continued application of broad 
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One proposal related to structural undertakings to advance competition.
154
  Despite the 
fact that merging banks are required to dispose of assets and liabilities to meet public financial 
assistance approval criteria, such action would result in reduced competition if this situation 




The second proposal concerned competition among banks.
156
 Such competition 
dynamics are damaged because of present and recognized problems experienced by customers 
in switching their current accounts, together with associated hardships.
157
 In addition, the 
Vickers‘ Report noted broader unsatisfactory situations regarding consumers‘ alternatives to 
changing banking service providers, and cumbersome barriers to entry for customers seeking 
to use the services of smaller banks.
158
 The Vickers‘ Report recommended presentation of 
mechanisms to significantly improve bank account switching and associated cost competition. 
In this respect, for making simpler for consumers to switch bank accounts, the independent 
commission recommended introduction of a free current account redirection service.
159
 This 
would include determining a time limit of seven working days for transferring an account and 
ensuring that all direct debits and payments are automatically redirected to the customer‘s new 
account.
160
 British banks and building societies have already started to implement the 




The final proposal was to create a strong and pro-competitive institution, namely the 
Financial Conduct Authority.
162
 This was motivated by a part of the Government‘s reforms of 
the regulatory architecture as potentially a vital spur to competition in banking.  The Vickers‘ 
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 Ibid, p 17; see, also, S Goff and L Warwick-Ching, ‗Banks Set to Launch Seven-Day Account-Switching 
Service‘ (16 August, 2013) Financial Times. 
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 Vickers‘ Report (n58), pp 16, 24-42, and 227.  Subsequently, the Financial Conduct Authority (‗FCA‘) came 
into effect on 1 April, 2013. For a discussion about the FCA, see chapter 3.2.2 in this thesis, pp 62-3. 
163
 Vickers‘ Report (n58), p 241. 
34 
 
The Vickers‘ Report concluded that the ‗too-big-too-fail‘ (‗TBTF‘) participants in the 
UK banking system should not be looked at as giving rise to issues that were too delicate to 
reform.
164
  Such issues should be tackled through the implementation of provisions to ensure 
financial stability, and by harmonizing domestic law with the European Union legislation and 




 The Government responded to the Vickers‘ Report by supporting the report‘s 
proposals in large part.
166 
While accepting that big retail banks would be required to retain 
equity capital of at least 10 per cent of risk weighted assets as well as absorb the possibility of 
losses of approximately 17 per cent, the Government, in its response to the Vickers‘ Report, 
noted
167
 that adjustments to these numbers could be made for financial institutions with 
sizable international operations that would not present a risk to British banking and financial 




In relation to depositors‘ banking choices and improvement of competition in this area, 
while the Government backed further convenience for the seven-day bank accounts switching 
between financial institutions,
169
 it disagreed with the Vickers‘ Report‘s findings on the 
divestment of branches from Lloyds Banking Group (‗Lloyds‘) that should exceed 
requirements set under the EU State aid rule.
170
 As a matter of fact, in 2013 the Government 
directed the then Office of Fair Trading (‗OFT‘) to review the impact of divestment of 
branches from Lloyds and Royal Bank of Scotland (‗RBS‘), respectively, in the competition 
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 Ibid, chs 4.6 - 4.9; see, also, TFEU (n3), art 107; Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March, 1999 
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Regulation‘), as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 1791/2006 of 20 November, 2006, OJ L 363, 
20.12.2006, p 1 and the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of 
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adjustments of the Treaties on which the European Union is founded, OJ L 236, 23.9.2003, p 33; see, further, T 
Edmonds, ‗The Independent Commission on Banking: The Vickers‘ Report‘ (30 December, 2013) House of 









The Government agreed with the findings from the then OFT
172
 that detailed 
arrangements for Lloyds and RBS are scrutinised to ensure that they would not hamper any 
future mergers, acquisitions or other strategic developments.
173
  Steps must be taken to ensure 
that the arrangements do not allow these banks to influence the divested branches‘ 
competitive behaviour, facilitate the coordination of the behaviour between each of these 
banks and their respective divested branches or render the divested branches vulnerable to 
poor quality of service.
174
 Measures to be taken to strengthen the divested operations 
financially with the objective of providing it with a higher income to enable it to invest and 
grow into its branch network and to allow it to compete more vigorously in retail banking.
175
  
The OFT determined that the sell-off of the branches from Lloyds and RBS appeared in 
compliance with the EU rules on the State aid, and they did not impede the competition in 




2.6 HM Treasury blueprint report  
 
The Government formulated its response to the recommendations of the Vickers‘ Report into 
the HM Treasury Blueprint Report of 2011 (‗Treasury Report‘).
177
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 C Maxwell, ‗Letter from Clive Maxwell CBE, the Chief Executive of the OFT to the Rt Hon George Osborne 
MP Chancellor of the Exchequer‘ (September, 2013) (‗OFT‘s Recommendations of LBG/RBS Divestments, to 




 HM Treasury, ‗A New Approach to Financial Regulation: The Blueprint for Reform‘ (2011) Cm 8083 




The Treasury Report called for amendments to the Financial Services and Markets Act 
of 2000 in order for the Government to implement the reform programme of the financial 
services.
178
 A large proportion of the Treasury Report related to the new draft Financial 
Services Bill and explanatory notes.
179
  The Report indicated the plans from the Government 
to reform the UK banking and financial system by establishing a macro prudential regulator, 
the Financial Policy Committee (‗FPC‘) within the Bank of England (‗BoE‘).
180
  This would 
monitor responses to systemic risks.
181
  The report, also, supported the transfer of 
responsibility for prudential regulation to a new regulatory body, the Prudential Regulation 
Authority (‗PRA‘);
182
 and creation of a focused conduct of business regulator, the Financial 
Conduct Authority (‗FCA‘).
183
  In relation to competition powers, the Government remained 
committed to ensuring that the new regulating system included ‗competition‘ as an important 
feature.
184
  The Government proposed that the FCA sustain the power to initiate and enhance 
referral to the Competition and Markets Authority (‗CMA‘), where it had identified a possible 
competition issue that may benefit from technical competition expertise or require recourse to 




In addition to the Treasury Report, the Government published a series of papers 
concerning issues within the Vickers‘ Report‘s findings.
186
  For instance, two significant 
papers on the competition aspects of British banking were: (i) the Competition and Choice in 




 Ibid, ch 3 (Draft Financial Services Bill, pt 2). 
179
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 Ibid, paras 1.25 - 1.30; and 2.6 - 2.44. 
181
 Ibid, para 1.28. 
182
 Ibid, paras 1.31 - 1.38; and 2.45 - 2.78. 
183
 Ibid, paras 1.39 - 1.44; and 2.79 - 2.110. 
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 For example, HM Treasury, ‗Statement by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the Publication of the 
Independent Commission on Banking Report‘ (12 September, 2011)  London, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/statement-by-the-chancellor-of-the-exchequer-rt-hon-george-osborne-
mp-on-the-publication-of-the-independent-commission-on-banking-report; see, also, HM Treasury, ‗Banking 





Retail Banking report of 2011 (‗Retail Banking Report‘),
187
 and, earlier, (ii) the 2010 report 




The Retail Banking Report acknowledged that banking system in the UK was not 
highly competitive, a reality exacerbated by the imposed consolidations following the Global 
Financial Crisis (‗GFC‘).
189
 The Report, also, noted alternatives to enhance competition, 
particularly highlighting that, supporting new bank participants was important in achieving 
this objective.
190
   
 
The Retail Banking Report looked at the long and short term effects of the divesture of 
large banks.  It found that in the short term, disposal of these banks‘ assets and liabilities in an 
unorganized market could likely carry a higher financial return.
191
  Nevertheless, in the longer 
term, a more vibrant and competitive market, with a larger number of participants, could boost 
economic development.
192
   
 
The 2010 TBTF Report dealt with the role of large and disproportionately significant 
banks in preserving stability of the financial system and competition in the banking system.
193
 
The Report indicated that the GFC has significantly reduced the number of banks and building 
societies operating within the UK.
194
  Effective competition will be inhibited for as long as 
incumbent financial institutions are ‗too big or too important to fail‘.
195
  That is yet another 
reason why the financial system must be reformed, as quickly as practicable, to ensure that 
financial institutions are, like the rest of the economy, properly subject to the discipline of the 
market place.
196
 In the end, the 2010 Report failed to make any concrete findings on this 
point.   
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As for the HM Treasury Report,
197
 this found that any prospective reform initiatives 
would have to meet certain criteria.
198
 Retail and investment banks need to be permitted to 
operate freely and without impacting the soundness of the banking system.
199
 The failure of 
any bank ought to be handled without creating a financial burden on British consumers.
200
   
 
Overall, the Treasury Report endorsed the Vickers‘ Report‘s recommendation 
regarding the critical role of competition in banking, the enhancement of consumer banking 
services, and driving down the cost of these services.
201
 It can be said that the Treasury Report 
was a positive step towards the Government‘s forthcoming initiatives for addressing 
competition issues in the UK financial regulatory architecture. 
 
2.7 Financial Services Act 2012 
 
The Financial Services Act 2012 (‗FSA 2012‘)
202
 established new banking and financial 
regulation architecture with formation of new regulators, namely the Financial Conduct 
Authority (‗FCA‘)
203
 and the Prudential Regulation Authority (‗PRA‘)
204
, and gave the Bank 
of England complete responsibility for financial stability.
205
  This delegated responsibility was 





The FSA 2012 achieved other ends beyond the creation of these supervisory 
institutions. The Act introduced changes to the law relating to market manipulation and 
misleading statements, both intentionally and recklessly.
207 
This was achieved through 
amendment of various sections of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.
208
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The FSA 2012, among other developments, modernized and expanded the reach of the 
law on proper regulation of the financial market and enhanced disclosure procedures and due 
diligence processes in the financial sector.
209
 Furthermore, the FSA 2012 expanded the range 
of the special resolution regime, under the Banking Act 2009,
210
 to certain UK investment 
firms, related companies to UK banks and investments banks and UK clearing houses
211
, 
established a new platform for regulated activity in connection with credit rating agencies and 
their rating parameters
212
, and transferred responsibility for consumer credit to the newly 




Overall, the FSA 2012 provided a further important contribution to improving 




2.8  Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 
 
On 18 December, 2013 the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 (the ‗Banking 
Reform Act 2013‘) was enacted.
215
 This essential legislation brings into law requirements for 




These reforms include: (i) the introduction of a retail ‗ring-fence‘ for banks;
217
 (ii) a 
preference for certain depositors on insolvency;
218
 (iii) a new bail-in tool;
219
 (iv) a new 
licensing regime;
220
 (v) a new payment systems regulator;
221
 and (vi) a cap on the cost of 
payday loans.
222
  The provisions in the Banking Reform Act 2013 are due to come in to force 
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on different dates from the time when the Act was enacted, until 1 January, 2019.
223
  
Following the enactment of the Act, a series of secondary legislation has been published,
224
 
and more secondary legislation is to come,
225
 which are aimed to clarify certain aspects of the 
Banking Reform Act 2013.
226
  As a result, it is too early to determine effect of the Act 
towards the enhancement of competition in banking sector. 
 
2.9 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 
 
The competition provisions of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act of 2013 
(‗ERRA13‘) entered into force on 1st April, 2014.
227
  The ERRA13 made changes to the 
EA02, considerably modifying the way cartel offences are scrutinized and prosecuted, as well 
as creating a much easier way to criminally prosecute the individuals involved.
228
  
Additionally, the ERRA13 eliminated both the Office of Fair Trading (‗OFT‘) and the 
Competition Commission (‗CC‘),
229
 creating the Competition and Markets Authority 




 Unlike the requirement under the ERRA13, the prosecution no longer requires 
evidence of ‗dishonesty‘ to secure a conviction in the case of a business or person deliberately 
participating in any type of criminal cartel agreement, including price fixing, market sharing, 
restrictions on production or supply, and bid rigging agreements.
231
  This change introduced 
by the ERRA13 is expected to substantially diminish the prosecutorial burden, and, therefore, 
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 Implementation of the ERRA13‘s provisions will be challenging for large financial 
institutions, and other businesses in the economy, requiring review and amendment of their 
internal policies and practices.  
 
2.10 Banking markets investigation  
 
One of the most recent initiatives implemented by the Competition and Markets Authority 
(‗CMA‘) to enhance competition in the banking business is the CMA 2014 - 2016 
investigation into personal current accounts and SMEs banking.
233
   
 
The CMA published its final report on this investigation in the summer 2016.
234
 The 
investigation focused on three important issues
235
, namely, hurdles of blocking customers 
from shopping around and switching current accounts; the dominance of the big financial 
institutions; and the problems of new banks aiming to enter the market.
236
  CMA found that a 
combination of low customer interaction, obstacles to search and switch accounts, and the big 
banks‘ benefits in providing accounts leads to an ‗adverse effect on competition‘.
237
  The 
CMA recommended numerous potential remedies, such as, forcing banks to prompt customers 
to consider switching to a rival on particular situations; financial institutions need to increase 
the profile of the current account switching service in order to aid customers to move bank; 
undertakings to establish a price comparison site for small business bank accounts.
238
  The 




 Competition and Markets Authority, ‗Retail banking market investigation: Summary of provisional findings 
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CMA aimed to ensure customers advantages from digital services and that new banks would 




Critics of the foregoing CMA‘s investigation report questioned whether the new 
measures under the report were enough to establish reform in retail banking.
240
  Nevertheless, 
the jury is out as to whether the remedies provided under the final report will be sufficient to 
enhance retail banking in the UK. 
 
2.11 EU competition legislation on bank mergers 
 
From time to time, British banks contemplate mergers with banks located within the European 
Union in order to add or enlarge their present banking operations.  Since the UK is a member 
of the European Union, in the case of an EU related bank merger involving a British bank, 
such a transaction would be considered as a merger within EU Member State competition 
legislation (e.g., UK) or the European Union competition provisions.  Therefore, a discussion 
of the present EU competition legislation affecting bank mergers is outlined, below. 
 
 Similar to applicability of the UK competition laws, the EU antitrust legislation 
regulates not only activities in the banking and financial services sector, but also in other 
sectors of the European economy. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this thesis, discussion of 




At the European Union level, the 1958 Treaty Establishing the European Economic 
Community (‗EEC Treaty‘)
241
 introduced pioneering standards and guidelines regarding 
concentration issues for business markets across the EU economies.
242
  In fact, the Treaty laid 
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the foundations of competition policies pursuant to the Treaty on European Union (‗TEU‘)
243
 
and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‗TFEU‘).
244
   
 
Presently, Articles 101-109 TFEU compose the legal basis of EU competition law.
245
   
 
Article 101 TFEU prohibits agreements between two or more independent market 
operators that restrict competition.
246
 This provision covers both horizontal agreements 
(namely an agreement between present or potential competitors operating at the same level of 
the supply chain), and vertical agreements (namely an agreement between businesses 
operating at different levels).
247
 Only limited exceptions are provided for in the general 
prohibition.
248
 The most blatant instance of unlawful conduct infringing Article 101 is the 





Article 102 TFEU forbids businesses like financial institutions, which sustain a 
‗dominant position‘ on a given market to abuse that position, for instance, by charging unfair 





The legal definition of a ‗dominant position‘ has been established by the European 
Court of Justice (‗ECJ‘) as: 
 
a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to hinder 
the maintenance of effective competition on the relevant market by allowing it to 
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Article 107 TFEU prohibits State aid that distorts or threatens to distort competition by 
favouring certain businesses or products that affect trade between Member States and are 




The Commission is empowered by the Treaty to apply these foregoing provisions,
253
 
and it has a number of investigative powers to that end, for example, inspection at business 
and non-business premises, written requests for information.
254
 The Commission may, also, 




Notwithstanding the foregoing consolidation of the competition rules in the Treaties, 




2.11.2 Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (the EU Merger Regulation)  
 
The bank merger control process in the EU is laid out in the EC Merger Regulation 
(‗ECMR‘)
257
 and its implementing regulation
258
, which has been in force from May, 2004.
259
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The ECMR contains the main rules for the assessment of concentrations,
260
 while the 
implementing regulation deals with procedural issues, such as, notification, deadlines, and 




The enactment of ECMR was accompanied, and followed, by a series of notices and 
guidelines concerning control of concentrations between undertakings,
262
 treatment of certain 
concentrations,
263
 case referral in respect of concentrations,
264
 definition of the relevant 
market for the purposes of Community competition law,
265
 assessment of horizontal 
mergers,
266




 restrictions to concentrations,
269
 and 
rules for access to the Commission file in competition related cases.
270
   
 
Broadly speaking, these foregoing notices and guidelines set out thorough information 
and clarification on the merger application situations notified by the merging parties to the 
Commission.
271
  In addition, they clarify the EU competition law and contributions to legal 
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 In addition to notices and guidelines, the Commission publishes ‗Best Practice 
Guidelines‘
273
 that help in better understanding and simplifying information and 
communication between case team and parties/third parties in every step of the merger 




The ECMR‘s goal is to review and regulate bank (or other businesses) merger 
transaction, which would precipitate a substantial long-term change within the EU financial 
market, and the European economy, as a whole. A bank merger is to be notified to the 
Commission only in the event of formation of a ‗concentration‘
275
 by the merging parties
276
 
or the establishment of a joint venture.
277
  The concentration in question should relate to the 
gaining of control on a lasting basis that results from the merger of two or more previously 
independent financial institutions or parts of these institutions, or the acquisition by one or 
more undertakings (or persons already controlling at least one undertaking) of direct or 
indirect control of the whole or parts of one or more other undertakings.
278
  ‗Control‘ is 
described as the ability to apply a definite authority over a bank (or other undertaking),
279
 




A ‗concentration‘ becomes subject to the ECMR in the event it has an EU 
(Community) dimension.
281
  This is when the combined global revenue of the merger exceeds 
€5 billion (so-called the ‗Worldwide Turnover Test‘),
282
 and the revenue across the EU of 
each of two merging banks (undertakings) is more than €250 million (so-called the ‗EU-wide 
Turnover Test‘).
283
 The relevant merging parties are to notify the Commission before they 
proceed with the proposed merger.
284
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There are other alternative thresholds, which can define the EU dimension on a bank 
(or other undertakings) merger. These requirements include the combined global revenue of 
the merging entities is at least €2.5 billion (so-called the ‗Lower Worldwide Turnover 
Test‘);
285
or the total revenue of the combined merging parties across the EU is over €100 




The merger does not have to be notified to the Commission, if either the essential or 
additional requirements referred to above are met, provided that the ‗two-thirds rule‘ is 
satisfied.
287
  This rule states that, if each of the merging parties (e.g., banks) obtains more than 
two-thirds of its EU gross revenue in one EU member state, then the merger falls outside the 
applicability of the ECMR provisions.
288
 For example, in the merger case of Royal Bank of 
Canada/Banque de Montreal, the Commission ruled that considering that one of the merging 
banks achieved two-thirds of its Community turnover in the UK, the Commission did not 
oppose the notified operation and declare it compatible with the common market and the EU 
merger regulations.
289
  Most of the bank mergers following the Global Financial Crisis 
(‗GFC‘) did not meet the aforementioned requirements, and, therefore, were assessed by 
relevant EU Member State competition and banking authorities.
290 
 
For a discussion of the competitive analysis in relation to the applicability of the 
ECMR provisions in a bank merger, and in particular, the matters of ex-ante versus ex-post 
notification control, the significant impediment of effective competition (‗SIEC‘) test, and 
failing firm defence, see subchapters 5.4.1 through 5.4.3 of this thesis.  
 
2.11.3 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003291 (implementation of the rules on 
competition) 
                                                        
285
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 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (2003) OJ L 1/.1, as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 




The Commission‘s responsibility for implementation and enforcement of the regulation of 
both the prohibition of anticompetitive agreements and the abuse of dominance, pursuant to 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU is largely governed by Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 
(‗Regulation 1/2003‘).
292
   
 
The Regulation 1/2003, also, addresses the relationship between national competition 
law and EU competition law (i.e., Articles 101 and 102 TFEU).
293
  The Regulation provides 
that Member State competition authorities applying national competition law to cases, which, 
also, are subject to Article 101 or 102 TFEU by virtues of the inter-state clause, must also 
apply the provisions of the TFEU.
294
 The national competition authorities essentially apply 




When required to evaluate agreements, decisions or behaviour, pursuant to Article 101 
or 102 TFEU, that are already the subject of a Commission decision, the competition 
authorities of the Member States may not make decisions that would contradict those made by 
the Commission.
296
   
 
When examining procedural rules, the Commission applies the procedural rules set out 
in the Regulation 1/2003, while the Member States‘ authorities apply their respective national 
procedural laws, within the meaning of EU anti-trust laws.
297
  However, the Regulation also 
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Acting on their own initiative, or on a complaint, the national competition authorities 
may order preliminary measures or the cessation of infringement, may accept commitments 
and impose fines, penalties and other sanctions provided for under national law in order to 
implement properly the applicability of Article 101 and/or 102 TFEU.
299
  A similar interim 




The national competition authorities may decide not to be necessary to act, if the 
requirements for a prohibition are not met, based on the information they have before them.
301
 
The basis for such a decision may be that the national authority has exercised its discretion so 
as not to start proceedings, or that such proceedings resulting in a finding that Articles 101 
and/or 102 TFEU were not violated.
302





The principle of having the respective national competition authorities applies their 
national law results, particularly, in the situation that the likelihood of imposing fines on 
individuals and on undertakings must be provided for in national law.
304
  The individual legal 
systems provided for both differing methods of evaluation, as well as different upper limits on 
the imposition of fines, so that very different sanctions may be imposed, depending on the 
respective national law subject to merger application.
305
    
 
In essence, at the EU level, if a ‗concentration‘
306
 has a Community ‗dimension‘
307
 it 
is down to the Commission;
308
 but a merger that does not have a Community ‗dimension‘, 
national law and procedures apply, provided that the concentration without a Community 
dimension does not threaten to ‗significantly affect competition‘ in the territory of the EU 
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 And, of course, banks and other financial institutions are required to 
comply with general competition rules of 101 and 102 TFEU
310
 at all times – which may 
bring in the Commission and/or national competition authorities and/or national courts.   
 
A discussion of the role of the Commission, the Competition and Markets Authority, 
and the EU and British courts in bank mergers review is provided in chapter 4 of this thesis.     
 
2.11.4    Banking retail report 2007 
 
The Commission deemed achieving progress in the EU banking industry to be critical to 
meeting the objectives of its antecedent policy initiatives and specific measures aimed at 
enhancing the financial services single market.
311
 One of the concrete steps taken by the 
Commission consisted of a review on the competition aspects of retail banking in the EU.
312
  
For this task, the Commission undertook a thorough assessment of retail banking services and 
issued its recommendations and findings in the 2007 ‗Report on the retail banking sector 
inquiry‘ (the ‗Banking Retail Report‘).
313
 The Commission reviewed the market for current 





 With reference to the retail banking market, the Commission identified important 
issues with supply operations. The Commission found that payment systems, credit 
registers
315
 and other credit data collectors seemed to be broadly fragmented across EU 
Member State boundaries.
316
 Another notable observation was the frequently demonstrated 
significant levels of collaboration between retail banking market participants that compete 
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against each other in different Member States‘ product markets.
317
 The Commission also 
highlighted persistent obstacles to entry in the retail banking market.
318
 Several potentially 
inevitable barriers occur as a result of regulatory measures or the anticompetitive conduct.   
 
 In relation to current accounts and associated services, the Banking Retail Report
319
 
indicated that in some EU Member States, the market for providing credit information 
services is restricted.  Indeed, the markets for credit information were likewise found to be 
fragmented across EU Member States.
320
 Regulatory obstacles at a national level greatly 
restrict the enhancement of data sharing between EU Member States.  The majority of banks 
in most EU Member States link current accounts to mortgages, small and medium-sized 
enterprise (‗SME‘) loans, and consumer loans. This causes concentration of these banking 
products and services in the hands of limited and powerful banks, and, also, makes it difficult 
for customers to look for other banks that offer banking products or services with lower costs 




Product linking to retail banking could dilute competition on several fronts.
322
  
Linking increases the costs of switching between bank service providers, and, as a result, 
could potentially reduce customer flexibility.
323
 Obligating customers to purchase various 
products from the same bank, linking may also dissuade both the entry of new market 
participants and the expansion of smaller participants.  Featuring more, non-standard products 
inside a banking transaction, linking decreases price clarity among banking providers. 
Increased switching charges in the retail banking could seriously hamper competition.
324
 
Consumers will be dissuaded from engaging the services of alternative banking service 
providers and, thus, new entrant banks will have much difficulty in establishing a sufficient 
customer base to make their businesses viable. Switching costs could, also, increase 
established banks‘ market capacity, allowing them to charge exorbitant prices to clients 
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effectively tied to their banking services.
325
  Large costs of switching and little customer 
flexibility could restrict market entry in the whole retail banking services sector.
326
 Therefore, 





After almost one decade from the Banking Retail Report‘s findings, the retail banking 
market at the EU level remains fragmented and concentrated at the national level.
328
  In the 
event of competition concerns, the Commission assesses, if demonstrated anticompetitive 
conduct is caused or sustained by an EU Member State‘s legislation or other measures.
329
 The 
Commission‘s position appears to be that it shall not refrain from exercising its powers 
pursuant to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU
330
 in order to ensure that the competition provisions 
are followed in relation to retail banking and the several payment markets.
331
 The 
Commission tends to operate in areas in addition to competition law to help elevate the 




2.11.5 The Liikanen report and EU regulation on structural reform of the EU banking 
sector 
 
At the start of the Global Financial Crisis (‗GFC‘), the EU had a harmonized system of 
financial regulation where banks along with securities and insurance firms licensed in one EU 
country could engage in business across the EU, based on their home state authorization.  
However, harmonization of financial regulation remained incomplete.
333
 Structurally, the 
EU‘s system of financial regulation was based on the division of competences between the 
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Member States regulators‘ and EU institutions. In 2001, the Lamfalussy Report
334
 triggered 
substantial changes to the EU‘s financial services regime.  
 
The Report recommended that EU securities regulation comprise a system of 
framework rules, detailed implementation of rules and cooperation between regulators 
concerning implementation of the EU rules and enforcement by the Commission.
335
 The EU 
created several committees related to banking, insurance and securities, which during the GFC 
were transformed into EU-level authorities with boosted powers.
336
   
 
By the end of 2011, the Commission established the Liikanen Group.
337
  The purpose 
of the group was to determine whether structural reforms of EU banks were necessary to 
establish a safe, stable and efficient banking system serving the needs of citizens, the EU 
economy and the internal market.  In October, 2012, the Liikanen Group released its report on 
reforming the structure of the EU banking sector (the ‗Liikanen Report‘),
338
 recommending 
macro and micro-prudential reforms in order to reduce systemic risks. In particular, the 
Liikanen Report recommended maintaining the universal banking model.
339
  It proposed that 
the trading arms of banks exceeding certain thresholds should be operated by entities that are 
legally separate from the entities carrying out deposit-taking activities if the activities to be 
separated amount to a significant share of the bank‘s business.
340
 The reasoning underlying 
the separation concept is because the separated trading activities would not be financed any 
longer through protected deposits, nor would such activities benefit from an implicit state 
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  In addition, banks that would be subject to separation of their activities would 




In response to its endorsed recommendations from the Liikanen Report, in early 2014 
the Commission published a draft Regulation on Structural Measures Improving the 
Resilience of EU Credit Institutions (‗Proposal‘).
343
 The Proposal addresses the ‗too-big-too-
fail‘ (‗TBTF‘) dilemma through structural measures designed to decrease the risk and 
complexity of large banks in the EU.
344
  Under the Proposal, certain large banks would not be 
permitted to engage in proprietary trading in financial instruments and commodities.
345
  In 
addition, these banks may be ordered by their national regulators to separate specified risky 
business activities from their deposit-taking, lending and certain other business activities;
346
 
notwithstanding the fact that they would be permitted to remain under the control of a single 
bank holding company,
347
 provided that the activities to be separated are carried out in a 




The Proposal is intended to apply to those banks in the EU that are determined to be 
‗global-systemically important institutions‘ (‗G-SIIs‘),
349
 have had total assets of at least €30 
billion over three consecutive years, and with trading activities of at least €70 billion or 10 per 




2.11.6     European Banking Union 
     
In response to the pressure of the Eurozone‘s enduring sovereign debt and banking crisis, 
following the Global Financial Crisis (‗GFC‘), in June, 2012 the EU Member States and 
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institutions agreed to establish a Eurozone Banking Union.
351
  The Banking Union 
architecture was based on three pillars, joint supervision, resolution, and deposit insurance.
352
   
 
The Banking Union would create ‗federal‘ resolution powers to be exercised by a new 
EU resolution authority granted access to a new ‗federal‘ rescue fund.
353
  Under its present 
structure, the Banking Union is mainly a framework for the Eurozone Member States,          
but is open for all other EU Member States (such as, the UK) too, through a ‗close 
cooperation‘ agreement with the European Central Bank (‗ECB‘).
354
    The   purpose             
for ‗federalizing‘ these powers is to build up an adequate approach to bank                  




    The first pillar was the formation of a Single Supervisory Mechanism (‗SSM‘)
356
 for 
Eurozone banks in 2014.  The ECB is given the power to supervise all ‗significant‘ Eurozone 
banks.
357
 A bank is deemed ‗significant‘ when it meets one of the following five conditions
358
: 
(i) the  total value of its assets exceeds €30 billion; (ii) the value of its assets exceeds both €5 
billion and 20 per  cent of its state gross domestic product; (iii) the bank is among the three 
most significant‘ banks established in a Member State; (iv) the bank conducts significant 
cross-border activities relative to its total assets/liabilities; and (v) the bank receives assistance 
from a Eurozone bailout fund, the European Stability Mechanism (‗ESM‘).
359
  On these 
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     The second pillar is the Single Resolution Mechanism (‗SRM‘), which comes into 
effect in 2016.
361
  The relevance of the SRM is in its fundamental departure from a parallel 
post-GFC enactment, namely the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (‗BRRD‘)
362
.  
While the BRRD harmonizes national resolution instruments and improves the coordination 
between them, the purpose of bank resolution under a Banking Union means that it 
becomes centralized.
363
  The Banking Union aims to safeguard impartial decision making in 
dealing with failed EU based banks, consequently reducing any prospect of national financial 
burden.
364




The third pillar, a joint deposit guarantee scheme, presently appears to be 
abandoned.
366
 Vigorous objections to joint deposit insurance from several EU Members States 
forced the Banking Union architects to give up on this element.
367
 Instead, the EU is      




    Banking Union represents an important direction towards integration for EU financial 
regulation.  Most likely, a future Banking Union would stand on two pillars, instead of three. 
Only the first pillar (supervision) is comparatively solid, while the second pillar (resolution) 
appears to be a weak compromise. The third pillar might not come to fruition, at least in the 
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  The open question remains whether the European Banking 




In relation to the theoretical issues pertaining to the nature of the relationship between 
competition and financial stability, a suitable balance between financial stability and 
competition assumes a structure that identifies the welfare benefits and costs of contrasting 
levels of financial stability and competition. 
 
Generally speaking, banking system presents oligopolistic fabric.  However, it does 
not, necessarily, mean such system do not lead to competitive results. Some of the broadest 
approaches that define and evaluate competition in banking are the structure-conduct-
performance (SCP) model; contestability - centres on conduct dependent on latent entry; and 
price responsiveness to cost shifts.  
 
Most of the traditional models or approaches concerning the relationship between 
competition and financial stability assume that financial institutions function in an ideal 
competitive setting or in a monopoly situation. In both situations, systemic crises or runs 
emerge in equilibrium due to co-ordination failure among depositors or as a balanced reaction 
by depositors to the coming of negative information of banks‘ future solvency.   
 
In terms of ‗public interest‘ exemption, public policy issues such as preserving the 
financial stability can be undertaken better by sectoral regulation or direct policies.  
Integrating the analysis of public interest considerations in merger control might cripple the 
basic competition assessment in mergers, accordingly impairing the broad ‗public interest‘ 
that competition policy intends to uphold.  
 
Maintaining the suitable right trade-off between competition and public interest 
criteria is not always easy; the analysis of the same merger on the grounds of both competition 
standards, and the public interest that contains socio-economic and political considerations, 
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may not always achieve the same outcomes.  This may trigger to an anti-competitive merger 
being approved, or a pro-competitive merger being barred on public interest basis. There are 
more instances of public interest basis ensuing from an anti-competitive merger being 
approved than of a merger approved by the competition watchdog being forbidden.  
 
Even if ‗public interest‘ considerations are surely characterized, not all circumstances 
where public interest is called upon can be covered by law or soft law, the role of competition 
law in situations of financial crises demonstrates there have been arguments for holding off 
competition rules for span of the crisis. 
 
The empirical and theoretical literature suggest that the stability effects of changes in 
market structures and competition are particularly case-dependent. It seems that there is much 
space for research to shed more light into this rather unclear issue. 
 
The theoretical literature does not appear to be irrefutable on the rapport between 
competition and stability. Theories of bank runs and systemic risk essentially neglect the 
effects of different bank market structures for the safety of the industry.  
 
Competition in banking is characteristically imperfect and many obstacles to entry 
could generate rents. In retail banking, switching costs for customers are quite essential, and 
reputation and branch networks act as entry obstacles. In corporate banking created uneven 
information and lending relationships offer banks some market power in relation to firms and 
investors. Stability and competition can exist side-by-side in the banking sector.  Competition 
makes the banking sector more effective and ensures that stimulus and rescue packages 
advantage final consumers. In the final assessment, the blueprint of financial regulation 
matters, at minimum, nearly of market structure for the stability of the financial sector. 
 
Often competition reduces stability and often perfect competition is harmonious with 
the socially ideal level of stability. 
 
 The UK and EU legislation in relation to the competition aspects of bank mergers have 
evolved and continue to do so. Both aim to respond to the expansion of banking products and 
59 
 
services, and protect consumers in their relationships with banking service providers, while at 
the same time ensuring that the UK financial services market continues to thrive. 
 
 Implementation of the ‗ring-fencing‘ (retail activities separated from the wholesale 
operations in banking) provisions to the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 in the 
UK; and the Liikanen Report‘s initiative followed by the European Banking Union directives 
to enhance the EU regulation on financial structural reform, appear to be a step in the right 
direction. 
 
 Nevertheless, banks in the UK are heading for the kind of legal uncertainty that has 
dogged the introduction of the Volcker rule
370
 in the US.  Radical financial services legislation 
reforms undertaken in the last decade appear to create unintended consequences to banks and 
other financial institutions.  Like the Volcker rule, the proposed UK ring fencing (the Vickers‘ 
Report) seems to be a simple concept.
371
  While the Volcker rule bans proprietary trading, the 
UK ring-fencing separates investment banking from retail activity. However, one 
consequence of a ring-fence is that small businesses could be left with a much narrower 
alternative of trade finance and derivative products. Costs also will be higher. Small banks 
could find their ability to do business with big ring-fenced counterparts is curtailed.   
 
The UK banking and financial system is not even at the end of the beginning. The 
work started with the enactment of the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013.  
Presently, it is up to the banking industry to put the issues clearly to the UK Government and 
show their gravity that these are issues for customers and not simply for the banks.  
 
The latest financial services laws, in particular the Financial Services (Banking 
Reform) Act 2013, do not alter the substance of competition law in its application to financial 
services. Rather, it makes important institutional changes to the enforcement of competition 
laws and the promotion of competition in the banking industry. Having more regulatory 
bodies capable of enforcing competition law, and requiring them to give specific 
                                                        
370
 The Volcker Rule, under § 619 (codified 12 USC §1851) of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act 2010, restricts US banks from making certain kinds of speculative investments that do 
not benefit their customers;  For a discussion of the Volcker Rule, see chapter 6.6.1 in this thesis, pp 192-3. 
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 A Berger et al The Oxford Handbook of Banking in A D Morrison Universal Banking (2nd edn, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2015), p131. 
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consideration to applying competition law, with the Financial Conduct Authority, along with 
the Competition and Markets Authority, having the role of competition enforcer, may increase 
the number of competition investigations in financial services. It may also promote a culture 
of compliance within the industry. 
 
Whether this will lead to an increase in the imposition of competition law enforcement 
orders and financial penalties would depend on several factors.  One factor would be whether 
the banking industry takes notice of the warnings inherent in the changes made in the 
regulation of the financial services, ensuring compliance with competition law. Another factor 
would be whether the banking regulators, which have greater knowledge of the banking and 
financial industry than the Competition and Markets Authority, become effective in building 
up a system of adequate competition enforcement. 
 
At the EU level, if a ‗concentration‘ has a Community ‗dimension‘ the Commission is 
the proper authority to enforce implementation of the EU merger provisions.  In a merger that 
does not have a Community ‗dimension‘, national law and procedures shall apply.  Banks and 
other financial institutions are required to comply with general competition rules of 101 and 
102 TFEU at all times that may bring in the Commission, national competition authorities, 
and/or national courts.  In conclusion, the EU will pre-empt any national control of a bank 




CHAPTER 3 - COMPETITION AND BANKING AUTHORITIES IN THE UNITED  
                        KINGDOM  
 
This chapter discusses the competition and banking authorities in the UK and EU, and the role 
of these authorities in shaping the competition aspects in bank mergers in the UK. 
 
3.0  Relevant regulators that oversee bank mergers 
 
The main UK governmental authorities with competence to review bank mergers, along with 
any competition aspects such mergers may pose are the Competition and Markets Authority 
(‗CMA‘),
1
 the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills (‗SoS‘),
2
 and the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer.
3
   
 
The main UK banking supervisors to review the same are the Bank of England 
(‗BoE‘),
4
 the Financial Conduct Authority (‗FCA‘),
5
 the Payment Systems Regulator 
(‗PSR‘),
6
 and the Prudential Regulation Authority (‗PRA‘).
7
   
 




Although the CMA and the SoS have powers to intervene, investigate and review 
mergers in banking and other sectors of the economy, this chapter considers the role of these 
bodies solely in relation to banks and other financial institutions. In addition, while the 
                                                        
1
 Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, c. 24 (‗ERRA13‘), ss 25 to 28; Sched 4. 
2
 Formed by the First Lord of Trade (16 September, 1672).  The SoS is cabinet position in the UK Government.  
Ths office is responsible for the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills.  For more information, 
available at www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-business-innovation-skills.  
3
 The office of the Chancellor of the Exchequer was appointed in 1221. The Chancellor of the Exchequer is head 
of Her Majesty‘s Treasury.  The Chancellor is responsible for all economic and financial matters. For more 
information of the Chancellor‘s duties and responsibilities, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/ministers/chancellor-of-the-exchequer.   
4
 The Bank of England Act 1694, c. 20 (Regnal. 5 and 6 Will and Mar).  For more information of the Bank of 
England, available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/Pages/home.aspx. 
5
 The Financial Services Act 2012, c. 21 (‗FSA12‘), ss 6(1A) to (1T) (Amendments of Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000); Scheds 1ZA and 1ZB to Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, c. 8 (‗FSMA2000‘)  
6
 Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, c. 33 (‗FSA13‘), pt 5, ss 40, 49-67; Sched 4.  
7
 FSA12 (n5), ss 6(2A) to (2P) (Amendments of FSMA2000 (n5)); Scheds 1ZA and 1ZB to FSMA2000 (n5). 
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competition legislation and rules, such as the Competition Act 1998,
9
 Enterprise Act 2002,
10
 
the CMA‘s merger provisions,
11
 regulate all sectors of the economy in the UK, this chapter 
focuses its discussion only in the implementation of the foregoing legislation and rules in a 
bank merger.   
 
3.1  Competition and public authorities 
 
In the UK, the governmental agencies responsible to oversee a bank merger and any 
competitive effects of it are the CMA, the SoS, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer.  On a 
case-by-case basis, these public institutions coordinate their efforts in the review process of a 
bank merger, as well as in the process of examination of competition issues that a merger may 
cause in the banking and financial system.
12
  The role of these authorities in bank merger 
transactions is discussed below. 
 
3.1.1  Competition and Markets Authority 
 
The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) is the body responsible for assessing bank, or 
any other business, merger situations in the UK. It was established by the Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform Act 2013, which abolished the pre-existing competition regulators, the 
Office of Fair Trading (‗OFT‘) and the Competition Commission (‗CC‘).
13
 The CMA is 
empowered to safeguard the functioning of competition within the markets and with ultimate 
responsibility for serving consumers‘ interests.
14
   
 
Under the competition provisions,
15
 merging parties are not required to notify the 
CMA of a merger transaction, notwithstanding the CMA‘s jurisdiction over mergers.  
Merging parties‘ notification to the UK competition authorities is made on a voluntary basis. 
                                                        
9
 Competition Act 1998, c. 41 (‗CA98‘). 
10
 Enterprise Act 2002, c. 40 (‗EA02‘). 
11
 For a discussion of the Competition and Markets Authority‘s guidelines regulating merger situations, see 
chapters 3.1.1, and 5.0 to 5.4 in this thesis, pp 51-7, 132-74. 
12
 D Currie, ‗The New Competition and Markets Authority: How Will It Promote Competition?‘ (7 November, 
2013) Speech to the Beesley Lectures, London, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-new-
competition-and-markets-authority-how-will-it-promote-competition. 
13
 ERRA13 (n1), s 26. 
14
 R Whish and D Bailey, Competition Law (8
th
 edn, New York: Oxford University Press 2015), pp 955-81. 
15
 EA02 (n10), s 96. 
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The competition authority may decide to review a bank merger, notwithstanding that the 
merging parties did not voluntarily notify the merger situation.  If the CMA determines that it 




Merger Review Test 
 




During the phase 1 review, the CMA considers, based on the objective evidence 
available, whether there is a practical expectation that the merger will substantially lessening 
competition.
18
  In the event of reasonable doubt regarding the existence of a competition 
concerns, the inquiry group resolves the same by initiating a phase 2 review.
19
 During the 




In the phase 1 examination, if a merger is deemed to create possible competition 
concerns, the merger participants seek to obtain a conditional or unconditional clearance.
21
 At 
the same phase, the parties may also enter into pre-notification consultations to address the 
competition regulator‘s possible concerns, and, therefore, establish the likelihood of obtaining 
unconditional or conditional clearance.
22
   
 
The CMA gathers and analyses information on merger cases, and refers for more 
rigorous ‗phase 2‘ inquiry any situation where it is determined that the merger has given or 
could give rise to a ‗substantial lessening of competition‘ (‗SLC‘) within market, i.e., banking 
and financial market in a bank merger, in the UK.
23
   
                                                        
16
 Ibid, ss 5 to 8, and 109; see, also, G Barling, ‗The Role of the Court in the Public Enforcement of Competition 
Law‘ (2014) in B Hawk (ed.) Fordham Competition Law Institute 5, pp 381-94.  
17
 EA02(n10), see generally, pt 3. 
18
 Ibid, ss 22, 23, and 103-104. 
19
 Ibid, pt 3, ch 1. 
20
 Office of Fair Trading/Competition Commission, ‗[UK] Merger Assessment Guidelines‘ (1 September, 2010) 
CC2/OFT1254, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284449/OFT1254.pdf; see, also, 
Office of Fair Trading, ‗Mergers Exceptions to the Duty to Refer and Undertakings in Lieu‘ (12 March, 2014) 
OFT1122, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/mergers-exceptions-to-the-duty-to-refer-
and-undertakings-in-lieu 
21
 EA02 (n10), ss 103-104, and 105-106. 
22
 Ibid, s 107(1)(e). 
23




After initiation of a phase 2 inquiry, the CMA conducts a more comprehensive review 
to ascertain whether there is a merger case constituting a UK merger control situation, and 
whether this has arisen because of or could result in a SLC.
24
 The phase 2 inquiry should 
ultimately remedy any pinpointed SLC concern. Determinations under phase 2 are made by an 
investigation team of at least three individuals, comprised in every situation of impartial CMA 




The CMA informs the SoS of any merger that it deems to cause a relevant public 
interest issue during phase 1 review.
26
 The CMA requires to advise the SoS of a merger 
situation, which could give rise to a public interest issue or be subject to the special public 




In a prospective or completed merger, e.g., bank merger, the CMA may agree to the 
imposition of undertakings in lieu of a reference to phase 2 inquiries.
28
  Such undertakings can 
be made as part of the CMA‘s own determination, or under the ‗public interest‘ concerns 





When necessary, the CMA coordinates a bank merger review with the banking 
regulators, banking sector associations, and the consumer protection organizations concerning 
their considerations over that merger case.
30
   
 
The competition provisions direct the CMA carry out a completed or planned bank 
merger situation for a thorough phase 2 review in the event it determines that there is or could 
be a pertinent merger case that does or could result in a SLC in the market(s) for banking 
                                                        
24
 Ibid, ss 23, and 34. 
25
 ERRA13 (n1), paras 56-58, and 38(1). 
26
 EA02 (n10), s 139. 
27
 Ibid, ss 140, and 140A. 
28
 Ibid, ss 154, and 155. 
29
 Ibid, ss 156-161. 
30
 For example, the UK Competition Network (‗UKCN‘) brings together the CMA along with the Financial 
Conduct Authority and other sectoral regulators.  The UKCN was mentioned in the ‗UKCN Statement of Intent‘ 









However, the CMA may decide not to recommend a phase 2 review, when it deems 
that the relevant banking market is not of sufficient significance to support such a course of 
action.
32
 Also, any applicable customer advantages associated with the merger case in 
question overrides a SLC and, thus, militate against progression to phase 2 reviews.
33
 
Additionally, a case will not likely be referred for a phase 2 review where the pertaining 





In the event the CMA decides to scrutinize a merger under phase 2 review, it may still 
impose undertakings in lieu of prohibiting the merger or applying penalties and to reduce the 




The UK competition watchdog will not carry out a thorough investigation of a merger 
under phase 2, if the SoS has issued a ‗public interest‘ intervention notice on the merger, and 
such notice is still valid, or in the EU level, if the Commission considers investigating the 
merger.
36
   
 
To make a market investigation reference (‗a reference‘),
37
 the CMA must have 
reasonable grounds for suspecting that any feature or combination of features of goods and 
services market in the UK prevents, restricts or distorts competition in connection with the 
supply or acquisition of any goods or services in the UK or as part of the UK (the ‗reference 
test‘).
38
  Within forty business days of commencement of the bank merger assessment process, 
the CMA must determine whether the reference test is met.
39
  If this threshold is met, then 
CMA can choose whether to exercise its discretion to make a reference.
40
 In the event no such 
                                                        
31
 EA02 (n10), ss 22, and 33. 
32
 Ibid, ss 22(2), and 33(2). 
33
 Ibid, ss 22(3), and 33(3). 
34
 Ibid, ss 22(2), and 33(2). 
35
 Ibid, s 73. 
36
 Ibid, s 22(3). 
37
 Ibid, ss 35, and 36. 
38
 Ibid, s 131(1). 
39
 Ibid, s 97(1). 
40
 Ibid, s 84. 
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determination is made, the CMA relinquishes its competence.
41
   
  
Under phase 2, if the CMA determines that a merger, e.g., a bank merger, produces a 
SLC and remedial measures are required to cure the same; it then acts to implement those 
remedies.
42
 In order to give effect to remedies, the CMA applies a certain timeline within 
which the interested parties in a merger shall carry out the necessary remedial undertakings.
43
 
If the merging parties do not implement any of these undertakings, the competition authority 
may compel compliance by starting a legal action for injunctive relief or other relevant 
remedy in a local court.
44
  Besides this recourse, any party who is damaged or sustained loss 
due to the failure of the merging parties to implement its required undertakings may 




The UK competition regulators have historically adopted a relaxed approach towards 
bank merger review policies. For instance, in 2004 the competition regulators authorized 
the merger Bank of America Corporation/FleetBoston Financial Corporation,
46
 determining 
that the merger did not give rise to a SLC.
47
  It, also, determined that notwithstanding the fact 
that there were overlaps between the banks‘ UK product markets, the combined portion 





In the event a merger, i.e., bank merger, does not have an EU ‗dimension‘ pursuant to 
the ECMR, the merging parties may consider making a pre-notification reference to the 
Commission.
49
  If the merger has an EU ‗dimension‘, the merging participants may approach 
the CMA to establish whether the competition authority is the appropriate regulator to assess 
                                                        
41
 Ibid, s 74. 
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 Ibid, s 41(3). 
43
 Ibid, s 39. 
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 Ibid, s 75. 
45
 Ibid, s 94. 
46
 Office of the Fair Trading, ‗Bank of America Corporation/FleetBoston Financial Corporation‘ (2004) OFT 





 OFT Bank of America/FleetBoston (n46). 
49
 Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January, 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings, OJ L 24/1, 29 January, 2004 (‗ECMR‘), art 4(5). 
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 is necessary.  
 
Decisions by the CMA or SoS are subject to appeal before the Competition Appeal 
Tribunal (‗CAT‘).
52
 An appeal may be from a decision of the CMA whether to conduct a 
phase 2 inquiry of the merger, or against the CMA‘s conclusive determination at phase 2.  
Unless the CAT rules otherwise, an appeal filed by the parties in a merger with the Tribunal 




3.1.2  Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills 
 
In the UK, the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills (‗SoS‘) has authority in 
relation to financial institution merger transactions that are considered as being significant to 
the national interest. Among other areas of the economy that are of vital interest to the UK, 
the Government decided, as a result of the Global Financial Crisis ('GFC'), to classify the 
banking and financial sector as having particular importance to the national interest.  Under 
this general power,
54
 the SoS may interfere in a UK bank merger case on national interest 
grounds.    
 
Historically, the power of the SoS to intervene in merger situations derives from the 
Industry Act 1975 (‗IA75‘), having been established to review acquisitions of significant 
undertakings by non-British businesses or individuals.
55
 While the provisions of IA75 seem 
quite broad, a prohibition order could be compelled by civil proceedings or an application for 
injunctive relief sought in the courts by the Crown.
56
  However, practically speaking, the 
provisions of IA75 do not commonly appear to apply. Until now, the SoS has not made use 
of his described IA75 authority.
57
 Nevertheless, these provisions may be applied by the SoS 
if he decides to refer a merger to the CMA for phase 2 investigation. 
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 Ibid, art 4(4). 
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 For more information of the role and functions of the Competition Appeal Tribunal (‗CAT‘), see chapter 4.1 in 
this thesis, pp 81-3. 
53
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The reform of UK competition legislation, especially the enactment of the Enterprise 
Act 2002,
58
 was intended to remove political interference in mergers, improve the clarity and 
straightforwardness of the merger control system, and establish wholly competition related 
benchmarks against which to review merger transactions, i.e., bank merger.
59
   
 
The SoS has been increasingly active in dealing with competition issues in the banking 
industry and concerning bank mergers. This was clearly exhibited following the GFC, where 
considerable activities, such as, intervention notices issued to the then Office of Fair Trading 





The SoS‘s contribution to enhancing competition in the banking industry remains 
inconsistent and unclear. Though the intention of the SoS in preserving the financial stability 
of the UK may have been constructive, in the longer run its interventions in bank mergers may 
be seen as damaging and counterproductive to competition in the country‘s banking system.  
It is commonly accepted that during the GFC the Government, through the SoS, and the HM 
Treasury, as well, has been obliged to intervene very heavily in the banking sector by the 
means of nationalization and State aids in order to ensure its survival and maintain economic 
stability.  In doing so, competition issues have not been a priority. 
  
3.1.3 HM Treasury 
 
Her Majesty‘s Treasury (‗HM Treasury‘) is the British government department responsible for 
the economy and finance. It supervises government expenditures, directs the country‘s 
economic policy, and operates to achieve strong and durable economic development. The 
Chancellor of the Exchequer oversees HM Treasury. The Treasury, also, supervised fiscal and 
monetary policy until 1997, at which point the Bank of England, as the central bank of the 
                                                        
58
 EA02 (n10), s 42. 
59
 B Rodger and A MacCulloch, Competition Law and Policy in the EU and UK (5th edn, New York: Routledge 
2014), ch 8. 
60
 The Enterprise Act 2002 (Specification of Additional Section 58 Consideration) Order 2008 SI 2008/2645; 
see, also, B Hawk, Fordham Competition Law Institute in S Polito (eds) EU and UK Competition Laws and the 
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HM Treasury is authorized to take control or ownership of a deficient financial 
institution or to authorize conveyance of such an institution to a third party.
62
  This authority 
exists in order to preserve financial stability and safeguard the public interest.  In this regard, 
intervention by the Treasury is intended to protect the financial strength of the entire economy 
in the UK.
63
  In the case of nationalization of failing banks in 2008, such as the Treasury‘s 
rescue operation of Northern Rock via nationalisation of the ailing bank,
64
 or the Treasury‘s 
intervention in Bradford & Bingley,
65
 the Treasury would require to take proper measures to 





In relation to competition concerns in the banking sector, HM Treasury has retained an 
active role. It has encouraged and often started various initiatives to support investigative 
commissions or working groups established by the UK Parliament with the purpose of 
enhancing the consideration of competition issues in banking activities. In particular, this has 
been evident in relation to retail banking, payment systems, bank account switching, credit 
cards, and other banking services for the purpose of protecting the interests of the consumer.  
However, practically speaking, HM Treasury has failed to uphold a firm and consistent 
position as to enforcement of competition provisions in relation to bank mergers and other 
banking operations. This was clear during and especially after, the GFC, when the 
Government bent competition rules, and justified its decisions, for example in granting public 
                                                        
61
 Bank of England Act 1998 (as amended), e.g., ss 4(1), and Part II (ss 13-20). 
62
 Banking Act 2009, c. 1 (‗BA09‘), ss 1, 4; The Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008, 2008 c. 2 has largely 
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longer applicable.    
63
 BA09 (n62), ss 1, 4; see, also, generally, Ibid, pt 1 (‗Special Resolution Regime‘). 
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 National Audit Office, ‗Her Majesty‘s Treasury: The Nationalization of Northern Rock‘ (20 March, 2009) 
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 HM Treasury, ‗Bradford & Bingley Plc‘ (29 September, 2008) Newsroom & Speeches 97/08, available at 
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66
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financial support to Lloyds, following its takeover of HBOS,
67





3.2  Banking Authorities  
 
In the UK, the banking agencies responsible for the overall overseeing a bank merger and any 
competitive effects of it are the Bank of England, the Financial Conduct Authority, the 
Payment Systems Regulator, and the Prudential Regulation Authority.
69
  On a case-by-case 
basis, these banking institutions coordinate their efforts in the review process of a bank 
merger, as well as in the process of examination of competition concerns that a merger may 
cause in the banking and financial system. The role of these institutions in bank mergers is 
discussed, below. 
 
 3.2.1 Bank of England 
 
The Bank of England (‗BoE‘) is the central bank of the UK.
70
 The bank is generally 
accountable for preserving and enhancing financial stability in the country.
71
 The bank, also, 
has supervisory authority over the established clearinghouses, and it has the capacity to order 
a British clearinghouse to act or desist from acting in particular situations.   
 
The BoE is assisted by the Financial Policy Committee (‗FPC‘),
72
 which is an 
independent committee in charge of assisting the BoE to accomplish its financial 
strengthening targets, and supporting and instructing the Prudential Regulation Authority 
                                                        
67
 HM Treasury, ‗Financial Support to the Banking Industry‘ (8 October, 2008) Press Notice 100/08, available at 
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HBOS. 
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(‗PRA‘) or the Financial Conduct Authority (‗FCA‘) to tackle issues that constitute systemic 




The FPC contributes to implementation of the financial strategy of the UK 
Government, together with its goals on employment and economic progress. Therefore, the 
FPC identifies, monitors, and intervenes to eliminate or reduce systemic threats for the 
purposes of safeguarding and improving the British financial system. These include 
systematic risks caused by structural characteristics of financial markets, including relations 
between banks, hazards traceable to risk diffusion within the financial services industry, and 
credit or debit augmentation.   
 
The FPC can instruct the FCA or the PRA to use their respective powers to establish 
whether a macro-prudential action applies in a course provided by the FPC.
74
 The Committee 
can also encourage the BoE to implement financial support to banks, and to address any issues 




In practice, the BoE uses its authority, for maintaining the financial and monetary 
stability in the UK, to have a voice in relation to merger outcome of financial institutions in 
the country.
76
 It achieves this by requesting and exchanging information with the CMA, and 




Notwithstanding the BoE‘s assumed ‗authority‘ in a bank merger, the Hong Kong & 
Shanghai Bank‘s decision
78
 to pursue acquisition of the Royal Bank of Scotland despite the 
disapproval of the central bank, along with the competition authority, demonstrated a level of 
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 For more information about the role and responsibilities of Financial Policy Committee (‗FPC‘), see 
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 Monopolies and Mergers Commission, ‗Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank/Royal Bank of Scotland‘ (1982) 
Cmnd 847; In 1980, a proposal was made by the Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank to acquire control of the Royal 
Bank of Scotland.  The Commission found against the merger on the grounds that having a major British bank 
controlled abroad was in itself ‗against the public interest‘. See ibid, p 6. 
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impotence when a bank merger meets the requirements of the relevant banking laws.
79
 
However, as in the Hong Kong & Shanghai Bank case, competition legislation has been 




3.2.2 Financial Conduct Authority 
 
The Financial Conduct Authority (‗FCA‘) is in charge of conduct regulation and, moreover, 
for the efficient regulation of non-Prudential Regulation Authority (‗PRA‘) financial 
institutions, such as, less significant investment institutions, exchanges, and additional 
financial services suppliers.   
 
The FCA replaced the Financial Services Authority as the regulator responsible for 
maintaining and supervising the UK banking and financial system.
81
 This is achieved by 
ensuring that the pertinent markets operate appropriately, creating a suitable level of consumer 
safety,
82
 preserving and amplifying the stability
83
 of the British financial system, and fostering 
effective competition
84




The FCA is tasked with overseeing the execution of undertakings by approved 





The FCA and PRA also coordinate their activities. In particular situations, the PRA 
could, if it deems necessary, order the FCA to cease exerting its authority in insolvency or 
regulatory matters in respect of a PRA-approved institution.
87
 This may happen in the event 
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the PRA concludes that the exercise of the PRA‘s authority could jeopardize the safety of the 
British financial system, or result in the collapse of the PRA-approved institution in a manner 
that may damage the banking and financial system in the UK.
88
 In reality, the FCA and the 
PRA jointly coordinate with the BoE to facilitate the bank‘s mission of financial stability 
preservation. 
 
The CMA also consults with the BoE, PRA, and FCA in respect of bank merger 
situations. Although the participation of these banking supervisory entities in a merger case 
often appears to be a formality and lacking in activity, their findings are taken into 
consideration in the CMA‘s final decision.
89
 Directly or through the SoS or another 
governmental instrumentality, the banking supervisory bodies can influence the decision to 




Considering that the competition law enforcement powers of the FCA came into force 
in 2015, it is too early to foresee how the regulator will use its broad competition powers over 




3.2.3 Payment Systems Regulator (‘PSR’) 
 
The Payment Systems Regulator is a subsidiary of the Financial Conduct Authority (‗FCA‘),
92
 
and commenced its activity in April, 2015.  It is responsible for competition, innovation and 
the interests of end-users in the market for payment systems.
93
 Payment systems include bank 




 in addition to card payment systems from 
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organisations, such as, Visa and MasterCard. The purpose of the PSR is to make payment 
systems work well for those that use them. 
 
The PSR ensures that payment systems are operated and developed in a sense that 
considers and promotes the interests of the businesses and consumers that utilize them.
96
  The 
regulator, also, promotes effective competition in the markets for payment systems and 
services between operators and payment service providers.
97
 It, further, promotes 
development and innovation in payment systems in the UK, in particular the infrastructure 




The approach provided by the PSR is collaborative. However, if the evidence would 
indicate that the payment systems industry is failing to deliver greater competition, more 
innovation and greater benefits for businesses or consumers, the PSR is expected to apply its 
powers.
99
  Its competition and regulatory powers include any direction given to take action 
and set standards, to impose requirements concerning payment system rules, demand 
operators to provide direct access to payment systems, demand payment service providers to 
provide indirect access to smaller payment service providers. In addition, the PSR has the 
power
100
 to amend agreements concerning payment systems, comprising fees and charges, 
investigate behaviour that is not consistent with the PSR‘s directions, and act along with the 





Considering its recent formation, it is too early to analyse its role in the enhancement 
of competition in the payment systems industry in the UK. 
 
3.2.4 Prudential Regulation Authority 
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The Prudential Regulation Authority (‗PRA‘) is a secondary body to the Bank of England 
(‗BoE‘).
102
 It is in charge of making the rules applying to deposit takers, investment 
companies and insurance companies.
103
 The PRA, also, increases the safety and stability of 
accredited financial institutions by tempering the negative consequences associated with their 




The PRA is tasked with fostering the uniform and judicious performance of the 
financial system by means of the regulation of banks and other financial institutions like 
building societies and credit unions.  The PRA‘s broad purpose is to nurture and protect PRA-
approved financial institutions. To fulfil this responsibility, the PRA works to ensure that the 
business of PRA-approved institutions is carried out consist with the objective of ensuring the 
soundness of the UK financial blueprint.   
 
It is, also, intended to safeguard against the collapse of a PRA-approved institution, 
which would negatively impact upon the health of the financial system in the UK. In 
performing its varied tasks, the PRA, along with the Financial Conduct Authority (‗FCA‘), 
apply similar regulatory standards for the purposes of eliminating negative competition 
consequences in the financial and banking markets.   
 
The Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 amended the functioning of the 
PRA, by providing that it must, so far as is reasonably possible, act in a way which, as a 
secondary objective, facilitates effective competition in the markets for services provided by 
PRA-authorised persons in carrying on regulated activities.    
 
The PRA, along with the Competition and Markets Authority, Financial Conduct 
Authority, and the Payment Systems Regulator, is empowered with the necessary competition 
enforcement tools towards the regulation of the financial services sector in the UK.  However, 
the jury is still out on whether the foregoing authorities will be able to meet their regulatory 
                                                        
102
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responsibilities, among others, to facilitate effective competition in the banking and financial 
system.   
 
3.3    The UK Government’s framework and approach to the assessment of 
State aids 
 
The UK Government adopts similar framework and approach like the EU
105
 in relation to the 
examination of the State aid.
106
 Below is a brief analysis of the State aid applicability in the 
UK. 
 
 State aid is an advantage provided by the UK Government to undertakings i.e., banks, 
in particular situations that could likely thwart competition and affect trade in the EU.
107
  The 
State aid definition is met if four characteristics (so-called ‗the four tests‘)
108
 are present for 
assistance to be defined as State aid.  Such characteristics are that (i) the assistance is granted 
by the UK Government or through its resources; (ii) the assistance favours certain 
undertakings, i.e., banks, or the production of certain goods; (iii) the assistance distorts or 





In the event the assistance satisfies the foregoing characteristics it is considered a State 
aid, and the concerning parties are required to follow the State aid rules of the EU to ensure 
compliance with the law.  In the event one of the above characteristics is not met, the measure 
is not subject to the State aid provisions.  When the test of State aid is all satisfied, it is 
unlawful for the UK government to render aid without prior approval from the Commission, 
except for applicability of exemption. 
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 of the TFEU regulates general prohibition on State aid.  It indicates 
aid given within state resources in any form that could impedes competition and affect trade 
by favouring particular undertakings or the production of specific goods is incompatible with 
the common market unless the Treaty permits otherwise.
111
   
 
Although Article 107(1) regulates general prohibition on State aid, the TFEU provides 
exceptions where aid is or may be considered compatible with the common market.  Broadly 
speaking, exemptions are divided in (i) State aid that is considered automatically permissible, 
that is compatible with the EU Treaty;
112





 It is the UK government‘s duty to notify the Commission of intended aid measures 
ahead and to give adequate time for the Commission to comment.
114
  The UK Government 





The Commission has determined circumstances where the notification process can be 
avoided and approval can be assumed, subject to specific conditions are satisfied.  Especially, 
the General Block Exemption Regulation (‗GBER‘)
116
 is a framework, which affirms certain 
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 TFEU, art 107(2). In relation to the first foregoing exemption, State aid types that the TFEU declares shall be 
automatically compatible (the Commission does not have discretion to decide whether an exemption ought to be 
granted): Article 107(2) of the TFEU provides three types of compatible aid, namely (i) social aid granted to 
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aid the Commission may suggest and the Council may specify.  Article 107(3) provides that the foregoing types 
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 Commission Regulation (EU) N 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with 
the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the EU Treaty; see, also, Council Regulation (EC) 
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types of aid to be consistent with the EU Treaty, in the event they meet specific prerequisites, 
so freeing them from the obligation of prior notification and Commission approval; and the de 
minimis regulation
117
 provides that aid of up to €200,000 over 3 years does not hamper trade 
between Member States.
118
  As result, exempting them from the requirement of prior 
notification and the Commission‘s approval.   The UK Government largely uses the GBER.
119
  
   
 In assessing proposed aid, the Commission is guided by standards in published 
frameworks and guidelines,
120
 which apply to specific aid types or purposes and throughout 
the EU Member States. The Commission may approve State aid for development of specific 
economic activities or areas, when a proposed State aid does not strictly comply with formal 
frameworks or guidelines or is in a type where there are not relevant published frameworks or 
guidelines, if the Commission considers that the aid won‘t affect competition and trade to a 
level adverse to the common interest.
121
      
 
 The Commission has adopted a modernization of the State aid regime
122
 aimed at 
cultivating development, focusing on enforcement of the cases that create a larger effect in the 
market and simplify rules and decision-making.
123
  The State Aid Modernisation (‗SAM‘) 
2014 package expanded the GBER
124
 to enable a more simplified approach to the confer of 
specific categories of aid, allowing Member States, i.e., UK, to do more without the necessity 
to go through the approval process, whereas mounting Member States‘ obligations of 
transparency, supervision, and compliance.   
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 State guarantees, such as loans, coverage of losses, will normally be deemed to be 
State aid, pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU, whether or not the guarantee is required.
125
  This 
is for the reason that they remove a component of risk that the beneficiary institution would 
otherwise have to endure absent the state‘s participation.   
 
 The de minimis regulation permits the UK Government to render moderately small 
levels of support up to a specific perimeter that may be paid for almost any reason, providing 
it satisfies the conditions under the de minimis regulation.  Prior notification and approval are 




 Services of General Economic Interest (‗SGEI‘) are not defined in the EU Treaty.
127
  
Therefore, it is for the UK Government to define a unique service as an SGEI.  The role of the 
Commission and Court is to solely determine whether the Government Member has errored in 
defining the service as an SGEI.  Generally, SGEIs lean towards public services, which the 
market does not provide or does not specify to the quality or extent that the state requires, and 
is a service generally and not the certain interest.  Funding of SGEI is caught by the State aid 
rules because the state provides an undertaking with financial assistance to render a service.  
In order to ensure legal certainty on how such assistance can be given in a State aid, lawfully, 
the Commission provides three sets of rules permitting for different degrees of financial 
assistance.  The first set of rule provides for support of up to €500,000.00
128
 during any three-
year period, there is the SGEI De Minimis Regulation.
129
  The regulation is applicable to aid 
provided as a grant, a loan or a loan guarantee, and subject to the form of the aid satisfies 
particular unambiguousness requisites.
130
  A link of entrustment between the beneficiary and 
the aid grantor must be established.  Aid granted as for the regulation is not required to be 
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notified to the Commission.
131
  However, as with regular de minimis aid, the aid provider 




The second set of rules provides for support of up to €15 million for year is blocked 
exempted, pursuant to the SGEI decision.
133
  In reference to SGEI de minimis, a form of 
entrustment between the beneficiary and the aid provider must be in place. The decision 
indicates what is required to go into an entrustment document, and that the entrustment period 
should not exceed ten years unless justified.
134
 The decision also sets out limits on the amount 
of compensation and its calculation, and Member States are required to check systematically 
that the recipient does not receive compensation above the determined sum. While there is no 
notification requirement where the decision is relied upon, Member States need to report on 




The third set of rules provides for aid for SGEI that cannot be granted under SGEI de 
minimis or the SGEI decision must be notified under the SGEI framework
136
 and approved by 
the Commission before it can be granted.  The framework
137
 usually covers aid for large 
network public services where the concern over likely hamper of competition is greater, and 
so approvals can take time.  
 
The Financial Transparency Directive
138
 (‗FTD‘) ensures transparency of financial 
relations between public authorities and certain undertakings.  Its aim is to boost the State aid 
system by requiring aid to be made transparent in terms of what funds have been made 
available to certain undertakings, and the use to which those funds have in fact been put.
139
  
Without such transparency, there is a real risk that the Commission‘s State aid system will be 
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 The Financial Transparency (EC Directive) Regulations 2009 (S.I. 2009/2331) implement Commission 
Directive 2006/111/EC of 16 November 2006 on the transparency of financial relations between Member States 





unable to expose funding that is not easily identifiable as State aid and identify funding that 





Making an adequate assessment of State aid issues is a significant aspect of policy-
making right through the UK Government.  Failure to properly implement the State aid rules 
and risk could create effects for the Government to render policy goals. Such a failure could 
thwart a scheme to be implemented, create damage to the policy goals or even could lead to 
funds paid under an arrangement to be recovered.  A large amount of the assistance schemes 
in the UK utilizes one of the exemptions – de minimis or GBER.
141
  The larger State aid 
schemes have sometime been authorized by the Commission prior to the aid being given.
142
  
Nevertheless, often it is unclear whether a given measure is a State aid and, if so, how it can 
be considered according to the rules.  
 
The UK Government aims at taking a ‗risk-based‘ approach
143
 to decision-making that 
both abides by legal obligations and centres on target delivery.  In other words, State aid 
decisions ought to be based on what is ‗credible‘ instead of what necessarily is ‗cast-iron‘.
144
 
Nevertheless, the Government is responsible to ensure that it comprehends and deems the 
effect and prospect of State aid risk concerned and, especially, the degree where any risk 
would be assumed by business rather than or in addition to the Government and warrant the 
degree of risk is one that business and the Government can tolerate.
145
  The Government has 
issued provisions that outline a risk-based approach to decision-making in State aid cases.
146
  
These provisions are aimed at assisting those concerned in each stage of the process, from 
planning a measure to its actual implementation, and it applies to State aid providers 
throughout the Government.
147
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While presenting a measure, it is significant to count the prospect of a State aid 
challenge.  An affected competitor or individual may launch a complaint to a UK court or the 
Commission, or the latter may be urged by a Member State‘s policy declarations or actively 
scrutinise areas of specific interest. 
 
3.4 European Commission 
 
Bank mergers in the EU are regulated similarly like mergers in other sectors of the European 
economy. The European Commission (‗Commission‘), together with national competition 
authorities (‗NCAs‘) of the Member States
148
, directly enforces EU competition rules
149
 to 
make markets within the EU work better by warranting all businesses compete equally and 
fairly on their merits.  This approach would benefit consumers, businesses and the economy 
throughout the EU. The Directorate-General for Competition (‗DG Competition‘) is the 





    The Commission sustains exclusive jurisdiction over mergers (‗concentrations‘)
151
 
between financial institutions, or other businesses, with Community dimension.
152
 Merging 
parties are required to notify the Commission, if the proposed concentration presents a 
Community dimension, i.e., concentrations that meet the turnover thresholds set out in the 
ECMR.
153
 A concentration does not have a Community dimension, if each of the merging 
parties attains higher than two-thirds of its combined EU-wide turnover in one and the same 
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 In such a case, the ECMR provisions do not apply. Instead, the proposed 
concentration will be subject for review by the Member State‘s competition authority where 




The Commission may notify the relevant Member State to look into whether a 
concentration threatens to affect substantially competition in a market in that Member State,
156
 




Any Member State may request from the Commission to assess any concentration that 
does not have a Community dimension, but affects trade between Member States, and 
threatens to substantially affect competition in the territory of the Member State(s) making the 
request.
158
 On raw data, since 1990 to date, there have been a total of 32 requests from 




  Any Member State is automatically relieved from examination of a concentration, once 
the Commission initiates its examination proceedings over the same concentration.
160
 For 
instance, in the bank merger case of Chase Manhattan/Chemical Banking,
161
 once the 
Commission started the review process of the proposed bank merger, some Member States, 
like the UK, where the merging banks had considerable business presence, were relieved from 
assessing the merger.
162
   
 
  A Member State shall not apply its national laws on competition to any concentration 
that has a Community dimension.
163
 Exception to this rule shall apply, if the Member State 
invokes the protection under its legitimate interest ground claiming public interest, plurality of 
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the media, and prudential rules.
164
 The Commission provides a narrow interpretation of 
legitimate interest because its applicability constitutes an exception to the Commission‘s 
exclusive jurisdiction to scrutinise concentrations with a Community dimension.
165
 For 
example, in the bank merger case of Banco Santander Central Hispano/A Champalimaud
166
 
the Portuguese Government claimed that the merger would interfere with the national 
interests. The Commission rejected these arguments and required that the Government 
suspended its opposition to the merger transaction. The Commission, also, held similar 
findings in the bank merger case of UniCredito/HVB
167
 against the Polish Government‘s 
opposition to block the merger under national interest. 
 
      The Commission analyses a concentration to determine if it is compatible with the EU 
Common Market.
168
 A concentration is incompatible in the event it establishes or strengthens 





Prior to initiating the formal investigative proceedings on a merger, the Commission 
conducts a pre-merger clearance process.
170
 During this process, parties to a proposed merger 
hold informal and confidential consultations with the Commission. In these consultations, 
parties discuss whether the Commission obtains jurisdiction on the proposed merger, and 
whether the case could be referred to relevant Member State(s)
171
 or from Member State(s) to 
Commission.
172
 In addition, the Commission looks into whether the case qualifies for the 
simplified procedure,
173
 nature of information that the merging parties need to provide 
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including completion of the premerger forms,
174
 and ascertaining important issues, possible 
competition aspects and meeting procedural deadlines.
175
   
 
In case of the applicability of a merger referral that is eligible for examination in at 
least three Member States, such merger can be reviewed directly by the Commission.
176
  This 
allows the merging parties to benefit from the Commission‘s one-stop shop review.  
 
  The Commission‘s investigative proceedings of a merger are divided in two phases, 
namely Phase 1 and Phase 2.
177
   
 
After the completion of the pre-merger process, the Commission starts Phase 1 
investigative proceedings. This phase begins with the merging parties informing the 
Commission of the proposed merger.
178
  Along with the notification from the merging parties 
to the Commission about the proposed merger, the parties submit to the Commission a 
completed Form CO.
179
 Within twenty-five days from receipt of the notification, the 
Commission has to render its Phase 1 decision.
180
  During this time, the Commission decides 
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provision of extensive information on the transaction, market definition and market share information. 
180
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whether the merger (i) is out of scope of the ECMR,
181
 (ii) is compatible with the internal 
market,
182
 (iii) or, as modified by the parties, no longer raises serious doubts, and so may be 
declared compatible with the internal market (subject to fulfilment of commitments),
183
 or (iv) 
raises serious doubts as to its compatibility with the internal market,
184
 therefore, referring the 
case to Phase 2 investigation.
185
   
 
 Notification of the merging parties to the Commission in Phase 1 can be based on a 
letter of intent to merge or acquire in which the parties would need to show to the 
Commission a good faith intention to consummate a merger agreement.
186
 Upon receipt of a 
merger notification, the Commission shall notify all Member States about the concerning 




Fifteen days upon receipt of the Commission‘s notification, Member States should 
inform the Commission whether they wish to seek referral of the concerning merger.
188
  
Where referral is sought, the Commission‘s deadline for the Phase 1 decision is extended by 




Within twenty days, upon receipt of the Commission‘s notification, merging parties 
(i.e., banks) must submit to the EU competition authority their proposed commitments, such 
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185
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as, divesture of assets, in order to resolve any concerns arisen from Commission.
190
 If the 
parties offer commitments, the deadline for a Phase 1 decision is extended by ten working 
days, to thirty-five.
191
 In the event that the merging parties satisfy the Commission‘s proposed 




If the Commission is unable to make a determination within twenty-five days, upon 
receipt of the complete notification from the merging parties, subject that no extension is made, 




     However, in the event that the Commission determines that further investigation is 
needed over the merger or the commitments made by the parties are proven to be deficient, 




The Commission initiates Phase 2 by issuing to the merging parties a formal, written 
decision, outlining the Commission‘s serious doubts about the merger‘s compatibility with the 
Common Market.
195
  Within this phase the Commission has ninety days to reach a final ruling 
on the proposed merger.
196
  Throughout such period, if the Commission decides that the 
concentration will have harmful consequences on competition, the EU competition authority 





 The ninety-day timetable can be extended by the merging parties‘ ‗stopping the clock‘ 
request to the Commission or the latter‘s own initiative, or if the merging parties offer 
remedial commitments after the fifty-fourth day of the Phase 2 investigative proceedings.
198
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191
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192
 Ibid, art 10.6. 
193
 Ibid, arts 6.1, and 10.6.  More than 90 per cent of all cases are resolved in Phase 1, generally, without 
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196
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197
 Commission Regulation 447/98 (1998) OJ L 61/1, art 13(2). 
198
 The time limits for decisions in art 10 of the ECMR (n49) are strict and can be tolled only for a delimited 
period with the consent of the parties.  The EU must issue decisions in all cases.  If it fails to issue a decision by 
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If certain situations arise throughout the Phase 2, the ninety-day statutory deadline 
would be extended automatically.
199
 For example, within fifteen days after the start of Phase 2 
the merging parties may request an extension of time.
200
  Also, the Commission may extend 




    The Commission, also, holds meetings with the merging and interested parties as early 
as possible in the Phase 2. The goal for these meetings is to enable the Commission to reach a 
more informed conclusion as to the relevant market characteristics of the proposed 





    About six weeks from the start of the Phase 2 proceedings, the Commission may 
conclude its investigation with the issuance of a SO that outlines the Commission‘s 
competitive concerns over the proposed merger.
203
 Anything on which the Commission 
wishes to rely on its final decision should be included in the SO.  The SO is accompanied by 





    SO issuance triggers the parties‘ right of access to the Commission‘s investigative file, 




    Normally two weeks after issuance of the SO, upon the merging parties‘ request, the 
Commission holds a formal hearing, at which unsworn testimony is taken from the parties and 
other interested parties, including customers and competitors.
206
  
                                                                                                                                                                             
the relevant ECMR deadline, the concentration, under art 10.6 of the ECMR, is deemed cleared in the form 
originally notified. 
199
 ECMR (n49), art 10.3. 
200




 Ibid, art 18(3). 
203
 Best Practices Guidelines (n132), paras 33(c) and (d). 
204
 Ibid, para 49. 
205
 Ibid, paras 34-37.  Similar access is not afforded in the US unless and until the agencies issue a complaint and 
the matter goes to litigation. 
206





    Following the parties‘ reply to the SO and the hearing, another meeting may take place 
that may, also, serve as an opportunity to discuss the scope and timing of possible remedy 
proposals.
207
   
 
  Within sixty-five days upon the start of the Phase 2, the merging parties must submit 
any proposed commitments, such as, divesture actions, that they wish the Commission to 
consider settling the merger case.
208
     
 
    If the parties submit proposed remedies between fifty-five and sixty-five days, upon 
the start of the Phase 2 proceedings, the deadline for the Commission‘s final decision is 
extended by fifteen days.
209
   
 
    Another meeting may be held prior to the ‗advisory committee‘
210
 meeting, primarily 
to discuss proposed remedies. 
 
On or before the expiration of the foregoing deadline(s), if the Commission has not 
rendered any decision on the merger, concentration would be presumed to be compatible with 
the EU Common Market.
211
 
        
The Commission is not empowered to compel oral testimony under oath. However, the 
Commission may take voluntary interviews and it can obtain answers to written questions.  
The Commission has the right to inspect the merging parties‘ premises including the 
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       The Commission may suspend the decision deadlines, where parties do not timely 




    Upon completion of its Phase 2 investigation, the Commission issues a decision on the 
proposed merger. In this regard, the Commission may decide to find the merger to be 
compatible with the Common Market,
214
 or it may decide that the merger is compatible with 
commitments to be undertaken by the undertakings
215
 or it blocks (prohibits) the merger
216
 
considering being incompatible with the Common Market.   
 
Since September, 1990 to date, the Commission has reviewed a total of 6,096 
notifications on merger cases, and it has issued only 24 prohibition decisions.
217
 Among these 
decisions only one case, Deutsche Börse/NYSE Euronext
218
 relates to financial services.  In 
the Deutsche Börse/NYSE Euronext case, the Commission blocked the proposed merger 
asserting that such merger would have eliminated the global competition, and it would have 
established a quasi-monopoly in a number of assets classes, leading to substantial harm to 
derivatives users and the European economy in its entirety.
219
 The Commission found that 
without actual competitive restriction left in the market, the price competition benefits would 
be taken away from customers.
220
 In addition, the Commission concluded that there would be 
less innovation in an area in which a competitive market is important for both small and 




Considering the low number of prohibition decisions issued to proposed mergers, it is 
clear that in practice many mergers go through because in the course of Phase 2 proceedings 
the parties hammer out a deal with the Commission whereby they remove the most 
anticompetitive (in Commission eyes) aspects.
222
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When the Commission finds that a merger has been consummated however it is declared 
incompatible with the common market or the EU competition authority finds that the 
undertakings have implemented the merger in contravention with conditions attached to the 
merger, i.e., fulfilment of certain commitments, Commission may require that the said 
concentration be dissolved.
223
 From 1990 to date Commission has implemented the dissolution 
mechanism over a concentration in very rare cases.  For example, in a total of 239 merger 
cases that underwent the Phase 2 proceedings, only in 4 of them Commission decided to 
‗restore effective competition‘
224
 therefore, dissolving them.
225
   
 
    The Commission can issue fines
226
 of up to 10 per cent of the total turnover of the 
merging parties where they fail to notify a concentration prior to its implementation, fail to 
comply with conditions of a Commission‘s decision clearing a merger, or consummate a 
merger in the face of a prohibition decision.
227
  Imposition of these fines has been quite rarely 




The Commission may also issue fines when merging parties deliberately or negligently 
fail to inform the authority of the merger, provide requested information, or supply erroneous 
or deceptive information.
229
    
 
Although a concentration won‘t be put into effect either before its notification or until it 
has been declared compatible with the common market,
230
 the Commission may, on request, 
grant derogation from the obligations imposed taking into account the effects of the suspension 
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 ECMR (n49), art 14. 
227
 Ibid, art 14.2. 
228
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on one or more undertakings concerned or on a third party and the threat to competition posed 
by the concentration.
231
  A derogation from the obligation to suspend concentrations is granted 
only exceptionally; only in 114 mergers, since 1990 to date.
232
  For example, in Macquarie 
Bank Limited/Crown Castle UK Holdings Limited
233
, the Commission, based on parties‘ 
request, granted a derogation to Macquarie from the obligations imposed under the ECMR
234
 in 
accordance with certain terms and conditions until the acquisition has been declared compatible 
with the common market by means of the Commission‘s decision.
235
 Other derogation related 
bank merger cases are Santander/Bradford & Bingley Assets
236
 and BNP Paribas/Fortis.
237
  In 
Santander/Bradford & Bingley, the Commission received a reasoned request for derogation on 
the same day that the UK Government received Santander‘s bid for the assets, indicating the 
extent of the Commission‘s ability to proceed quickly and flexibility in times of financial crisis.  
In BNP Paribas/Fortis, prior to the conditional clearance decision, the Commission had granted 
the parties‘ request for a derogation to permit BNP Paribas to acquire assets pending the 




The Commission‘s decisions on proposed concentrations, including bank mergers, are 




Of the UK-origin bank mergers adjudicated upon by the Commission in the last 
decade, all have been authorized.
240
 Even in those instances in which the Commission 
hesitated initially to approve the bank merger(s), on the condition of certain divestures, such 
merger(s) were eventually approved.
241
 For example, in 2015 the Commission approved the 
bank acquisition of TSB Banking Group, a British bank and a spin-off of Lloyds, by Banco 
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de Sabadell, S.A. of Spain
242
 due to successful completion of the divestments commitments 





The foregoing suggests that the Commission adopts a laissez-faire attitude towards 
bank merger regulation.  Presently, there is no sign of a change in the competition authority‘s 
philosophy.  The authority‘s laissez-faire stance could be tested by a surge of future 
consolidations that may happen due to ongoing relaxation of credit conditions across the 
markets.  
 
Framework and approach to the assessment of State aids in the EU 
 
A multifaceted framework of EU State aid rules is designed to entrust such aid is 
compatible with the requirements of the Internal Market.
244
  The validity of State aid given by 





Any aid authorized by a Member State or through State resources, in any way, is in 
principle not allowed as discordant with the Internal Market, where it alters or risk to alter 
competition by advantaging particular undertakings, i.e., banks or the production of given 




In order to be prohibited, an aid must be ‗selective‘,
247
 meaning it should influence the 
balance between the beneficiary institution and its competitors.  General measures that apply 
to all financial institutions in a Member State would not be categorized as aid.  Aid must 
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sustain a real or latent impact
248
 on trade between Member States, except for in the situation 




In the framework laid out in the TFEU and Council regulations made upon Article 109 
TFEU, the Commission maintains a crucial position in assessing existing aid and in choosing 




In relation to banks, the Commission has issued a series of communications adopted 
during and post GFC.
251
  The 2013 Banking Communication
252
 and the 2009 Recapitalisation 
and Impaired Assets Communications
253
 tackles state guarantees on liabilities, 
recapitalisations and asset relief measures. The 2009 Restructuring Communication tackles 




 It is not unusual for a Member State to finance certain investments or to make capital 
contributions to financial institutions, where it holds an interest.
255
  These types of 
transactions concern a transfer of State resources, but may not necessarily concern a selective 
benefit or ‗net cost‘ to, or a burden on, the State in advising that advantage, if the transfer is 
made on market terms.  In this regard, the Commission is required to ascertain whether the 
State is acting as a private market investor - the so-called ‗private market investor‘ test.
256
  




 Commission, ‗State aid: Commission adopts revised exemption for small aid amounts (de minimis 
Regulation) Press Release (18 December 2013); see, also, Commission, ‗State aid modernisation (SAM) and its 
implementation‘ (08.05.2012) COM/2012/0209 final. 
250
 TFEU, art 109. 
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 DG Competition Staff Working Document, ‗The application of State aid rules to government schemes 
covering bank debt to be issued after 30 June 2011‘ (01.06.2011). 
256
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95 
 
This approach is criticised for its variation from the classical ‗effects-based‘ approach in State 
aid control through a ‗balancing test‘
257
 in as much as the meaning behind the issuance of an 
aid is evidently considered irrelevant in the classical approach. 
 
The Commission‘s policy on State aid, during the GFC, evolved from a very lenient 
approach - prompted by the high economic and political tension of the early days of the GFC - 
towards a stricter approach as the financial and economic context became more stable. The 
Commission‘s method to increase the toughness of State aid control progressively is based on 
the publication of soft law instruments stating how it intended to approach the compatibility 
of aid for banks in different periods of the GFC.
258
 This method has been used by the 
Commission in the past to fill the gap left by the absence of legal (and particularly procedural) 
instruments, in the field of State aid, as Member States refused to adopt them for many years. 
The adoption of soft law instruments, together with a permissive interpretation of the rules—
essentially accepting all bank-related aid schemes proposed by Member States at the start of 
the GFC - under exceptional legal basis,
259
 was motivated by a desire to avoid direct 
confrontation with Member States in a difficult economic context, in which it was even 
proposed, to suspend the application of the State aid discipline altogether.
260
  The 
Commission‘s method has attempted to fill a gap in the regulation at EU level concerning 
banks‘ supervision, a regulation that has only were issued during and post GFC.
261
  It is 
accurate to determine that the TFEU bans aids that distort competition.  However, it was 
difficult to find a satisfactory solution, when an emergency, such as the GFC, arises.
262
  The 
Commission responded with a ‗crisis regime‘ devised to combine the needs for quick and 
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flexible State intervention with the safeguard of competition and the avoidance of subsidy 
races.
263
  The Commission, also, pursued a number of regulatory objectives, in addition to the 
traditional protection of competition and the internal market‘s integrity. Throughout its 
enforcement of the State aid rules in the context of the GFC, the Commission tackled issues, 




During the GFC, the Commission adopted a very lax approach with the publication of 
the Banking Communication 2008,
265
 which introduced the new legal basis for compatibility 
of measures related to the financial sector (TFEU Article 107(3)(b)) that allowed the 
Commission to treat the financial sector as special, and therefore, to be more flexible and 
lenient with this sector than with others under the rescue and restructuring compatibility rules, 
as well as the commitment to approve State aid measures within a short notice, and, in event 




During the GFC, the Commission published the Recapitalization Communication
267
 
that adopted a pragmatic and lax approach towards ‗fundamentally sound‘ banks at the request 
Member States, while it became stricter vis-à-vis distressed banks, imposing conditions for 
them to obtain compatible State aid that had not been previously demanded of banks in the 
Banking Communication.
268
 The Commission, also, adopted the Impaired Assets 
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 Communication on the re-capitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial crisis: limitation of aid 
to the minimum necessary and safeguards against undue distortions of competition (‗Re-capitalisation 







 where it created a balance between accommodating the demands of 
Member States that wanted to remove toxic assets from the banks‘ balance sheets, with those 
of competitors and the financial industry that feared that governments could overvalue the 




In 2013, the Commission issued a ‗new‘ communication
271
 that replaced the 2008 
Banking Communication
272
 and supplements the remaining crisis rules. Under the issued 
communication, Commission further tightens the rules applicable to State aid for the banking 
sector by, for instance, making the temporary authorizations of recapitalizations 
exceptional.
273
  The ‗new‘ Communication
274
 requires banks to work out a restructuring plan, 
including a capital-raising plan, before they can receive recapitalization measures.  
 
The Commission has emerged, through the application of the State aid rules, as a 
pragmatic crisis-management and resolution authority that adopted a strategically permissive 
position at the start of the GFC, when the latter was most needed, and became stricter over 
time, as the macroeconomic condition became more stable and the political pressure to 
authorize aid schemes diminished.
275
 In the last phase of the GFC, the Commission pursued 
regulatory objectives past the whole competition preservation in the market and the Internal 
Market integrity.
276
 The Commission found the right balance between preventing 
significant distortions of competition and allowing national interventions in the absence of a 
EU framework to deal with such a severe crisis.
277
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 Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 January 2013, of State aid rules to support 
measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis (Banking Communication‘) OJ 2013/C 216/01, 
30.7.2013. 
272
 2008 Banking Communication (n265). 
273
 Banking Communication (n271), art 2. 
274
 Ibid, art 3. 
275
 J J Piernas Lopez, The concept of State aid under EU law: From internal market to competition and beyond 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp 224-6. 
276
  B Hawk (ed), Fordham Competition Law Institute in F Jenny et al State aids and EU competition law and 
policy (2010, New York: Juris Publishing), pp 300-4. 
277
 H C H Hofmann et al (eds) State aid law of the European Union Law in C Micheau Evolution of State aid 
rules: Conceptions, challenges, and outcomes (2016, Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp 18-35.  
98 
 
The Commission concluded that the financial crisis rules, taken as a whole, resulted in 
an approach centred on the overall balance of the compatibility conditions, based on a 





The so-called ‗State Aid action plan‘ in 2005
279
 modernised the State aid control based 
on less and better targeted State aid, a refined economic approach, more effective procedures 
and enforcement, greater predictability and transparency, as well as sharing of responsibility 
between the Commission and the Member States.
280
  The foregoing plan set out a vision of 
simpler, more effective and transparent procedures for State aids that are efficient from an 
economic perspective.
281
The Commission pursued this approach by introducing several 
instruments, such as, a ‗new‘ de minimis Regulation,
282
 the general block exemption 
Regulation (‗GBER‘),
283
 the introduction of a simplified procedure
284
 for the approval of 
certain types of aid and a Code of Practice
285
 for the conduct of State aid control proceedings, 
notice
286
 on the enforcement of State aid law by national courts, and a number of revised 
guidelines and communications
287
 spelling out the State aid rules for specific sectors or 
objectives of common interest. 
 
 A more refined economic approach to State aid has maximizes the benefits of State 
aid, while minimizing its negative outcomes on competition and the Internal Market. 
                                                        
278
 Commission communication on the return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the 
financial sector in the current crisis under the State aid rules, OJ C 195, 19.8.2009 (―Restructuring 
Communication‘). 
279
 State aid action plan – Less and better targeted state aid: A roadmap for state aid reform 2005-2009 
(Consultation document) COM (2005) 107 final, 7.6.2005 (‗SAAP‘). 
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 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 
of the TFEU to de minimis aid, OJ L 352/1, 24.12.2013. 
283
 Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal 
market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the TFEU, OJ L 187/1, 26.6.2014.  
284
 Commission Notice on a Simplified procedure for the treatment of certain types of State aid, OJ C136, 
16.06.2009. 
285
 Commission Notice on a Best Practice Code on the conduct of State aid control proceedings, OJ C 136, 
16.06.2009. 
286
 Notice from the Commission – Towards an effective implementation of Commission decisions ordering 
Member States to recover unlawful and incompatible State aid, OJ C 272, 15.11.2007; see, also, Commission 
notice on the enforcement of State aid law by national courts, OJ C 85, 09.04.2009. 
287
 For more information, visit http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/rules.html. 
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Especially, the State Aid Action Plan
288
 and the State Aid Modernization Communication
289
 
look at the notion of market failure and on its importance to justify public intervention, and on 
the incentive results of the aid.  The more economic approach to State aid is implemented 
through the so-called led ‗balancing test‘,
290
 which weighs the positive outcomes of the aid 
against distortions of competition and trade.  
 
 Identifying a target of common interest is insufficient for the State aid‘s approval, 
pursuant to TFEU.
291
  The Commission‘s shift of emphasis to considerations of economic 
efficiency is reflected in its policy objective of moving from a form-based approach towards a 
more effects-based approach
292
 that shows the economic implications of State aid. The 
centrepiece of the modernized approach is the adoption of common goals applicable to the 
assessment of compatibility of all the aid measures conducted by the Commission. These 
common goals are based on the balancing test,
293
 which has three stages.  The first stage 
deems whether the aid is targeted at a ‗well-defined object of common interest‘,
294
 including 
efficiency objectives and equity objectives.
295
 The second stage deems whether the aid is a 
‗well-designed instrument‘ with which to transmit the identified objectives.
296
  The third stage 
deems the potential negative consequences of the aid need to be considered and weighed 
against the positive consequences of achieving the common interest‘s objectives.
297
  The 
balancing test uses cost-benefit analysis as a means of identifying the Member State‘s aids 
falling, pursuant to the derogation in TFEU.
298




In this chapter, a number of different institutional actors play critical roles in maintaining a 
                                                        
288
 SAAP (n279). 
289
 SAM (n249). 
290
 In SAAP (n279), the Commission introduced the ‗balancing test‘ which is applied to measures that are Stat aid 
under the meaning of TFEU Article 107(1), and therefore, unlawful, but that might be declared compatible with 
the Internal Market as being in the common interest under the derogation in TFEU Article 107(3)(c). 
291
 TFEU, art 107(3). 
292
 SAAP (n279), para 19. 
293








 Ibid.  
298
 TFEU, art 107(3). 
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competitive environment in the UK banking and finance sector are examined. However, in 
some instances, these bodies are hampered in the discharge of their functions by competing 
priorities, such as, the maintenance of broader financial stability or desire to limit interference 
in markets to the most minimum level. Surveying previous practices and in particular events 
of the last decade, it is difficult not to suggest that the competition and banking authorities 
could exercise their responsibilities in more active and effective ways, whilst acknowledging 
the challenging and constantly circumstances in which they operate. 
 
Where a merger situation affects both EU and UK interests, the Commission is the EU 
entity responsible for competition oversight.  In doing so, the Commission analyses cases with 
an EU ‗dimension‘ against the ECMR. On occasion, Commission decisions have been 
criticized as including scant reasoning, which is possibly due to the limited time provided to 
complete investigations and issue decisions. Conversely, the Commission has also been 
criticized for delay, and issuing decisions at a time when the market has evidently changed 
from when the merger was initially notified. The Commission has been criticized
299
 by many 
experts of antitrust for reliance upon testimonial evidence of interested parties, focusing on 
immediate consequences rather than long-term impacts, being toothless in terms of 
punishments it may impose, and due to the absence of an ability to review decisions on 
merger situations, which go on to produce unanticipated negative competition consequences. 
Taking inspiration from the equivalent US regulatory provision,
300
 the ability of the 
Commission to seek treble damages from delinquent parties would constitute an effective 
deterrent. Additional improvements to Commission‘s discharge of its role would be the 
betterment of evidentiary standards and the ability to reconsider competition based merger 
determinations that turn out to be erroneous. In common with the CMA and its predecessors, 
the Commission has an unblemished record in approving bank mergers, which may, in due 
course, be tested when faced with future market consolidations. 
 
As can be seen, there are both structural and result related similarities between the UK 
national and EU mechanisms for reviewing competition concerns associated with bank 
                                                        
299
 J Saurer, ‗The Accountability of Supranational Administration: The Case of European Union Agencies‘ 
(2009) 24 American University International Law Review 429, pp 434-442. 
300
 Commission, ‗Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of EC Treaty Anti-Trust Rules – FAQs‘ (20 




mergers. In both cases, there is considerable room for improvement, as the present author has 
identified. In practical terms, the systems could better synergize in cases that give rise to 
issues that can properly be divided and addressed in tandem, in a way that makes logical sense 
without unnecessarily duplicating work. 
  
In relation to the UK Government‘s framework and approach to the assessment of 
State aid, the latter is an advantage provided by the UK Government to undertakings i.e., 
banks, in particular situations that could likely thwart competition and affect trade in the EU. 
The State aid definition is satisfied, if four characteristics of the so-called ‗the four tests‘ are 
present for assistance to be defined as State aid.  Such characteristics are that the assistance is 
granted by the UK Government or through its resources; the assistance favours certain 
undertakings, i.e., banks, or the production of certain goods; the assistance distorts or 
threatens to distort competition; and the assistance affects trade between Member States. 
 
Although Article 107(1) regulates general prohibition on State aid, the TFEU provides 
exceptions, where aid is or may be considered compatible with the common market.  
Generally speaking, exemptions are divided in (i) State aid that is considered automatically 
permissible, that is compatible with the EU Treaty; and (ii) State aid that requires approval of 
the Commission. 
 
The UK Government aims at taking a ‗risk-based‘ approach to decision-making that 
both abides by legal obligations and centres on target delivery.  In other words, State aid 
decisions ought to be based on what is ‗credible‘ instead of what necessarily is ‗cast-iron‘. 
Nevertheless, the Government is responsible to ensure that it comprehends and deems the 
effect and prospect of State aid risk concerned and, especially, the degree where any risk 
would be assumed by business rather than or in addition to the Government and warrant the 
degree of risk is one that business and the Government can tolerate. The Government has 
issued provisions that outline a risk-based approach to decision-making in State aid cases. 
These provisions are aimed at assisting those concerned in each stage of the process, from 
planning a measure to its actual implementation, and it applies to State aid providers 




While presenting a measure, it is significant to count the prospect of a State aid 
challenge.  An affected competitor or individual may launch a complaint to a UK court or the 
Commission, or the latter may be urged by a Member State‘s policy declarations or actively 
scrutinise areas of specific interest. 
 
In reference to the framework and approach to the assessment of State aids in the EU, 
a multifaceted framework of EU State aid rules is designed to entrust such aid is compatible 
with the requirements of the Internal Market. The validity of State aid given by Member 
States is regulated by Articles 107 to 109 TFEU and numerous secondary guidelines and 
measures. 
 
Any aid authorized by a Member State or through State resources, in any way, is in 
principle not allowed as discordant with the Internal Market, where it alters or risk to alter 
competition by advantaging particular undertakings, i.e., banks or the production of given 
goods; and influences trade between Member States. 
 
The Commission‘s policy on State aid, during the GFC, evolved from a very lenient 
approach - prompted by the high economic and political tension of the early days of the GFC - 
towards a stricter approach as the financial and economic context became more stable. The 
Commission‘s method to increase the toughness of State aid control progressively is based on 
the publication of soft law instruments stating how it intended to approach the compatibility 
of aid for banks in different periods of the GFC. This method has been used by the 
Commission in the past to fill the gap left by the absence of legal (and particularly procedural) 
instruments, in the field of State aid, as Member States refused to adopt them for many years. 
The adoption of soft law instruments, together with a permissive interpretation of the rules—
essentially accepting all bank-related aid schemes proposed by Member States at the start of 
the GFC - under exceptional legal basis, was motivated by a desire to avoid direct 
confrontation with Member States in a difficult economic context, in which it was even 
proposed, to suspend the application of the State aid discipline altogether.  The Commission‘s 
method has attempted to fill a gap in the regulation at EU level concerning banks‘ 
supervision, a regulation that has only were issued during and post GFC.  It is accurate to 
determine that the TFEU bans aids that distort competition.  However, it was difficult to find a 
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satisfactory solution, when an emergency, such as the GFC, arises.  The Commission 
responded with a ‗crisis regime‘ devised to combine the needs for quick and flexible State 
intervention with the safeguard of competition and the avoidance of subsidy races.  The 
Commission, also, pursued a number of regulatory objectives, in addition to the traditional 
protection of competition and the internal market‘s integrity. Throughout its enforcement of 
the State aid rules in the context of the GFC, the Commission tackled issues, i.e., financial 
stability, or moral hazard. 
  
 By stating that it wants to base the analysis of compatibility of an aid on a review of its 
costs and benefits, the Commission has taken a clear step in the direction of a more coherent 
economic effects-based approach to State aid control. The Commission‘s current 
modernization initiative and the further revision of the guidelines, may move the State aid 
assessment closer to the more economic approach envisioned by the Commission, leading to 
decisions that are substantially more grounded in the financial and economic analysis of 
effects than in the past.  There is obviously a conceptual framework, which identifies several 
substantive points that require to be established, where financial and economic analysis can 
render the most credible evidence.  
 
During the GFC, the Commission managed to assist Member States avert a banking 
meltdown, and to avert significant distortions of competition in the Internal Market, while 
sustaining the State aid rules in place. The Commission‘s central position was substantially 
reinforced by the Member States‘ realization that traditional national protectionist policies 
could be extremely dangerous in the present level of economic integration.  
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CHAPTER 4 - ROLE OF UNITED KINGDOM’S COURTS AND GOVERNMENT IN  
  BANK MERGER REVIEWS 
 
This chapter discusses the role of the UK and EU courts, as well as the contribution of the UK 
Government and the Commission in the enhancement of the bank mergers‘ review process in 
the UK.    
 
4.0  Courts and competition authorities - review of bank mergers 
 
Courts in the UK and the EU play an important role in the interpretation and enforcement of 
competition laws in the bank merger cases in relation to UK and non-UK banks merging, or 
wishing to merge in the UK.  The UK court authorized to review bank merger cases is the 
Competition Appeal Tribunal.
1
 At the EU level, the judicial courts authorized to review bank 




 The UK Government and the EU competition authority, also, play a similar important 
role in the bank merger review process. The Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and 
Skills is authorized to intervene on behalf of the UK Government, under special situations, 
in a bank merger review. And the Commission has the power,
3
 on behalf of the EU, to 
review bank mergers (concentration) with the Community dimension. 
 
4.1  UK courts and the Competition Appeal Tribunal (‘CAT’) 
 
The Competition Appeal Tribunal (‗CAT‘) was created in April, 2003,
4
 succeeding the 
Competition Commission Appeal Tribunal, which was created by the Competition Act 1998.
5
  
Bank merger cases are heard at the Tribunal by a three-judge panel. The Tribunal adopts the 
same principles that a court would use in adjudicating a merger application for review.
6
 It 
                                                        
1
 Competition Appeal Tribunal, available at http://www.catribunal.org.uk/. 
2
 General Court, available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7033/; Court of Justice, available at 
http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice/index_en.htm.   
3
  Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January, 2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings, OJ L 24/1, 29 January, 2004 (‗ECMR‘), art 1(2).  
4
 Enterprise Act 2002, c. 40 (‗EA02‘), s 12; Sched 2. 
5
 Competition Act 1998, c. 41 (‗CA98‘), s 48; Sched 8. 
6
 EA02 (n4), s 120.4. 
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would not be able to substitute these principles with its own views on the merits of the case.
7
  
Rather, it must examine the lawfulness, rationality and objectivity of the relevant decisions 
and, if required, it may demand the Competition and Markets Authority (‗CMA‘) or request 
the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills (‗SoS‘), depending on which 




The banks concerned may appeal the Tribunal‘s decision to the Court of Appeal in 
England, Wales or Northern Ireland, or to the Court of Session in Scotland, depending on the 




The Court of Appeal has acknowledged that the CAT is ‗an expert and specialist 
tribunal, specifically constituted by Parliament to make judgments in an area of law in 
which judges have no expertise‘.
10
 Thus, it falls under the category recognized by the court 
in Cooke v Secretary of State for Social Security
11
as a special body whose judgments the 
Court of Appeal remains hesitant to interfere with.  This may be one of the reasons that bank 
merger reviews by the judiciary in the UK have been dealt almost exclusively by the 




The CAT continues to contribute to the development of the review of merger law.  
Reviews by the judiciary, heard by the CAT, have seen an enhanced process of collecting 
evidence and a higher degree of transparency of the bank merger review process.
13
  Under the 
former UK regime of review by the judiciary, competition regulators succeeded in all cases 
because, to a certain extent, courts would defer the decision to competition and banking 
                                                        
7
 Ibid, s 15.4; see, also, [2001] EWCA Civ 1916, [2002] 1 WLR 2120, para 41. 
8
 EA02 (n4), s 120.5; see, also, C Clarke, ‗The UK Competition Regime; Recent Changes and Future Challenges‘ 
(December, 2004) Japanese Fair Trade Commission Seminar, available at 
www.jftc.go.jp/cprc/koukai/seminar/h16/02_2-report.files/koenku.pdf.  
9
 EA02 (n4), s 120.6. 
10
 Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Ltd v The Director General of Fair Trading [2002] EWCA Civ 796, [2002] 
UKCLR 726, para 34, per Buxton LJ. 
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[2001] EWCA Civ 734, [2002] 3 All ER 279, para 38. 
12
 This finding is based on the author of this thesis‘ extensive case law research.  
13
 K Middleton et al, Cases & Materials on UK & EC Competition Law (2nd edn, New York: Oxford University 
Press 2009), pp 81-3. 
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However, a review of the CAT‘s role in shaping the bank mergers in the UK and other 
competition aspects in banking business would reveal a number of shortcomings. It has almost 
no experience in handling bank merger cases. Since its inception, the CAT appears to have 
decided one bank merger case,
15
 and a very few others that indirectly affect competition 
aspects in banking operations in the market.
 
This may have been a result of several factors, 
such as, the efforts by the competition authorities and bank merger parties to resolve their 
concerns at the merger examination level, or a more compromised or relaxed approach by the 
competition authorities in approving bank merger notifications. Regardless of the reasons, 
nevertheless, the CAT deserves more time to consolidate its role and position in enhancing 
competition aspects in bank merger cases. Whether CAT will be able to step up to the 
expectations is yet to be seen.  
 
4.2  EU courts  
 
The Commission‘s decisions are conditioned upon legal review by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (‗ECJ‘) that is the judicial institution of the European Union.
16
 The Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (‗TFEU‘) provides the ECJ with the authority to 
review bank merger decisions made by the Commission.
17
  The Court is made up of three 
courts: (i) the General Court,
18
 the Court of Justice,
19
 and the Civil Service Tribunal.
20
  Their 
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 C Graham, ‗The Enterprise Act 2002 and Competition Law‘ (2004) 67 The Modern Law Review 273, pp 273-
88. 
15
 For a discussion of the appeal of the HBOS takeover by Lloyds before the Competition Appeal Tribunal 
(‗CAT‘) in 2008, see chapter 4.3.1(a) in this thesis, pp 88-94. 
16
 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Consolidated version 2012) OJ C 326/01 P. 0001-0390 
(‗TFEU‘), art 263; For more information about the role of the ECJ, see ‗European Union: Court of Justice of the 
European Union‘, available at see http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7024/#jurisprudences.  
17
 TFEU (n16), art 263, that states that ‗[t]he Court of Justice … shall review the legality of legislative acts … 
intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties‘; see, also, C Kerse and N Khan, EU Antitrust Procedure 
(6th edn, London: Sweet & Maxwell 2012), pp 41-2. 
18
 Treaty on European Union (Consolidated version 2012) OJ C 326/01, P. 0001 – 0390 (‗TEU‘), arts 19(1) and 
19(2); see generally, Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Consolidated version 2015) , as 
amended by Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 741/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
August, 2012 (OJ L 228, 23.8.2012, p 1), by Article 9 of the act concerning the conditions of accession to the 
European Union of the Republic of Croatia and the adjustments to the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community 
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primary role is to examine the legality of the EU measures and ensure the uniform 
interpretation and application of EU law. 
 
 Set out, below, is a discussion of the role of the General Court, and the European 
Court of Justice, respectively, in reviewing the competition aspects related to bank merger 
cases.
21
   
 
 4.2.1 General Court 
 
The General Court is composed of at least one judge from each Member State. Presently, the 
Court is composed of forty judges, a number, which is expected to increase gradually to 
fifty-six in 2019.
22
  The judges are nominated by joint agreement among the governments of 
the Member States, upon prior consultation.
23
 
The General Court has jurisdiction to hear and rule on actions commenced by any 
party of interest (i.e., merging banks) to annul the decisions or declare a failure to act by the 
institutions, bodies, agencies, or offices of the EU.
24
  
It, also, has jurisdiction over actions initiated by the EU Member States against the 
Commission, the Council of the EU concerning undertakings adopted on State aid,
25
 and 
actions by any party of interest (i.e., merging banks) demanding compensation for damage 
caused by any EU institution, bodies, agencies, or offices
26
 or relating to contracts made by 




                                                                                                                                                                             
(OJ L 112, 24.4.2012, p 21) and by Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2015/2422 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 December, 2015 (OJ L 341, 24.12.2015, p 14) (‗Statute‘). 
19
 TEU (n18), arts 19.1, and 19.3; see, also, generally, Statute (n18). 
20
 TFEU (n16), art 257; see, also, Statute (n18), Annex I, arts 1-13 
21
 The role of the Civil Service Tribunal is outside the scope of this thesis; therefore, it is not discussed in this 
thesis.   
22
 Statute (n18), art 48.  7 more judges will be added to the Court when the Civil Service Tribunal is dissolved in 
September, 2016, then another 9 judges will be added to the Court, to total 56 judges by 2019. 
23
 TEU (n18), art 19.2; TFEU (n16), arts 253, and 254. 
24
 TFEU (n16), art 256. 
25
 Ibid, art 263. 
26
 Ibid, arts 268, and 340.2.  
27
 Ibid, art 340.1. 
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Moreover, it has jurisdiction over cases concerning the scope of the application of EU 
competition provisions, cartels, abuse of a dominant position, merger cases where the Court 
may decide whether the merger is compatible with the common market on the basis that it 
would rise to a dominant position, the compatibility of State aid with the common market, and 
related areas.   
 
Unlike the courts of appeal in the US, the General Court does not look at the records 
on appeal.
28
 Nevertheless, the court may demand documents production, call and probe 
experts and witnesses, and direct additional inquiries.
29
 After the General Court renders a 
ruling, the parties can appeal its decision to the European Court of Justice in a period of two 
months from the ordered decision.
30
 The appeal, when launched, must be based on an issue of 
law and not of fact.
31
 
            
            4.2.2   European Court of Justice 
 
The Court of Justice is composed of 28 Judges
32
 and eleven Advocates General.
33
 The Court 
has jurisdiction over references for preliminary rulings
34
 and other types of proceedings
35
. To 
ensure the consistent interpretation and application of EU legislation, national courts may 
submit to the Court of Justice and request the latter to interpret the EU law in question, so that 
they may establish whether their national legislation is compliant.
36
 The actions for failure to 
meet obligations may also be commenced, allowing the Court to decide whether a Member 




The Court of Justice has a shared jurisdiction with the General Court over actions for 
                                                        
28
 Ibid, arts 278, and 279; see, also, Statute (n18), art 60. 
29
 Statute (n18), art 54. 
30
 TFEU (n16), art 256.1; see, also, Statute (n18), art 56. 
31
 TFEU (n16), arts 278, 279, and 299(4); see, also, Statute (n18), art 58. 
32
 TEU (n18), art 19. 
33
 TFEU (n16), art 252. 
34
 Ibid, art 267. Under the preliminary ruling procedure, the Court can interpret and review validity of acts issued 
by the EU agencies and offices upon the request of national courts. This would enable the national courts to 
ascertain if their national legislation is in compliance with the EU laws. 
35
 Other proceedings from the Court could be for example, under the TFEU (n16), arts 260 (actions brought by 
the Commission or a Member State against another Member State for failure to fulfil obligations under the EU 
law), and 263 (conditions for the admissibility of actions brought by individuals) 
36
 TFEU (n16), art 267. 
37
 Ibid, arts 258-260. 
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failure to act, involving the review of the lawfulness of the failure of EU institutions, bodies, 
agencies, or offices to act.
38
 An applicant may also request the Court to annul a measure taken 
by the same. It has exclusive jurisdiction on actions commenced by a Member State against 





Appeals on issues of law can only be filed before the Court of Justice against orders 
and judgments of the General Court.
40
 If the appeal is admissible and justifiable, the Court 
may stay the judgment or order of the General Court. The Court may decide the case in 
appropriate circumstances. Otherwise, it remits the case to the General Court, which is bound 






 allowing a party to succeed in an appeal against a decision of the 
Commission are narrow in scope.  
 
Where the Court of Justice holds that the Commission has contravened the law, it 
annuls the measures contrary to EU law
43
 or it rules against the Commission for failure to 
act
44
.  The Court does not replace the decision of the Commission with its own judgment.
45
 
Alternatively, the Court may specify issues in which the Commission erred. It may demand 
the Commission to proceed with the appropriate procedure, application, or law.
46
 The 
Commission must follow the Court‘s ruling.
47
  The Court may also hear appeals relating to the 
                                                        
38
 Ibid, arts 257, and 267. 
39
 Ibid, art 263.  
40
 Ibid, art 256. 
41
 Statute (n18), art 61. 
42
 See, for example, the Court of Justice‘s opinion in ECLI:E:C:2014:42 Case No C-382/12 P Mastercard and 
Others v Commission (2014) ECLI:E:C:2014, where it discusses grounds for appellant‘s appeal, p 8.  Cases 
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(TFEU (n16), art 265). 
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 TFEU (n16), art 263. 
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 Ibid, art 265. 
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 Case T-11/95 IECC v Commission [1998] ECR II-3605, para 33; This case was appealed before the ECJ in  
IECC v Commission (C-449/98 P) [2001] ECR I-3875. 
46
 TFEU (n16), art 264. 
47
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The Court of Justice has played an active role in shaping the examination aspects of 
bank mergers in compliance with the EU provisions.  Some of the relevant bank merger case-
laws brought before the Court will be discussed in chapter 4.4 of this thesis.   
 
4.3.  Bank mergers before the UK courts and government  
 
In this section, several important bank merger reviews before the UK judiciary will be 
outlined. In addition, there are some significant bank mergers that were reviewed, and then 
approved by the UK Government in coordination with the competition authority. In the 
context of UK court bank merger case law analysis, several important bank merger case laws 
before the EU courts that influenced the competition aspects of bank merger policies in the 
UK will be examined.    
 
4.3.1  Case laws related to competition aspects in banking and bank mergers 
before UK courts and tribunals 
 
Set out, below, is a discussion of four important cases dealing with competition aspects in 
banking and bank mergers before the UK courts and tribunals.  
 
Issues put before the courts and tribunals in the discussed cases are whether 
competition implementation should be sidestepped in the name of the financial stability 
preservation; whether certain banking products and/or services issued from large financial 
institutions can distort competition. 
 
4.3.1(a)   The Merger Action Group v Secretary for Business,  
     Enterprises and Regulatory Reform 
                                                        
48
 For example, see Case No. COMP/M.3894 UniCredito/HVB [2005] OJ C 278/17, in which Poland filed a 
complaint in the European Court of Justice challenging the Commission‘s approval of UniCredito/HVB merger, 
based on dominant position in the Polish market.  For a detailed discussion of this case, see chapter 4.4.2(d) in 




The most relevant bank merger review cases before the Competition Appeal Tribunal (‗CAT‘) 
to date
49
 is the Merger Action Group v Secretary for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform case in late 2008.
50
  This was not per se a bank merger review case involving merging 
banks and the authorities. Rather, this involved interested parties against the UK Government 
challenging the Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS) takeover by Lloyds Banking Group 
(Lloyds).
51
      
 
The case involved a group of individuals and businesses mostly from Scotland, who 
opposed a decision by the then Secretary for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
Secretary, presently, renamed as the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, 
(‗SoS‘) not to refer to the then Competition Commission (‗CC‘) the takeover of HBOS by 




The SoS‘ decision indicated that the new public interest consideration, namely the 
stability of the UK financial system, is relevant to the takeover situation.
53
 Based on the 
‗substantial lessening of competition‘ (‗SLC‘) and the public interest consideration, the SoS 
determined that the formation of the relevant takeover situation was not envisaged to function 
against the public interest.
54
 The SoS deemed that the takeover would result in important 
advantages to public interest because it pertained to safeguarding the stability of the financial 
system in the country and that these advantages offset the potential anti-competitive 
                                                        
49
 According to the author of this thesis‘ extensive research, the CAT has reviewed a limited number of bank 
merger cases.  The most relevant cases are those discussed in subchapter 4.3.1 of this thesis; see also 
Competition Appeal Tribunal, Rules 2015 S.I. 1648, available at 
http://www.catribunal.org.uk/files/The_Competition_Appeal_Tribunal_Rules_2015.pdf; For a guide to 
proceedings as to how a case starts and is conducted before the Competition Appeal Tribunal, see Competition 
Appeal Tribunal Guide to Proceedings 2015, available at 
http://www.catribunal.org.uk/files/Guide_to_proceedings_2015.pdf. 
50
 Case No 1107/4/10/08 Merger Action Group v SoS for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform [2008] 
CAT 36 (‗MAG v SoS‘). 
51
 MAG v SoS (n158), Summary of Application under S 120 of the EA02 (‗Summary of application‘), p 1.  
52
 For more discussion of the CAT‘s decision, go to www.berr.gov.UK/files/file48745.pdf (‗Decision‘). 
53
 Ibid, paras 8, 11, and 12. 
54
 Ibid, paras 5, 10, 12, and 14-15.  
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consequences addressed by the Office of Fair Trading (‗OFT‘).
55
  In the end, considering the 




The group of applicants (‗Applicant‘) claimed that they were aggrieved
57
 by the SoS‘ 
decision, thus, giving them standing to support the present application with the Tribunal.
58
  
The Applicant claimed that the takeover should have been sent on to the CC pursuant to the 
OFT‘s findings.
59
 Alternatively, it argued that the addition of the public interest consideration 
into the relevant legislation was an attempt to eschew the otherwise functional legal 
standard.
60
  Rather than complying with the legal standard in place when the bank takeover 
was reported, the SoS relied on a new standard that was implemented to avoid complying with 
the otherwise functional criteria. The SoS, thereafter, used its discretion, as argued by the 
Applicant, to arbitrarily and unreasonably refused to refer the bank takeover to the CC without 




In the end, the Applicant requested the CAT to issue an order revoking the SoS‘s 
decision,
62
 based on the power bestowed by the Enterprise Act 2002 (‗EA02‘)
63
, an order 
referring to the recommendations made by the OFT in its report to the SoS, including the 
recommendation that the SoS should refer the takeover to the CC for review, and an order that 




The Tribunal ordered that the case be considered as a proceeding in Scotland.
65
  It took 
into account statements made by government officials for supporting the bank takeover as 
their best option both to salvage HBOS and to guarantee the stability of the financial system 
in the UK, which was at that time believed to be on the verge of collapse.  The Tribunal 
                                                        
55
 Office of Fair Trading, ‗Anticipated Acquisition by Lloyds TSB plc of HBOS Plc‘ Report under s 44 of the 
EA02‘ (24 October, 2008) (the ‗OFT Report‘), available 
atwww.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/press_release_attachments/LLoydstsb.pdf; see also Decision (n52), para 7. 
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 Ibid, pp 1, and 2. 
60















 that the UK Government was forthright in acting on its stance over the takeover, and 
its belief that the changes in legislation were required for the clearance of the takeover without 
the uncertainties and delays created due to a reference to the CC.
67
  The government evidently 
devoted itself to effect such legislative amendments, which included a maintaining ‗financial 
stability‘ factor to the prevailing distinctive public interest.
68
 The UK Government committed 
to this inclusion due to the fact that it desired to accelerate the takeover.
69




 that the OFT‘s findings did not render the information provided 
by the OFT any less useful, nor was there any indication that the SoS failed to give 
appropriate weight to the findings. The Tribunal found it difficult to comprehend any benefits 
that would arise for distorting the views of the OFT and the Financial Services Authority 
when the SoS was making a decision on the matter.
71
 In the Tribunal‘s opinion, it was also not 




The Tribunal did not find any merit in the argument that the SoS sought the Financial 
Services Authority, rather than the OFT, for competition analysis.  It indicated
73
 that the SoS 
did no more than requesting submissions from the OFT, a regulator under a statutory duty to 
obtain submissions from third parties during its inquires, and raising the public interest 
factor.
74
  The Financial Services Authority‘s submissions related to the issue of sustaining the 
stability of the financial system, which was the precise issue addressed in the SoS‘s decision; 
this issue was not within the scope of the OFT.
75
 The Tribunal did not find anything in the 
SoS‘s decision to suggest that the SoS considered the OFT‘s findings on competition as 
binding, or that the Financial Services Authority‘s submission as diminishing the credibility 
or importance of the OFT‘s findings.
76
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 In relation to the Applicant‘s argument over the consequence of the State aid 
provisions of the TFEU to a financial institution that was in acceptance of aid, the Tribunal 
found it a ‗hopeless point‘.
77
  The Tribunal concluded that it did not in any way restrain the 
SoS‘s decision.
78
  The Tribunal did not see any oversight of the law by the Financial Services 
Authority.  Even if there was an oversight, it did not affect the validity of the SoS‘s decision 





 The Tribunal found
80
 no merit in the argument that the SoS‘s discretion was restricted 
by the statements of the UK Government, and, thus, should be revoked.  It also addressed the 
claim that the SoS ignored or put insufficient focus on the accessibility of the UK 
Government‘s financial relief for banks, which was, in the Applicant‘s submissions, a genuine 
alternative to the merger for salvaging HBOS.
81
  The Applicant claimed that the SoS‘s did not 
pay sufficient attention to alternative options of tackling the HBOS issue.
82
 The Applicant 
claimed that the SoS also paid too much emphasis on the takeover and the Financial Services 
Authority‘s opinion concerning the HBOS‘s ability to become an effective standalone 
competitor should the takeover did not occur, rather than the legally binding recommendations 
of the OFT.
83
 The Applicant contended that an alternative option was the recapitalization 
scheme declared by the UK Government in late 2008.
84
   
 
However, the Tribunal found
85
 no sufficient evidence to conclude that the SoS failed 
to fully and adequately consider the necessity of the takeover in light of alternative options. 
The necessity of the takeover, taking into account the UK Government financial relief 
package, was previously raised by the SoS in the UK parliamentary sessions.
86
 The SoS 
obtained comments from interested groups.  In particular, jointly, the Bank of England, the 
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 Ibid, para 87. 
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 Ibid, para 89 
83









HM Treasury, and the Financial Services Authority strongly maintained that the 
recapitalization programme was complementary rather than a standalone option in favor of the 
takeover.
87





 Moreover, the Tribunal did not find
89
 any substance in the assertion that the SoS 
erroneously placing the opinion of the Financial Services Authority on the competitive 
soundness of HBOS over the recommendations of the OFT, or that the SoS failed to consider 
the EU Commission‘s standing on State aid.  The Tribunal found that these arguments were 




 As to the argument that the decision of the SoS violated the proportionality principle 





 The Tribunal unanimously ruled that the Applicant were ‗persons aggrieved‘ within 
relevant legislation,
92
 but dismissed the action for the aforementioned reasons,
93
 and awarded 
some costs to the SoS.
94
 The Applicant decided on the day following the handing down of the 




 From the above case, it is clear that the UK Government, along with the regulators, 
sidestepped the competition issues posed in the takeover of HBOS by Lloyds, in the name of 
the financial stability preservation.  The precedent established in this case is a step backward 
towards the enhancement of competition enforcement provisions in the banking and financial 
system.  
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  4.3.1(b)   Barclays Bank Plc v Competition Commission96 
 
In 2009, Barclays bank brought an application against the Competition Commission (‗CC‘) 
before the Competition Appeal Tribunal (‗CAT‘) for a review under the Enterprise Act 2002 
(‗EA02‘) regarding particular recommendations made by the CC, including a 2009 report of 




 Barclays‘ application contained four grounds of challenge, three of them related to the 
CC‘s remedial determination containing a prohibition on the sale of payment protection 
insurance at the point of sale of the related credit (the ‗point of sale prohibition‘). In 
particular, Barclays asserted that the CC failed to consider aspects that are pertinent to the 
proportionality of the point of sale prohibition.
98
  Barclays also contended that the CC did not 
have the suitable evidential foundation for concluding that the point of sale prohibition was 
justified.  Finally, Barclays asserted that the CC failed to include pertinent considerations in 
its review of the degree of the consumer disadvantage resulting from the known adverse 
consequence on competition and whether the advantages of its intervention would offset the 
loss of the pertinent consumer advantages.
99
   
 
Barclays‘ fourth basis of challenge related to the CC‘s review of the relevant market(s) 
and the degree of the competition concerns that prevailed in the relevant market(s).  Barclays 
asserted that the CC‘s review was defective due to its failure to take into account relevant 
consideration.
100
   
 
 The Tribunal found that the CC failed to take into account a relevant consideration. In 
the Tribunal‘s opinion, the Commission erred in considering the loss of convenience that 
would ensue from the application of the point of sale prohibition in evaluating whether it was 
proportional to contain it in its anticipated remedies package.
101
  The Tribunal revoked the 
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part of the CC‘s report that foists the point of sale prohibition as part of the recommended 
remedies package.
102
 It also remitted the issue on whether a point of sale prohibition should be 
so taken into account as an additional consideration by the CC pursuant to the principles 




 This case, although not directly related to bank merger, dealt with competition aspects 
in banking, such as service of payments, within the UK market.  Large banks, like Barclays, 
continue to maintain a dominant position in providing banking products and services to 
consumers, while hindering entry of new participant banks in the market.    
 
4.3.1(c)   MasterCard UK Members Forum Limited, MasterCard  
International Incorporated and MasterCard Europe SPRL,       
Royal Bank of Scotland Group v Office of Fair Trading104 
 
This case involved a 2005 decision from the Office of Fair Trading (‗OFT‘) about interchange 
fees rendered by the banks issuing MasterCard within the UK.
105
 The applicants, namely 
MasterCard UK, MasterCard International, MasterCard Europe, and Royal Bank of Scotland 
(‗Applicants‘) sought that the Competition Appeal Tribunal (‗CAT‘) either permit the 
Applicants‘ appeal, or set aside the OFT decision, or order the latter to withdraw such 
decision.
106





 In reaching its conclusion, the Tribunal found that, after years of administrative 
proceedings, the OFT had established a stance that it should withdraw its decision on the 
interchange fees provided by the banks issuing MasterCard, particularly in a significant 
‗frontrunner‘ case like the present one that has drawn a far-reaching interest not only within 
                                                        
102
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the country but also across the EU and elsewhere.
108
   
 
The Tribunal deemed that the setting aside of the OFT decision would in effect be 
granting the substantive relief requested by MasterCard UK Members Forum Ltd (who 
comprised most of the banks in the UK) and contained in the notices of appeal filed by the 
MasterCard International Inc. and Royal Bank of Scotland, respectively.
109
  The only 
additional relief sought was the two further declarations demanded by MasterCard 
International, Inc. in its notice of appeal.
110
  In response to these declarations, the Tribunal did 
not conclude whether it had jurisdiction to grant the declarations requested or relief that has a 
similar effect in an appropriate case.
111
 Arguments in support of granting these reliefs were, in 
the Tribunal‘s point of view, broad enough to include the request for additional relief, or relief 
of a similar effect.
112
  The Tribunal found no evidence of any constraint on the OFT‘s power 




As to whether it would be suitable in the circumstances to proceed with the appeals 
solely to consider the declaratory relief demanded by MasterCard International, Inc., the issue 
whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to award the declarations is different from the issue 
whether the Tribunal, in its discretion, should have exercised that jurisdiction in the specific 
circumstances of this case.
114
  Regarding the latter, the court saw it fit to take into account 
some relevant considerations.
115
 First, the OFT had by that time indicated its intention to 
withdraw its decision. Second, regardless of whether the decision was withdrawn or set aside, 
MasterCard UK Members Forum Ltd and Royal Bank of Scotland, in reality, obtained all 
reliefs sought in these proceedings, and MasterCard International Inc. received, in the 
Tribunal‘s view, a large portion of the relief sought.
116
 Given the circumstances, a 
continuation of the review by the judiciary on the declarations sought by MasterCard 
International Inc. would call for a significant investigation of the merits regarding the defense 
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The Tribunal, also, found that while VisaCard was an intervener rather than an 
appellant in the action, it is, along with MasterCard, the only two major international credit 
card institutions.
118
 Thus, the Tribunal found it undisputed that VisaCard had standing to take 
the position against the OFT decision.
119
 The Tribunal saw it important that a proceeding with 
likely global implications, such as, the present one should proceed on sound procedural 
grounds.
120
 The Tribunal was not content that the procedural basis for further pursuing these 





The Tribunal found it unsuitable to adjudicate without first reviewing the way the 
MasterCard structure operates. It found it arduous to undertake such substantive exercise 
merely to adjudicate the declaratory reliefs sought by MasterCard International, Inc., 
particularly in light of the admission by the OFT that its decision had to be set aside or 
withdrawn. Even if the appeals were to proceed, supplementary administrative steps would 
have been required to deal with MasterCard‘s previous arrangements, the position of 




In addition, the Tribunal noted the parallel proceedings at the EU level would likely 
address the issues that MasterCard International, Inc. wished to raise with the Tribunal, 
notwithstanding the fact that the EU proceedings concerned international instead of the UK 
interchange fees.
123
 The Tribunal noted that whether to hear these appeals on the declaratory 
relief was discretion for the same court to rule upon.  While the Tribunal acknowledged the 
undesirability of a prolonged administrative procedure, such procedure has commenced at that 
time and was expected to run in parallel with the European Commission procedure.
124
 The 
















 The Commission concluded that MasterCard/Visa infringed Article 101 EU Treaty as a result of setting the 
interchange fee.  However, the Commission recognized that having a centrally set interchange is economically 
desirable and that a lower fee would be exempt under Article 101(3). See Commission, ‗Summary of 
120 
 
Tribunal, also, found it inappropriate for the court to continue hearing a case that the 
competition regulators had shown involved ongoing inquires, notwithstanding the amount of 
time spent on such inquiries at that time.
125
 While the Tribunal acknowledged the position 
taken by MasterCard International, Inc., it found no ‗legitimate expectation‘, as used in 
administrative law, had arisen in the proceedings to the extent of compelling the continuation 




 The Tribunal opined that the results of setting aside, or withdrawing, the decision 
would be largely the same.
127
 Nevertheless, in cases like the present there was a necessity for 
legal certainty and clarity. The Tribunal found that the legal consequence of a ‗withdrawal‘ 
would not be wholly evident, regardless of whether the OFT had the power to ‗withdraw‘.
128
 
It would, also, be likely for third parties to be unaware of such withdrawal. On the other hand, 
the setting aside of the decision by the Tribunal would be an evident and significant judicial 





For the foregoing reasons, the Tribunal ordered to set aside the OFT decision. The 




 The above interchange fees case shows the tribunal‘s role in keeping a balance 
between the competition enforcement authority and financial institutions in implementing 
remedies imposed by the authority.   
 
  4.3.1(d) Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National  
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In 2009, the UK Supreme Court issued the final judgment in Office of Fair Trading v Abbey 
National,
131
which was recognized as phase one of the broadly exposed test case over bank 
charges.  
 
The Supreme Court found that the unarranged overdraft charges imposed on customers 
with personal current account created part of the price paid for the package of banking 
services provided in exchange.
132
 Consequently, provided the terms creating those charges 
were in clear and unambiguous language, any valuation of their objectivity, pursuant to the 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999
133
 was impermissible in comparison 
to the services rendered in exchange. 
 
Unarranged overdraft charges would normally be sustained in the case a bank makes a 
payment upon a customer‘s request, resulting in the customer exceeding the limit of his 
arranged overdraft or overdrawing. They could, also, be sustained where a bank declines to 
make a payment, leading to the same result, had the payment demand been assented to.  Banks 
frequently charge customers a monthly fee for unarranged lending. 
 
Due to a sharp rise of claims from consumers against the retail banks on charges over 
the unarranged overdrafts, the Office of Fair Trading (‗OFT‘) commenced an investigation on 
the charges and involved seven big UK banks and one building society (the ‗Banks‘) to 




In 2007, following an agreement between the OFT and the Banks, the OFT started a 
legal proceeding in the High Court against the Banks, seeking from the court provide legal 
certainty over the crucial legal aspects in the matter.  These proceedings before the High 
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122 
 
The High Court was to rule whether the Banks‘ terms and conditions in force at that 
time creating charges of the unarranged overdrafts would qualify as penalties at common 
law.
136
  It found that the terms did not qualify as penalties due to the fact that such charges 
were not ‗payable upon a breach of contract‘.
137
  The court consequently held that all the 
previous terms and conditions similarly did not qualify as penalties.
138
   
 
The High Court was also asked to rule whether a valuation of the objectivity of the 
terms and conditions in force at that time giving rise to unarranged overdraft charges under 
the existing consumer protection regulations was excluded by certain provision(s) of the same 
regulations
139
. The Banks asserted that such terms and conditions were in apparent 
comprehensible language and that a valuation of them would connect with the reasonableness 





The High Court was satisfied that the terms and conditions of four financial 
institutions among the Banks were in clear comprehensible language.
141
 The terms and 
conditions of the remaining four were in evident comprehensible language, expect for some 
minor elements. However, it held against the Banks on whether a valuation of them would 
connect with the reasonableness of the price or remuneration in contrast to the services or 
products provided in exchange.
142




The Court of Appeal disagreed with the lower court (High Court)‘s reasoning.
144
  
However, it found unanimously that a valuation for objectivity of the terms and conditions at 
that time giving rise to unarranged overdraft chargers was not precluded by certain provisions 
of the consumers‘ regulations.
145
  The Court of Appeal held that these provisions are only 
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applicable to the ‗essential‘ services and the ‗core‘ price. While applying this test, the Court 
held that charges of the unarranged overdrafts were not an integral part of the core price, and 
provision of an unarranged overdraft was found not to be an essential service.  On that basis, 




The Banks filed an appeal before the then House of Lords, presently the Supreme 
Court, in 2009.
147
  The House of Lords was faced with the issue whether, at law, the 
objectivity of charges on the unarranged overdraft could be challenged by the OFT as 




In November, 2009, in a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that the OFT 
could not challenge the unarranged overdraft charges of the Banks.
149
  It found that the Banks 
provided a package of services to their current account customers, the price of which could 
likewise be defined as a package.
150
  Charges of the unarranged overdrafts are an integral part 





In arriving at this conclusion, the Supreme Court overruled the Court of Appeal‘s 
interpretation that the exemption only shielded the ‗essential‘ services and the ‗core‘ price.  It 
held that certain provisions of the UTCCR
152
 did not include any indication that the 
exemption was to be constrained in this manner.  It also found that, even if the Court of 
Appeal‘s approach was correct, the charges, totally about 30 per cent of a bank‘s fee income 
pertaining to personal current accounts, should establish an integral part of the ‗core‘ price.  
Consequently, the Supreme Court held that as far as terms and conditions are in clear 
comprehensible language, no valuation of the objectivity of charges of the unarranged 
overdrafts can be allowed pursuant to the consumers‘ regulations provisions
153
 where the 
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grounds of the challenge would be that those consumers paying the banks are being charged 





It is remarkable that the Supreme Court found it incorrect to consider charges of the 
unarranged overdrafts as payments made in consideration for the particular services, as 
asserted by the OFT.
155
  The consequence of this ruling was that, even as far as any terms 
arising to charges of the unarranged overdrafts are not in evident comprehensible language, 
any objection to the degree of those charges on the grounds that they surpass the costs of 




The Supreme Court determined that, even though the interpretation of the EU 
Directive that was adopted by the UTCCR
157
 was a matter of EU law, it was unnecessary to 




 Although the foregoing case does not relate to a bank merger, it has some relevance to 
competition aspects of banking products and services rendered in the market. Clearly, the 
Supreme Court‘s decision on the unarranged overdraft charges was a setback to the 
consumer‘s protection rights, and further consolidated the power of banks over their 
customers.   
 
4.3.2    Bank merger cases with government approval 
 
The section below outlines some important bank merger transactions that were dealt by the 
UK Government, without the involvement of the UK courts and tribunals, are discussed 
below. These bank mergers show the Government‘s debatable role in implementation of 
competition policies, while aiming to maintain stability in the financial system.    
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4.3.2(a) RBS and HSBC159 
 
The 1982 merger Royal Bank of Scotland (‗RBC‘)/Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation Standard Chartered Bank (‗HSBC‘) triggered the public interest ground for 
opposing inward investment bank merger.
160
   
 
In 1980, a proposal was made by the then non-British bank, HSBC,
161
 to gain control 
over the RBS.  The Monopolies and Merger Commission (the then UK competition authority) 
concluded against the proposal on the basis that sustaining a major UK bank controlled 
overseas would be against the public interest.
162 
The emphasis of the UK competition authority 
merger investigations pursuant to the competition provisions were on the likely anti-
competitive aftermaths of the submitted bank merger.
163
   
 
Notwithstanding this, the 1980s was a period where a substantial burden was placed 
on the regional policy to reflect the public interest test as set out in the competition provisions.  
Pursuant to such provisions, the UK competition authority looked at the objective to preserve 




In particular, the Monopolies and Merger Commission issued a number of important 
reports
165
 on mergers and acquisitions of homegrown Scottish businesses. The review method 
adopted by the UK competition authority in considering the bid for the RBS in 1982 seemed 
to be especially interesting.
166
  It found that the submitted bank merger may work against the 
public interest as a result of stripping the ultimate control away from Edinburgh.
167
 The 
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regulator, also, found that the merger would diminish the significance of the banking sector in 
Scotland and reduce employment opportunities in banking and finance in Scotland.
168
 It 
would, also, produce an uncertainty over the formation of a branch economy.  Nonetheless, it 





 In April, 1981, eager to establish a stage for its European expansion, the HSBC sent a 
hostile offer for the RBS, estimated at £498 million.
170
  As the RBS accepted a month earlier a 
friendly offer from Standard Chartered Bank valued at £334 million, the Standard Chartered 
Bank and the HSBC entered into a bidding war to merger the RBS.
171
   In the end, the UK 
competition authority held that it was not in Scotland‘s best interests to lose or wane control 
of RBS, one of the largest banks in Scotland, to foreign banks.
172
  As a result, the HSBC 
pulled out of the acquisition offer for the RBS.  Standard Chartered Bank, also, failed to gain 




In 1992, the HSBC made an offer and successfully took over Midland Bank for £3.9 
billion, rising to one of the tenth largest banks in the world.
174
  This was then the costliest 
take-over in the banking history in the UK.
175
  It provided the HSBC with strategic standing in 
the UK market and a safety net for its HSBC bank to move its head-offices from Hong Kong 
to London.
176
  The European Commission, also, gave its approval to the merger, finding it to 
be in compliance with the merger procedure and that the merger did not create any doubt to 
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On the other hand, in early 2000, the RBS acquired the National Westminster Bank 
(‗NatWest‘) for £21 billion.
178
  Preceding the take-over, the NatWest became the target of two 
spontaneous hostile acquisition offers by two Scottish banks: the RBS and the Bank of 
Scotland.  In relation to the size of net income and assets, the RBS was almost half the size of 
NatWest.
179
 Conversely, the RBS was deemed to be one of the most technologically advanced 
financial institutions in the UK. Ultimately, the RBS ‗outdid‘ the Bank of Scotland in the 
merger of the NatWest. The acquisition was successful because the RBS‘s approach to the 
acquisition appeared to be better situated for removing duplicated sustenance operations with 
NatWest.
180
 The RBS, also, showed that revenue rise benefits with NatWest included the 




4.3.2(b)  Lloyds and Abbey 
 
Competition concerns were much to the forepart in the UK banking system in the early 2000, 
as rumours circulated about the likely emergence of a rival acquisition offer for Abbey 
National plc (‗Abbey‘) from a UK based bank to put out of place the bid made by the Spanish 
bank Banco Santander Central Hispano.
182
 As internationalization and consolidation are 
taking place simultaneously in the financial services industry, bank merger control is not to be 




Lloyds Banking Group (‗Lloyds‘) was prepared to witness its offer to acquire Abbey, 
the mortgage and savings bank, opposed by the UK competition authority (Competition 
Commission),
184
 which was acting on the referral of the Secretary of State for Business, 
Innovation and Skills (‗SoS‘).
185
 This merger case was of particular interest because it created 
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precedents in relation to the types of UK bank mergers approved by the competition 
regulators, namely the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition Commission.
186
   
 
 The SoS held up the £19 billion proposed acquisition from Lloyds of Abbey, a 
decision made after a three-month thorough inquiry by the Competition Commission into the 
consequence of the bank merger proposal towards consumers.
187
 The competition authority 
found that Lloyds and Abbey clearly dominated the market of the current accounts.  As a 




The SoS endorsed the Competition Commission‘s recommendation that indicated the 
banks merger be banned on the basis that it could most likely lessen competition in the market 
for banking services for small and medium-sized enterprises (‗SMEs‘) and the market for 
personal current accounts.
189
 The SoS, also, endorsed the competition regulator‘s findings that 
the merger posed adverse effects in these indicated markets resulting to diminished innovation 
along with higher prices to customers with respect to banking products and services.
190
  The 
SoS, also, concurred with the Commission Competition‘s findings that forbidding the merger 
of Lloyds with Abbey was the only remedy efficient of abundantly tackling the adverse 




The findings of the Competition Commission along with the SoS‘s endorsement 
caught Lloyds by surprise. The bank was already involved in the process of taking over other 
targeted banks in the UK.
192
 On the other hand, Abbey, which ended merger discussions with 
the Bank of Scotland in early 2001, was projected to be a likely merger target for National 
Australia Bank, which held ownership control over the Clydesdale and Yorkshire Banks.
193
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4.3.2(c) UK government’s takeover of the Northern Rock 
 
The first important credit crisis situation in Britain happened in the fall of 2007, when the 
public in the UK suddenly learnt that the Bank of England granted to the Northern Rock bank 
£25 billions of emergency financial liquidity. This created the first run on a British bank in 
almost hundred years. As a result, depositors in panic withdrew £1 billion from the Northern 
Rock bank in one day.
194
 Under these circumstances, and in order to avoid the domino effect 
in other banks and creating a potential collapse of the financial and banking system, the UK 
Government intervened by guaranteeing savings accounts of depositors in the Northern 
Rock. Various efforts outside the public view to sell Northern Rock to private sector were 
unsuccessful. Therefore, the Government in early 2008 decided to nationalize Northern Rock 
bank by taking it over with the taxpayers‘ monies in the name of prevention measures for a 




As the financial meltdown worsened, in April, 2008, the Bank of England injected 
into the banking and financial market £50 billion to assist struggling banks across the 
country.  Banks were permitted to exchange toxic mortgage debts for secure government bonds 




4.3.2(d) Barclays and Lehman Brothers 
 
The only Anglo-American bank merger in at least the last decade was the acquisition by the 
UK bank Barclays of the now defunct American bank Lehman Brothers. In 2008, Lehman 
Brothers agreed to sell its North American investment banking and capital markets businesses 
for $1.75bn to UK lender Barclays. The acquisition was used by Barclays to boost its US 
investment banking prowess without having to assume Lehman‘s crippling liabilities.
197
  The 
agreement was reached after an intense negotiation between Lehman and Barclays, at a time 
when the Lehman Brothers‘ parent company had already filed for bankruptcy protection in the 
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 Barclays took over ownership of Lehman Brothers‘ American and 
Canadian investment banking business, fixed income and equity sales operations, and research 
divisions. The merger had the approval of the US and UK banking regulators, including the 
US federal bankruptcy court overseeing Lehman Brothers‘ insolvency proceedings.
199
   
 
 Both the US and UK regulators failed to look at the competition impact of the 
takeover. Instead, they focused their attention on facilitating a quick acquisition of Lehman 
Brothers‘ assets by Barclays. 
 
4.3.2(e) Lloyds and HBOS 
 
In 2008, the then Office of Fair Trading (‗OFT‘)‘s restatement of its guidelines was published 
shortly after the UK Government‘s withdrawal of jurisdiction from the competition regulators 
to review the takeover of Halifax Bank of Scotland (‗HBOS‘) by Lloyds Banking Group 
(‗Lloyds‘).  The government did so by carrying out statutory powers given to the Secretary 




The OFT noted that, from its assessment, the projected takeover would invoke a 
‗substantial lessening of competition‘ (‗SLC‘) in the banking services for small and medium-
sized enterprises (‗SMEs‘), personal current accounts, and mortgages.
201
 Nevertheless, 
regardless of these issues, the SoS utilized his statutory power to emphasize the public interest 
of financial stability and permitted the case to carry on without reference by the then OFT to 




The Lloyds‘ takeover is one of the most significant State aid cases in the UK bank 
merger history.  The CC favored a package of financial support undertakings towards the 
banking sector in the UK in 2008 as a response to the Global Financial Crisis (‗GFC‘).  In 
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addition, in July 2009, the UK Government informed the public about a restructuring strategy 





Lloyds‘ necessity for State aid was due to the acquisition of HBOS and the consequent 
financial troubles of the HBOS. Prior to the takeover, HBOS was in near collapse due to its 
high-risk lending and the unwarranted utilization of leverage. The Lloyds‘ takeover of the 
HBOS was conditioned upon the receipt of a substantial amount of the UK Government 
financial aid required to rescue HBOS.
204
   
 
In early 2009, Lloyds obtained a state recapitalization of £17 billion that resulted in the 
UK Government owning an equity interest in the bank of 43.5 per cent.
205
  The aid permitted 
Lloyds to take over HBOS, substantially increasing its market shares. The takeover, also, 
removed a challenger in markets that were at that time concentrated. Certain measures, such 
as, decreasing the balance sheet of Lloyds, its risk profile, and funding gap were taken to 
ensure that Lloyds would re-emerge as a profitable and stable financial institution. These, 
also, aimed at disposing or streamlining non-core operations in wholesale, corporate, 




The European Commission imposed an exhaustive list of requirements, for example 
on the reduction of the balance sheet, decreasing the risk profile of the business and the 
funding gap of the bank,
207
 on Lloyds. The bank was ordered to carry out a fair and 
transparent process concerning the divesture process for sale of the assets that was going to be 
properly publicized. The Commission, also, ordered Lloyds to take on an asset reduction 
programme in order to reach a £181 billion reduction in a particular group of assets by the end 
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of 2014. The Commission, further, outlined to the bank a thorough explanation of the 




Moreover, the Commission outlined a specific divestment package and requirements 
for purchaser(s) to warrant that the divested institution renders a suitable means of growing 
competition in the concentrated retail banking market in the UK.
209
  With the Lloyds‘ brand, 
Scottish branches of Lloyds, the C&G branches, and supplementary branches guaranteeing 
relative geographical coverage, the carried off entity would result in an sufficiently attractive 




In September, 2008, the UK Government orchestrated the takeover of the failing 
HBOS by Lloyds for £12.2 billion.
211
 This deal formed the biggest bank and mortgage lending 




For the takeover to succeed, the SoS had to step in. Using his public interest power in 
Lloyds/HBOS deal, the SoS announced the need to uphold the strength of the financial system 
in the UK as a new consideration of public interest.
213
  The SoS, also, pinpointed the systemic 
significance of HBOS in the banking system that warranted his intervention, considering the 




In OFT‘s report to the SoS, the regulator found that there was a genuine perspective 
that the takeover would cause a ‗substantial lessening of competition‘ (‗SLC‘) among 
banking services for SMEs, personal current accounts, and mortgages.
215
  A thorough 
investigation by the CC was, thus, necessary, even though it was in no way a certainty that the 
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Despite these findings, Lord Mandelson concluded not to make a reference to the 
CC, based on the Enterprise Act 2002 (‗EA02‘), on the grounds that the advantages of the 
takeover for the stability of the UK financial system would offset any anticompetitive 
consequences, notwithstanding the OFT‘s concerns.
217
  He noted that on balance, the SoS 
determined that safeguarding the stability of the financial system warrants the anti-
competitive outcome that the OFT ascertained and that public interest was served at best, if 
the takeover was to be cleared.
218
 The decision of Lord Mandelson relied heavily on the 




The records show an interesting timeline of the steps taken to effectuate the decision to 
approve the takeover of HBOS by Lloyds. On 18 September, 2008, the takeover was 
announced.  The SoS issued an intervention notice on the same day.
  
On 7 October, a Draft 
Financial Stability Order was presented before Parliament.
220
 The following day, the UK 
Government revealed a £500 billion bank assistance package.
221
 On 13 October, the 





The draft order was deliberated on in the House of Lords on 16 October,
223
 and in the 
House of Commons on 20 October.
224
 On the 23 October, the Financial Stability Order was 
approved. It became effective on the 24 October.
225
 On the same day, the then OFT sent a 
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report to the SoS on the takeover of HBOS by Lloyds.
226
 On 31 October, the SoS issued its 
decision not to make a reference to the CC.
227
 On 10 December, the Competition Appeal 





The decisions to clear the takeover of HBOS by Lloyds and to set aside the OFT‘s 
competition concerns were widely criticized.
229
 The UK Government reassured the public that 
the merged bank remained subject to competition provisions.
230
 However, few were 
convinced by the government‘s reassurance. It is common that ex post bank merger 
enforcements are substantially less effective than the initial prevention of the merger.
231 
 
By the time the Competition Appeal Tribunal issued its ruling about the takeover of 
HBOS by Lloyds,
232
 the £200 billion package of systemic support for the UK banks was 
already in place, as were the recapitalization measures.
233
 The financial package specified 
undertakings to enhance bank capital, the government subscription of capital, and its 
guarantees to issue new debt. These undertakings were made to target the systemic problem 
among banks rather than problems faced by any particular bank.
234 
They seemed sufficient 
to sustain HBOS‘ survival.  Some critics argued that once this financial support of capital was 
made available, the decision to clear the takeover of HBOS by Lloyds was unnecessary and an 
economic error.
235
 They argued that this gave rise to an irretrievable loss of competition in 
banking and financial services in the UK, particularly in Scotland.
236
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The conditions surrounding the bank merger clearance showed that notwithstanding 
the provisions of the EA02 aiming to render the former OFT and former CC (presently CMA) 
independent authorities, bank mergers competition policy in UK are not free from political 
pressure.
237
  It could be tempting to give in to political pressure in bank merger situations, 
which is likely to create a major impact in the financial and banking system.   
 
There was prevalent concern within the banking community that the takeover of 
HBOS by Lloyds could result in less competition in the relevant markets.
238
  Even prior to the 
takeover, the UK banking industry was broadly deemed not entirely competitive and had been 





At the peak of the GFC, the UK Government orchestrated the takeover of HBOS by 
its competitor, Lloyds.
240
 This resulted in the formation of a new banking mammoth that has 
become the biggest bank and mortgage lender in the UK.
241
  To allow the takeover to proceed, 
the UK Government took the critical step of altering the law
242
 to permit the SoS to intervene 
in the standard bank merger examination process.
243
  It, also, permitted the SoS to disregard 
competition issues on the basis of the public interest to maintain the stability of the financial 
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 House of Commons, ‗Banking Crisis: Dealing with the Failure of the UK Banks‘ (1 May, 2009) HC 416, p 
12. 
243





 This was criticized as ripping up the UK‘s competition laws by raising significant 




 4.3.2(f) Thomas Cook and Barclays 
 
In 1994, Thomas Cook Group Limited (‗Thomas Cook‘)/Barclays bank merger case
246
 arose, 
with the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (‗SoS‘), in exercising its legislative 
powers,
247
 making a reference to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (the former 
competition authority in the UK) for investigation.
248
 The Commission was to report any 
relevant findings to the SoS.
249
  The SoS endorsed the Commission‘s report, noting that the 
case presented competition concerns in particular as to whether both merging parties would 




The case involved banking services, such as, the inter-payment travelers‘ cheques 
issued by Barclays‘ inter-payment services, which bore the ‗Visa‘ trade mark, upon the 
issuing institutions becoming a subsidiary of the Thomas Cook or the latter acquisition of the 
issuing institution‘s assets.
251
    
 
Upon a thorough investigation, the Commission requested the Thomas Cook to 
undertake certain conditions prior to the acquisition. These conditions were expected to 
reduce any competition issues in the market.
252
 Subject to the conditions, the Commission 
revoked the merger reference made by the SoS.
253
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The Thomas Cook/Barclays case shows that - unlike the takeover case of HBOS by 
Lloyds, where the SoS disregarded the UK competition regulators expressed competition 
concerns over the proposed takeover - the UK Government relied on the regulator‘s remedial 
findings. This shows that when the government has the will, it is fully capable to implement 
competition policies towards bank merger and acquisition transactions.   
 
4.4  Bank mergers before EU courts and Commission 
 
The EU courts and Commission play an important role in shaping competition aspects of bank 
mergers. Some important bank merger reviews, before the EU courts and the Commission, are 
discussed below.    
 
 4.4.1 Bank merger case laws before EU courts 
 
The following are some relevant bank merger case laws before the EU courts. 
 
             4.4.1(a) Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich v Commission 
 
The 2006 merger case of Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich v. Commission
254 
involved eight 
banks bringing an action against the Commission, based on Article 81 of the EC Treaty 
[presently Article 101 TFEU] before the then Court of First Instance (Second Chamber).  
These banks challenged a decision by the Commission that imposed fines on the banks upon 
holding that they formed a system of regular meetings (the ‗Lombard network‘).
255
  In their 
meetings, the banks discussed underlying aspects of competition in the Austrian market, 
which according to the Commission‘s contested decision amounted to joint practices 
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pertaining to prices, charges, and advertising.
256
 The Commission defined the distortion of 




The Court of First Instance (Second Chamber) looked at the assertion that the 
determination of the banks‘ agreements was erroneous.
258
 The Court found that the 
Commission presented evidence to show that the Lombard network was deemed as competent 
to decide on the prices to be allotted on several significant cross-border deals and that the 
Lombard network was authorized to decide on the compliance of the participating banks 
pertaining to the agreements.
259
   
 
The Court noted a compelling assumption that if the practice of curbing competition is 
used across the territory of a Member State, it would facilitate the ‗compartmentalization of 
the markets‘ and consequently affect intra-Community trade.
260
  The Court determined that 
the banks were unable to overcome this assumptive argument.
261
   
 
The Court held that the foregoing assumption could only be rebutted by the 
examination of the aspects of the agreement, and the economic setting of the agreement 
showing the contrary.
262




4.4.1(b) ABN AMRO Group v Commission 
 
In ABN AMRO Group v. European Commission
264
, the ABN AMRO Group, formed upon the 
2014 merger between ABN AMRO and Fortis Bank Netherland, filed an action before the 
General Court seeking annulment of the decision of the Commission barring ABN AMRO to 
merger above 5 per cent of any undertaking.
265
  The State aid received by the bank by means 
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of recapitalization assistance was subject to a three-year ban of entering into merger deals.
266
  
ABN AMRO asserted that such bar was disproportionate and broader than those measures 
ruled in other decisions of the General Court implemented during similar period concerning 
State aid.
267
   
 
The General Court relied on the discretion of the Commission in deciding the 
conditions to be satisfied prior to a State aid measure would be announced and being 
compatible with the internal market.
268
  The Court found that the restraint was compatible 
with the principles included in the Commission‘s communication on bank‘s restructuring.
269
  
Additionally, the General Court held that the Commission was correct in deciding the 
maximum duration of the future merger prohibition of ABN AMRO due to the fact that the 
role of a competition regulator to consider the strategy of the Dutch Government for exiting 




4.4.1(c) Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank v Commission 
 
In 2004, Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank v Commission
271
, the bank, Bayerische Hypo- 
und Vereinsbank (‗Bayerische‘), filed an action for annulment of the Commission‘s decision 
before the then Court of First Instance (Fifth Chamber).
272
  This involved a decision of the 
Commission made in 2001, based on an investigation on 150 banks, including Bayerische.
273
  
The Commission found that the banks agreed to inform the Bundesbank (central bank of 
Germany) that they would effectuate the exchange of euro-zone banknotes at the fixed 
exchange rates and charge a certain commission.
274
 
   
The Court of First Instance (Fifth Chamber) reminded both parties of the 
Commission‘s previous decision that found that any German banks, including those they 
intended to merger between each other, had to express their joint intention to conduct 
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themselves on the exchange of euro-zone banknotes market in compliance with the their 
previous undertakings to the Commission.
275
  Nevertheless, the Court held that the evidence 
presented by the Commission was inadequate to ascertain the presence of a concurrence of 
wills on the principle of a commission balanced to the volume exchanged.
276
  Accordingly, 
the Court found that the Commission failed to establish the necessary legal parameters that 
there was an agreement about the charges for currency exchange services.
277





               4.4.1(d) Assicurazioni Generali SpA and UniCredit S.p.A. v Commission 
 
The 1999 AssicurazioniGenerali S.p.A. and UniCredit S.p.A. v Commission
279
 was a case 
before the Court of First Instance (First Chamber) concerning the Commission‘s finding that 
the formation of a joint venture, Casse e Generali Vita S.p.A. (‗CG Vita‘), did not sustain 
operational autonomy.
280
 The bank applicants, upon admitting that CG Vita rose to a 
concentration, asserted that such concentration did not amount to coordinating the competitive 
conduct of the founding entities.
281
  They claimed to have fulfilled the conditions provided 
under the merger control in companies‘ provisions. The applicants alleged that the 
Commission erred in supporting its decision on a narrow interpretation of the condition 
pertaining to operational autonomy.
282
 According to the applicants, decision conflicted with 
numerous previous decisions, when the Commission ruled in support of the operational 
autonomy of joint ventures with more extensive economic relations than the CG Vita case.
283
   
 
The Court of First Instance (First Chamber) agreed with the Commission that it would 
have been extremely improbable that the joint venture enjoyed operational autonomy.
284
  
Based on the evidence, for at least the first five years of business, CG Vita could not manage 
independently the services related to the management and production of insurance policies, 
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settlement of insurance claims, and administrative tasks of the portfolio.
285
  CG Vita could not 
qualify as ‗concentration‘ due to the fact that the entity failed operational independence.  
Accordingly, this finding was adequate to affect the analysis of matters concerning the 
cooperation between the two entities.
286




4.4.1(e) BNP Paribas and Banca Nazionale del Lavoro v Commission 
 
The BNP Paribas and BNL v Commission
288
 case concerned State aid.   
 
In 2010, BNP Paribas, a French bank, and Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (‗BNL‘), an 
Italian bank, filed an action against the Commission before the General Court (Fifth Chamber) 
to seek an annulment of a decision by the Commission.
289
 The decision established that a 
particular tax scheme pertinent to the banking industry created a ‗selective advantage‘ that 
would have an effect on improving the competitiveness of particular financial institutions.
290
  
The Commission opined that the benefit was not warranted by the nature of the Italian tax 
system and amounted to a State aid, and, thus, incompatible with the common market.
291
  The 
applicants argued that the Commission erred in finding the presence of State aid and that it 
impinged on its obligation to articulate specific reasons due to a factual error.
292
   
 
The court dismissed the action, finding that the Commission was correct in utilizing 
the normal tax rates as a reference basis for determining whether there was an economic 
benefit.
293
  The court, also, dismissed the assertion that the benefit was warranted due to the 
general structure of the tax system.
294
   
 
In 2012, both banks appealed to the Court of Justice (Second Chamber), asserting, 
among others, that the lower court failed to exercise its review power to evaluate whether the 
                                                        
285
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tax scheme subject matter was warranted by the essence and overall structure of the Italian tax 
system.
295
  The Court of Justice found that the lower court erred in its decision as a matter of 
law by failing to conduct a comprehensive examination as to whether or not the tax scheme in 
the matter arouse within the meaning of the State aid EU compatibility provisions.
296
 It 
subsequently found that the tax scheme was unwarranted by the essential reasoning of the 




 The foregoing bank merger case laws before the European courts show the strict, and 
often, narrow interpretation of the EU competition provisions by these courts towards bank 
mergers. Frequently, these courts do not hesitate to annul decisions issued by the Commission 
on bank mergers, when such decisions are deemed to be defective and not fully supported by 
the law.       
 
4.4.2 Bank merger cases before the Commission 
 
In addition to the aforementioned bank merger case law before the EU courts, there have been 
four important bank merger review cases before the Commission, which deserve 
consideration. 
 
        4.4.2(a) Banque Nationale de Paris and Dresdner Bank AG-Austrian JV298 
 
This case was one of the first cases heard by the Commission in late 1990‘s pertaining to bank 
mergers at the EU level.
299
  The French bank of Banque Nationale de Paris (‗BNP‘) and the 
German bank of Dresdner Bank AG (‗Dresdner‘) proposed a concentration under EU laws.
300
 
This would give rise to a new joint venture creating a stock company under Austrian law.
301
  
Each bank would have an ownership of 50 per cent of the share capital and the joint control of 
the anticipated consolidated banking institution.
302
 The new institution would operate as a 
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financial holding company carrying out the banking joint ventures activity in the Central and 
Eastern Europe.
303
   
 
The concentration between these two banks was considered to fall into the provisions 
of the ECMR.
304
 Therefore, the Commission reviewed its compatibility with the Common 
Market.
305
 The Commission, while holding the relevant products market to be the deposit 
taking, short and midterm loans, and processing of domestic and global payment transfers, it 




The Commission determined that the aforementioned concentration neither established 
nor strengthened a dominant position.
307
 In relation to the definition of the relevant 
geographic market, the Commission agreed with the merging banks that the relevant 
geographic market is within Austria.
308
 Although, it was likely for the venture to carry out 
cross-border activities, the neighboring markets would merely be influenced indirectly.
309
  
The Commission noted that the wholesale banking market in Austria would not be influenced 
by the venture, considering that this market was distinguished by a weighty presence of 
national banking counterparts.
310
   
 
The Commission concluded that the venture fell within the scope of the co-operation 
agreement exemption provisions under the EU Treaty.
311
 The bank consolidation between 




4.4.2(b) BNP Paribas and Fortis 
 
In the 2008 BNP Paribas and Fortis case,
313
 BNP Paribas notified the Commission of its 
intention to take over the sole control of the Luxembourg and Belgian subsidiaries of Fortis 
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Holding (Fortise Banque Luxembourg, Fortis Bank Belgium and Fortis Insurance Belgium, 
respectively).
314
  The combined global revenue of the players was assessed above €5 billion, 
and each undertaking sustained an EU-wide revenue above €250 million.
315
 Therefore, the 




While the corporate banking and retail banking markets did not cause any issues, 
serious reservations were made about the credit cards issuing in Luxembourg and Belgium.
317
 
The merger would make BNP the biggest bank within these two countries market, therefore, 
diminishing customers‘ options for credit cards.
318
  The Commission, upon individualizing the 
different kinds of cards, such as, debit cards, credit cards, and store cards, deemed it suitable 
to leave out debit cards from the relevant market.
319
  This was because while the concerning 
banks overlapped in the charge and credit cards issuing, it was not the case in the debit cards 
issuing.
320
  Although the Commission did not encounter any aspects of vertical effects in its 




The Commission set apart the overlaps that resulted in affected markets and those that 
did not.
322
  Those that did not result in affected markets - such as, when the concerning banks‘ 
combined shares did not surpass 15 per cent - included the savings accounts and the personal 
current accounts in France, personal loans in Germany, Belgium, and Poland, and private 
banking in the UK, France, Italy, Belgium, Spain, and Luxembourg.
323
  The overlaps that 
gave rise to affected markets - such as, when the concerning banks‘ combined shares did 
surpass 15 per cent - comprised the French leasing market (in aggregate market share of 20 
per cent) and the Belgian leasing market (aggregate market share between 20 to 30 per cent), 
and the Belgian mortgages and retail banking (aggregate market share under 25 per cent).
324
  
Following the merger, the issuing of universal credit/charge cards would have reached 40 to 
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50 per cent of the market shares in the Belgian market and about 40 to 50 per cent in 
Luxembourg.
325
   
 
In response to the Commission‘s concerns, BNP divested its entire Belgian credit card 
operation unit, namely the BNP Paribas Personal Finance Belgium SA/NV.
326
  In 
consideration of such divestment, the Commission found that the merger did not create 




4.4.2(c) Banco Santander and Bradford & Bingley Assets 
 
Santander and Bradford & Bingley Assets case
328
 concerned a 2008 concentration proposed 
by the Abbey, a UK bank wholly owned by the Spanish bank, Banco Santander, to acquire 
particular assets of Bradford & Bingley, another UK bank.
329
  Both UK banks provided 
personal financial services of savings accounts, mortgages, loans, and financial planning.
330
   
 
Upon determining that the precise product and geographic market definition could be 
left open, the Commission looked into the competitive valuation.
331
  It noted that in relation to 
retail banking, notwithstanding the fact that there was some overlap in activities between the 
two banks, they did not provide a whole spectrum of services, but were only concentrated on 
mortgage and savings products.
332
  Accordingly, the bank was not deemed to be a competitor 
over the primary banking relationship towards retail customers.
333
   
 
As to the savings account products, the Commission determined that the proposed 
merger did not influence the UK market, provided that the new share would rise less than 5 
per cent.
334
  In relation to the retail mortgages operations, the Commission found that the HHI 
post-merger indicated that the acquisition did not give rise to concerns about its affinity with 
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the common market within the retail mortgage market in the UK.
335
  Therefore, the 




4.4.2(d) UniCredit S.p.A. and HypoVereinsbank 
 





In 1999, UniCredit entered into a bidding process to acquire a majority interest in 
Pekao, a publicly owned bank that was undergoing privatization by the Polish Government.
338
  
Part of the deal included the prohibition of UniCredit to grow its position within the Polish 
banking market through acquiring other Polish or foreign banks in the same market.
339
  
Nevertheless, in 1998, UniCredit had already acquired another Polish bank, BPH, and HVB 





In clearing the UniCredit/HVB bank merger, the Commission admitted that the effect 
of this deal would be on the Polish banking market due to the practical combination of Pekao 
and BPH.
341
  Even though the merger would result in an increase in the assets market of the 
Pekao bank, and in an increase of the branch network market of BPH bank, the Commission 
noted that banking sector in Polish market showed a ‗fairly low degree of concentration‘.
342
  
In the end, the Commission decided not to oppose the UniCredit/HVB merger, and to declare 
it compatible with the common market.
343  
  
The Polish Government disagreed with the Commission‘s foregoing findings 
regarding the impact the merger would have on the credibility of the privatization process in 
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  As a result, in 2006, the Polish Government sought UniCredit/HVB to divest the 
entire shares held in BPH bank.
345
  It, also, launched an action against the Commission with 
the Court of First Instance, asserting that the Commission committed procedural and 
substantive errors in its UniCredit/HVB merger decision.
346
 Especially, the Polish 
Government claimed that the Commission violated the duty of loyal co-operation in Article 10 
of the EC (presently Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union) by failing to consider 
Poland‘s genuine interests in guaranteeing the application and implementation of the 




The Commission immediately open an infringement proceeding against Poland, 
claiming the privatization agreements that UniCredit and HVB entered into with the Polish 
Government contravened the free movement of capital provisions of the EU Treaty
348
, and 
that the ex post intervention of the Polish Government aimed at implementing those 
agreements against the merged financial institution violated Article 21 of the ECMR.
349
  Soon 
after, the Polish Government dropped its action before the Court of First Instance, and 
declared that it entered into an agreement with UniCredit/HVB, in which it agreed to permit 
the merger of the two Polish banks, conditional upon the divestment of about half of BPH‘s 
branches and an agreement not to eliminate jobs at the merged bank until early 2008, which 




The foregoing bank merger cases before the Commission‘s review show that the EU 
competition regulator analyses closely specific evidence, such as banking products market, 
geographic market, in order to determine the level of concentration that the proposed merger 
will have in the Common Market.  Like its American and British counterparts, the 
Commission tends to resolve competition issues in a bank merger by the means of remedial 
action, i.e., divestiture.  
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The role of the UK and EU State aids assessment in banking cases 
 
State aid to the banking and financial sector can be offered in the form of guarantee, equity, 




 Governments can guarantee bank deposits, banks bonds or all bank liabilities.
352
 
Because deposit guarantees schemes are structured for retail depositors and limited to a fixed 
maximum amount, they do not raise a State aid concern.  However, when the deposit 




    Member States can provide equity support to consolidate the capital base of banks.
354
  
In recapitalisation programmes, States provide funds to banks in return for direct equity, 




     A special form to absorb losses in the financial system is the formation of a bad bank, 
which applies where banks get a delay to reimburse their creditors until the financial system 
normalises, and assets recover.
356
 Bad bank schemes raise fundamental competition policy 
issues pertaining to determination of the new book value of the impaired assets, tackling the 
distortions created by the schemes, and justifying the scheme to taxpayers, when public 




     The final form of State aid is the banks nationalisation, under which a large portion of 
or the whole assets are taken over by the state.
358
  It is the capital injection in a bank in 
trouble, rather than a nationalisation per se, that forms state aid.
359
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 The most relevant and applicable State aid assessments related to banking sector have 
been the ‗aid … to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State‘
360
 and 
‗aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain economic areas, 





    The Commission was required to act under severe time limits.
362
 The ‗effect‘ that has 
created for continuing to deal with all banking State aid cases under ‗conventional‘ EU State 
aid law has been for Member States‘ notifications of proposed aid to be vetted by the 
Commission, sometimes within a short notice in order to preserve market stability.  In most of 
the banking cases, the Commission approved such notifications, though on a provisional 
basis, categorising the measure(s) in issue as a ‗rescue‘ aid and requiring the Member State to 
return to the Commission, at a specific time, with a plan for the bank‘s restructuring, aimed at 
ensuring its long-term viability without additional aid.
363
 Upon receipt of this plan, the 
Commission could issue a final decision approving the concerning aid, with or without 
conditions. The Commission decisions in banking cases such as KBC, ING and Lloyds were 




 In the banking sectors, the Commission has acted autonomously, under its ‗classical‘ 
position in the State aid area, pursuant to Articles 107-109 TFEU; developed its approach 
pragmatically through non-binding Communications, setting out (for the benefit of Member 
States and the banking sector) its intended approach under the fundamental EU Treaty 
provisions; and it made maximum use of the flexibility inherent in the Treaty, especially the 
‗derogations‘ permitted in Article 107(3) (a)-(c);
365
 as well as it has successfully avoided 
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reaching decisions Member States and concerning financial institutions economic would have 




 The Commission has provided guidance to Member States and the financial sector by 
the way a several Communications
367
 of a general and specific nature, dealing with matters 











 have provided an 
evolutionary and consistent response throughout the GFC.   
 
    There are however a number of general themes that characterise the Commission‘s 
approach in banking cases, especially during the GFC.
373
 These include the need from the 
Commission to separate between ‗good‘ and ‗bad‘ banks; that all State aid is well-targeted, 
proportionate and minimise negative spill-over consequences on competitors; that State aid 
needs to be limited in minimum and the banking sector must contribute its fair share to 
restructuring (‗burden-sharing‘);
374
 that State aid schemes should be limited in time with 
mandatory periodic reviews; that a clear difference is made between ‗normal‘ liquidity 
provided by central banks in the form of general measures open to all comparable market 
players and support for specific banks; that all State aid measures and restructuring plans are 
aim to restore long-term viability, without the need for further injections of aid; and all State 
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 The Commission decisions in response to the State aids given from the Member States 




 The restructuring ordered by the Commission in the ING, KBC and Lloyds cases is 
radical by any standards, even if it is based on proposals worked out between the banks and 
the concerned Member States.
377
 The Commission determined that almost all divestments 
were proposed by the concerning banks and there was sufficient market interest in the 
divested activities.
378
 The Commission‘s approach went further by admitting that its 
restructuring Communication required a review of the structure of the market where the 
concerning banks operated.  In the case of KBC, ING and Lloyds, the Commission found that 
in each of the three domestic markets involved, the top five banks occupy around 80 per cent 
of each market.
379
 Therefore, the Commission concluded that the divestments in question 
created opportunities for new entrants or already present smaller competitors, and will 
therefore, remedy any distortions of competition caused by the State aid.
380
   
 
 The Commission asserted that the individual banks and the EU banking industry came 
out stronger from this process and is therefore, be better equipped to compete in global 
markets.   
 
4.5  Conclusion 
 
Overall, the courts‘ involvement in the review process of bank merger in the UK has moved 
slowly and gradually towards the courts and other institutions specialized in the area of 
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competition regulatory matters. Unlike the US
381
, the UK courts have taken a backseat 
position in relation to their role in shaping competition aspects of the bank mergers.  For 
example, as analyzed above, the Supreme Court‘s ruling in Office of Fair Trading v Abbey 
National was a setback to the consumer‘s protection rights and further consolidated the power 
of banks over their customers. 
 
 The contribution of the UK courts in shaping the competition aspects of bank mergers 
is modest. Perhaps this can be explained from the fact that any competition aspects of bank 
merger situations tend to be resolved at the stage of the competition and banking regulators‘ 
examination of the merger. Banks know that challenging a bank merger before the courts will 
be not only costly, but also will provide them with uncertainty with respect to the outcome of 
the case.  
 
In the last two decades, and especially since the GFC, there has been an increasing 
involvement by the EU courts and the Commission in dealing with competition issues of bank 
mergers. However, the overall perception is that both the EU institutions and their UK 
counterparts have somewhat compromised the strict applicability of competition provisions in 
bank mergers in the post-GFC era. These mergers were largely dictated by the consequences 
of the crisis, which added to the political pressure from the governments of the UK or other 
EU Member States to approve them, despite evidence that these mergers would result in a 
substantial lessening of competition in the relevant markets. For example, the UK 
Government in the takeover of HBOS by Lloyds sidestepped competition concerns of the 
merger in the name of the financial stability preservation. The government‘s approach to the 
merger remains controversial because of the precedent established for future bank mergers.   
 
The UK courts, like their US counterparts, should consider viewing banks as special 
institutions, which deserve particular special attention, especially when reviewing competition 
aspects of their mergers and acquisitions. In this respect, the Competition Appeal Tribunal, as 
a specialized competition court in the UK, and the General Court at the EU level that deals 
with bank merger cases of EU interest, play important roles. Courts and competition 
authorities show an increasing tendency to look at certain aspects of banking products and 
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services, such as, overdraft charges, credit/debit cards fees, and fees for switching bank 
accounts,
382
 from a competition point of view.  Instead, courts and competition authorities 
should take a broad look at the situation of competition in the banking system starting with 
preservation and enhancement of competition in bank consolidation cases in the UK.   
 
In terms of the EU and UK State aid assessments in banking cases, State aid to the 
banking and financial sector is offered in the form of guarantee, equity, bad bank, and 
nationalisation. Governments can guarantee bank deposits, banks bonds or all bank liabilities. 
Because deposit guarantees schemes are structured for retail depositors and limited to a fixed 
maximum amount, they do not raise a State aid concern.  However, when the deposit 
protection fund is utilized to bail out a bank, the EU‘s State aid rules apply. Member States 
can provide equity support to consolidate the capital base of banks. In recapitalisation 
programmes, States provide funds to banks in return for direct equity, preferred shares or 
subordinated debt.  A special form to absorb losses in the financial system is the formation of 
a bad bank, which applies where banks get a delay to reimburse their creditors until the 
financial system normalises, and assets recover. The final form of State aid is the banks 
nationalisation, under which a large portion of or the whole assets are taken over by the state. 
It is the capital injection in a bank in trouble, rather than a nationalisation per se, that forms 
state aid.  
 
 In the banking sectors, the Commission has acted autonomously, under its ‗classical‘ 
position in the State aid area, pursuant to Articles 107-109 TFEU; developed its approach 
pragmatically through non-binding Communications, setting out (for the benefit of Member 
States and the banking sector) its intended approach under the fundamental EU Treaty 
provisions; and it made maximum use of the flexibility inherent in the Treaty, especially the 
‗derogations‘ permitted in Article 107(3) (a)-(c); as well as it has successfully avoided 
reaching decisions Member States and concerning financial institutions economic would have 
felt forced to refer to judicial review in the European Courts.  
 
 The Commission decisions in response to the State aids given from the Member States 
to their banks has shown transparency, comparability and consistency.  
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 The restructuring ordered by the Commission in the ING, KBC and Lloyds cases is 
radical by any standards, even if it is based on proposals worked out between the banks and 
the concerned Member States. The Commission determined that almost all divestments were 
proposed by the concerning banks and there was sufficient market interest in the divested 
activities. The Commission‘s approach went further by admitting that its restructuring 
Communication required a review of the structure of the market where the concerning banks 
operated.  In the case of KBC, ING and Lloyds, the Commission found that in each of the 
three domestic markets involved, the top five banks occupy around 80 per cent of each 
market. Therefore, the Commission concluded that the divestments in question created 
opportunities for new entrants or already present smaller competitors, and will therefore, 










CHAPTER 5 - IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION METHODOLOGIES AND 
POLICES IN BANK MERGERS IN UNITED KINGDOM 
 
This chapter discusses competition methodologies applying to the UK and EU, focusing on 
markets, products, consumer issues and competition in relation to bank mergers.  
 
The competition methodologies and policies of the UK and the EU competition 
authorities apply broadly and generally to any merger, being in banking or other sectors of the 
economy in the EU or the UK. In addition, the EU and the UK competition legislation, 
regulations, and guidelines generally regulate mergers from all sectors of the economy. 
 
Notwithstanding the above, this chapter focuses its discussion only in the 
implementation of the foregoing competition methodologies, policies, including the 
competition legislation, regulations and guidelines, only in the context of a bank merger.   
 
5.0  Markets, products, consumer issues and competitive analysis in relation 
to bank mergers 
 
The UK competition regulators base their assessment processes on specific merger examination 
provisions under a set of merger guidance documents (‗Merger Guidelines‘).
1
  Pursuant to the 
Merger Guidelines, a bank (or other business) merger case is examined, based on whether the 
merger‘s anti-competitive consequences derive from the unilateral behaviour of the merged 
bank (or other business) or because of synchronized interaction between the existing 
competitors.
2
  The guidelines, also, allow merging parties to better evaluate the competitive 
effect of the anticipated merger, in advance.  
 
                                                        
1
 ‗Mergers: Guidance on the CMA‘s Jurisdiction and Procedure‘ (2014) CMA2 (‗UK Merger Jurisdiction and 
Procedure‘); see, also, ‗Mergers: How to Notify the CMA of a Merger‘ (2015) Detailed Guide (‗UK Merger 
Notification‘); see, further, ‗Merger Assessment Guidelines‘ (2010) CC2/OFT1254 (‗UK Merger Assessment 
Guidelines‘); see, more, ‗Quick Guide to UK Merger Assessment‘ (2014) CMA18 (‗UK Quick Guide Merger 
Assessment‘); see, additionally, ‗Disclosure of Information in CMA Work‘ (2013) CC7 (‗UK Merger Disclosure 
Information‘); see, furthermore, ‗Merger Remedies‘ (2008) CC8 (‗UK Merger Remedies‘); see, finally, ‗Mergers 
Exceptions to the Duty to Refer and Undertakings in Lieu‘ (2014) OFT1122 (‗UK Merger Exceptions to the 
Duty to Refer and Undertakings in Lieu‘).  All the above, hereinafter ‗UK Merger Guidelines‘) available at 
www.gov.uk/government/collections/cma-mergers-guidance. 
2
 UK Merger Assessment Guidelines (n1), pp 13-16. 
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The Merger Guidelines provide that one-sided anti-competitive consequences may 
occur when, due to a merger, the merged party considers profitable to unilaterally raise prices, 
or decrease quality or productivity.
3
 The guidelines identify several market specifications as 
suitable indicators of potential anti-competitive outcomes.
4
  These consist of large post-merger 
market shares, the competitive likeness of the merging parties‘ services or products, 
considerable impediments to entry, and counterparts‘ difficulty in responding to variations in 
prices.
5
 In situations where the chances of unilaterally imposed consequences are 
considerable, the bank (or other business) merger will be forbidden unless the merging parties 





The Merger Guidelines test puts significant pressure on the competition regulators to 
justify the possibility of post-merger co-ordination. As a result, this could improve the ability 





 In 2004, the EU enacted measures intended to enhance EU merger control provision.  
These measures included the revision of ECMR, a notice on the assessment of horizontal 
mergers, and best practice guidelines on the conduct of merger reviews. These measures 
improve the review process of a bank (or other business) merger by providing greater 
flexibility. They have improved the clarity of the Commission‘s merger scrutiny, and have 





 Despite the improved provisions in the UK and EU, the proposed Lloyds/Abbey merger 
blocked by the UK Government may have created a ‗psychological‘ impediment to future bank 
merger and acquisition deals. Apparently, the public interest purpose of blocking the bank 
                                                        
3
 Ibid, pp 30-33. 
4
 Ibid, pp 34-35. 
5
 Ibid, pp 38-40, and 45. 
6
 S S Megregian and A C Rosen, ‗UK and EU Merger Reforms Increase Opportunity for Financial Institution 
Consolidation‘ (2003) 16 Journal of Taxation and Financial Institutions 31 (‗Megregian‘), pp 34-42. 
7
 J Clarke, International Merger Policy, Applying Domestic Law to International Markets (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar 2014) (‗Clarke‘), p 72. 
8
 I Kokkoris, Merger Control in Europe: The Gap in the ECMR and National Merger Legislations (New York: 
Routledge 2011), pp 27-34.  
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merger was that the merger increased the capacity of the four major banks in the financial 
market to implicitly coordinate their prices and reduced the competitive impact of smaller 
sized banks.  
 
Nevertheless, the reform of EU competition merger control provided opportunity to 
sufficiently address the Lloyds/Abbey case competition concerns.  For instance, clarification of 
the consequences of synchronization in the UK Merger Guidelines now permits banks (or 
other businesses) to get over implicit collusion issues. Even as the banking system remains 
vibrant, with new services and products being frequently offered, it may become more 





The EU and UK merger guidelines include thorough narrative on practice and policy, 
as well as providing clear tests employed in merger reviews.  There is a noticeable retreat from 
previous merger reviews that depended substantially on market shares. Presently, the 
competition regulators must apply vigorous economic scrutiny, based on a theory of probable 
harm. The EU and UK financial services reforms provide banks and other financial 




5.1  Markets 
 
UK law is not applicable to foreign banks (or other foreign businesses) merging overseas, 
despite the existence of ramifications within the country.
11
 In reality, for several years the UK 
position was that seizing jurisdiction in such cases would violate principles of international 
law.
12
  Presently, in order for merging parties, i.e., banks, to have significant involvement in a 
UK market, i.e., the financial and banking market, they must satisfy a turnover threshold of 
£70 million and, also, meet the required share of supply test.
13
 The relevant merging 
participants, i.e., banks, do not have to become established in the UK or become in other 
                                                        
9
 C S Rusu, European Merger Control: The Challenges Raised by Twenty Years of Enforcement Experience 
(Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2010), ch 7. 
10
 Megregian (n6), p 37. 
11
 Clarke (n7), pp 135-56.  
12
 L Collins, Essays in International Litigation and the Conflict of Laws (New York: Oxford University Press 
1994), p 106.  
13
 Enterprise Act 2002 (n11), c.40 (‗EA02‘), ss 23.3 and 23.4. 
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respects connected with the UK to be subject to its jurisdiction.  In other words, if the 
jurisdictional requirements are fulfilled, participants could be subject to scrutiny by the UK 
authorities notwithstanding the fact that participants‘ primary business is carried out 
elsewhere.
14
  Nonetheless, it can frequently be the case that such a merger would be subject to 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the EU merger system.  
 
Securing a competitive market in the banking sector is the cornerstone objective of the 




            In relation to effectiveness, banks across the market remain constantly concentrated on 
attracting and retaining consumers. Banks carry this out by offering a complete suite of 
services and products which satisfy consumer essentials and comprise value for money. 
 
With regard to diversification, consumers value the opportunity to utilize online 
services or go to a branch. Diverse management groups apply various methodologies so that 
banks display disparities in organizational structures, corporate governance, and business 
blueprints. 
 
The innovation aspect translates into the market, which constantly brings step-by-step 
enhancements to banking services and products. Existing banks and new entrants experiment 
with extensive innovation, which may profoundly alter the nature of bank consolidation in 




Evidently, issues regarding concentration
17
 in the banking and financial market, 
switching bank accounts and transparency continue to prove controversial, and require 
constant scrutiny from the UK competition and bank regulators.
18
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 A Scott et al, Merger Control in the United Kingdom (New York: Oxford University Press 2006), p 22. 
15
 HM Treasury, ‗Maintaining the Financial Stability of UK Banks: Update on the Support Schemes‘ (15 
December, 2010) HC 676, pp 19-24.  
16
 House of Commons, ‗Government Response to the Ninth Report from the Committee, Seventh Special Report 
of Session 2010-12‘ (2011) HC 1408 (‗Competition in Retail Banking‘), pp 2-3, and 9. 
17
 Concentration‘ arises when two or more banks merge, or when one or more merging banks directly or 
indirectly acquire control of the entire or part of one or more other merging banks. See, Council Regulation (EC) 
No 139/2004 of 20 January, 2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ L 24/1, 29 January, 
2004 (‗ECMR‘), art 3. 
18




The biggest banks and other financial institutions in the UK maintain a significant 
market share of the individual banking markets, as well as mid and small sized enterprise 
banking.
19
   
 
There appear to be indications of obstacles to entry in retail banking as well as 
substantial difficulties for new banks attracting consumers, and increasing their market 
shares.
20
  The largest obstacles arise from the challenge of attracting medium and small-sized 
business customers and individual customers because of their preference for financial 
institutions with a wide-ranging branch network, low rates for switching bank accounts, and 
robust brand loyalty. These obstacles discourage financial institutions entering the market in 
case they are unable to attract adequate amounts of customers to recuperate start-up costs, 
grow market share, and maintain a favourable place within the market.  
 
An additional possible obstacle to entry is customer preference for financial 
institutions with branch networks.  Nevertheless, this barrier is gradually decreased because of 
the growing use of internet banking.
21
 Conversely, branch-related attributes remain top of 
consumers‘ reasons for preferring personal current account providers, which is not 
diminishing, based on changes to customers‘ interaction with their financial institution 




Share of new business is substantially intertwined with financial institutions‘ shares 




 Independent Commission on Banking, ‗Final Report‘ (September, 2011), London (the ‗Vickers‘ Report‘), pp 
79, 116, and 335, available at www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/ICB-Final-Report.pdf. 
20
 Competition and Markets Authority, ‗Retail Banking Market Investigation: Retail Banking Financial 
Performance‘ (14 August, 2015) CMA, pp 21, and 29-30, available at https://assets.digital.cabinet-
office.gov.uk/media/55cdf857ed915d534600002d/Financial_performance_working_paper.pdf; see, also, 
Competition and Markets Authority, ‗Extension to CMA Retail Banking Market Investigation‘ (29 January, 
2016), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/extension-to-cma-retail-banking-market-investigation; 
see, further, Competition and Markets Authority, ‗Retail Banking Market Investigation: Summary of Provisional 
Findings Report‘ (22 October, 2015) (‗Retail Banking Market Investigation: Summary of Provisional Findings 




 Competition and Markets Authority, ‗Retail Banking Market Investigation: Barriers to Entry and Expansion: 
Branches‘ (13 August, 2015), pp 30-36, available at https://assets.digital.cabinet-
office.gov.uk/media/55cdf841ed915d5343000038/Branches_working_paper_v2.pdf. 
22
 Vickers‘ Report (n19), pp 217, 266, 268, and 320. 
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throughout the network of national branches, providing additional quantitative evidence that 
branch networks remain a priority for consumers in choosing their financial institution.  The 
number of customers using internet banking still continues to be moderate notwithstanding 
reduced prices and considering improved customer satisfaction levels from the branch 
services. Consumers continue to consider internet banking to be a complimentary service, 




In contrast to bigger financial institutions, small existing and new entrant banks are 
disproportionately influenced by regulation.  Consequently, they form a regulatory obstacle to 
entry in the banking services market. The small and new entrant banks seem likely to be 
sanctioned because of insufficiently qualified management or inability to establish a record of 
performance. They would most likely need to possess extra capital to offset the effects of 
concentration in a particular geographical area or market.  The risk placed on assets of these 




 At the European level, the Commission has applied a series of procedural variations in 
order to improve the process of merger examination.
25
 Banks, or other merging parties, now 
have more control than before over the timing of the examination. The previous requirement 
that banks, or other merging parties, provide notification of merger cases at least seven days 
before achieving a binding agreement has been repealed in the 2004 reform.
26
 The timing of 
notification is now left to the merging parties‘ judgment. This approach is similar to the 
practice in the US.
27
  Nevertheless, notifiable merger cases should continue to obtain clearance 
before closing.  
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The Commission has, in addition, introduced several means to increase convenience 
during the review period in complex merger situations.  A ‗stop-the-clock‘ provision
28
 allows 
the merging parties to seek a twenty-day extension to the review deadline in complex 
investigations.
29
 This provides extra time to address any competition issues associated with 
the merger. Additional extensions may be predicted in those cases in which the merging 




Various mechanisms have been introduced to enhance the transparency of merger 
analysis. Merging parties may ask for ‗state-of-play‘meetings with the Commission, in which 
the latter outlines its issues and existing concerns. Further, merging parties are given the 
opportunity to address complainants in order to better understand their objections. These 
changes provide the merging participants banks with scope to refuse or resolve any issues 




                  5.1.1     Horizontal bank mergers 
 
In the event the acquiring party has ‗in-house‘ distribution operations within the same relevant 
market(s) as the target party, an acquisition within the EU is potentially considered to be a 
‗horizontal merger‘.
32
 The EU merger guidelines apply an analytical approach similar to the 
UK and US merger guidelines.
33
  The Commission, normally, determines if the merger would 
create or increase a sole or concerted dominant position in the market.        
 
Pursuant to the EU merger guidelines, there may be a greater possibility that mergers 
in concentrated markets could be depicted as product ‗differentiated‘.
34
  Traditionally, banking 
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 A Andreangeli, ‗Fairness and Timing in Merger Control Proceedings: Will the ―Stop-the-Clock‖ Clause 
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31
 Megregian (n6), p 39. 
32
 Commission, ‗Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under the Council Regulation on the 
Control of Concentrations between Undertakings‘ (5 February, 2004) OJ C31/03 (‗EU Horizontal Merger 
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this thesis, pp 256-99. 
34
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services and products are viewed as homogeneous. If merging parties, i.e., banks, may 
effectively circumvent this depiction, this could mean that those parties may overcome prior 
market share assumptions. Presently, analysis does centre predominantly on market shares in 
homogeneous product markets. As for differentiated product markets, the Commission 
determines markets in a much narrower way, based on the established level of substitutability 
of the merging parties‘ products. Concerning differentiated product markets, the Commission 
aims to prevent a merger leading to a market share of more than the threshold percentage,
35
 and 
in which the merging parties‘ services or products could be closely substituted. Therefore, 
merging parties may respond to such concerns by showing they are not direct competitors or 
that they can rearrange their products to compete more effectively with the products of the 
other merging party(-ies). 
 
The merger assessment improves the likelihood of parties acquiring product varieties 
that fit with those parties‘ existing product portfolios. The competition regulators are steadily 
implementing approaches that narrow the scope of product market analysis, departing from 
conventional, broader market analysis that has prevailed throughout the retail banking, 
investment banking, corporate banking and financial markets.  For instance, in the Fortis/ABN 
AMRO Assets merger case
36
, for analytical reasons, the Commission separated the retail 
banking market into four smaller markets.
37
 These markets were deposits, lending, credit 
cards, and funds/additional types of asset management.
38
 The identification of narrower 
markets permit merging banks to grow through acquiring businesses offering banking 
products and services businesses that do not overlap with pre-existing offerings within those 
narrower markets.
39
 Similarly, this expands opportunities for permissible geographic market 
growth. 
 
Removing political influence in the EU and UK bank mergers, also, would assist 
merging banks by providing greater certainty and lessening protectionism. In the UK, 
                                                        
35
 The threshold is 30 per cent for vertical mergers (see Commission, ‗Guidelines on the Assessment of Non-
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 Ibid, paras 11, 93, 130, 132, 177, and 245. 
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eliminating the SoS‘s role in approval of bank mergers strengthened certainty. The SoS can no 
longer influence complex bank merger situations. Merging banks would benefit from a clearer 




 In the EU, the Commission‘s increasing attempts to prevent EU Member States from 
affecting cross-border bank mergers should sustain a broader de-politicization agenda. For 
instance, in Banco Santander Central Hispano Americano/A. Champalimaud
41
, the 
Commission underlined that it was not prepared to acquiesce to Member States‘ attempts to 
safeguard domestic banks from foreign acquisition.
42
 The constrained influence of Member 
States in controlling bank mergers assists in averting protectionist merger examinations by 
respective EU governments eager to override competition policy with industrial policy.
43
 This 
de-politicization of bank merger control is constructive and essential in addressing cross-
border situations, also motivating financial institutions to properly evaluate possible 
acquisitions.  
 
 Of continued importance are the ‗efficiency‘ and ‗entry‘ defences, which may result in 
an increase in banks‘ ability to effectively address competition issues associated with a 
proposed merger. For each defence, the UK and EU merger guidelines provide applicable 
elements, which require to be met.
44
 Merging banks can assess the soundness of these 
defences at the initial stage of the process, prepare thorough arguments and submit evidence 
that the merger should be permitted to proceed.  Furthermore, the merger guidelines define the 
hurdles that merging parties should overcome to evidence the available defences.
45
   
 
During the Global Financial Crisis, banks in the UK had significant opportunities to 
acquire financially distressed competitors that faced complexity in restructuring and 
recapitalizing their operations.
46
  Additionally, the UK Government had a reduced capacity to 
safeguard its national banks and other financial institutions, while the Commission tightened 
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its scrutiny of EU Member States‘ attempts to provide State aid to failing financial 
institutions.
47
 A merger could potentially be the only feasible alternative to a distressed bank 
going out of business. Banks could benefit from invoking the ‗failing firm‘ defence. The 
merger guidelines in the UK and EU provide this defence together with the prerequisites for its 
application. Although banks looking to rely on this defence face considerable challenges, 





 The EU‘s merger guidelines on the referral system ought to streamline the process of 
merger notification and could improve parties‘, i.e., banks, capability to attain clearance.  
Merging banks would enhance their ability to influence the Commission to improve their 
chance of a merger success. For instance, the Commission‘s consistent position against 
protectionist EU Member States policies
49
 could establish the Commission as the favoured 
alternative adjudicatory authority on cross-border bank acquisitions.                                                         
 
                           5.1.2   Vertical bank mergers 
 
If the acquiring party (bank) does not have its own distribution system, but acquires one by 
means of the merger, the EU merger competition provisions typically define this situation to 




            A vertical merger is normally less likely to hamper competition than a horizontal 
merger, because a vertical merger does not lead to loss of direct competition between the 
merging parties‘ businesses.
51
 Nonetheless, it may limit competition once it alters the market‘s 
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structure to such a degree that merging parties are better placed to synchronize their behaviour 




            Prior to declaring a proposed merger contrary to the EU Common Market, the 
Commission should determine that the merger would establish or consolidate a dominant 
position throughout the Common Market.
53
 There is no clear-cut test to define dominance, 
therefore, making it less objective and subject to individual interpretation. Dominance is 
identified, based on a sliding scale, with there being various levels of dominance associated 
with market influence as well as capacity to act independently of competitors and consumers.
54 
 
In relation to a merger analysis, once it is established whether a concentration may 
create or increase a dominant position, the next step is to determine if the dominant position 
could harmfully impact the existence of competition. The Commission would disallow a 
proposed merger only in those cases in which the establishment or augmentation of a 
dominant position could create an important negative effect on competition, or considerably 
so across the Common Market.
55
 It is possible that a merger could establish or increase a 
dominant position, which does not create negative competition consequences. It is, however, 
likely that a merger will result in a negative impact on competition. If such effect is regional 




Competition regulations impose a high burden for the Commission to meet in order to 
refuse a merger application. This means that merging parties have a good chance of having 
their merger application granted. The regulations, while permitting the Commission to impose 
conditions, also, lower the chance of refusal.
57
 A less strict analysis would permit fewer 
concessions and be harmful to merging parties, which would then have a negative result on 
competition in certain products or markets, due to the reduced likelihood of merger 
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approval being granted. However, in many cases, it is possible through negotiations to 
arrive at a situation where the merger is permitted to go ahead. 
 
 The Commission, also, considers the likelihood of collective or joint dominance, 
when examining merger applications.
58
 Some critics believe collective dominance to be a 
contentious theory, because it permits the Commission to determine that parties with smaller 
market shares have the collective (but not individual) capacity to dominate the market. The 
contention emerges as a result of the assumption that banks may conspire, instead of compete, 
with each other within the financial and banking market. Unlike the American approach that 
assumes that parties, i.e., banks, will conspire, if allowed,
59
 the EU‘s position is that parties 
will not conspire to jointly dominate the market.
60
 Therefore, the theory of ‗abuse of 
collective dominant position‘
61
 is less assumed in the EU than the US to apply in practice. 
 
The Commission uses a particular method of examination of mergers to establish 
impact on the market. The market is influenced, if a proposed horizontal merger dominates 
more than 20 per cent of the banking and financial market.
62
 This modest threshold shows 
the Commission‘s particular concern regarding horizontal mergers because of their likely 
negative effect of competition in the Common Market. 
 
The criterion for examination is more rigorous for a horizontal merger than for a 
vertical merger because of a greater probability that a horizontal merger would adversely 
influence competition than is the case with a vertical merger. 
 
 
To narrow the number of vertical mergers being blocked, the EU courts‘ review 
process employs a de minimis criterion,
63
maintaining that a simple constraint on competition 
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  The constraint should be considerable. The Commission only has to prove 
that the merger has the capability to substantially affect competition. Under the de minimis 
criterion, the Commission excludes from Article 81 review a merger, which does not result in 
more than 10 per cent of total market share.
65
  The Commission, often, issues block 
exemptions in specific vertical merger situations, basing its rationale on the fact that such 




5.1.3   Conglomerate bank mergers  
 
A conglomerate merger might encompass both vertical and horizontal competition issues, but 
cannot be purely categorized as a vertical or horizontal merger.
67
  The filing of the parties 
with the Commission in the context of a determination of market affected by a proposed 





A conglomerate merger does not result in the combining of competitors (like 
horizontal merger), nor does it render complimentary services to the market (like vertical 
merger).
69
 Consequently, a conglomerate merger solely presents anti-competition concerns in 
respect of the vertical or horizontal characteristics of the merger. Conglomerate mergers are 
useful for banks and other financial institutions that wish to diversify and reduce their risk 
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5.2  Products 
  
Savings accounts, personal current accounts, credit cards, personal loans, and mortgages are 
the most important products in the banking market.
71
 Broadly speaking, the markets in 
relation to such products are considered and examined from a UK-wide perspective.
72
 Almost 
all retail-banking products appear to be accessible to consumers throughout the country, 
without particular differentiation in prices or other specifications. Specifically, the large 
financial institutions, such as Barclays Plc, Royal Bank of Scotland, and Lloyds Banking 
Group, have national branch networks, which make their banking products available across 
Britain.
73
   
 
The largest financial institutions in the UK are the Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds 
Banking Group, HSBC, Santander (UK), and Barclays.
74
 Combined, these banks have 
approximately an 85 per cent share of the personal current account products market within the 
UK. The market for small and medium-sized enterprises (‗SMEs‘) liquidity services 
controlled by these financial institutions is about 80 per cent of the entire products market.  In 
cases where the number of financial institution market participants is greater, such as, for 





To date and notwithstanding a few encouraging improvements, the competition and 
bank regulators still find that competition remains ineffective in respect of the interests of 
SMEs. In particular, markets continue to be concentrated, with the biggest bank providers 
holding in excess of 85 per cent of business current accounts, as well as about 90 per cent of 
business loans. Presently, obstacles to entry and expansion for smaller, newer entrant financial 
institutions continue to be important including the need for branch banking network. Further, 
it appears to be an insignificant driver in the market shares of the biggest financial institutions, 
except as a result of mergers and acquisitions. In recent years, only a very few banks, i.e., 
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 Competition in Retail Banking (n16), pp 12-14. 
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Metro Bank, Tesco Bank, have newly entered into the full service SMEs sector.
76
  Currently, 
about 4 per cent of SMEs switch bank provider each year because they see little or no 
differentiation among the largest financial institutions with respect to the services they 
provide. There is an indication of a significant limitation in market share gains over the last 
several years for those financial institutions with the highest levels of customer satisfaction. 





Market concentration in respect of supply is exceptionally problematic because of the 
weaknesses in demand, particularly regarding bank current accounts. Pricing structures 
remain compound and impervious. Also, customers have not demonstrated confidence in 
switching between bank account providers. As a matter of fact, the rates of switching bank 
accounts continue to be low, notwithstanding substantial variety in pricing in the current bank 
account market that does not appear to be explained by consumer satisfaction. Lack of 
transparency can cause the competition become mislead. In such situation, banking products 





Products in the personal loan and credit card markets remain the most challenging. 
These markets appear to include the largest number of providers, and correspondingly a 
proportionately large number of financial institution market entrants in comparison to the size 
of the market. In addition, there appears to be a handful of new financial institution entrants in 
the bank savings account and mortgages markets. However, entry into these markets has been 
gradually reduced from the GFC. Several of the financial institution entrants within the 
markets for loans, mortgages, and credit cards provide a variety of products short of the whole 
span of personal banking products more broadly available to consumers. Usually, these 
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There appears to be quite a small number of financial institution entrants
80
 in the 
market for personal current bank account products, which approximately comprises 2 per cent 
of the broader market.
81
 The insignificant levels of new financial institution entrants, as well 
as the minimal market shares captured by them shows that new financial institution entrants 





5.3  Consumer Issues 
 
One of the main competition objectives in bank consolidations remains to capitalize on the 
advantages to customers of banks and other financial institutions, which currently continues to 
be critical. The big financial institutions do poorly in several customer satisfaction surveys, 
when measured in proportion to other providers.
83
 Customers expressed their unhappiness 
with the quality of services received from financial institutions, and the apparent lack of 
alternatives on offer in the marketplace. In an openly competitive market, banks and other 
financial institutions that render better service, prices or alternative products are projected to 
increase meaningful market share as compared with their rival banks and financial 




Some undertakings are needed to advance competition within retail banking and to 
generate improved results for customers of banks and other financial institutions.
85
 Poor 
customer satisfaction results can be addressed by reducing impediments to entry and 
expansion, encouraging better competition between existing financial institutions and to foster 
new financial institutions to enter the market. Tackling concentration without addressing these 
concerns is insufficient to stimulate a more competitive market.
86
 By dealing with these 
concerns, new entrant banks or those that are in the process of expansion would succeed in 
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development in important markets, like the current account and SME market.
87
  Other barriers 
to expansion, that are principally associated with bank account switching and the lack of 
comparability and transparency, must also be fully addressed. 
 
Competition in the retail-banking sector in the UK remains ineffective.
88
  The markets 
for SMEs banking services, as well as for individual current accounts continue to be 
concentrated. As a result, those banks and other financial institutions that challenge the large 
sized market participants either ended up going out of business or are taken over by their 
larger counterparts. Consumer alternatives remain dissatisfying especially because of 
complexities in switching accounts between banks. There is exploitation of both customer 
knowledge gaps and the insufficiency of banking regulatory provisions. In addition, implied 




Competition among banks is restricted due to apparent complications for consumers in 
identifying the right bank account for their necessities, in switching bank accounts, and 
through insufficient conditions providing customers with alternatives more generally.  
Financial institutions have few incentives to provide superior offers when their customers are 
unlikely to choose a different bank for their account and other financial needs.
90
  Over the last 
decade, a substantial number of personal current account consumers believed that switching 
bank accounts between banks was risky and a complex undertaking.  Consequently, the level 
of switching bank accounts remains relatively low.
91
 A select, well-informed number of 
consumers do monitor products offered by other banking institutions. However, most of 
consumers are unacquainted with the important fees applying to their personal current bank 
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It is of significant competition concern that there is such a low rate of switching for 
both personal current bank accounts as well as business current bank accounts.
93
 Moreover, 
this has established consequential obstacles for additional banking products that are linked to 
bank accounts.
94
 For example, cross selling through personal current accounts has become 
more valuable that cross selling through other retail banking products.
95
 In particular, small 
financial institutions are dependent on cross sales to sustain a presence in multiple markets.
96
  
Financial institutions that provide business current accounts have a considerable benefit over 
those institutions that do not provide the same, because the former institutions can collect 
transactional track records on consumers prior to providing an overdraft or loan. Most SME 
customers use one of the largest financial institutions in the UK, i.e., Barclays, Lloyds TSB, 
Royal Bank of Scotland, and HSBC, as their primary banking services provider.
97
  Therefore, 





Presently, the banking markets in the UK remain considerably concentrated because 
many financial institutions have either consolidated into larger groups, or have exited the 
market. For example, the combined market shares in the main personal current account 
products market of the four biggest financial institutions (Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds TSB, and 
Royal Bank of Scotland) in the UK rose from about 64 per cent in 2008 to approximately 77 
per cent in 2010.
99
  The combined UK market shares of the four largest banks have been 
slightly decreasing since 2011, and in 2014 accounted for more than 70 per cent of UK main 
personal current accounts.
100
  With the exception of new entrants like Metro Bank, Santander, 
and Tesco Bank, that between the period 2011 – 2014 each entrant has gained 1 to 2 per cent 
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of the total market of personal current accounts,
101
 such market remains within the control of 




As late as the 1970s, banks and other financial institutions in the UK rendered similar 
services to consumers, based on somewhat similar terms.
103
 They maintained the same 
operational business hours, catering to satisfying the convenience of bankers instead of their 
customers.  Banks looked upon their customers with arrogance and indifference.  Remarkably, 
this strict oligopoly situation did not appear to be entire destructive. Those who were 




Changes began to take place in 1971, with the publication from the Bank of England 
of a ‗consultative document‘ called ‗Competition and Credit Control‘
105
, which was probably 
the first time there was a serious discussion on the competition effects of credit institutions. 
Thereafter, the UK went through the 1986 Big Bang deregulation and reregulation process, 
creation of universal banking and financial conglomerates as well as the globalization of 
financial system.
106
 These gradual developments led to the transformation and improvement 
of the UK banking regime. 
 
However, the expected results were not realized.  In reality, banks and other financial 
institutions remain much the same to their retail customers.
107
  This was proven recently by 
the case of the new entrants in the UK banking market, such as, Tesco Bank, Metro Bank, or 
Virgin Money.
108
 Based on a survey, most bank account holders believed that switching bank 
accounts from their present bank to these new challenger banks would not matter much.  Bank 
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account holders did not think they could obtain better service or gain more value for money 




There are several problems experienced to date, which appear to damage bank 
customers due to competitive pressure rather than its non-existence. For example, bank 
customers are urged to take out mortgages or obtain deposit products with unfavourable 
rates.
110
 A large number of these customers will still take these products notwithstanding that 
introductory rates subsequently change to unappealing terms.
111
  Even in those instances in 
which banks promise their customers to treat them fairly, history indicates that competition 
for new customers makes these banks abandon previous promises, when they notice the effect 




The crucial issue in the banking market is the competitive pressure, which forces 
financial institutions to provide their customers with ‗free‘ current account banking 
services.
113
  However, such a thing does not, in reality, exist. Financial institutions obtain 
financial benefits from the current account relationship in other respects. They provide 
accounts wrapped in incentives, which are hardly worth what a customer would pay for 
them.
114
 Banks introduce arbitrarily high charges for other banking services, unauthorized 
overdrafts, and foreign transactions. They, also, seek to cross-sell services to a customer that 
possibly does not need, and would, indeed, get less expensively services somewhere else. 
 
The market for personal current accounts has comparatively few bank providers and 
banking products. The charges in this market remain multi-layered and complex, making the 




Regarding competition in the cash savings market, savers appear to earn poorer returns 
than necessary from their bank accounts, especially the case for longstanding customers.  As a 
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result, whereas certain aspects of the cash savings market tend to function properly, 




Most bank account holders are unable to take advantage of the best financial product 
offers available to them. 
 
The four-dominant cash savings account financial institution providers (Royal Bank of 
Scotland, Lloyds Banking Group, Barclays, and HSBC) that hold approximately two-thirds of 





For example, the median yearly interest rate that the leading personal current account 
financial institution renders on easy-access savings accounts opened between 2012 and 2014 
was roughly 0.5 per cent.
118
  The corresponding rate given by other providers for the same 




Financial institutions are able to pay lower interest rates to existing customers than 
they offer on bank accounts opened more recently, because most customers fail to look around 




For instance, in early 2014, the average interest rate on easy-access bank accounts 
opened in the previous two years was approximately 0.8 per cent, as compared with 0.3 per 




The dominance of established suppliers of current accounts and the unpopularity of 
bank account switching makes it hard for competing financial institutions to obtain a foothold 
in the UK savings market.
122
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Most consumers put their savings in accounts with their current account providers, 
notwithstanding that the dominant current account market players characteristically provide 




Nevertheless, some critics doubt whether regulatory investigations can provide any 
benefit to consumers. Persuading consumers to retain their savings in accounts overtaken by 
inflation remains a probing assessment of investor protection.
124
 A possible alternative could 
be to inform savers that the best means to realize real profits would be to embrace investment 
risk and market exposure. 
 
The banking and competition authorities maintain they intend to carry out additional 
studies, such as the Competition and Markets Authority‘s ongoing retail banking market 
investigation,
125
 prior to deciding on implementation of any necessary intervention to 
safeguard operational competition in the banking market. 
 
Any action taken will be measured to advance consumers‘ insight into the interest 
rates they are receiving, in comparison to rates available from other accounts. It would, 
moreover, scrutinize the improving of consumer awareness on the change of their rates over 
time, mostly for accounts that provide appealing introductory interest rates. Characteristically, 
banks offer ‗teaser‘ rates to entice individuals and businesses to their savings products, with 
the publicized rate only continuing for a particular period before returning to a lower rate.
126
 
Often, these accounts are criticized by consumer groups that believe most consumers do not 
succeed to move their savings before the promotional rate comes to an end. Numerous 
providers utilize ‗teaser‘ rates to inflate the notification rates on savings accounts, and this is 
not necessarily a negative thing when rates are reasonably low. However, when interest rates 
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The UK banking and competition regulators are, also, in the process of reviewing how 
to make it more convenient for consumers to switch their bank accounts. 
 
New rules were introduced in 2013 to provide that it should only take seven business 
days, rather than thirty business days, for a consumer and/or a business to change bank 
account providers.
128
  The rules are intended to enhance competition and persuade smaller 
financial institutions to challenge the dominance of the large banks.
129
  Nevertheless, bank 




Banks‘ customers lose billions of pounds by holding their funds in poor value savings 
accounts, while banks provide inadequate services to assist their customers in receiving the 
best deals. 
 
Despite the fact that the banking authorities do undertake investigations in this 
market,
131
 financial institutions ought to be entirely transparent, when it comes to interest 
rates.  These institutions need to inform consumers, when bonus interest rates expire, and 
make it more convenient for consumers to switch their savings accounts to other financial 
institutions. 
 
5.4  Competitive analysis 
 
A relevant merger situation in the UK arises when at least two parties fulfil a three-step 
process.  
 
First, the enterprises (i.e., banks) must cease to be distinct.
132
 Secondly, the merger 
must have either not yet occurred or was consummated within four months prior to the 
reference to the competition authority, unless the merger occurred without public knowledge 
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and the authority was not notified of the merger.
133
 Thirdly, the UK turnover of the acquired 
enterprise must surpass £70 million (turnover test)
134
 or the merger case forms or boosts a 
supplier‘s share of services or products of an exact specification in the UK to 25 per cent or 




To ascertain if two or more enterprises cease to be distinct, the UK competition 





Notwithstanding the complexities the share of supply test presents for merging parties, 
it is only one of two possible jurisdictional size thresholds that may apply.
137
 The share of 
supply test is met if the merger establishes or increases a 25 per cent market share of any 
products or services within the UK, or in a significant part of the country.  The share of supply 





 The competition authority ensures that the concerned market or markets are adequately 
importance to warrant a reference, i.e., where their total yearly value in the UK exceeds £10 
million. Where the yearly value of the market or markets is in sum total below £3 million, the 
Competition and Markets Authority (‗CMA‘) normally will not contemplate a reference as 
long as there is not, in principle, a definite undertakings in lieu of reference solution 
available.
139
  Where the total relevant annual value in the UK is between £3 million and £10 
million, the CMA will look at whether the anticipated harm to customers arising from the 
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 The UK competition watchdog applies a de minimis rule in relation to markets of insufficient importance, 
which can be less than £10 million of the merger‘s yearly value of the affected market in the UK.  For more 
information, see Mergers Exceptions to the Duty to Refer and Undertakings in Lieu of Reference (n1), pp 3-21.    
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The UK competition authority bases its analysis of likely customer harm on the size of 
the concerned market. This means that its view is based on the prospect that a ‗substantial 
lessening of competition‘ (‗SLC‘) shall materialize, its analysis of the extent of any 
competition that would be removed, and its view regarding the duration of that substantial 
reduction of competition.
141
 It is more probable that the competition authority will refer the 
merger for ‗Phase 2‘ investigation, where the merger is possibly replicable in a number of 




The CMA does not implement the de minimis exception in the event straightforward 
undertakings in lieu could be put forward by the merging parties to address the identified 
competition concerns.
143
 Even where the concerned markets are in context insignificant in 
size, the merging parties should still be motivated to proffer clear undertakings to resolve 




The merger analysis provisions embody the common principles that the UK 
competition authority and the responsible sector regulator(s) apply to assess the unilaterally 
imposed and synchronized consequences of horizontal or non-horizontal merger 
transactions.
145
 These guidelines explain the SLC test and the significance of important 
consequence on competitiveness over time.
146
   
 
They, also, consider a more ‗economics-built‘ method to merger examination, 
especially in unilaterally imposed competition consequences situations.
147
 For instance, as 
market definition remains pertinent to framing competitive analysis, it is presently deemed to 
be more of a valuable instrument and not essentially an end in itself.
148
 This is principally the 
case in situations of unilaterally imposed consequences, where advanced application of profit 
margins, diversion ratios, and related quantitative evidence is more imperative.
149
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The retail banking market in UK is moderately concentrated, with a small number of 




 For most banking services, including mortgage lending, unsecured lending, and 
instant access deposits, the outcome of mergers on interest rate levels is not much more than 




The consequences of bank mergers on notice deposit accounts, in comparison with 
other banking products, do seem to be statistically meaningful. For considerable quantities, 
between £5,000 and £50,000, invested in notice deposit accounts, a consistent negative 
change in interest rates provided on customers‘ accounts appears to occur. This happens, 
instantly, following the merger, and for a few years after that event.
152
  Overall, the result is a 
rapid decrease in the level of interest for customers compared to those customers of banks that 
are not merging. This shows that merging banks compete much less aggressively in the UK 
market for the notice deposits accounts as compared with their non-merging counterparts. 
 
Prior to a merger, targeted banks appear to price their notice deposit accounts for 
smaller amounts, between £500 and £5,000, reasonably competitively, and render 
considerably higher interest rates in the last few years prior to the merger.
153
  Generally, a 
bank merger seems to correlate with a strategic reduction of competition in the notice deposit 
accounts market. 
 
The UK merger assessment guidelines provide a thorough explanation of the ‗defences‘ 
available to banks wishing to receive merger clearance.
154
 An important factor is that the 
merger increases effectiveness.
155
 A bank merger sometimes leads to a diversity of 
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efficiencies, like economies of scope and branch sharing, as well as back-office integration.
156
  
Banks‘ abilities to rely on effectiveness arguments are relatively narrow. The UK competition 
regulators acknowledge that effectiveness makes a difference, when it is considerable and the 
potential anti-competitive effect of the merger would be small.  However, the merging banks 




The merger case is eligible for assessment by UK competition authority when the 
share of supply test
158
 or the turnover test
159
 is met.  Accordingly, a merger might be subject 
to more scrutiny when there appears to be no competitive overlap between the merging 
parties.  
 
The turnover test is met where the annual value of the UK turnover of the party being 
taken over exceeds £70 million.
160
 Generally, it will be straightforward to identify the 
acquired party business whose turnover should be considered.  Particular rules apply in 
relation to joint ventures and partnership mergers.
161
  The custom is to base turnover on the 
latest reported accounts, conditioned to reflect any substantial transactions completed after the 




Regarding the share of supply test, there is broad discretion in determination of the 
relevant services or products, which might be exercised for the following reasons.
163
  The 
share of supply test is, in many instances, loosely, yet erroneously, considered as a market 
share test.  In fact, it is not an economic market share test.  Therefore, there is no requirement 
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The competition authorities heed any sensible characterization of a set of products or 
services in order to decide, if the share of supply test is satisfied. For example, such a 
characterization may be based on value, price, cost, quantity or capacity of people employed. 
 
Applicability of the supply share test can extend to the UK as a whole, or to a 
‗substantial‘ part of the country.
165
  An area may be defined as ‗substantial‘, when it is of 





If one of the merging parties possesses a 25 per cent share of supply, the share of 




The SLC standard allows consideration of a broad spectrum of competition concerns, 
while assessing vertical, horizontal, or conglomerate mergers.
168
 A merger can be envisaged 
to give rise to a SLC, when such merger is anticipated to impair competitiveness to such a 
level that it would be harmful to customers.
169
  This could occur, for instance, because of 
decreased product options, or as a result of the profitable increase in prices, a decrease in 
output, or a decrease in innovation or product quality. 
 
Determination of the markets affected by a relevant merger provides the structure for 
the competition analysis. The merger assessment guidelines issued by the competition 
regulator concerning market determination
170
 constitute the regulator‘s blueprint for dealing 
with merger situations and competition provisions.  The foremost standard is on the suitability 
of products from the perspective of consumers and competing providers. The supposed 
                                                        
164
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 Regina v Monopolies and Mergers Commission, ex parte South Yorkshire Transport LtD, [1993] 1 WLR 23, 
[1993] 1 ALL ER 289. 
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 Ibid, para 5.2. 
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monopolist test is a crucial one. This concerns profitability for a theoretical monopolist to 
apply a 5 per cent non-transitory increment in prices
171
 relative to a specific product.  The 
merger is considered for the existence of any short-term competitive restraints in the way of 
substituted products.   
 
The geographic market is determined in line with the location of merging parties, 
which are perceived as competitive options for consumers within a specific area.
172
   
 
Part of a merger review is assessment of the ‗counterfactual‘ position,
173
 which means 




            The ‗counterfactual‘ position is of importance in a horizontal merger in which issues 
emerge regarding competitive overlapping between the merging parties.
175
 These could 
involve coordinated
176
 or non-coordinated (unilateral) consequences.
177
 Coordinated results 
consist of competitors in the market place synchronizing their conduct in order to increase 
prices, lessen quality or curb yield.
178
  Non-coordinated or unilateral consequences consist of 
situations where one party discovers it is profitable to increase prices or diminish yield or 
quality due to the market power of the merged parties.
179
   
 
                The competition examination centres on the merging parties‘ market shares, their 
competitors‘ market shares, obstacles to entry, any competitive weights (persuasions) on the 
merging parties‘ business, the effects of prices and additional provision of products and 
services supply, as well as any offsetting buyer ability.
180
 The degree of concentration in the 
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 Ibid, paras 4.3.1 - 4.3.4. 
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market is a robust indicator of any latent competition issues and can be counted, based on 




             The potential issue that occurs in vertical mergers is the vertically combined 
businesses may encourage market foreclosure, either towards or in the opposite direction of 
the vertically combined business operation.
182
  The merged parties‘ position in these markets 
is a significant factor.  
 
             A conglomerate merger hardly ever gives rise to a SLC. However, this could be an 





The EU competition provisions are applicable to banking (or other businesses) 
‗concentrations‘ transactions possessing an EU dimension. A merger has an EU dimension, if 
the grand total global turnover of the entire banks involved exceeds €5 billion, and the total 
Community-wide turnover of each, or at minimum two, of the banks involved exceeds €250 
million.
184
 However, this criterion will not be satisfied if each of the banks involved has more 
than two thirds of its grand total EU-wide turnover in one and the same member state.
185
  In 
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            The above financial threshold of banks is computed, based on an income-related test, 
in which turnover includes the sum of interest and similar income, income from securities, 




A bank merger subject to the EU merger provisions is evaluated to determine if the 
merger is compatible with the Common Market.  If a bank merger causes a concentration that 
could notably hamper effectual competition, within the Common Market or in a considerable 
portion of it, especially due to the formation or consolidation of a dominant position, the 
merger would be held incompatible with the Common Market and consequently prohibited.
188
  
In the event that it does not present an incompatibility issue, at that juncture the merger 
should be permitted. 
 
In relation to the application of State aid provisions to undertakings implemented by 
banks and other financial institutions in light of the Global Financial Crisis, the EU 
competition authority has identified numerous types of State aid situations.
189
  These include 
guarantees of banks‘ liabilities, recapitalization of banks that should not have been allowed 
under the special aid provisions, administered bank winding up processes, and central bank 





            The Commission provides twenty-four hours or over a weekend, if required, for an 
enhanced procedure to evaluate and grant State aid to banks.
191
  Also, the normal time 
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 Council Directive 86/635/EEC on the annual accounts and consolidated accounts of banks and other financial 
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 DG Competition, ‗DG Competition‘s Review of Guarantee and Recapitalization Schemes in the Financial 






           Retail deposit guarantees are normally designed to protect against any bank run 
situations.
193
 Wholesale lending and additional kinds of guarantees are allowed in particular 




            For retail deposit guarantees, the basis to ensure adequate recompense from the 
beneficiary of the guarantee must be greater if the guarantee is requested. For 
recapitalization, the price of stock purchased by a Member State government is stemmed from 
a market-driven assessment, with elements like claw-back instruments or favoured stock being 
regarded positively.  
 
 In terms of guarantees and recapitalizations, several restrictions on the future conduct 
of the bank recipients are needed.  These include a prohibition on advertising derived from the 
bank recipient‘s state-backed position, or regarding business operation expansion.  
 
The reason behind the recapitalization relief for the EU Member States‘ actions, like 
the UK Government‘s recapitalization scheme and asset guarantee for Royal Bank of 
Scotland,
195
 and Lloyds Banking Group,
196
 is to restore financial stability of banks within the 





            The Commission adopted temporary approaches on State aid undertakings in order to 
support banks and other financial institutions‘ access to finance during the Global Financial 
Crisis.
198
  The Commission‘s measures concerned aid to stimulate loan guarantees and 
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Under the EU merger regulation, the general position is that a notifiable transaction 
cannot be implemented before clearance of the merger.
200
 However, the merger regulation 
permits the Commission to grant derogations from this suspensory obligation.
201
 In deciding 
whether to accept a derogation request, the Commission must consider the effects on the 
parties and third parties and the threat to competition posed by the transaction. Derogations 
are in practice very rarely granted. The derogation may be contingent on conditions and 
obligations in contemplation of warranting conditions for efficient competition. The 





Previously derogations were issued solely under extraordinary conditions.
203
  
Recently, the Commission has demonstrated an inclination to be more accommodating, finding 
extraordinary conditions more frequently than before.  In 2008, the Commission granted 
derogation actions, giving the go-ahead to the Bradford & Bingley takeover by Santander, 




Non-European bank acquirers, like US banks, need to adhere to the EU parameters for 
evaluating banking mergers.
205
 These parameters require an analysis of the ‗equivalence‘ of 
third country regulatory authority in the jurisdiction where the banking group is formed.
206
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The Commission finds that cross-border bank mergers within the EU are less prevalent 
than in other areas of the economy.  Market participants recognize a number of impediments to 
cross-border bank mergers.
207
 One obstacle is that the banking and competition regulators that 
approve cross-border bank mergers are frequently utilized for national protectionist reasons.
208
  
The ability to examine the effects of a bank merger and approval on the basis of this 
examination is, in reality, granted to the pertinent authorities of the Member State in which the 
merger target bank is located. 
 
When a UK bank merger has an EU dimension,
209
 the UK regulators do not have 
authority to apply their own regulatory provisions to the merger.
210
 However, under the EU 
provisions, UK competition authorities are permitted to apply suitable means to preserve 
‗legitimate interests‘ in the bank merger transaction.
211
  The EU provisions recognize 




5.4.1 Ex-ante v ex-post notification control 
 
The Commission‘s merger control analysis under the ECMR is carried out based on an ex-
ante (pre-notification) control.
213
 Under this approach, the Commission shall primarily aim to 
prevent merging parties from reinforcing or establishing a dominant position enabling them to 
exercise market power that could be harmful for the process of undisturbed competition.
214
 
Consequently, the most important purpose of merger policy is to avert formation of a market 
                                                                                                                                                                             
206
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structure that would significantly facilitate coordination of market behaviour between 
different market players.  For example, in the Deutsche Börse/NYSE-Euronext merger
215
, the 
Commission banned ex-ante this planned merger to near monopoly on the European financial 
derivatives market, despite future substantial efficiency gains argued by the parties. 
 
The inability of the Commission to review developments on post-mergers
216
 influences 
the authority to implement more compromises than may otherwise be the case when carrying 
out its responsibilities.
217
 The burdensome nature of action, in addition to the lack of a 
requirement that the EU competition authority justifies its findings with solid evidence, and 






The examination of specific mergers may be particularly contentious as the merging 
parties concerned and the Commission along with the Member States are arguing on the basis 





Unlike the ex-ante merger control assessment, the anticompetitive agreements 
(cooperation) pursuant to Article 101 TFEU
220
 and the control of abuse of dominance 
(unilateral conduct) under Article 102 TFEU
221
 are examined by the Commission on ex-post-
merger basis.
222
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 edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013), p 349. 
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 The market analysis in cases assessed under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the 
ECMR is, notwithstanding the different wording of these provisions, not different under each 
rule, though the different time perspective of Articles 101(1) and 102 TFEU (ex-post) and 
merger control (ex-ante) could lead on occasion to different geographic markets being defined 
for the same products.
223
 Notwithstanding this insignificant anomaly, the objective should be 
uniformity, or, failing that, at least compatibility among all the market definitions (both 





As for the UK and the US, bank merger notifications are not mandatory.  Nevertheless, 
merging banks tend to notify the relevant regulators before consummation of merger in order 
to avoid any potential anticompetitive issues in post-merger condition.   
 
5.4.2 Significant impediment of effective competition (‘SIEC’) test 
 
The Commission utilizes a specific test as a relevant criterion to examine mergers and to 
enhance the possibilities to refer mergers to Member States or the latter referring mergers to 
the Commission.
225
 The test is called the ‗Significant Impediment of Effective Competition‘ 
(‗SIEC‘).
226
  The SIEC test is defined as,  
 
A concentration which would significantly impede effective competition, in particular 
by the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, in the Common Market or in a 
substantial part of it shall be declared incompatible with the Common Market.
227
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The SIEC test includes not only coordinated effects, which are ‗creation or strengthening of a 
dominant position‘,
228
 but also non-coordinated effects, which is ‗significantly impede 




In order to improve the transparency of its merger analysis, while implementing the 
SIEC test, the Commission has published two sets of guidelines providing a sound economic 
framework for the assessment of both horizontal
230
 and non-horizontal (i.e., vertical or 
conglomerate) mergers.
231
  Besides the guidelines the Commission has adopted three other 








The term ‗Significant Impediment of Effective Competition‘ (‗SIEC‘) is used to 
describe a situation in which the new business, e.g., financial institution, deriving from a 
merger is the single strongest participant in the market and is capable to significantly hamper 
competition by creating unilateral effects.
235
 This is the situation in which a merger removes a 
significant competitive constraint, especially because prior to the merger, the businesses being 
brought together were previously one another‘s closest competitors.
236
   
 
When evaluating the impact of a notified merger on competition, the Commission 
reviews whether the merger would substantially hamper effective competition in the internal 
market or a substantial part of it.
237
  Especially, the Commission seeks to conclude whether 
the merger would establish or strengthen a dominant position.
238
  For example, in the merger 
case of Bank of New York / Royal Bank of Scotland,
239
 the Commission found that the 
proposed bank merger did not result in the ‗creation or strengthening of a dominant position‘ 
                                                        
228
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 Case No. COMP/IV/M.1618 Bank of New York/Royal Bank of Scotland [1999] OJ C/16.  In this case Bank of 
New York acquired a subsidiary of Royal Bank of Scotland. 
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because the merger failed to distort effective competition in the EU market or a significant 
part of it.
240
  Therefore, the Commission decided to not oppose the notified operation and to 




The SIEC test eliminated a possible enforcement ‗gap‘ created from the previous 
(dominance) test
242
, which did not clearly capture possible anti-competitive effects deriving 
from a merger of two businesses in an oligopolistic market, where the merged business would 
not have become dominant.
243
 Therefore, the SIEC test has removed this uncertainty and 
permits the Commission to strengthen its economic analysis of complex mergers.  The merger 
examination employs a series of combination of qualitative quantitative/empirical evidence.
244
  
For example, in Fortis/ABN Assets merger
245
, the Commission utilized the SIEC test 
identifying non-coordinated effects in spite of the fact that the merged bank‘s market share 
was similar or even lower than its competitors.
246
   
 
While the SIEC test is mostly common used in EU Member States, the UK and the US 
apply the ‗substantial lessening of competition‘ (‗SLC‘) test.
247
  The SIEC and the SLC tests are 
potentially quite different. The SLC draws attention to the level of change the merger shall 
cause to existing levels of competition, while the SIEC test appears capable of capturing a 
broader range of conduct, where the merger in question hinders competition without 
substantially reducing existing market competition.  Nevertheless, practically speaking, the 
analytical approach adopted by the UK, the US and the EU Member States applying either of 
these tests is very similar. 
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 In this bank merger case the proposed merger was to combine the first and the fourth biggest financial 
institutions within the Dutch market that was already concentrated.  The Commission expressed some concerns 
in relation to the banking markets for commercial customers within the Dutch market.  The market investigation 
established the position of Fortis as an aggressive competitor, which wished to remain an active competitor by 
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 EA02 (n13), ss 22-23; also, 15 USC §§12-27, 29 USC §§52-53 (Clayton Act 1914), s 7. 
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5.4.3  Failing firm (exiting firm) defence 
 
In relation to the analysis of obstacles to entry and the ‗failing firm (‗exiting firm‘ is the 
British terminology) defence‘, the UK competition authorities have adopted a coherent 
standard for ascertaining whether these defences may apply.
248
  To establish the defence of 
possible entry, concerning undertakings should show market entry is of adequate scope and 
extent, and is timely in manner, such as, to offset the likely bettered competitive position of 
the merged bank.  To determine a ‗failing firm‘ (‗exiting firm‘) situation, the CMA considers, 
‗(1) whether the [bank] would have exited (through failure or otherwise); and, if so (b) 
whether there would have been an alternative purchaser for the [bank] or its assets to the 
acquirer under consideration; and (c) what would have happened to the sales of the [bank] in 




The UK competition authority‘ approach in bank merger cases, i.e., the takeover of 
HBOS by Lloyds, confirmed that the authority is not lightly persuaded by the ‗failing firm 
(‗exiting firm‘) defence‘.
250
  In that case, the competition authority (then the Office of Fair 
Trading) deemed that the assets of the merged banks would not leave the UK financial market 
because the government guaranteed medium and short-term funding to these banks.
251
 The 
competition authorities assess the prevailing market and economic situations, when weighing 
evidence presented by merging parties. These situations are predominantly relevant to an 
assessment of evidence regarding the predictability of a party departing the market, and the 
genuine readiness of an alternate acquirer for an existing party to make such acquisition.
 
 
The foregoing dynamics are similar to those factors considered by the US252 and the 
EU253 competition regulators.  
 
                                                        
248
 UK Merger Assessment Guidelines (n1), para 4.3.8.   
249
 Ibid.  
250
 Decision by Lord Mandelson, the Secretary of State for Business, Not to Refer to the Competition 
Commission the Merger Between Lloyds TSB Group plc and HBOS plc under Section 45 of the Enterprise Act 
2002 (31 October, 2008) Department for Business, Enterprise & Regulatory Reform (‗Lord Mandelson 
Decision‘), paras 19-21, available at www.berr.gov.uk/files/file48745.pdf. 
251
 Office of Fair Trading, ‗Report to the SoS for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform: Anticipated 
Acquisition by Lloyds TSB plc of HBOS plc‘ (24 October, 2008) OFT, paras 59-60. 
252
 Department of Justice, ‗Horizontal Merger Guidelines‘ (2010) (‗US Horizontal Merger Guidelines‘), paras 
5.0, and 11, available at www.justice.gov/atr/public/guide lines/hmg-2010.pdf.  
253
 EU Horizontal Merger Guidelines (n32). para 89; also, pp 5-18. 
194 
 
In the US, the ‗failing firm defence‘
254
 is established when (i) the allegedly ‗failing 
firm‘ would be unable to meet its financial obligations in the near future;
255
 (ii) it would not 
be able to reorganize successfully under Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the US Code (‗US 
Bankruptcy Code‘);
256
 (iii) it has made unsuccessful good-faith efforts to elicit reasonable 
alternative offers of acquisition of the assets of the ‗failing firm‘ that would both keep its 
tangible and intangible assets in the relevant market and pose a less severe danger to 
competition than does the proposed merger; and absent the acquisition, the assets of the 
‗failing firm‘ would exit the relevant market.
257
 In practical terms, a ‗failing firm‘ defence 
would be unlikely used in the bank mergers market because those banks that are in dire 
financial situation are undesirable targets from other banks.   
 
Role of the ‘failing firm defence’ in EU merger analysis 
 
Although the doctrine is not made explicit in the EUMR,
258
 it is noted in paragraphs 89 to 91 
in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
259
  The rationale behind the ‗failing firm defence‘ rule is 
the notion the deterioration of the competitive structure follows a merger cannot be caused by 
the merger.
260
  This lack of a causality link between a merger and a subsequent decrease in 
competition is consistent with Article 2(3) EUMR,
261
 in which a merger would significantly 
impede effective competition (‗SIEC‘) should be prohibited or modified by the Commission.  
In the ‗failing firm defence‘, though, because the lessening of competition occurs regardless 
of the merger, the merger cannot be the cause of any harm to competition, or it is at least 
―neutral‖,
262
 and thus, such merger should be approved.
263
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et de l‘Azote (SCPA) and Enterprise Miniere et Chimique (EMC) v Commission [1998] ECR I-1375, para 116; 





 Because the ‗failing firm defence‘ is an exceptional test, the Commission applies it 
very narrowly.
264
  The evidential hurdle in applying ‗failing firm defence‘ comes from the fact 
that in order to succeed, merging banks must show something more than the lack of 
causality
265
 and their claim would need to be accompanied by an efficiencies defence.
266
  The 
Commission‘s Guidelines consider three cumulative criteria in its evaluation of a bank‘s 
application for ‗failing firm defence‘: first, the failing bank shall exit the market in the 
foreseeable future due to its financial difficulties; secondly, there is no less anti-competitive 
alternative purchase that could occur in place of a merger; and thirdly, in the absence of a 
merger, the assets of the failing firm (bank) would inevitably exit the market.
267
  The high 
burden of proving that the criteria are satisfied lies on the merging banks, which must show 
the proposed merger would lead to a less anti-competitive outcome than a counterfactual 




Even though the foregoing three criteria may not be rigorously met, the merger could 
still be accepted due a counterfactual analysis, considering the fragility of the bank in 
question, the financial market and the banking industry and, above all, consumer welfare.
269
 In 
other words, rather than refining the defence, it may be more appropriate to focus on the 
substance of the causality test.
270
  Indeed, the approach taken by the Commission concerning 
situations similar to a ‗failing firm‘ scenario,
271
 in which the Commission uses a 
counterfactual analysis, seems to confirm that the formalistic ‗failing firm‘ test might no 
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longer be appropriate, and indeed, a more pragmatic approach can be used when applying a 




   The Commission‘s thinking has developed gradually over time, leaving open the 
possibility of a wider analysis of the ‗failing firm defence‘, although this should depend on the 
specific circumstances of each case.
273
 Indeed, the Commission submitted at the OECD 
Roundtable that ‗while especially relevant, these factors [the three ‗failing firm defence‘ 
criteria] are not exclusive and exhaustive in establishing that a merging party is a failing firm. 
Other factors may be equally relevant depending on the circumstances of the case‖.
274  
    The ‗failing firm defence‘ does not follow the standard two-step merger review 
process.  Instead, the ‗defence‘ is structured around three cumulative criteria, as outlined 
above.  This threefold test is problematic in that ‗a merger involving a failing firm may be 
blocked (or remedied) for not satisfying the above conditions [criteria], even when it 
represents the least anticompetitive solution for the failing firm‘s financial problems‘.
275  
Instances of this could include a situation in which the failing firm‘s assets are used by 
potential purchasers but inefficiently, or one in which the alternative buyer itself lacks the 
ability to compete effectively in the market.
276  
  Under the first condition of the ‗failing firm‘ test, the merging parties need to show the 
firm is unlikely to meet its financial obligations in the near future.
277  It is not necessary to 
demonstrate that the firm has entered into bankruptcy or liquidation proceedings, but only that 
it is a feasible prospect.
278  Sophisticated financial data comes into play in order to measure 
the firm‘s financial health, together with the health of the industry at issue. Particularly, the 
Commission takes into account the firm‘s balance sheet in terms of profitability, liquidity and 
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279 Although it is a highly demanding financial analysis, it is more certain than the 
other two criteria in which the counterfactual assessment is hypothetical in nature.
280  
    In the second component of the test, the parties must demonstrate that there are no less 
harmful alternative purchasers for the firm than the proposed transaction.  It implies a difficult 
scrutiny of other reasonable buyers, and whether they would lead to a better competitive 
outcome.
281 The merging parties need to show that the assets of the ‗failing firm‘ would exit 
the market, if not for the merger. In essence, the parties have to provide evidence that the 
business in question, as an on-going concern, is less valuable than its liquidation price.
282 In 
the application of the ‗failing firm‘ test, not only is the exit of the target firm a key issue but, 
also, the exit of the target firm‘s specialised or productive assets. In a successful application of 
‗failing firm defence‘, the merger is justified on the basis that it is the only way of keeping the 
assets in the market.
283 Indeed, some commentators have even proposed referring to the 




The establishment of comprehensive provisions for the ‗failing firm‘ defence is, 
moreover, an important issue, as this could be useful in the acquisition of a distressed bank‘s 
business. To apply, the target bank should be on the brink of being pushed out of the market.  
The acquirer bank must demonstrate that the acquisition will be an ultimate recourse for the 




 The Commission has demonstrated an inclination to be flexible regarding its standard 
requirement to hold back clearance of a bank merger in anticipation of closing.
286
  In the event 
a rescue package needs to be put together quickly; the suspensory effect of the EU merger 
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provisions may prove to be an impediment. This would have been a serious issue in the 
Bradford & Bingley takeover, in which Santander bank came out as the primary bidder.
287
  
The Commission quickly issued a belittlement against the suspensory provisions to permit 




In bank merger cases, the EU, UK, and the US authorities show a great deal of 
scrutiny in order to permit merging banks to consummate a merger under a failing firm 
defence.  As a result, such defence is rarely used by the banks. 
 
5.5  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, competition methodologies applying to the UK, focusing on markets, 
products, consumer issues and competition in relation to bank mergers are described, 
explained and analysed.  
 
As has been demonstrated, despite regulatory developments at domestic and EU 
levels, competition in this sector remains limited and problematic. A combination of the 
recent global financial crisis, effects of regulatory developments and consumer behaviours 
means that SMEs continue to find it challenging to enter the banking and finance market.  
 
In evaluating a proposed bank merger, both UK and EU regulators seek to establish 
whether the proposed merger will establish or strengthen an existing dominant position, and 
further whether this will negatively impact competition in the market. Regarding markets, 
both product and geographical delimitations are relevant to the overall analysis. In addition to 
market share, which in itself has generally decreased in importance over time as the primary 
factor for consideration, barriers to entry now feature heavily in regulatory impact assessment. 
Jurisdictional rules determine whether a given merger may be evaluated by the UK or EU 
authorities, with legal developments in recent times having expanded the Commission‘s scope 
of competence. Commission has the power to review bank mergers with an EU dimension, to 
establish compatibility with the Common Market.  
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In general, considerable challenges remain in terms of achieving the desired objective, 
being a competitive market for banking in the UK. At present the developments that have 
taken place have principally advantaged banks seeking to merge, through improved process 
transparency and flexibility, without any appreciable benefit to consumers. In fact, dominant 
market players exploit consumer ignorance, mis-sell products, and offer services that are 
inferior to those limited other options in the marketplace, but without negative consequence to 
their market shares.  In reality, by one means or another, the majority of proposed bank 
mergers are permitted to proceed. There are both similarities and differences with the US 
experience, where, for example, timing issues are broadly the same but collective dominance 
has greater relevance. 
 
The author has demonstrated that in the personal current account product market, there 
is particularly heavy concentration.  Significant competition problems also exist in product 
markets where there are a greater number of participants, such as, personal loans and credit 
cards. Notwithstanding the obvious requirement for banks to be more transparent with their 
customers, it must be asked whether this alone will be sufficient to remedy consumer apathy 
towards switching bank accounts, a continued problem documented in this thesis. 
 
In terms of competition analysis, merging banks are offered a number of alternative 
routes to approval, from undertakings in lieu of reference to avoid enhanced scrutiny, de 
minimis exceptions, increased effectiveness defences, and the failing firm defence. In the 
context of the underlying economic situation that has prevailed since at least the start of the 
GFC, in many ways orchestrated by large financial institutions themselves, there has been 
infinite motivation for competition regulators to approve bank merger transactions despite 
evidence that merging institutions generally compete less effectively than their non-merging 
counterparts. When all is said and done and whilst acknowledging laudable intentions in all of 
this, it is difficult to say that the cornerstone objective of providing for healthy competition in 
the market for banking products and services has been achieved. 
 
While the EU looks at a merger in its ‗concentration‘ with a ‗Community dimension‘, 
in which two or more undertakings may cease to be distinct and the jurisdictional thresholds 
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of the ‗Community dimension‘ are met, the UK investigates a merger based on ‗relevant 
merger situations‘ that may exist where two or more enterprises cease to be distinct and the 
jurisdictional thresholds are satisfied.   
 
The Commission‘s merger control analysis under the ECMR is carried out based on an 
ex-ante (pre-notification) control. Under this approach, the Commission shall primarily aim to 
prevent merging parties from reinforcing or establishing a dominant position enabling them to 
exercise market power that could be harmful for the process of undisturbed competition. As 
for the UK and the US, bank merger notifications are not mandatory.  Nevertheless, merging 
banks tend to notify the relevant authorities before consummation of merger in order to avoid 
any potential anticompetitive issues in post-merger.   
 
The Commission utilizes a specific test as a relevant criterion to examine mergers and 
to enhance the possibilities to refer mergers to Member States or the latter referring mergers to 
the Commission. The test is called the ‗Significant Impediment of Effective Competition‘ 
(‗SIEC‘). The SIEC test is defined as concentration, which would significantly impede 
effective competition, in particular by the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, in 
the Common Market or in a substantial part of it shall be declared incompatible with the 
Common Market. Unlike the EU (SIEC) test, the UK and the US apply the ‗substantial 
lessening of competition‘ (‗SLC‘) test. The SIEC and the SLC tests are potentially quite 
different. The SLC draws attention to the level of change the merger shall cause to existing 
levels of competition, while the SIEC test appears capable of capturing a broader range of 
conduct, where the merger in question hinders competition without substantially reducing 
existing market competition. Nevertheless, practically speaking, the analytical approach adopted 
by the UK, the US and the EU Member States applying either of these tests is quite similar. 
 
In relation to the analysis of obstacles to entry and the ‗failing firm‘ (‗exiting firm‘ is 
the British terminology) defence, the UK competition authority has adopted a coherent 
standard for ascertaining whether these defences may apply. To establish the defence of 
possible entry, concerning undertakings should show market entry is of adequate scope and 
extent, and is timely in manner, such as, to offset the likely bettered competitive position of 
the merged bank.  To determine a ‗failing firm‘ (‗exiting firm‘) situation, the UK competition 
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authority CMA considers various factors, such as, whether the bank would have exited 
(through failure or otherwise); and, if so, whether there would have been an alternative 
purchaser for the bank or its assets to the acquirer under consideration; and what would have 
happened to the sales of the bank in the event of its exit. 
 
The foregoing dynamics of failing firm‘ defence are similar to those factors considered 
by the US and the EU competition regulators. In bank merger cases, the EU, UK, and the US 
authorities show a great deal of scrutiny in order to permit merging banks to consummate a 






CHAPTER 6 – ANTITRUST PROVISIONS OVER BANK MERGERS IN UNITED 
STATES  
 
Banking in the US is regulated by both the federal and state governments. Depending on its 
type of federal or state charter and organizational structure, a banking organization may be 
subject to numerous federal and state banking regulations.  
 
 Preserving financial stability is a fundamental goal of bank regulation, and historically 
has been a specific goal of bank competition policy. Paradoxically, it was previously believed 
that bank consolidation promoted stability. In addition, when the US Government enforced 
antitrust law, the banking industry remained intact due to the fact that competition policy was 




The competitive issues raised by bank mergers are subject to the Sherman Antitrust 
Act
2
, the Clayton Antitrust Act
3
, the Bank Merger Act
4
, the Bank Holding Company Act of 
1956
5
, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act
6
, the Change in Bank 
Control Act
7
, and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
8
. The 
aspects of these Acts as they relate to bank antitrust are discussed in this chapter. 
 
6.0  Sherman Antitrust Act 
  
In consideration of the increasing number of large-scale business enterprise in the post 
American civil war period, and the increasing number of trusts that utilized their power to 
oppress individuals, and injure the public, the US Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust 
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 PL 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (‗Riegle-Neal‘). 
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Act (‗Sherman Act‘) on 2 July, 1890 to promote and preserve competition.
9
  This law was 
perceived as the ‗MagnaCarta‘
10




 The Sherman Act prohibits ‗every contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce,‘
12
 and makes unlawful 
‗monopol[ies], or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire … to monopolize.‘
13
   The 
breach of any of these provisions may result in criminal and civil penalties.  The goal of the 
Sherman Act is not to protect businesses from competition, but to protect consumers from 





Two sections of the Sherman Act carry out its goals.  S 1 defines and prohibits specific 
types, such as, contracts, combinations, or conspiracies of anticompetitive conduct that 
restraint commerce or trade.
15
  S 2 defines the concept of monopolization as an effort or actual 
action from one person to combine or to conspire with one or more persons to have or take 




6.1 Clayton Antitrust Act 
 
In 1914, the US Congress passed the Clayton Antitrust Act (‗Clayton Act‘) to augment 
the Sherman Act
17
 and protect the public from mergers reduces competition.  The Clayton Act 
forbids acquisition by ‗one corporation of the stock of another corporation when such 
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S 7 of the Clayton Act
19
 forbids mergers that ‗may … substantially … lessen 
competition, or tend to create a monopoly.‘
20
  The Act applies to bank mergers,
21
 and the 
Justice Department has repeatedly opposed bank mergers under s 7.  
 
S 7‘s criteria are altered by simply forbidding mergers whose anticompetitive 
outcomes are evidently offset in the public interest by the apparent consequence of the merger 




The goal of s 7 of the Clayton Act is to forbid mergers that could exercise market 
power by increasing prices and limiting the supply of goods or services.   
 
Several US authorities, such as the Federal Reserve, Department of Justice,
23
 share the 
responsibility of imposing statutory anti-monopoly provisions. These regulators implement s 
7 of the Clayton Act throughout legal actions in federal court or agency proceedings.  In this 
regard, US banking regulators and competition authority apply s 7 to challenge directly any 
bank merger in a court of law or within regulator‘s administrative process. 
 
However, the Clayton Act does not expressly prohibit merger by one bank of the 
assets of another bank.
24
  The Act also does not seem to impede the purchase of stock in any 
bank but a direct competitor.
25
  Indeed, the Clayton Act promotes financial holding companies 
by permitting the purchase of its competitor‘s stock. 
 




 Ibid, §§ 12-27; see, also, 29 USC 29 §§52-53 (2000). 
20
 Ibid, §18. 
21
 S 7 is applicable to bank mergers. See Philadelphia Nat‘l Bank, 374 US at 354 (holding that ‗the Bank 
Merger Act of 1960 does not preclude application of s 7 of the Clayton Act to bank mergers‘ and that s 7 of the 
Clayton Act is applicable to bank mergers). For a discussion of Philadelphia Nat‘l Bank case, see chapter 8.1 in 
this thesis, pp 219-24. 
22
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23
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 In order to consider any competitive impact of a proposed bank merger, bank 
regulators and the antitrust authority must consider the foregoing requirements provided under 
the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Regulators may not approve a merger that would result in a 
monopoly or substantially to lessen competition.
26
 If the merger involves the acquisition of a 
nonbank by a bank holding company, the regulator should consider whether any possible 
adverse effects from the acquisition are outweighed by reasonably expected public benefits, 




6.2 Bank Merger Act 
 
The Bank Merger Act of 1960
28
 (‗BMA‘) pursues goals similar to the Clayton Act, but solely 
in the context of bank mergers.
29
  Congress enacted the BMA after considering the impact of 
bank mergers on competition.
30
  The BMA takes into account certain elements in bank merger 
situations. 
 
The BMA requires regulatory approval of mergers, which is shared among the Federal 
Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (‗OCC‘), and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (‗FDIC‘),
 
based on the regulatory status of the institutions.  In every 
proposed merger, the relevant regulator obtains advisory opinions about competition concerns 
from the other two regulators and the DOJ. The BMA provides that appropriate regulator must 
not approve any proposed merger that would result in a monopoly, or that would be in 
furtherance of any combination or conspiracy to monopolize, or to attempt to monopolize, the 
business of banking in any part of the US.
31
  The exception is if the anticompetitive outcomes 
of the proposed merger are outweighed by the consequence of the merger case in meeting the 












 P Z Robert, ‗The Bank Failure Crisis: Challenges in Enforcing Antitrust Regulation‘ (2009) 55 Wayne Law 
Review 1178, p 1182. 
30
 B Shull and G A Hanweck, Bank Mergers in a Deregulated Environment: Promise and Peril (Westport: 
Quorum Books 2001), p 87. 
31
 BMA (n4), §1828(c)(5)(A). 
32
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product of powerful contending forces‘ in United States v First City National Bank of Houston (1967) 386 US 
361, p 367. 
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The BMA indeed exempted pending bank merger transactions from s 7 of the Clayton 
Act and s 1 of the Sherman Act.
33
  Therefore, even if a merger were deemed anticompetitive, 




 Under the BMA, bank merger applications are sent to the Attorney General who is 
required to report to the banking regulator on the intended merger‘s competitive results in 
thirty calendar days.  The regulator can reduce this pre-approval time to ten days by informing 
the Attorney General that an emergency to prevent an institution‘s collapse demands 
immediate action.  The regulator must inform the Attorney General in the event it approves a 
merger.
35
  The BMA also contains a post-approval time requiring a bank merger not be 
completed before the thirtieth calendar day after the date of approval by the suitable banking 
regulator. The thirty-day period could, also, be reduced to a period of not less than fifteen 
days, with the Attorney General‘s approval, in the event the bank regulator has not received 




Pursuant to the BMA,
37
 in the event a suit to prevent the merger is not commenced 
within the applicable approval period the bank merger might be consummated and be exempt 
from a competition-based challenge except for under s 2 of the Sherman Act.  This means that 
a bank merger approved instantly to avert a bank collapse may not be conditioned to 
competition challenge whatsoever. A lawsuit initiated within the indicated period leads into an 
automatic stay of the merger. A bank may defend against the stay by demonstrating that the 




6.3 Bank Holding Company Act 
 
Before the enactment of Bank Holding Company Act (‗BHCA‘) 1956,
39
 bank holding 
companies were not subject to regulations that limited banks from engaging in commerce.  A 
purpose of the BHCA was to prevent concentrations of economic power resulting from 
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34
 Ibid, §1828(c)(5)(B). 
35




 Ibid, §1828(c)(7)(A). 
38
 Ibid.  
39
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companies, like Sears and Ford Motors, from operating in banking business.
40
  Among other 
restrictions, the Act prohibits companies that own banks from engaging in ‗activities that are 




S 3 of the BHCA
42
 provides standards for the Federal Reserve to apply in deciding 
whether bank holding companies may acquire other bank holding companies, banks, or bank 
assets.  The process is similar to merger applications under the BMA.  The Federal Reserve 
must specifically determine ‗whether or not the effect of [a merger proposal] would be to 
expand the size or extent of the bank holding company system involved beyond limits 




S 4 of the BHCA
44
 applies to bank holding company mergers of a nonbank or thrift 
institutions. A significant change came about in 1999 with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
45
 
amendment of the BHCA to recognize a class of financial holding companies. These 
companies are permitted to engage in a wide variety of financial services previously off-limits 




The standards of the BHCA are similar to those from s 2 of the Sherman Act and s 7 of 
the Clayton Act. The Act gives the Federal Reserve broad authority ‗to restrain the undue 
concentration of commercial banking resources and to prevent possible abuses related to the 
control of commercial credit‘.
47
  The Act, also, empowers the Federal Reserve to regulate ‗any 
company which has control over any bank‘.
48
 The BHCA, also, prohibits certain tying 
arrangements and exclusive dealing agreements with customers.
49
  The statutory definition of 
‗bank‘ and ‗bank holding company‘ under the BHCA has been amended several times.
50
 Each 
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of these amendments was a significant step in the historical development of the banking 
statutory scheme, reflecting shifting policy priorities about interstate banking, the scope of 
permissible non-banking activities of banks‘ corporate parents, and the separation of banking 
and commerce.
51
 Tracing the evolution of this key statutory definition helps to comprehend 
the broader political and economic dynamics, which have shaped bank holding company 
regulation since enactment of the BHCA in 1956 to date. 
 
6.4 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act  
 
The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (‗Riegle-Neal Act‘)
52
 
permits both intra- and interstate branching by both federal and state chartered banks. For 
intrastate, it only requires a bank holding company to have one bank subsidiary to operate in 
states, which have opted in to the Act‘s interstate branching provision.
53
 For interstate, it 
permits a bank to operate branches in any state nationwide so long as the ‗home state‘ and 
‗host state‘ have opted into the Act.
54
 Interstate branching may be accomplished by 
consolidation, taking over an existing bank or branch, or opening a new branch. The main 
exception in the Act is that it permits states to prohibit interstate branching. States were 
requested to either ‗opt in‘
55
 or ‗opt out‘
56
 of the Act‘s interstate branching provisions inside 
their borders until 1 June, 1997.
57
 The Act, effectively, permits bank holding companies to 
merge their subsidiary banks into a sole bank subsidiary.  
 




Unfortunately, Riegle-Neal‘s nationwide and state-wide deposit caps contained three 
major loopholes.  First, the deposit caps applied only to interstate bank acquisitions 
and interstate bank mergers, and the deposit caps therefore did not restrict 
combinations between banking organizations headquartered in the same state.  Second, 
                                                        
51
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the deposit caps did not apply to acquisitions of, or mergers with, thrift institutions and 
industrial banks, because those institutions were not treated as ‗banks‘ under the 
Riegle-Neal Act.  Third, the deposit caps did not apply to acquisitions of, or mergers 




As a result of these loopholes, banks were able to surpass nationwide depository caps through 
the emergency government-backed mergers during the Global Financial Crisis.
60
 These 
transactions included Bank of America‘s acquisition of Countrywide
61
, and Merrill Lynch
62
, 
JPMorgan Chase‘s acquisition of Washington Mutual,
63
 Wells Fargo acquired Wachovia,
64
 




Enactment of Riegle-Neal ushered in a new wave of bank mergers and acquisitions.  
Riegle-Neal permitted state and federally chartered banks to engage in interstate mergers 
restricted only by previously interstate restrictions provisions of the so-called ‗Douglas 
Amendment‘ under the BHCA.
66
  Bank consolidation and the emergence of megabanks 
became the norm.
67
  Riegle-Neal abolished geographic restrictions by allowing a single 
national bank headquartered in one state to open branches across the country.
68
  The Act 
reflected Congressional recognition of the nationwide banking trend and made competition 
between state and federally chartered banks more equal.
69
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6.5  Change in Bank Control Act 
 
The US Congress enacted the Change in Bank Control Act (‗CBCA‘)
70
 to regulate 
acquisitions of ‗control‘ of commercial banks that is not subject to the BHCA and the BMA.
71
  
Parties who desire to acquire control of a federal bank by the way of the purchase, transfer, 
pledge, or other disposition of voting stock must notify the competent federal regulator 
regulator(s), such as, the Federal Reserve, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (‗OCC‘), 





 Under the CBCA and the pertinent regulation of the authorized regulator, such as, the 
Federal Reserve, the OCC, or the FDIC, any party seeking to acquire the power to vote 25 per 
cent, or more, of a class of voting securities of a federally chartered bank must notify the 
regulator at least sixty days prior to the acquisition of commercial bank.  In addition, persons 
wishing to acquire the power to vote 10 per cent or more of a class of voting securities are 
deemed to have acquired control in certain circumstances. This comprises situations when two 





6.6 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act   
 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (‗Dodd-Frank Act‘)
74
 has 
important, but yet indirect, consequences for bank competition and concentration. The Act 
does not add substantive competition rules. However, it does limit concentration in the 
financial sector to promote financial stability and reduce system risk. In so doing, the Act may 
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prohibit a bank merger or acquisition that would reduce competition, except for the purpose of 
preserving stability in the banking or financial system.
75
  The first interpretations of the Act‘s 
‗financial stability‘ factor
76
 that the Federal Reserve considered were in acquisitions approvals 
of RBC Bank (USA) by The PNC Financial Services Group
77
, and ING Bank by Capital One 
Financial Corporation.
78
    
 
 The Dodd-Frank Act requires bank holding companies seeking to acquire an out of 
state bank to be well managed and well capitalized.
79
  It, also, amended the BMA to demand 




An important aspect of the Dodd-Frank Act is the fact that it provides overriding 
power to the applicability of the American antitrust laws in the event of any dispute between 
the latter laws and the Act, as long as such power is utilized by the banking regulators to 




 6.6.1  Volcker Rule 
 
Several provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act seek to improve the stability of the financial system 
beyond limiting bank size.  For instance, s 165 of Dodd-Frank Act builds up prudential 
criterions for large, interrelated financial institutions, including qualifying nonbanks.
82
 S 619 
of Dodd-Frank Act (known as the ‗Volcker Rule‘)
83
 prohibits banking entities from engaging 
in proprietary trading (trading for profit on financial markets for its own account) or investing 
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in hedge funds and private equity. The major exceptions for proprietary trading are hedging 
and market making.
84
  However, compliance, implementation, and enforcement of the 
Volcker Rule depend crucially of how these activities are defined and carried out.
85
   
 
 The main idea behind the Volcker Rule is to protect the stability of the financial sector 
and the government safety net (tax payers) against risks stemming from opportunistic 
speculative activities.
86
 It recognizes that banks can use their core banking activities, 
including the supporting government safety net, to support highly risky trading activities.  The 
Volcker Rule intends to address the issue by separating trading from banking activities.
87
  
Whether this can be achieved effectively remains to be seen.  Essentially, the implementation 




 The Volcker Rule, unlike the Vickers
89
 and the Liikanen
90
 reports, called for a 
complete separation solutions between deposit taking institutions and their incorporated non-
deposit-taking affiliates from engaging in proprietary trading in certain financial institutions 
and from acquiring or retaining ownership interests in, sponsoring, or entering into certain 
lending and other covered transactions with related, hedge funds, private equity funds and 
many other vehicles (‗covered funds‘).
91
  Instead of a full separation solution of the foregoing 
activities, the Vickers and Liikanen reports do not require investment banking to be pushed 
                                                        
84
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out of banking groups entirely, but only out of deposit-taking legal entities into separately 
capitalized non-bank affiliates.
92
    
 
6.7 Regulation of thrifts’ acquisition  
 
Like banks, other forms of financial institutions, which provided banking services in the US, 
include savings and loan associations, also known as thrifts or thrift institutions.  Thrifts are 
specialized in accepting deposits and making mortgages.
93
  These institutions are similar to 
building societies and trustee savings banks in the UK.  Their focus of activity is on mortgage 
and consumer loans, making them especially vulnerable to housing downturns, such as, the 




The US Congress enacted legislation to regulate thrift institutions in response to their 
massive failures during the 1930‘s Great Depression and the savings and loans crisis of 
1980‘s.
95
 Congress established a regulatory regime for supervision of the thrifts activities, 
drawing a line between commercial banks and thrifts that focused on home mortgage lending, 




6.7.1  Home Owners Loan Act 
 
The 1933 Home Owners Loan Act (‗HOLA‘)
97
 governs acquisitions of control of savings 
associations, or savings and loan holding companies (‗SLHCs‘)
98
 including any company that 
directly or indirectly controls a savings association other than a bank holding company.  
 
 Pursuant to the HOLA provisions
99
 and the relevant bank regulators‘ regulation,
100
 any 
company that wishes to acquire control of a savings association or a SLHC must file an 
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application with the relevant bank regulator before such company acquires control. 
   
In approving request for acquisition of interest in savings association or an SLHC, the 
pertinent banking regulator should consider the effect the acquisition would have on 
competition, the managerial and financial resources and future prospects of the constituent 
thrifts. In addition, the regulator should consider the convenience and needs of the 





 Overall, the federal legislation governing the acquisition of thrift institutions provide 
for similar antitrust approach as applied to the banks. Such approach includes enhancement 
and preserving the competition in the banking system.
102
 The pertinent bank regulatory 
agencies provide to the application of an interested party to acquire thrift institutions a similar 
review process like they apply in a bank merger process. The trend of the legislative process 
of the thrift acquisition process is towards closer harmonization, and almost making them 
similar to the legislation of the banks process. This is a result of the blurring separation line 
between the banks‘ and thrift‘s activities.
103




The antitrust principles that ensure competition in the markets for most products and services, 
also, apply to financial institutions mergers and acquisitions. However, merging financial 
institutions face additional scrutiny under the federal banking statutes, such as, the BHCA and 
the BMA, which include provisions comparable to the antitrust laws.   
 
 S 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits acquisitions, mergers and consolidations whose effect 
‗may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly‘.  Theoretically, 
mergers and acquisitions may also violate two sections of the Sherman Antitrust Act: S 1, 
which prohibits combinations in restraint of trade, and s 2, which proscribes monopolization 
                                                        
101
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and attempts to monopolize. As a practical matter, though, s 7 of the Clayton Act is most 
relevant to mergers and acquisitions. 
 
 In addition to the Sherman Act and Clayton Act, five bank industry-specific laws may 
regulate financial institution mergers or acquisitions: the BHCA, the BMA, the CBCA, the 
Dodd-Frank, and the HOLA.  The types of institutions involved in a transaction determine the 
bank-specific statute that applies.   
 
No bank merger since 1994 has been derailed by an antitrust standard. Occasionally, 
local branches will overlap in an undesirable manner. The solution is to sell off a few bank 
branches and, thereby, resolve the problem. The antitrust laws are a bug to be brushed off, not 
a fundamental protection to our economic liberties. One sees the process continuing. Entities 
like Bank of America and JPMorgan Chase are gradually becoming the rule. How far we will 
go in the reduction of bank numbers and the growth in bank size is anybody‘s guess. Also 
unknown is the effect that this trend will have upon bank services including credit cards, real 










CHAPTER 7 - AMERICAN ANTITRUST AND BANKING AUTHORITIES: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY 
 
This chapter discusses the US antitrust and banking watchdogs‘ roles to oversee and regulate 
competition aspects in bank mergers in the US, as well as a comparative analysis of these 
watchdogs‘ approach to bank mergers‘ examination process. 
   
7.0 Antitrust federal government authority  
 
The antitrust federal government authority in charge of overseeing bank mergers and any 
antitrust aspects relating to them is the Department of Justice.   
  
7.0.1     Department of Justice (‘DOJ’) 
 
Before the Bank Merger Act (‗BMA‘) was enacted,
1
 the Department of Justice (‗DOJ‘) lacked 
the statutory authority to block bank mergers. Following Philadelphia National Bank,
2
 bank 
mergers became subject to s 7 of the Clayton Act and as a result under DOJ jurisdiction.
3
  The 
BMA and Bank Holding Company Act (‗BHCA‘)
4
 authorize the DOJ to review bank mergers 
in a process separate from the review performed by banking agencies. Under the BMA, bank 




When the DOJ opposes a merger, the opposition involves filing a federal court lawsuit. 
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 12 USC § 1828 (‗BMA‘).  
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6
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Instead of relying on the competition analysis from Philadelphia National Bank,
7
 the 





Bank regulators seek the DOJ‘s views on any proposed bank merger, after providing 
the DOJ with the merger application. Banks are advised to involve the DOJ early on in the 
process, if the proposed merger may have a substantial impact on competition. This can be 
accomplished by sending to the DOJ copies of the merger application filed with the relevant 
banking regulator, and contacting the DOJ about any specific competitive issues. 
 
The DOJ reviews roughly 500 bank mergers per year,
9
 and it ‗challenges‘ hardly any 
of them. Even when it decides to ‗challenge‘ any merger, such ‗challenge‘ does not entail the 
filing of complaints in federal court. In fact, the DOJ has not filed a complaint against a bank 
merger since 1993.
10
 Instead, the DOJ issues a press release, announcing that competitive 
concerns with a bank merger have been resolved though the divestiture of branches, along 




In addition to information supplied by the merging banks within a merger application, 
the DOJ may request they voluntarily deliver additional information.  S 3(a) of the Antitrust 
Civil Process Act
12
 enables the DOJ to issue civil investigative demands requesting 
documents and information concerning a bank merger.  Demands are issued only to merging 
banks, but often may be issued to parties, such as, competitors with relevant market 
information.
13
  Other methods of information gathering by the DOJ include telephone or in-
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person interviews of competitors, customers, and other entities or individuals.
14
  The DOJ 




In the course of its investigation process, the DOJ will send a report to a requesting 
bank regulator outlining its position on competitive issues raised by the proposed bank 
merger. If the DOJ has no concerns, it will determine that the proposed bank merger will not 
reduce competition in the relevant markets. If the DOJ perceives serious issues, it will note its 
concerns to the banks and their regulator, and may resolve the issues by seeking a divestiture 
or other solution(s).
16
 If the issues are successfully resolved, the divestiture or other action 
may become conditions to the Federal Reserve‘s order to avoid the need for a consent 
decree.
17
 If the DOJ has not found a resolution of its concerns, but the Federal Reserve 
approves the merger, the resolution process will require simultaneously filing a complaint and 
consent decree.
18
  The DOJ may, also, bring a court action to stay the merger subject to the 
outcome of the litigation.
19
 The DOJ must inform regulators of its conclusions including any 
divestiture proposals. 
 
An important consideration for the DOJ is that it must act so as not to deter potential 
bidders showing an ability and willingness to act quickly and express the limits of the type of 
relief it may later demand. Otherwise, it runs the risk either preventing a highly beneficial 





7.1  Federal banking agencies that oversee bank mergers 
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Federal banking agencies that are in charge of overseeing bank mergers, and any related 
competition aspects to these transactions, are the Federal Reserve, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.   
 
7.1.1 Federal Reserve21  
 
The Federal Reserve‘s review of bank merger cases begins with the filing of an application. 
As part of the application the merging parties must provide a discussion of competitive 
issues.
22
 These issues are based on specified factors in relation to the proposed merger.  The 
Federal Reserve comments on the merger application, typically, raise questions seeking 
clarification of the elements of a merger, and about competitive issues. Once the application 
responds to the comments and questions, Federal Reserve must act on the application within a 
given period of time.
23
  The merger application may, also, engage in ongoing discussions and 
written presentations with the Federal Reserve‘s staff, and with one of the twelve regional 
banks of the Federal Reserve.
24
  The regional Federal Reserve Bank is determined based on 
the geographical area where the merger will take place. The process is completed, when the 
regional bank and the Federal Reserve‘s staff present their decision to the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve. 
 
The bank merger review guidelines promulgated by the Federal Reserve, the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Department 
of Justice sought to harmonize their review of bank mergers.
25
  The Department of Justice and 
banking authorities have nonetheless not implemented consistent standards.  
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The Federal Reserve still applies the traditional Philadelphia National Bank
26
 
competition analysis, despite admitting its lack of confidence in the ‗cluster approach‘.
27
  The 
Federal Reserve defines the relevant geographic market locally for a bank merger 
proposal, notwithstanding the fact that its merger analysis in principle could involve a review 
of competitors spanning the entire country.
28
  How a product or geographic market is defined, 
often, determines whether a proposed merger will be approved. An evolving and pragmatic 
merger analysis paradigm must exist to ensure effective competition policy. This is 
particularly true in a fast-changing and increasingly borderless market in financial services. 
Nonetheless, the Federal Reserve‘s analysis remains unchanged. 
 
7.1.2 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency29 
  
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (‗OCC‘) has been characterized as an agency 
that supports banks mergers. The OCC‘s view is that the realities of the marketplace require 
that competition from thrift institutions be considered to define the appropriate product 
market, and to assess the competitive consequences of a commercial bank merger proposal.
30
 
The OCC‘s position that thrifts compete directly with commercial banks grew from dicta in 





Under the Bank Merger Act (‗BMA‘),
32
 the OCC is prohibited from approving a 
transaction that would have an anti-competitive effect.  Under the BMA,
33
 the OCC must 
consider the merging banks‘ financial and managerial resources, future prospects and 
                                                        
26
 United States v Philadelphia National Bank (1963) 374 US 321.  For a detailed discussion of this case law, see 
chapter 8.1 of this thesis. 
27
 R S Carnell et al, The Law of Banking and Financial Institutions (4th edn, New York: Wolters Kluwer 2009), 
pp 221-2.   
28
 Chemical Banking Corporation, 82 Federal Reserve Bulletin 239, 239 (1996), p 240. 
29
 The National Bank Act 1864, 12 Stat. 665. The OCC charters, regulates and supervises all national banks and 
federal savings associations, and federal branches and agencies of foreign banks.  The OCC is an independent 
bureau of the US Department of the Treasury.  For more information, see www.occ.gov. 
30
 R V Fitzgerald, ‗Thoughts on Antitrust Policy‘ (23 September, 1982) Speech before the Ninth Annual 
Conference on Legal Problems in Bank Regulation, Washington, D.C., reprinted in 4 Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency Quarterly Journal 27 (December, 1982). 
31
 See generally R Kumar, Strategies of Banks and Other Financial Institutions: Theories and Cases (Oxford: 
Elsevier 2014). 
32
 BMA (n1), § 1828(c) (as amended by s 604 of the Dodd-Frank Act). 
33
 Ibid, §§ 1828(c)(5), and 1828(c)(11). 
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efficiency in combating money laundering, as well as the convenience and needs                    
of the relevant community. The OCC must, also, consider any stability and risk                    




 The OCC approves a bank merger where the resulting financial institution is a 
federally chartered bank.
35
 This includes mergers of banks and thrifts into national banks, 
consolidations of banks and thrifts with national banks, and the purchase by a national bank of 
the assets of other banks and thrifts.
36
 The OCC is not required to approve acquisition by a 
federal bank of a financial institution that does not have federal deposit insurance. 
Nonetheless, any branches of federal bank created from the acquisition of an uninsured 




After a federally chartered bank applies to the OCC for approval of a bank merger, it 
forwards the application to the Department of Justice, the Federal Deposit Insurance 




The OCC, also, seeks to promote the soundness of the federal banking system and 
competitive market structures. The OCC approves bank mergers not substantially adverse 
competition and beneficial to the public. The OCC identifies the relevant geographic market 
to determine the effects of a proposed bank merger on competition.
39
 The OCC focuses on the 
territory in which most of the bank‘s customers reside and the effect of the bank merger on 
competition is immediate and direct.  The OCC‘s identifies the competitors in a market and 
uses statistical measures of market concentration, such as, the Herfindahl indices.
40
   
 
The OCC reviews a proposed merger under the BMA‘s criteria, and applicable OCC 
provisions and policies. The OCC evaluates the financial and managerial resources of the 
                                                        
34
 Ibid.  
35
 12 USC §214(a). 
36
 12 USC §215(a). 
37
 12 USC §§214(a), and 215(a). 
38
 See generally, US Bank Merger Review Guidelines (n25); see, also, The Office of Comptroller of the 
Currency, ‗Business Combinations: Comptroller‘s Licensing Manual‘ (December, 2006), ‗Summary‘ (‗OCC 
Manual‘), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/licensing-
manuals/bizcombo.pdf 
39
 US Bank Merger Review Guidelines (n25), p 2; see, also, OCC Manual (n38), pp 13, 42-43, and 56-58. 
40
 US Bank Merger Review Guidelines (n25), pp 1, 2, and 5; see, also, OCC Manual (p38), pp 13, 17, and 42. 
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banks, their future prospects, the convenience and needs of the communities to be served. 
Under the BMA, the OCC is required to consider ‗the effectiveness of any insured depository 
institution‘ involved in the proposed merger transaction in fighting money laundering 
activities, including overseas branches.
41
   
 
7.1.3   Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation42  
 
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (‗FDIC‘)‘s approach to bank merger competition 
analysis is contained in a 1989 policy statement
43
 and other provisions.
44
  The agency‘s 
approach to geographic market determination remains unchanged despite an update the 
statement.  The relevant geographic market is the territory where the target offices are located, 
and from where they derive the predominant portion of their loans, deposits, or other 
business.
45
 It, also, includes the territories in which current and potential customers impacted 
by the proposed merger may turn for alternative sources of banking services. In identifying 





 The FDIC‘s approach is based on the banking ‗services area‘ and ‗customer 
alternatives‘.
47
  Bank applicants have the ability to influence the agency‘s definition of 
relevant market, including by using the Federal Reserve‘s ‗economics markets‘ definition.
48
  
In evaluating commercial bank mergers, the FDIC includes thrift market shares and the 
insertion of broad product lines in evaluating the competitive impact of bank merger cases.
49
  
                                                        
41
 BMA (n1), §1828(c)(11). 
42
   Banking Act 1933, 48 Stat. 162 (1933). The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is an independent 
agency authorized to insure bank deposits, examine and supervise banks for safety and soundness and consumer 
protection, and resolving and managing receiverships.  For more information, see www.fdic.gov. 
43
 FDIC, ‗Statement of Policy on Bank Merger Transactions‘ (2008) 1 FDIC Law, Regulations, and Related Acts 
5145 (‗FDIC Policy on Bank Merger Transactions‘), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/5000-1200.htm. 
44
 12 CFR Part 303, Subpart D (Merger Transactions). 
45




 Ibid, pt III (3) and (4). 
48
 US Bank Merger Review Guidelines (n25), p 3. 
49
 FDIC, ‗Policy Statement‘ (12 October, 1988) 53 Federal Register 39,803. 
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The JPMorgan Chase acquisition of Washington Mutual, in 2008, fell under the FDIC‘s 




The FDIC defines the relevant market in relation to the banks that are merging.
51
 By 
contrast, the Federal Reserve predefines markets for all bank mergers.
52
 The FDIC is more 
willing than the Federal Reserve to modify its market definition in response to information 
contained in a merger application, due to not having invested significant resources in defining 
markets. 
 
 In addition to the role of the foregoing federal banking agencies, state banking 
authorities play a vital part in enforcement of antitrust issues related to bank mergers at the 
state level.   
 
7.2 State banking authorities  
 
The role of state attorney general
53
 has become increasingly involved in analysing bank 
mergers due to increasing bank consolidation potentially impacting local economies.
54
 The 
state attorney general‘s challenges on proposed bank mergers have matched the DOJ since 
1990.
55





 that the proper role for state law enforcement is merely participating 
in reviewing bank mergers initiated at the federal level. They argue that federal law governing 
                                                        
50
 12 USC § 1831o(a); see, also, FDIC ‗JPMorgan Chase Acquires Banking Operations of Washington Mutual‘ 
(25 September, 2008), available at https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr08085.html. 
51
 FDIC Policy on Bank Merger Transactions (n43), pt III (1), (2), and (3). 
52
 US Bank Merger Review Guidelines (n25), pp 2, and 4. 
53
 The state attorney general in each of the fifty US states and territories is the chief legal advisor to 
the state government and the state‘s chief law enforcement officer. 
54
 C James, ‗Bank Merger Experts Offer Tips on Murky Scene for Acquisitions‘ (26 August, 1993) 65 Antitrust 
and Trade Regulation Report No 1629, p 294. 
55
 Congressional Hearings before the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, ‗Antitrust 





 Session 1.  
56
 P E Greene and G A MacDonald, ‗The Jurisdiction of State Attorneys General to Challenge Bank Mergers 
under the Antitrust Laws‘ (1993) 110 Banking Law Journal 500, pp 508-10. 
57
 C Felsenfeld and D L Glass, Banking Regulation in the United States (3rd edn, New York: Juris Publishing 
2011), pp 291-5. 
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State attorney general have the authority to challenge proposed bank mergers that are 
anticompetitive and have protected competition and local economies by enforcing state and 
federal competition laws. State enforcement of competition policy has been upheld by Federal 
Courts that have rejected challenges to state authority, based on the US Constitution‘s 
Supremacy Clause.
59
 Federal bank regulation does not pre-empts state competition law, or 
undermine the ability of state attorneys general standing to enforce federal competition law.  
 
The state attorney general is not limited to enforcing only state competition laws. They 
have parens patriae standing to enforce federal competition laws, a doctrine that has long 
been a basis for competition lawsuits by state attorney general.
60
 States have used their 
authority to oppose proposed bank mergers with anticompetitive consequences. Some states 
have statutes, particularly, prohibiting anticompetitive mergers, and are the basis for 
opposition to such bank mergers. 
 
Parens patriae enforcement authority is the frequent basis 
opposing anticompetitive mergers. General policy considerations supporting state action 
preventing anticompetitive conduct that adversely affects a state‘s economy is directly 
applicable to anticompetitive bank mergers.  The most significant impact of banking activities 




Federal courts have consistently held that federal law does not pre-empt more 
restrictive state competition provisions because such laws are not an obstacle to the federal 
goal of preserving competition. Indeed, the fact that the Sherman Act tolerates certain conduct 
does not mean that there is an affirmative federal policy encouraging such conduct.   In other 
words, federal competition provisions do not encourage state bank mergers that are unlawful 
under state law. The majority of state competition provisions are interpreted and implemented 




 US Constitution, article VI, clause 2. 
60
 The doctrine of ‗parens patriae‘ allows the attorney general of a state to start legal action for the benefit of 
state residents for federal antitrust violations (15 USC §15(c)).  This authority is aimed to further the public trust, 
protect the general and economic welfare of a state‘s residents, safeguard residents from unlawful practices, as 
well as ensure that the benefits of federal law are not denied to the general population.  
61
 C Marquis et al, Communities and Organizations (Bingley: Emerald 2011), pp 177-88. 
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consistent with federal competition laws.
62
 State enforcement of competition law does not 





Instead of pre-empting state law, the US Congress integrated state competition laws 
through the Bank Merger Act providing that state actions pursuant to state law are grounds for 
objecting bank mergers approved by federal regulators.
64
 The Bank Merger Act and the Bank 
Holding Company Act establish specific remedies and enforcement authority for state 
attorneys general that challenge proposed anticompetitive bank mergers. These include 
provisions allowing automatic stay of proposed bank mergers, state intervention in federal 
enforcement actions, and comment requirements in both statutes. 
 
According to the Bank Merger Act,
65
 state attorneys general may intervene in any 
competition action opposing a bank merger if initiated by a private party or the government.  
The Act provides that: 
 
In any action brought under the antitrust laws arising out of [a merger transaction] 
approved by [a federal supervisory agency] . . . any [s]tate banking supervisory agency 
having jurisdiction within the state involved, may appear as a party of its own motion 




Under the Bank Holding Company Act,
67
 the appropriate federal regulator must notify the 
‗appropriate [s]tate supervisory authority‘ of any proposed merger.
68
 State attorneys general 
have utilized these procedures to block anticompetitive issues of a numerous proposed bank 
mergers, without opposing with legal action in a state or a federal court.
69
 The increasing 
amount of bank mergers and concentration in the banking industry impacts states‘ economies, 
businesses, and citizens. Enforcement of competition laws by state attorneys general protects 
                                                        
62





 BMA (n1), §1828(c)(7)(A).  
65








 United States v First City National Bank, 386 US 361, 367-69 (1967); Southwest Miss. Bank v FDIC, 499 F. 
Supp. 1, 5-8 (S.D. Miss. 1979). 
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states‘ interests and is consistent with the well-established doctrine of dual federalism, a 
balanced power between federal and state authority.
70
    
 
7.3  Coordination of efforts between antitrust and banking authorities 
pertaining to bank merger situations 
 
The general task of the regulators is to ensure the resulting bank would have sufficient capital 
and other resources to operate in a safe and sound manner, and that the merger would not 
substantially lessen competition.  Banking authorities and the Department of Justice screen 
proposed mergers.
71
  They further scrutiny those mergers that appear to create anticompetitive 
effects.
72
  Part of the regulators‘ analysis consists of looking at relevant geographical market.  
 
The Federal Trade Commission (‗FTC‘),
73
 a US competition regulator, does not 
review bank mergers because pursuant to s 7A(c)(8) of the Clayton Act
74
 such mergers are 





 Upon receipt of a merger application, banking regulator forwards it to the Department 
of Justice (‗DOJ‘), after which both authorities review the application for the proposed 
merger‘s anticompetitive effects.
76
  The DOJ applies s 7 of the Clayton Act
77
 in analysing a 
merger‘s competitive effects and the Federal Reserve adds to its analysis consideration of the 
bank‘s resources and needs of the community.
78
  The Federal Reserve does not issue its own 
finding until the DOJ submits its own report. The analytic framework the banking authorities 
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71
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72
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 The Federal Trade Commission Act 1914, 15 USC §§ 41-58, as amended.  The Federal Trade Commission is a 
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 Clayton (n3), §18(a); 16 Code of Federal Regulations §802.6(a) (1992). 
75
 15 USC §18.   
76
 Federal Reserve / Department of Justice, ‗How Do the Federal Reserve and the DOJ, Antitrust Division, 
Analyze the Competitive Effects of Mergers and Acquisitions under the Bank Holding Company Act, the Bank 
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78
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apply when they review possible competitive effects of a bank merger goes back to the United 




 The governmental authorities‘ review of a bank merger is based upon bank 
merger guidelines developed by the DOJ, the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
80
  Under the guidelines, the 
so-called 1800/200 test applied to bank deposits. The Federal Reserve is unlikely to challenge 
the merger transaction, if it does not cause the HHI (Herfindahl-Hirchman Index) to exceed 
1800 in total and more than 200 points in any relevant banking market.
81
  If a merger exceeds 
those thresholds, the Federal Reserve will typically approve the transaction, subject to the 
resulting firm divesting branches so as to decrease the HHI change to less than 200 points as 
measured by bank deposits. The DOJ screens transactions, based on the 1800/200 standard 
and applies the horizontal merger guidelines
82
 for transactions that exceed the threshold. 
 
 The Federal Reserve and the DOJ apply the 1800/200 test differently in identifying 
relevant geographic and product markets.
83
  Banking authorities apply pre-determined    
market definitions (such as, ‗traditional banking‘);
84
 while the DOJ defines relevant      




 From the DOJ‘s perspective, banking services to small and medium-sized enterprises 
(‗SMEs‘) can comprise a relevant product market because those enterprises depend                




                                                        
79
 Philadelphia National Bank (n26).  For a discussion of this case law, see chapter 8.1 in this thesis, pp 219-24. 
80
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81
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82
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available at www.justice.gov/atr/public/guide lines/hmg-2010.pdf.  For a detailed discussion of bank merger 
competitive analysis, geographic market, product market, and the consumers‘ issues, see chapter 9 of this thesis.  
83
 Ibid, para 4. 
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According to the DOJ,
87
 SMEs have fewer credit alternatives and options available 
than retail consumers or large businesses. Middle market consumers require expertise and 
services that small banks may not be able to provide (including payroll, collection, and 





 If the Federal Reserve approves a transaction, which the DOJ concludes to                 
be anticompetitive, the DOJ can challenge the transaction in federal district court.
89
          
Under   the Bank Merger Act (‗BMA‘),
90
 the court must automatically stay the        




 The BMA requires bank authorities to evaluate competitive effects before approving a 
proposed bank merger.
91
   
 
These authorities are required to consider several factors, such as, financial history and 
condition of each of the banks involved, adequacy of its capital structure, future earnings 
prospects, general character of management, and convenience and needs of the community to 
be served.
92
  Other factors include consistency of bank‘s corporate powers with the purposes 





 Banking authorities may waive any concerns about adverse effects on competition, if 
they conclude that the transaction is in the public interest because factors unrelated to 
competition are more important.
94
  The authorities may decide that the bank merger solves an 
immediate management succession problem, improves a bank‘s stability, provides important 
                                                        
87
 Department of Justice, ‗DOJ Requires Divestitures in Acquisition of National City Corporation by the PNC 





 BMA (n1), §1828(c)(7)(A). 
90
 Ibid, § 1828(c)(7)(A). 
91
 Ibid, § 1828(c). 
92
 See generally L L Broome and J W Markham, Regulation of Bank Financial Services Activities: Cases and 




 S D Waxberg and S D Robinson, ‗Chaos in Federal Regulation of Bank Mergers, A Need for Legislative 
Revision‘ (1965) 82 Banking Law Journal 377, p 379. 
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services to an underserved community, or allows a bank to a growing customer base.  
Relevant authorities may approve only those proposed bank mergers that are consistent with 




A fundamental difference between bank mergers and the mergers of other businesses 
is that the DOJ divides jurisdiction with banking authorities.
96
 A proposed bank merger must 
be filed for approval with the proper banking authority.  The proper authority for federally 
chartered banks is the OCC;
97
 for state member banks and bank and financial holding 
companies it is the Federal Reserve;
98
 and for non-member insured banks it is the FDIC.
99
  
Upon receipt of the bank merger application, the proper banking authority sends a merger 




Different statutory standards are applied by the DOJ and banking authorities. 
Standards established by s 7 of the Clayton Act
101
 are applied by the DOJ utilizes, while the 
BMA
102
 guides the analysis of banking authorities. Banking authorities wait until the DOJ 
provides a report with its findings regarding the competitive effects of a merger before 
deciding whether to approve. 
 
Bank regulators and the DOJ initiate their bank merger competition analysis, based on 
the bank merger review guidelines.
103
 S 1 of the guidelines lists quantitative information for 
authorities to evaluate.
104
 It also contains two separate screens (screen A and screen B) for 
analysing bank merger transaction.
105
  S 2 outlines information that ‗may be relevant to the 




                                                        
95
 BHCA (n4), Chapter VII, Sec C (section 3(c)); see, also, United States v First City of Nat‘l Bank of Houston, 
386 US 361 (1967). 
96
 Rich and Scriven (n20), pp 34-57. 
97
 12 USC § 1. 
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After filing a bank merger application, the merging bank needs to complete a screen A 
HHI
107
 calculation chart for three separate geographic markets: the Federal Reserve market,
108
 
the Ranally Metropolitan Area (‗RMA‘) market,
109
 and the county market. The DOJ and 
banking authorities implement the 1800/200 test for screen A.
110
 However, banking 
authorities only apply the test to bank deposits, if, concerning deposits, a transaction does not 
cause the HHI to exceed 1800 and to increase more than 200 points in any relevant banking 
market.
111
  If the foregoing thresholds are met, the Federal Reserve is unlikely to challenge the 
transaction. 
 
Banking authorities do not utilize screen B.
112
 Instead, they analyse the merger 
application under s 2 of the bank merger guidelines,
113
 and focus on the enumerated 
qualitative factors.
 
The guidelines provide merging banks with transparency. They are not 
intended to unify the competition analysis of banking authorities and the DOJ.  The DOJ uses 
screen A to begin its analysis and often screen B as a backup method.
114
  If the proposed 
merger exceeds the 1800/200 threshold of screen A, the DOJ suggests to the merging banks 
that they consider submitting calculations set forth in Screen B. Screen B has alternative 





 Even if a proposed merger would not exceed the screen A threshold, the DOJ may 
analyse it further under screen B, if screen A does not reflect entirely the competitive effects 
                                                        
107
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 Ibid, pp 8-10. 
113
 US Horizontal Merger Guidelines (n82), para 2. 
114
 US Bank Merger Review Guidelines (n25), pp 4-10. 
115
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231 
 
of the transaction in all relevant markets, in particular lending to SMEs.
116
  The DOJ is more 
likely to review a bank merger transaction, if the applicants compete in an area substantially 
larger than the area where lending to small business takes place. The DOJ‘s unique 
application of screen B to product and geographic markets may explain the increased 
concentration that has taken place in local markets. The DOJ‘s analysis of geographic and 
product markets is important, but does not receive sufficient attention because of the status of 




 Banking authorities use outdated definitions of product and geographic markets.
118
 
The Federal Reserve uses the cluster method, which defines the relevant product market as the 
‗cluster‘ of products i.e., different kinds of credit and services i.e., checking and debit 
accounts denoted by the term ‗commercial banking‘.
119
  The FDIC views relevant product 
markets as particular banking services offered by the merging banks or those to be offered by 





 Banking authorities may overlook concentrations in particular product lines and 
particular geographic areas because they define markets broadly.
121
 The DOJ‘s approach is 
more sensitive to the operation of contemporary markets.
122
 When analysing the product 
market, it uses a submarket or product-oriented approach. By focusing on transaction accounts 
and commercial lending to SMEs, the DOJ‘s method makes it more likely to find markets 
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Overall, banking authorities and the DOJ seem highly inclined to permit bank mergers 
to proceed without significant obstacles, proceeding according to the principle of not 
appearing overly concentrated.  The approach from the foregoing regulators, so far, has been: 
the proposed merging banks dispose of a half-a-dozen branches in, for example, Cincinnati, 
and the merger will be okay.
124
 Bank merger analysis by the agencies is fact-intensive. 
Accordingly, successfully defending a bank merger requires applicants to gather fact 
sufficient to demonstrate that a proposed merger would not substantially lessen competition.  
 
The federal banking laws establish the standard applied to the analysis of bank 
mergers.  It is essentially the same standard as s 7 of the Clayton Act.
125
  That is, no bank 
merger may be approved, if it would result in a monopoly, would be in furtherance of any 
combination or conspiracy to monopolize or attempt to monopolize, or that would 
substantially lessen competition or restrain trade.
126
  State law is generally not pre-empted by 




   
7.4 Conclusion 
 
The general task of the Department of Justice (‗DOJ‘), Federal Reserve, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (‗OCC‘), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(‗FDIC‘), along with the state banking regulators, is to ensure the resulting bank would have 
sufficient capital other resources to operate in a safe and sound manner and that the merger 
would not substantially lessen competition.
128
 The DOJ and the banking agencies screen 
submitted mergers and categorize them needing further scrutiny into anticompetitive 
consequences. 
 
An important difference between bank mergers and the mergers in other industries is 
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that the DOJ divides jurisdiction with banking regulators. A submitted bank merger must be 
filed for approval with the proper banking regulator, such as, the Federal Reserve, the OCC, 
or the FDIC.  After receipt of the bank merger application, the proper banking agency sends a 
merger application to the DOJ upon receipt, while both carry out their respective 
examinations. Different statutory standards are applied by the DOJ and federal banking 
agencies. Standards established by s 7 of the Clayton Act are applied by the DOJ, while the 
Bank Merger Act guides the analysis of federal banking agencies. Banking agencies wait until 
the DOJ provides a report with its findings concerning the competitive consequences of a 
merger before deciding whether to approve. 
 
The DOJ along with the federal banking agencies has developed certain guidelines, 
under 1800/200 test, based on which they review a bank merger.  Under the guidelines, a bank 
merger can potentially be approved if the merger does not exceed 1800 in total and more than 
200 points in any relevant market.  
 
The DOJ and the federal agencies apply the 1800/200 test differently in identifying 
relevant geographic and product markets.  DOJ defines relevant markets under the horizontal 
merger guidelines in relation to consumer demand, while the federal banking regulators apply 
pre-determined market definitions (such as, ‗traditional banking‘). 
 
The analytic framework the federal banking agencies apply when they review possible 
competitive consequences of a bank merger goes back to the Philadelphia National Bank.  In 
examination of a bank merger, the federal banking agencies utilize outdated definitions of 
product and geographic markets, based on the cluster method that defines the relevant product 
market as the cluster of products (different kinds of credit) and services (i.e., checking and 
debit accounts) denoted by the term ‗commercial banking.‘    
 
Banking regulators risk in overlooking concentrations especially in product lines and 
particular geographic areas because they define markets broadly. The DOJ‘s approach is more 
sensitive to the operation of contemporary markets. When analysing the product market, the 
regulator uses a submarket or product-oriented approach. By focusing on transaction accounts 
and commercial lending to SMEs, the DOJ‘s method makes it more likely to find markets 
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being overly concentrated or at risk of becoming so. The DOJ‘s competition examination 
identifies a specific area of competitive concern, such as, lending or credit card processing 
services or other business banking services for SMEs. On the other hand, the federal banking 
regulators inquiry whether a merger could result in the combined entity‘s share of deposits 
exceeding the regulator‘s statutory thresholds. Nonetheless, divestiture is often the proper 
measure to tackle competition concerns. 
 
Banking regulators may waive any issues about adverse consequences on competition 
if they determine that the bank merger is in the public interest. Factors unrelated to 
competition are seemingly given more importance.  The regulators may decide that the bank 
merger solves an immediate management succession problem, enhances a bank‘s stability, 
renders significant services to an underserved community, or permits a bank to a growing 
customer base.  Relevant regulator may approve only those submitted bank mergers that it 














CHAPTER 8 – BANK MERGER CASES BEFORE AMERICAN COURTS AND 
REGULATORS  
 
This chapter discusses the role of American courts in shaping bank merger competition 
policies, including analysis of several important case laws on the subject.  This chapter, also, 
discusses significant bank merger transactions cleared by the US banking watchdogs, without 
courts intervention.    
 
8.0  Role of American courts in shaping bank merger competition policies 
 
The US judicial and banking systems are dual in nature. The duality of the judicial system 
consists of federal and state laws and courts, which adjudicate bank mergers, based on 
national or state level respectively. The duality of the banking system consists of nationally 
chartered banks and state chartered banks.
1
  In view of the relevance and scope of this thesis, 
below is an overview of significant bank mergers cases decided by the federal courts (both the 
lower courts and the Supreme Court).  
 
Interestingly, there has been an increase in the courts‘ adjudication of numerous bank 
mergers cases brought by the Department of Justice or banking regulators on behalf of the US 
Government from the early 1960s through to the late 1990s.
2
  In particular, the 1960s and 
1970s proved to be the period with the highest number of bank merger cases brought before 
the American courts.
3
  This corresponded with a time in which the US Congress, along with 
the regulators, implemented and enhanced competition laws and regulations, coupled with an 





                                                        
1
 K E Scott, ‗The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation‘ (1977) 30 Stanford Law Review 
1, pp 12-16. 
2
 C P Rogers III, ‗The Antitrust Legacy of Justice William O. Douglas‘ (2008) 56 Cleveland Saint Louis Law 
Review 895, pp 899-903.   
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 P S Rose, Bank Mergers: Current Issues and Perspectives in B E Gup (ed.) (2nd edn, Boston: Kluwer 
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During the Global Financial Crisis, and immediately thereafter, there has been nearly 
no bank merger case challenged by either US banking and/or competition regulators, or 
interesting party before American courts.
5
  This appears to be due to the lack of diligence or 
the manipulation of the rules on the part of the regulators.
6
 Instead of closely scrutinizing 
bank mergers and bringing some of these mergers before the courts, the supervisory agencies 
have preferred to rely on emergency provisions contained in the competition legislation to 
approve bank mergers in the name of public interest vis-à-vis the protection of the consumers‘ 
deposits.
7
  Often, in the course of such undertakings, responsible authorities have simply 
requested some divesture actions on the part of the merging banks in order to meet an alleged 
minimum threshold of the lessening of competition aspect in the best interest of the public.  
Whether such approach has been, and still is, an appropriate measure in circumventing review 
by the courts remains an open question that deserves to be addressed by the US Congress and 
the public.
8
          
 
In order to illustrate the United States courts role in shaping bank merger antitrust 
policies, several federal court cases with an important impact on the policies will be 
discussed, below. Considering the significant effect of the United States v Philadelphia 
National Bank in the bank merger examination policies, such case law is given a particular 
and separate discussion from the other federal case laws, below. 
 
8.1 United States v Philadelphia National Bank 
 
The landmark court case that sets the parameters of bank mergers regulations in the US and, 
in particular, products and services within the banking markets remains the 1963 case of 
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 United States v Philadelphia National Bank (1963) 374 US 321 (‗Philadelphia National Bank‘). 
237 
 
In Philadelphia National Bank, the lower (federal district) court
10
 dismissed the case, 
after concluding that the geographic market was clearly not restricted to the four-county 
metropolitan area in Philadelphia, State of Pennsylvania.
11
  In the indicated area the merging 
banks obtained offices in consideration of the fact that bank customers would rely on supplier 
banks outside the area.
12




Pursuant to its overview of the record, the Supreme Court restricted the market within 
the metropolitan area.
14
 The court supported its findings, based on the incapability of small 
number of customers to engage in specific banking services at considerable distances.
15
 The 
court, further, noted a number of factors that contributed to the argument that the smaller the 
number of the customers, the more restricted would be their banking market geographically.
16
 
Its factors included the elevated proportion of the defendants‘ business that emerged in the 
metropolitan area, and the relatively smaller proportion of business, which the merging 
businesses raked in outside Philadelphia.
17
 Another factor was the fact that nearly the entire 




The Philadelphia National Bank case was ground-breaking for the applicability of 





 The Supreme Court noted that the element of inconvenience confines 
competition in banking as strictly as high costs of transportation in other sectors of the 
economy.
21  
The court, moreover, stated that different bank customers carry out their banking 
activities in areas of differing geographic extent. Nevertheless, the court categorized all of 
them, and established that a four-county area bordering Philadelphia constituted a ‗workable 
compromise‘ in relation to the geographic area where banks competed among themselves.
22
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The court based its finding of this area on the fact that the same area was mapped out as the 




This case was the leading case where the court was asked to deliberate on the 
applicability of competition provisions to the commercial banking sector.
24
 Two foremost 
findings
25
 were set out in the case, which would alter the configuration of competition 
legislation applicable to the banking sector. First, the court for the first-time interpreted s 7 of 
the Clayton Act to cover mergers by banks.
26
 Second, the court spelled out the interaction 




The Supreme Court examined the validity of a submitted merger Girard Trust Corn 
Exchange Bank/Philadelphia National Bank.
28
  During the submitted merger, Girard Trust 
Corn Exchange Bank and Philadelphia National Bank were, respectively, the third and the 
second biggest banks of the forty-two commercial banks situated within the metropolitan area 
of Philadelphia.
29 
If the proposed merger were authorized, the newly established bank would 
become the biggest financial institution within the metropolitan area of Philadelphia.
30
  The 
new bank was to control nearly 36 per cent of deposits, about 36 per cent of the area banks‘ 




The Supreme Court stated
32
 that s 7 of the Clayton Act extends to regulate acquisitions 
of share capital or corporate stock of any business entity that participated in commerce.  
Nonetheless, in relation to acquisitions of corporate assets, s 7 of the Clayton Act only extends 
to regulate such acquisitions by business entities that are subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Federal Trade Commission (‗FTC‘).
33
 Consequently, the court noted that as the proposed 
bank merger transaction in the case fell within the scope of an assets acquisition by banks, 
which are business enterprises that are not subject to the jurisdiction of the FTC, it would not 
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be subject to s 7 of the Clayton Act.
34
 The court elaborated on the purpose and applicability of 
s 7, stating that when the Clayton Act was passed by the US Congress, s 7 appertained solely 
to acquisitions of share capital or corporate stock, and did not state anything concerning 




Before the Philadelphia National Bank case, courts had determined that merger 
transactions were not covered by s 7 of the Clayton Act.
36
 Even at the time bank mergers were 
used as an alternative to a genuine stock acquisition. Due to the ambiguity of the coverage and 
applicability of 7, in 1950 the US Congress amended s 7 to contain an assets-acquisition 
clause.
37
 The Supreme Court analysed the legislative history and found that US Congress 
intended to include bank mergers within s 7 in order to close the ambiguity.
38
 The court 
concluded
39
 that the US Congress aimed to give s 7 a wide coverage to include a variety of 
‗corporate amalgamations‘, from genuine assets acquisitions to genuine stock acquisitions.  
The court found
40
 that when the relevant provisions on assets acquisitions and stock-
acquisitions are read together, merger transactions would be covered under s 7. 
 
The court, further, pointed out
41
 that any other construction of s 7 would fail to give 
effect to the evident congressional motive for amending s 7 of the Clayton Act; any other 
construction would only serve to create ambiguity in a law intended to resolve an ambiguity.  
The Supreme Court explained that it was undisputed that the stock-acquisition clause of s 7 
would cover any enterprises involved in commerce, including banks.
42
  The court maintained 
that the provision on the stock-acquisition incorporated all means of indirect and direct 
acquisition transactions, containing also consolidation and merger transactions.
43
  The FTC 
has jurisdiction over such acquisition transactions.  The court applied s 7 and, in so doing, 
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The US Supreme Court, also, noted the interaction between the BMA and the Clayton 
Act.
45
  The Philadelphia National Bank and Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank argued that the 
BMA authorized banking regulators to take into account competitive aspects prior to a bank 
merger being authorized, thus, immunizing authorized merger cases from oppositions 
pursuant to the American competition legislation.
46
  The court dismissed this argument and 
affirmed that the BMA did not provide any express immunity.
47
  Moreover, the court found 
that the BMA did not prevent the applicability of s 7 to a bank merger transaction.
48
  
Nonetheless, the court stated that the applicability of the Clayton Act did not reduce the scope 
or applicability of the BMA.
49
 The court, too, clarified that the Clayton Act and the BMA 




The court went on to  discuss the implementation of s 7 of the Clayton Act,
51
 
analysing the pertinent market of the banks with a view to assess whether there was,  in fact, a 
competitive overlapping, and whether such overlapping should cause a competitive effect 
within the market.
52
 The US Supreme Court indicated
53
 that an analysis of anti-competitive 
outcomes of a merger need not be an assessment of the instant effect of the merger on 
competition, but a forecast of its effect over competitive situations in the future.  This is what 
was intended by the amended s 7 of the Clayton Act, which was meant to catch anti-
competitive propensities concerning their ‗incipiency‘.
54
 The US Supreme Court consequently 
concluded that a bank merger scrutinized closely in accordance with the spirit of s 7 of the 
Clayton Act, averting likely anti-competitive outcomes, when the bank merger is submitted 
and in consideration of any forthcoming consequences.
55
 In the end, the Court reversed the 
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The importance of the 1963 Philadelphia National Bank Supreme Court‘s ruling is 
that it held that banks are subject to the antitrust laws in their merger activities and that 




8.2  Other important Supreme Court and federal court case laws related to 
bank mergers 
 
Following the Philadelphia National Bank ruling,
58
 federal courts along with the US Supreme 
Court reviewed several bank merger cases that have important impact to antitrust policies in 
bank mergers. Some of these case law court decisions attempted to divert from the findings of 
the Supreme Court in Philadelphia National Bank. Below is a discussion of several of these 
case law court decisions.  
 
8.2.1  Supreme Court case laws 
 
a)   United States v First National Bank and Trust Co. of Lexington 
 
In 1962, the Department of Justice (‗DOJ‘) filed a lawsuit against First National Bank and 
Trust Co of Lexington et al, in the federal court,
59
 requesting from the court to prohibit the 
merger between banks (First National Bank and Trust Co. with Security Trust Co.) in 
Lexington, State of Kentucky pursuant to the Sherman Act due to issues concerning the 
application of s 7 towards a bank merger.
60
  That legal action, First National Bank & Trust 
Co. of Lexington, went before the US Supreme Court
61
 in the court‘s term subsequent to the 
Philadelphia National Bank decision.
62
  The court did not hesitate to reverse the              
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 United States v First National Bank and Trust Co of Lexington et al (1964) 376 US 665 (‗First National Bank 
of Lexington‘). 
62
 Philadelphia National Bank (n9), p 372. 
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federal (lower) court‘s ruling and vacated the bank merger pursuant to s 1 of the Sherman               




 The bank merger concerned the first and fourth biggest banks in Fayette County in the 
State of Kentucky that gave rise to a bank dominating approximately fifty-two per cent of the 
area‘s deposits and assets.
64
 The court reviewed previous cases involving railroad and ruled 
pursuant to the Sherman Act in determining that the bank merger satisfied the prevention of 
trade criterion.
65
  Among these previous cases, the Court put more analytical consideration on 
the United States v Columbia Steel Co. case.
66
  Justice Douglas, for the majority of the court, 
dismissed the Columbia Steel case, which he had accordingly strongly dissented.
67
 In 
particular, he noted that while the Columbia Steel decision should be narrowed to its particular 
facts, there was insufficient clarification in the judgment as to what those distinctive 
particulars were.
68
  Alternatively, he extracted a number of components mentioned in the 
Columbia Steel case that supported an undue constraint of trade finding, and ruled that in the 




   The Supreme Court made clear that commercial banking would continue to be a 
relevant market.
70
  Since the majority of the Court held that the merger concerned in the case 
was unlawful with the market so determined, the Court did not see the need to determine 




 In 1966, on the aftermath of the First National Bank and Trust Co. of Lexington 
rulings, the US Congress showed its discontent with the court‘s ruling, and the Congress shed 
light on the Clayton Act‘s application to bank merger cases by amending the Bank Merger 
Act 1960.
72
 The main effect of the Act was to relief actual bank mergers, covering even those 
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bank mergers under pending government commenced lawsuits, from s 7 of the Clayton Act 




    The Bank Merger Act 1960, as amended in 1966,
74
 indicated that future bank 
mergers would be subject to the Clayton Act inquiry, except where the likely public interest 
resulting to the transaction clearly prevails over their anti-competitive outcomes in satisfying 




b)    United States v First City Bank of Houston 
 
While it appears that the Bank Merger Act,
76
 may have given rise to a new defence for the 
advocates of a bank merger, the US Supreme Court led by Justice Douglas quickly reduced 
the scope and applicability of the defence. For instance, in the 1967 case, United States v First 
City Bank of Houston,
77
 the Court determined the public interest arising out of the Bank 
Merger Act.
78
 Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas opined that the burden of proof to 
establish the public interest defence rested on the banks intending to enter into merge.
79
  
Although the Bank Merger Act sought the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency to look 
the anti-competitive outcomes of a bank merger should be clearly offset by the likely public 
interest resulting from the merger undertaking in satisfying the needs and suitability of the 
community in which they render banking services, Justice Douglas concluded that the US 
Congress envisaged that review by the courts be de novo.
80
  According to Justice Douglas, 
that meant an independent resolution of the points at issue by the reviewing court.
81
   
 
Therefore, Justice Douglas rejected the reasoning that the judiciary should uphold an 
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c)  United States v Third National Bank in Nashville 
 
In the 1968 case, United States v Third National Bank in Nashville,
83
the court implemented 
the de novo review enumerated in the First City Bank of Houston case,
84
 and overruled a 
district court decision
85
 that endorsed the merger between the fourth and the second biggest 
banks in Nashville, the capital of the State of Tennessee.
86
  The court affirmed that the 
purpose and objective of the legislators in passing the Bank Merger Act was to implement 
significant variations in the legislation appurtenant to bank mergers.
87
 However, the court 
determined that it was unrestricted by an administrative specification about the suitability and 
prerequisites of the community.
88
  Based on the court‘s findings, the defending bank needs to 
demonstrate that it cannot match the community‘s suitability and requires prerequisites in the 




The Third National Bank in Nashville case gave an occasion for the US Supreme 
Court to bring the Bank Merger Act in line and consistency with the Philadelphia National 
Bank decision. Absent further elaboration, the Supreme Court noted that commercial banking 
remained to be the relevant product market.
90
  The court affirmed that the Bank Merger Act 
did not alter the criterions for resolving the issue about a merger whether or not is 
competitive.
91
  Instead, the Act employed a ‗convenience and needs‘
92
 assessment method 




The courts, like in the First City Bank of Houston case
93
 and the Third National Bank 
in Nashville case,
94
 continued to employ the criteria set out by the Warren court in relation to 
the s 7 of the Clayton Act assessment to a bank merger, unaffected by the enactment of the 
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 First City Bank of Houston (n77). 
94





 The court‘s reading of the suitability and prerequisites criteria, putting the 
burden of proof on the defendant to satisfy the criteria and indirectly requiring the 
administration to apply the criteria, did not cause any apparent change to the 
‗pure‘ competition enforcement of a bank merger pursuant to s 7 of the Clayton Act, 
regardless of the US congressional objective.
96
  The court, consistent with the approach taken 
by the Warren court, clarified that it was not prepared to hand over the enforcement power of 
the Clayton Act to an administrative regulator without a clear authority from the US 
Congress.
97





d)   United States v Phillipsburg National Bank & Trust Co. 
 
In the 1970 case, United States v Phillipsburg National Bank & Trust Co,
99
 the US Supreme 
Court reaffirmed its position held in Philadelphia National Bank.
100
   
 
 In Phillipsburg National Bank & Trust Co, two small banks (Phillipsburg National 
Bank, and Second National Bank) in Phillipsburg, an inconsiderable industrial city in the State 
of New Jersey, intended to merge.
101
  They filed a merger application and received approval 
from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.
102
  In 1969 the Department of Justice filed 
a legal action against the foregoing merging banks, in the federal court, to admonish the bank 
merger for violating s 7 of the Clayton Act.
103
   
 
The federal court followed an analysis, based on an arranged product market as in the 
courts in previous cases, such as, the Provident National Bank case.
104
  However, the US 
Supreme Court held that this examination was flawed.
105
 In an unusual brief and insufficiently 
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articulated discussion on this particularly significant issue, the Court capriciously followed its 




 Setting out the relevant circumstances of the merger case, the US Supreme Court 
noted that although lower (federal) courts deal with cases involving smaller banks as the 
subject of the merger, these banks supplied a vast spectrum of products and services 
accessible at the level of commercial banks.
107
 These products and services comprise of 
savings deposits, demand deposits, industrial and commercial loans, consumer loans, safe 




The lower court concluded that the banks in question were functionally more similar to 
savings and loan associations than large commercial banks.
109
  Therefore, the court adopted an 
approach that looked at submarkets in a broad product market.
110
  In its ‗submarkets‘ analysis 
the court included banks, savings and loan associations, mutual funds, pension funds, and 




The submitted merger banks have an area of focus in real estate and mortgage loans.  
They had a little portion of demand to entire deposits, and were directed to small borrowers 
and depositors.
112
  The merging banks seemed to be closer to thrift institutions instead of big 
banks.
113
   
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing characteristic, the US Supreme Court found that a 
‗submarket‘ review was flawed.
114
  The Court noted that banking continued to sustain an 
important part of the economy with the numerous services and products concerned.
115
 The 
Court failed to emphasize the position of demand deposit accounts, which was a significant 
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piece of fact in the Philadelphia National Bank case.
116
 Nevertheless, it observed a 
superseding economic importance in the suitability of ‗one-stop shop‘ effect in banking.
117
 
The Court left open the question of whether or not a customer who lacks resources possessed 





 Chief Justice Burger and Justice Harlan differed in part from the majority and were 





The minority justices opined that the current court shunned the whole review of the 
configuration of the services and products presented by merging banks.
120
 As a result, the 
majority overlooked entirely how competition from mutual savings banks, savings and loan 
entities, and other financial institutions that are not commercial banks influence the market 




In the end, the US Supreme Court 
 
reversed the lower court‘s judgement in favour of 
the defendants, as well as remanded the case for consideration to the lower court to decide 




e) United States v Connecticut National Bank 
 
The 1973 federal court case in United States v Connecticut National Bank
123
did not follow the 
Phillipsburg National Bank & Trust Co
124
 with the financial and economic situation within 
the State of Connecticut or with the US Supreme Court‘s nonbanking rulings.
125
  In reviewing 
the decision in Phillipsburg National Bank, the federal court noted that the Supreme Court‘s 
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assertions in Philadelphia National Bank and Phillipsburg National Bank were not meant to 
be stagnant, firm and quick rules that required later courts to ignore the reality of competition 




In Connecticut National Bank, five commercial banks, a savings bank, the federal 
banking regulators along with the State Banking Commission of Connecticut concurred that 
savings banks had become competitors of commercial banks.
127
 Even the DOJ, during the 
trial, admitted that competition between savings and commercial banks had increased steadily 
from the time of the Philadelphia National Bank ruling.
128
  The federal court took note of the 
then latest legislative changes that showed a national tendency to more similar controls 
between thrift institutions and banks.
129
 The evidence presented at trial revealed the 
undisputable reality that commercial and savings banks were competing in full extent of at 
minimum five product lines, namely, real estate mortgages, IPC deposits,
130
 personal 
checking, personal loans and commercial loans.
131
 In the end, the district court agreed that 
savings banks (defendants) should be included in the consideration of the lines of commerce 




During the plaintiff‘s appeal, the US Supreme Court rejected the lower court‘s 
findings in relation to the line of commerce.
133
 The majority acknowledged some of the 
loopholes left unresolved in the Phillipsburg National Bank decision.
134
 The Court, also, 
acknowledged a remark initially made in a footnote in the decision of Third National Bank in 
Nashville.
135
 For the first time, the court expressly found that the lack of any line of commerce 
definition under the Bank Merger Act did not affect criteria set out in s 7 of the Clayton Act in 
relation to the characterization of a product market.
136
 The court found that reality of the 
banking field within the State of Connecticut did not clearly distinguish between commercial 
and savings banks and, thus, the only conclusion that could be drawn from the banking reality 
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would be commercial banking being the line of commerce.
137
 In arriving at such conclusion, 
the Supreme Court was left with no choice but to unbundle its own cluster of product market 
in commercial banking.
138
    
 
In Connecticut, the savings banks provided most aspects of the banking cluster.
139
  
However, the US Supreme Court was unconvinced that these savings banks epitomized 
significant competition since they offered fairly limited short-term enterprise loans.
140
  
Moreover, the savings banks did not issue or render loans for securities purchases, investment 
services, credit cards, and letters of credit.  The failure to provide these products and services 
was considered important.  However, not every commercial bank within the State of 
Connecticut provided the whole gamut of characteristic products of commercial banking. 
While the US Supreme Court rejected the inclusion of thrift institutions in the commerce‘s 
line in Connecticut National Bank, the court left open the possibility of including thrift 




In the end, the Court vacated the judgment of the lower court, in favour of the plaintiff, 





8.2.2   Federal district court case laws 
 
Besides the Supreme Court‘s decisions on the antitrust aspects of bank merger case laws, 
some of which are discussed in the foregoing subchapter, the federal district courts have, also, 
played an important role in shaping the antitrust policies in bank mergers.  Below is a 
discussion of some important case law rulings made by the federal courts pertaining to bank 
merger antitrust issues.  
 
 a)  United States v Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. 
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In the 1965 case, United States v Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.,
143
 the Department of 
Justice brought a legal action seeking divestiture subsequent to the merger of the Hanover 
Bank, a wholesale bank, and Manufacturers Trust Company, a retail bank.
144
  The district 
court relied on the ruling in Philadelphia National Bank
145
 that, in order to previse the 





The district court denied the Department of Justice‘s assertion that seven specific 
banking services should be regarded as submarkets.
147
 Instead, it embraced a bit refined 
reading of the Philadelphia National Bank cluster approach.
148
   
 
The district court in the end inferred that while favouring the easy direction, draining 
the hard work, complicated, evasive and piecemeal the evidence, seeking intelligible tests, or 
facing considerable pressure for speedy resolution and bulk production,
149
 it needs to closely 
look through the distinctiveness of commercial banking in New York City.
150
  Once the court 
employed this approach, it discovered that retail and wholesale banking appeared seamlessly 
in upright boundaries of commerce
151
 and that both were within the limits of Philadelphia 
National Bank.  The district court, however, did not address a point raised in the Philadelphia 
National Bank case that non-bank competition would not need to be considered when 




b)   United States v Croker-Anglo National Bank 
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In the 1967 case, United States v Crocker-Anglo National Bank,
153
 while relying on the letter 
and spirit of the Bank Merger Act,
154
 a federal district court overruled the standard set in the 




The district court noted that the Bank Merger Act demanded a broader test due to the 
fact that the legislation did not include the catchphrase in ‗any line of commerce‘.
156
  It, also, 
acknowledged that members of the US Congress who advocated forcefully in favour of the 
Bank Merger Act maintained that the courts and the banking regulators are not allowed to 
handpick handful single, perhaps minor, facet of the banks‘ business and claim that, since 
there is some decreasing of competition in this particular component of the business, the rise 
in the overall competition throughout the whole sector of banking and in the larger sector of 




The federal district court recognized that demand deposits, which are distinctive to the 
business of banking, were simply the kind of ‗minor aspect‘ for which the aforementioned 




The district court, likewise, noted the viewpoints or positions expressed by other US 
congressional members that commercial banks face severe competition from other financial 
institutions, like mutual savings banks, savings and loan associations, finance companies, and 
insurance companies.
159
  If the competition and banking regulators, and the courts, would 
neglect any one of these characteristics of competition, it would be highly impractical and 




The corroboration in the present action supported a finding that nonbank financial 
competitors rendered ‗effective economic substitutes‘
161
 throughout the rightfully distinctive 
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service of demand deposit from banks.  The federal district court affirmed that the cluster 





Nonetheless, viewing the California financial market as a whole, the district court 
closely considered the services of credit unions, savings and loan associations, insurance 
companies, and finance companies to be part of the same market.
163
  The eventual decision in 
the present legal action depended on the lack of any opposing result on concrete or possible 
competition in banking sector. 
 
    c)   United States v Provident National Bank  
 
In the 1968 case, United States v Provident National Bank,
164
 two banks (the Provident 
National Bank and the Central-Penn National Bank) in Philadelphia, State of Pennsylvania, 
planned to merge with each other.
165
  Apart from the usual advantages that the merger could 
provide to Philadelphia and its banking and business environment, the federal district court 
opposed the bank merger, finding it to violate the antitrust laws i.e., the Bank Merger Act.
166
  
While rejecting the proposed merger transaction,
167
 the Court concurred with the US Supreme 
Court‘s examination of the product market under the Bank Merger Act in the Third National 
Bank in Nashville case.
168
   
 
The federal district court indicated that particularly in the concentrated market in 
Philadelphia, the financial services sector had sustained major transformations, since the 
ruling of the Philadelphia National Bank case.
169
 In particular, the figures showed that it was 
no longer correct that commercial banks benefited from a resolved consumer inclination about 
their savings sums.
170
  The Court saw sensible evocative and interchange ability competition 
for the consumers‘ savings sums and mortgage loans between commercial banks and thrift 
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  In the end, the Court noted that thrift institutions had to be included in the 
examination.
172
 Meanwhile, the same court overruled competition from finance enterprises, 
insurance enterprises, and the similar due to the fact that they appeared to be too different 
from the business of banking.
173
   
 
The position taken by the federal district court in the Provident National Bank case 
was that that the distinctiveness of the banking sector was specifically the very fact that had 




 d)  United States v Chelsea Savings Bank 
 
The issue submitted in the 1969 case of United States v Chelsea Savings Bank
175
was 




 The Chelsea Savings Bank and the Dime Savings Bank, both mutual savings        
banks, located in the City of Norwich, and state (Connecticut) chartered, executed a 
consolidation agreement.
177
  The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Banking 




 The US Government (plaintiff) moved to reverse the submitted consolidation on the 
basis that the merger deemed to violate s 7 of the Clayton Act and s 1 of the Sherman Act.
179
   
  
The Court held that the US Congress intended s 7 of the Clayton Act to cover mergers 
and, thus, resolve any ambiguity in the section.
180
 The US Congress intended that the 
amendment in the Clayton Act would clarify the scope of applicability of s 7, such that it 
would cover the whole variety of corporate amalgamations, from acquisitions of stocks to 
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acquisitions of assets. Therefore, the assets and stocks acquisitions provisions 
respectively should be read together and catch merger transactions that do not fall squarely 




The Court disagreed with the defendant banks‘ claim, which sought to limit the ruling 
in the Philadelphia National Bank case to mergers concerning stock enterprises. The 
defendants, further, contended that the statutory consolidation of non-stock corporations, like 
the one in the present action, is outside the reach of s 7 of the Clayton Act.
182
  In disagreeing 
with these assertions from the defendants, the court indicated that it was correct that the 
Philadelphia National Bank case concerned the merger of two commercial banks.
183
  
However, nothing would support a ruling that restricted the applicability of the decision to 
amalgamations of banks that issue stock.  The court, specifically, cautioned against any 
elusive corporate ploys aimed at circumventing s 7 of the Clayton Act. In this regard, it noted 
that it is correct that an exchange of its stock for assets could attain the acquiring bank‘s 
goals.
184
   
 
 The Court looked at the fact that the ensuing bank, the Chelsea-Dime Savings Bank, 
intended to carry on operations in a way that the Chelsea bank‘s facility would become its 
principal office and the Dime banks‘ would be its branch office, including one board of 
directors in charge to manage the business operations of the new bank.
185
  The foregoing led 
the court to rule that the consolidation deemed to be equal in its results to a merger.
186
  





 The Court, also, looked at the differences between a mutual savings bank and a stock 
bank.  It found that any different corporate structure between the forgoing institutions would 
be relevant within the meaning of s 7 of the Clayton Act.  A savings bank accepts monies in 

















trust, and the deposit holders are positioned in the similar rapport to the bank like the 




The Court, further, noted that the competitive effects of the proposed merger should be 
subject to an analysis under  s 7 of the Clayton Act because the defendant banks intended to 




In the end, the Court concluded that the present action like any other bank 
merger ought to be subject to coherent antitrust conduct pursuant to s 7 of the Clayton Act, 




    e)   United States v Idaho First National Bank 
 
The federal court, in the 1970 case, United States v Idaho First National Bank,
191
 favoured the 
argument of the ‗many additional so-called lines of commerce‘ that the US Supreme Court in 




The federal court argued that the preceding cases appeared to be particular on their 
facts.
193
 Those cases dealt with banking operations in highly inhabited metropolitan parts 
instead of what the present case concerned, namely the rural atmosphere of Twin Falls city 
and the Magic Valley region in the State of Idaho.
194
 The court engaged in what it defined as a 
practical bottom line examination
195
 and took a submarket approach in order to determine the 
relevant product market.
196
  The court, also, noted that demand deposits remained constantly 
an adequate line of commerce.
197
 Moreover, the court, also, found
198
 that banks in the relevant 
market area compete among themselves to provide products and services, except for demand 
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deposits.  There is cross-elasticity of demand for such products and services. Every product or 




The federal court acknowledged that commercial banks in the city of Twin Falls 
market faced competition from a series of nonbank suppliers of financial services and 
products.
200
  Some of these services and products included interest held deposits, commercial 
and residential real estate loans, farm real estate and farming production loans, education 
loans, and additional consumer loans.
201
  The court did not find any evidence that the merger 
would tend to substantially lessen competition in any line of commerce in any geographic area 
relevant to this case.
202





 f)  United States v First National Bancorporation204 
 
In 1971 case United States v First National Bancorporation,
205
 the district court embraced the 
cluster as articulated by the court in Philadelphia National Bank.
206
  It defended the cluster 
method with evidence on the presence of nonbank financial institution competitors in the City 
of Greeley, State of Colorado, market.
207
 The Department of Justice sought a possible line of 
commerce, specifically; correspondent banking that was within the sphere of commercial 
banking.
 





, in reviewing the hypothetical alternative of banking submarkets.
210
  However, 
the court found the foregoing nonbanking related cases unhelpful due to the fact that the 
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In the end, the district court did not reach a conclusion on whether to consider the 
commercial banking bundle or the concurrent banking submarket remained the line of 
commerce.
212
 It maintained that the submitted bank merger was not significantly reducing 
competition nor aimed at forming a monopoly provided under s 7 of the Clayton Act.
213
  
Thereafter, following the plaintiff‘s appeal to the Supreme Court, an evenly split Supreme 
Court
214
 asserted its decision per curiam.
215
  As a result, the ruling of the district (lower) court 
was upheld.  
  
 g)  United States v First National State Bancorporation 
 
In the 1980 bank merger case of United States v First National State Bancorporation
216
, in its 
analysis, the Court perceived a potential competition concern in the merger.
217
 However, the 
Court found that there was a considerable group of likely banking entry participants within the 
relevant markets.
218
 Therefore, the court added, such entry would erase any competition 
concern.
219
 As a result, the loss of Bancorporation was going to be an inconsequential 
competitive happening.
220
 The court eventually dismissed the bank merger dispute mainly due 
to competition boosting divestitures that was sought by the Office of the Comptroller of the 





 h)  United States v Central State Bank 
 
The DOJ‘s drive to transform bank merger regulation seems to have influenced its change in 
approach in the 1987 case United States v Central State Bank.
222
  The change could be 
understood in relation to the facts.  The two biggest banks (Central State Bank and State 
Savings Bank) in rural Benzie County in Michigan merged in order to hold over 60 per cent of 
                                                        
212
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  Even though the defendants at first contended that non-depository and 
thrift institutions should be incorporated within the market,
224
it is doubtful that this argument 
had any bearing on the result because Benzie County did not have any thrift institutions; it 
only had two credit unions that were less than influential.
225
 The only tenable argument that 
the defendants could put forward was to expand the geographic market to contain at minimum 
a second county, Grand Traverse County, comprising, as the specified location, Traverse City, 
a regional centre 40 miles off from one bank, and 32 miles off from the other bank. Between 




The issue before the District Court was whether the geography of one county would 
render reasonable to support a one-county market.
227
  As separate issue were whether a 
customer would travel for about 45 minutes to carry out his or her banking needs, while 




In the end, the Court entered a judgment in favour of the defendants,
229
 holding that 




In arriving to its conclusion, the Court relied on three pieces of evidence.
231
  First, a 
1980 survey revealed that 17.2 per cent of Benzie County‘s inhabitants were employed in 
Grand Traverse County.
232
  Second, a market census consisted of a poll of 400 individuals 
financed by the Traverse City newspaper revealed that nearly 30 per cent of Benzie County 
residents relied on a Grand Traverse supermarket as their only or main food place origin.
233
  A 
further 27 per cent relied on it as an unimportant food place origin, and a considerable 
minority of Benzie County inhabitants had made their last clothing purchase in Traverse 
City.
234
  Third, banks located in Grand Traverse County maintained 15.03 per cent of the 
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deposits of Benzie County inhabitants.
235
  Based on the foregoing, the court found that there 





 From the foregoing case laws dealt by the Federal District Courts, it is determined that 
notwithstanding some efforts from the Courts to ‗divert‘ from the Philadelphia National Bank 
ruling on the ‗cluster‘ of banking products and services within a commercial banking line of 
commerce, and the applicability of antitrust laws to bank mergers, the Courts‘ application of 
the Philadelphia National Bank in bank merger case laws remains unchanged.   
 
8.3 Important bank merger transactions cleared by federal banking 
regulators 
 
The US antitrust and banking regulators review numerous bank merger cases that are 
eventually approved or denied. In the course of their review, regulators contribute in shaping 
the US bank merger policy regime. Some of the most important bank merger reviews that 
were cleared by the regulators, and without the US courts involvement, are discussed, below.   
 
a)  Bankers Trust/Public Loan Co. 
 
In 1973, the Bankers Trust New York Corporation (‗Bankers Trust‘),
237
 a commercial bank, 
submitted an application with the Federal Reserve in order to purchase Public Loan Company, 
a sales and consumer finance enterprise.
238
  The deal aimed at phasing out actual competition 
between the targeted finance enterprise and the applicant‘s subsidiary. The Federal Reserve 
recognized the existence of two product submarkets, namely the direct consumer payment 
loans and personal loans no higher than $1,400.
239
  The Federal Reserve noted that consumer 
finance enterprises were a substitute basis for personal loans, loans to finance home 
improvements and buying automobiles, and additional loans conventionally offered by 
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The Federal Reserve did not support the position that finance entities remained 
entirely sheltered from bank competition because finance companies apportioned elevated-
risk customers. As a result, the Federal Reserve rejected the takeover of Public Loan 




b)  American Fletcher Corporation/Southwest S&L 
 
In 1974, in reviewing the applications for nonbank mergers by bank holding companies, the 
Federal Reserve, consistently, relied fully on the decision of Phillipsburg National Bank Trust 
&Co.
243
  In the merger case of American Fletcher Corporation/Southwest S&L
244
 the Federal 
Reserve rejected the merger of a savings and loan association for reasons not concerning 
competition. The regulator observed that banks and saving and loan associations are no longer 
as clearly distinguishable.
245
   
 
The Federal Reserve, also, noted that the savings and loan associations and 
commercial banks historically became involved in financing of sales, purchases and housing 




c)  Chase-Manhattan/Chemical  
 
Viewed as a merger deal of equal participants; both Chase Manhattan Banking Corporation 
(‗Chase Manhattan‘) and Chemical Banking Corporation (‗Chemical‘) carried an affluent 
history of preceding acquisitions and mergers undertakings.
247
  At the time of the merger, 
Chase Manhattan had become the sixth biggest financial institution in the US, and Chemical 
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 In 1996, the Chemical bank and Chase Manhattan entered into a merger, emerging as 
the biggest bank in the nation.
249
  The consolidation was undertaken as a measure to enable 
both banks to maintain competitiveness in the international financial market. 
  
 Notwithstanding the resulted enormous concentration of assets, the Chemical/Chase 
Manhattan merger did not encounter any impediments from US competition and banking 
authorities.
250
 To a certain extent, the only opposition arose from the community and 
consumer groups that raised their opposition to the fact the bank merger would precipitate in 
excessive costs in relation to bank services.  They similarly opposed to the massive layoff due 
to the consolidation of networks and branches throughout the US.  As a result, the community 
and consumer groups filed a court action against the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal 
Reserve, as well as the two banks and their holding companies on a likely violation of 




Moreover, the community and consumer groups explicitly complained that the   




 A relevant aspect in a bank merger review is to find out the market definition, extent, 
and concentration of the new bank subsequent to the submitted merger. Pursuant to the merger 
guidelines of the US competition and banking authorities, the target of measuring and 
determining the market is to equip a suitable review of the merger‘s possible concentration of 
market and the likely dominant results such concentration could create.
253
  With the bank 
merger, the new Chase Manhattan was provided with an overwhelming global and domestic 
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presence in fifty-one nations and thirty-nine states across the US.  Both Chase Manhattan and 
Chemical bank were engaged in similar-businesses - credit cards, mortgages, securities 
trading, small business lending, global banking, and corporate banking.
254
  As a consequence 
of the merger transaction, the new Chase Manhattan turned into a major lender to big 
corporations and a front runner in securities processing, and became the biggest trading 
revenue in the US.
255
  The new bank similarly grew to become the fourth-biggest supplier of 
credit cards, the third-biggest maker of new mortgages, and the leading provider of remaining 
mortgages.
256
  Apart from its domination across the country, the new bank similarly attained 
control through possessing most consumer deposits in New York and came                             




 Notwithstanding the power amassment across the country and state-wide domination 
as a result of the bank merger, competition authorities authorized the merger 
transaction.
258
  This authorization showed that the market concentration supremacy 
examination went off on a tangent from the time of Philadelphia National Bank.
259
  In the 
Philadelphia National Bank case, the court recognized that, in the setting of the pertinent 
product market as well as the prospective for concentration, the effect on competition that a 
merger could cause locally, regionally, and nationally needs to be considered. 
260
 The Chase 
Manhattan/Chemical merger would not have passed the criteria established in Philadelphia 
National Bank, which overruled a bank merger that could have triggered a 30 per cent 
dominance of commercial bank business within the four-county Philadelphia area, for the 
reason that such merger culminated in the new bank getting product market control in several 
regions, particularly in New York.
261
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      Also, due to the fact that the merger Chemical/Chase Manhattan culminated in control in 
several aspects at the regional, state, and country level, the bank merger concluded in a 




  Entry examination is a relevant factor used in a bank merger examination. The 
question is whether the entry of new bank competitors will probably dissuade an anti-
competitive merger at the outset, or dissuade or offset the competitive consequences.  The 
new Chase Manhattan bank did not permit presence of other bank competitors rendering the 
same kind of services as the new bank, averting them from participating fairly and openly for 
products and services to customers in the market.  Due to the level of the new bank merger‘s 
considerable concentration in the banking market, it culminated in a restriction                        




d)  Citicorp/Travelers Group 
 
In 1998 one significant merger in the financial services industry was the $70 billion-merger 
transaction of Citigroup/Travelers Group.  Citigroup, with gross assets of about $331 billion, 
had grown to become the third biggest commercial bank in the US.
264
  Travelers Group, a 
varied financial services institution with gross assets of about $420 billion, partook in several 
activities in the areas included insurance, securities, lending, and additional financial 




The merger formed the biggest commercial banking institution worldwide with gross 
assets of about $751 billion.
266
  In the course of the merger analysis, the competition and 
banking agencies received several complaints that Citigroup would have an unwarranted 
accumulation of resources as the merger transaction would establish a financial group too big 
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to be permitted to fail.
267
  Nonetheless, the Department of Justice regarded this as 
predominantly a regulatory matter to be taken into consideration by the Federal Reserve. 
 
The Federal Reserve sidestepped competition issues posed in Citigroup (a commercial 
bank) and Travelers Group (insurance institution) merger.  The merger clearly violated 
provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act 1933
268
 for the separation of the business of commercial 
banking, investment banking and insurance activities.  Under the Act,
269
 a commercial bank 
was not allowed to enter into an insurance activity, or an investment activity. Citigroup was a 
commercial bank and Travelers Group was an insurance institution.  Powerful groups of 
interest lobbied upon the Federal Reserve to put on hold the review of the proposal until and 
unless the Congress amends the Glass-Steagall Act 1933
270
 to cover unrestricted combinations 
that would catch banking, securities and insurance activities under the same financial 
institution umbrella.
271
 Critics noted that the Citigroup/Travelers Group merger would     
cause an unwarranted concentration of resources and a financial institution                       




 In allowing the merger, the Federal Reserve noted that the markets where the merging 
banks competed were not concentrated.
273
  The regulator found that in any market in which 
one bank had an important presence, the other bank has a comparatively insignificant market 
share.
274
  The Federal Reserve projected that the Citigroup/Travelers Group merger was going 
to have a de minimis consequence on competition.
275
  The Federal Reserve rejected the 
argument that the relative or absolute dimension of Citigroup would unfavourably sway the 
market structure. It opined that there was insufficient evidence to assert that the scope or scale 
of Citigroup‘s operations would permit it to alter or control any relevant market.
276
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In the Global Financial Crisis, almost a decade after the merger consummation, 
Citigroup and other large banks and financial institutions were on the verge of collapse. They 
were saved thanks to the US Government financial bailouts in which Citigroup obtained $45 
billion emergency funding and $301 billion of government asset insurance.
277
  This is, to date, 




e) Wells Fargo/Wachovia & PNC Financial Services/National City 
 
In the bank mergers, Wells Fargo/Wachovia,
279
 and PNC Financial Services/National 
City,
280
 both in 2008, the Federal Reserve and the Department of Justice
281
 harmonized and 
accelerated their analysis on the bank merger.  
 
The Federal Reserve granted the Wells Fargo/Wachovia merger in merely over a 
week‘s time from receiving its submissions.
282
  After over a month of review, both, the 
Federal Reserve and the Department of Justice, allowed the takeover of National City by PNC 
Financial Services notwithstanding relevant unresolved competitive concerns.
283  
 
Unlike expedited review for non-emergency bank mergers, under which the 
Department of Justice and the Federal Reserve may require from merging parties to find 
purchasers for their required divestitures within a certain time, upon the entry of a consent 
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decision, the Department of Justice and Federal Reserve exercised their discretionary power in 
the mergers Wells Fargo/Wachovia and PNC Financial Services/National City in order to 




The exercise of the regulators‘ discretionary powers in the quick merger processing 
and the timing of divestitures of the two mergers, Wells Fargo/Wachovia,
285
 and PNC 
Financial Services/National City, demonstrate how the regulators that oversee bank mergers 




In conclusion, this chapter has provided a comprehensive overview of the US courts‘ 
decisions in reviewing bank merger cases, together with an analysis of the methodologies 
employed and reasoning given by the courts to scrutinize these mergers.  
 
As the legal cases demonstrate, a central issue in considering the legitimacy of bank 
mergers is the identification of the relevant product and geographic markets. Realizing that 
the first point of reference in the regulation of bank mergers is the relevant legislation, courts 
have at an early stage clarified the relationship between s 7 of the Clayton Act and the Bank 
Merger Act. In particular, courts have emphasized that the two acts are complimentary of each 
other, and rejected the argument that the applicability of one is the prerequisite of the 
applicability of the other. Unfortunately, it appears that courts have not been able to come to a 
solid conclusion regarding the scope and application of the ‗cluster‘ or ‗line of commerce‘ 
approach. Courts have often seen themselves adopting different interpretation and, at times 
added their own remarks, to landmark rulings, such as, the Philadelphia National Bank case
286
 
and the Phillipsburg National Bank & Trust, Co. case.
287
 It was also common to see courts 
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taking different factors and considerations into account when determining the outcome of a 
case.  
 
Much of the confusing and at times contradictory rulings by the courts were a result 
and reflective of the undisputable fact that the banking industry has been experiencing 
substantial changes over the years since the Philadelphia National Bank decision was handed 
down. The services and products provided by banks and other financial institutions have 
expanded both vertically and horizontally.  New services and products have emerged.  The 
services and products traditionally provided by one type of financial institutions have begun to 
be available at other types of financial institutions.  
 
The issue of whether or not the US Supreme Court has reached a well-founded ruling 
in deciding that commercial banking was a particular line of commerce in the cases of 
Philadelphia National Bank, Phillipsburg National Bank & Trust, and Connecticut National 
Bank
288
 is essentially inconsequential.  Situations in the banking industry is uninterruptedly 
changing substantially since these rulings such that it has called into question the notion of the 
continuing recognition of commercial banking as a precise line of commerce.  Market forces, 
stricter banking regulations, and legislative amendments in the US have added an additional 
layer of ambiguity to the already troubled cluster argument in commercial banking. Perhaps 
only the firmest advocate to the notion of stare decisis could draw a conclusion that 
commercial banking is pertinent in a competition perspective.  Fortunately, the banking and 
financial markets, unlike US courts, do not rely on precedents. 
 
Essentially, the peculiar conclusion that could be drawn, particularly, from the cases of 
Philadelphia National Bank
289
 and Phillipsburg National Bank,
290
 is that while non-bank 
financial services enterprises were found not to be competing with commercial banks, 
commercial banks were found to be competing with non-bank financial services enterprises.  
 
                                                        
288
 Connecticut National Bank (n133). 
289
 Philadelphia National Bank (n9). 
290
 Phillipsburg National Bank (n99). 
268 
 
The Connecticut National Bank ruling,
291
 nevertheless, partially deviated from 
previous rulings by indicating that the courts in the present case and the cases of Phillipsburg 
National Bank and Philadelphia National Bank did not reject the possibility of finding that 
commercial banks and savings banks function within the same line of commerce if there are 
similarities in their services and economic conduct.
292
 The court further added that at some 
point in time of the progress of savings banks, it would become impractical to differentiate 




To the deviation mechanism set out in Connecticut National Bank, it is apparent that 
the financial services sector has changed quite substantially such that it is unreasonable to 




 After the Philadelphia National Bank case, the US district courts scrambled to exert its 
lessons learnt in several bank merger situations.  Several courts imprudently or absent of 
necessary clarification acknowledged the commercial banking bundle of products and services 
as the external boundary of the line of commerce.  Some district courts tried to limit the 
application of the Philadelphia National Bank ruling to its uncharacteristic facts and 
circumstances. 
 
To remain as a key player in the field, courts must, thus, strike a balance between 
upholding the spirit of precedents and recognizing the ever-evolving circumstances in the 
modern financial world.   
 
The Federal Reserve and the Department of Justice might have failed to notice the 
anti-competitive effect of the merger Chemical/Chase Manhattan and Citi/Travelers, in their 
entirety.  The extent of banking and financial market dominance in both the country and the 
state of New York should have revealed serious issues for the competition agencies and 
banking regulators.  The negligence to completely disregard the concerns raised by the 
community and consumer groups demonstrates the failure of the current competition 
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 For a discussion of the evolution of banking products and services, since the Philadelphia National Bank, and 
the need for a revisit of this case from the competent courts, see chapter 11.2 in this thesis, pp 361-91. 
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provisions to involve the community and consumer involvement in the competition law 
system.  The Chase Manhattan/Chemical, Citi/Travelers bank mergers show tendencies in the 
competition law application and implementation process in the US.   
 
The foregoing demonstrates the increasing tolerance (forbearance) in bank merger 
standards; the failure about consumer focal point concerning the competition law application 
and enforcement process, as well as it illustrates the extent about the bank merger guidelines 








CHAPTER 9 – ANTITRUST METHODOLOGIES AND POLICIES APPLIED IN 
BANK MERGERS IN UNITED STATES 
 
In this chapter, antitrust methodologies and policies applied from the US competition 
authority and banking regulators to bank mergers are examined.  Below, discussion is focused 
on the specific aspects of markets, products, consumer issues and competitive analysis in 
relation to bank mergers. In addition, below, is a discussion of the examination approach from 
the foregoing regulators towards bank merger applications. 
 
9.0  Markets, products, consumer issues and competitive analysis in relation 
to bank mergers 
 
Due to the unique framework of competition review, regulators employ special methods 
addressing issues regarding the relevant product markets under which the competitive issues 
of a bank merger are reviewed.
1
 Regulators, also, look to the geographic markets within which 
the merging banks would provide banking products after the proposed merger, any 
competition consequences associated with the bank merger in the geographic and product 
markets, whether there are any mitigating circumstances. Regulators, further, look to whether 




Despite the fact the foregoing competition analysis methods applied to bank mergers 
have remained largely unchanged over time, the resources applied to each method has not 
been equal. The trend in methods of competition analysis has, from the early 1960s until now, 
gradually moved from looking at the product markets and geographic markets and the effect 
of a bank merger on competition, to increased scrutiny of market performance in the event of 
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Bank Mergers & Acquisitions (Boston: Kluwer 2013), pp 191-5. 
3
 B Shull and G A Hanweck, Bank Mergers in a Deregulated Environment: Promise and Peril (Westport: 
Quorum Books 2001), pp 184-5. 
271 
 
The Federal Reserve and the Department of Justice (‗DOJ‘)‘s analytical methods 
appear to be basically similar in most aspects.
4
 Both these agencies review the relevant 
product and geographic markets, the level of concentration in the relevant markets, and the 
increase in concentration resulting from the merger.
5
  In addition, these agencies examine the 
convenience of and opportunity for market entry by new participants, and efficacies brought 
by the bank merger.
6
   
 
The DOJ reviews the possible competitive effects that might derive from the bank 
merger.
7
 This is not an internal component of the Federal Reserve‘s review, but a distinct 
procedure.  The latter regulator examines if any anticompetitive concerns are dominated by a 





Notwithstanding the foregoing, each, the Federal Reserve, and the DOJ, looks closely 
at several of these distinct analytical factors very differently. The different approaches applied 
are reasonably clear in relation to determining the geographic and product markets, as well as 
the concentration inquiry.
9
  Their positions on entry examination are alike.
10
  However, even 
on this issue the factual reviews and indications may vary. 
 
9.1  Markets 
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The definition and application of the geographic market used in a bank merger review, as well 
as approaches taken by the antitrust and banking agencies in determining such market, are 
discussed below.    
 
9.1.1  Geographic market 
  
Courts have defined a geographic market as the ‗area of effective competition … in which the 
seller operates and to which the purchaser can practically turn for supplies.‘
11
  In relation to a 
bank merger, the US Supreme Court in the Philadelphia National Bank case described the 
geographic market as being local in nature.
12
  In that regard, the court stated: 
 
The proper question to be asked in this case is not where the parties … do business or 
even where they compete, but where, within the area of competitive overlap, the effect 
… on competition will be direct and immediate.  …  This depends upon ‗the 
geographic structure of supplier-customer relations‘. … The factor of inconvenience 





In this case, the court‘s review of the geographic market now appears to be unrealistic, 
considering that banks have expanded their activities beyond commercial banking, into 
investment banking and insurance activities.
14
 In addition, the US banking industry has 
expanded both across the country and internationally. 
 
In retrospect, the highest court in the US appears to have foreseen the evolution that 
has taken place in relation to local geographic banking markets by acknowledging that 
precedent would not bind the lower courts to become ‗blind … to economic realities‘.
15
 Banks 
arrange their business across the country; they are regulated at national or state level.
16
  Under 
these circumstances, the geographic market appears to expand not only locally (within the 
US), but also internationally due to the operations of financial institutions throughout the 
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 Certainly, the application of this reasoning does depend on the 
given bank or financial institution. Most systemic banking institutions in the US hold most of 




Nevertheless, expansion of the geographic market from local to national weakens 
dominant (i.e., monopoly) influence.
19
 While the scope of the geographic market continues to 
enlarge, the number of prospective market players also increases, which lessens market 
influence in a market-share review. This lessening along with the difficulty in determining the 
product market shows that a systemic banking institution would not attain dominant influence, 
based on standard market-share investigation.  Indeed, a new method is needed to identify 




9.1.2  Department of Justice approach to defining geographic markets 
 
The Department of Justice (‗DOJ‘), along with the Federal Trade Commission,
21
 produced the 
2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines
22
 (the ‗DOJ Guidelines‘) to outline the procedure used for 
reviewing the competition effects of a horizontal merger.
23
  In a merger case law, the 
Guidelines are not binding from the courts to be implemented.  However, due to the fact that 
American courts have traditionally considered in the past previous guidelines implemented by 
the DOJ,
24
 and since DOJ tends to resolve any competitive issues on a bank merger at its 
review process, the Guidelines take an important role.   
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Provisions of the DOJ Guidelines explain the practice that the DOJ applies to 
determine the relevant geographic market.
25
 In substance, the purpose of the method is to 
identify the geographic territory where a supposed monopolist may gainfully inflict a minor 
but noteworthy and non-transitory price increase. The US competition authority begins to 
analyse whether there is any overlapping of service areas of the merging parties within a given 
territory.
26
  Thereafter, it decides if a monopolist within that territory would increases prices.  
In the event that it does not, this is due to the fact that the monopolist in that small area 
encounters competition from banks situated in a somehow expanded area. By ongoing 
expansion of the geographic market until it contains all banks that, in reality, would actually 
compete within an area, the DOJ arrives at an identified geographic market, which is the 
economic market for these purposes. An important factor to define the geographic market is 
transportation costs.
27
 In addition the DOJ Guidelines cite ‗language, regulation, tariff and 
non-tariff trade barriers, custom and familiarity, reputation, and service availability‘ as 
relevant to the quality of long distance transactions.
28
  Further, a bank‘s ability to price 
discriminate, based on customer location may justify the recognition of smaller markets.  
Under the DOJ Guidelines,
29
 the DOJ implements the hypothetical monopolist test, dividing 
its analysis into two parts.
30
 The first part is the market delineation, based on the supplier 
location.
31
 The second part is the market delineation, based on the customer location.
32 
The 
separate consideration of customer location from supplier location is due to the possibility that 
the financial institutions would be able to price discriminate against ‗targeted‘ customers 
identified by geography.
33
 This may happen when the suppliers deliver products to customers. 
 
Notwithstanding the above, there may be one important variation between the 
economic markets determined by the DOJ and the Federal Reserve.  The geographic market is 
closely linked to the product market considering that it seeks to identify an area in which 
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competition for that product would be impacted by the bank merger.
34
 According to the 
banking regulators‘ position, the pertinent product market for a financial institution merger is 
the cluster of services under the commercial banking umbrella.
35
  The DOJ has broken up this 
cluster into a number of essential parts. The DOJ begins by taking into consideration a distinct 
product market for commercial banking and retail banking services, respectively. The DOJ 
defines its product market to include the existing products provided by the merging banks and 




The reason for geographic market determination is to ascertain the likely customers of 
the merging banks that would be impacted by the merger transaction.  The DOJ has concluded 
that small companies are locally bound to the sources of their own credit.
37
  As a result, when 
the DOJ looks into issues in the small business market, the agency often discovers the relevant 
geographic market would be smaller than the market identified by the Federal Reserve. The 
latter market analysis is determined on the basis of the cluster of commercial banking services 
in the guise of the relevant product market. 
 
The different approaches taken by the DOJ and banking regulators sometimes create 
disparate bank merger examination results. If two financial institutions are placed within the 
same geographic market, and such market is defined to be smaller, the result of the bank 
merger would be to lessen the number of competitors and to raise the impact of the bank 
merger on competition.
38
 For instance, a relevant case is the merger Society 
Corporation/Ameritrust Corporation in 1992.
39
 The Federal Reserve granted the merger 
application upon review of the merger‘s effect on ten markets in the state of Ohio, including 
the market of Cleveland. The Federal Reserve demanded substantial divestitures in numerous 
markets. During this process, the Federal Reserve concluded that in the Cleveland market, 
determined to comprise eight counties in the metropolitan area of Cleveland, there was no 
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need for divestiture undertakings.
40
 The DOJ looked at the small commercial loan market, 
determining these borrowers were restricted, within the terms of geographic market, as where 
they could get loans.  Therefore, the DOJ did not find a ‗Cleveland market‘ to exist, and 
determined geographic markets, based upon a county-by-county approach. The DOJ found 
relevant anticompetitive concerns in two of the eight counties identified by the Federal 




The DOJ sees the relevant geographic markets for bank merger cases in the same way 
as it views the geographic markets in other areas of the economy.
42
 Particularly, the 
competition authority assumes several market dimensions, starting with a small geographic 
market. It presumes that a monopolist provides banking services in that area of the geographic 
market.
43
 Afterwards, it looks at whether customers would pursue suppliers located outside of 
that area of the geographic market. Concerning the presumed geographic markets, if the DOJ 
determines that businesses and individuals in the market would divert to suppliers outside the 
market, the authority broadens the geographic market to include areas that these enterprises 





The US banking sector has shown a readiness to oppose the DOJ in cases the agency 
identifies anticompetitive concerns, based upon fragmenting the product market and smaller 
geographic market, which the product market often indicates. In almost all bank merger cases, 
the divestiture of a few added offices composing a small percentage of the assets bought by 




However, the banking sector continues to believe that bank mergers that the DOJ 
opposes should be allowed.  The sector supports this belief by arguing that there are dozens of 
non-bank opportunities for banking service providers, and small enterprises are not as locally 
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restricted as claimed by the DOJ. The facts gathered by the Federal Reserve justify as well as 
undermine the banking sector‘s claim that small enterprises are not locally restricted.
46
 These 
findings also indicate a significant amount of out-of-market lending institutions provide loans 
to local companies. The Federal Reserve conclusions further indicate that on average the 
percentage of every business seeking loan(s) from out-of-market lending institutions is an 




9.1.3 Federal Reserve’s method in determining geographic markets 
 
The Federal Reserve openly falls within the ‗economic market‘
48
 approach. All regional 
offices of the Federal Reserve
49
 have predetermined banking markets across the US. These 





In determining these markets, the Federal Reserve conducts censuses and analyses 
data regarding labour commuting trends, as well as additional indications of economic 
evolution and integration of competitive factors within banks and other financial institutions. 
In addition, the Federal Reserve‘s data contains information on consumers, shopping, owners 




Based on the Federal Reserve‘s factual evidence, the pre-determined economic market 
is defined as territory in which the economic factors of banks are systematically interlinked. 
Although merging banks may submit evidence showing a different ‗economic market‘, the 
Federal Reserve is not likely to alter the market definition.
52
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Clearly, the Federal Reserve and the DOJ take different analytical positions 
concerning their respective determination of the pertinent geographic market.  As a result, 
those financial institutions that are merger participants need to prepare separate presentations 
for each agency‘s review in order to support the suggested geographic market.  In that case, 
each of the agencies often arrives at substantially diverse findings regarding the 




The Federal Reserve‘s regional offices establish and provide definitions of pertinent 
geographic markets, while they review a bank merger within the territory over which the 
office has authority. Each office aims to determine the pertinent market, which ‗reflect[s] 
commercial and banking realities and [that] consist[s] of the local area … where local 
customers can practicably turn for alternatives‘.
54
  Therefore, the Federal Reserve‘s regional 
offices attempt to define the extent of the geographic area as comprising a contiguous 
economic area with all fragments connected to each other or to a joint centre city.  
Traditionally, the review aims to define the geographic zone within which a certain town or 
city is of particular concern or interest, and within which that zone there are separate areas for 




Notwithstanding that established methods for determining a geographic market may 
vary in application from one area to another,
56
 the Federal Reserve normally analyses local 
commerce and trade trends, the geographic dispersal of loans and deposits, labour force 
movements and concentration, and data on highway traffic, as well as figures for newsprint 
circulation and radio and television transmission. The Federal Reserve, mainly, looks at 
overall commuting indicators and the presence of roads linking certain geographic zones to 
determine whether that zone operates as a distinct economic component.
57
 Generally, 
incoming commuting levels of 15 to 20 per cent of the total workforce is an adequate 
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indication of an area being an integrated part of the same market as the areas from which such 
commuting occurs.
58
  Furthermore, the ability to reach the centre city within reasonable times 




The Federal Reserve considers whether a centre city is an economic destination in 
terms of offering substantial job prospects, as well as being a commercial business, sports, 
cultural and entertainment venue for people living in the areas that may be contained within 
the geographic market. To achieve this, the Federal Reserve analyses evidence in relation to 
the reasonable location and number of significant employers.  The regulator, also, examines 
the prevalence of retailers‘ advertisements within the centre city, and the utilization levels of 




The Federal Reserve‘s focus appears to be on the external boundaries of the 
prospective geographic market, for the purposes of deciding if residents and enterprises there 
are to a substantial level concentrated in and financially connected to the metropolis or the 
market centre.
61
  Otherwise, the market is reduced until foregoing threshold is reached. The 
Federal Reserve‘s perspective on the geographical market looks from the suburban areas 
towards the centre city, as part of one economic unit. Conversely, the DOJ looks from the 




In addition, the Federal Reserve determines a sole geographic market and utilizes this 
for all reviews, whereas the DOJ identifies more than one geographic market for the purposes 
of reviewing the competition consequences of a bank merger transaction. The agencies‘ 
different angles for analysing the geographic market reflect their different approaches to 
determining the product market.
63
 The Federal Reserve includes banking and other financial 
services within one product market, and considers this to be a sole geographic market. The 
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DOJ‘s review of a bank merger presumes the existence of numerous product markets. As a 




9.1.4  Specific geographic market 
 
The existence of a relevant argument is crucial to persuading the DOJ or the Federal Reserve 
to select a certain geographic market when reviewing the competition consequences of a 
financial institution merger case. Gathering of significant statistics and the preparation of 
maps to reveal that a given area is a sole economic compartment is essential. 
 
The statistics that most commonly demonstrate a relevant geographic market may 
fluctuate. This depends on market conditions. Gathering of statistics on local commerce and 
trade, such as, highway traffic and commuting of labour are vital in the final determination 
made by the Federal Reserve regarding the geographic market.
65
 Other important 
considerations are the degree to which residents travel to nearby geographic locations for 
work, leisure or shopping. These considerations are of interest to the US courts and the 
Federal Reserve in arriving at conclusions on geographic markets.
66
  The Federal Reserve and 
the courts rely on numerous sources, such as, local and state transport and labour data, as well 
as commuter surveys and highway traffic use statistics. 
 
Also, relevant to the Federal Reserve are the interested banks‘ surveys on geographic 
markets. In this sense, banks involved in the merger often carry out zip code reviews 
throughout the areas where they render banking services to retail and business customers.
67
  
This approach allows the merging banks to argue that locations in the market they serve are 
used by a meaningful number of customers, and, thus, is/are located within the geographic 
market defined from the Federal Reserve.  
 
Other important data used to define the proposed geographic market in the centre city 
is gathered from malls and shopping centres in respect of their customers, medical facilities 
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regarding their patients, and the number of individuals who watch television or listen to radio 




The DOJ analyses cases in which financial services buyers located in a certain part of 
the suggested geographic market commute to other part of the market to receive such services; 
or situations in which banks in one part of the market provide necessary services to consumers 
and enterprises situated in another part of the market.
69
  Gathering the relevant information 
can be a complex exercise because the DOJ reviews are based on statistics on present use of 
or readiness to utilize banks in other parts of the geographic market. 
 
Examining the location of customers and enterprises using the branches of banks 
involved in a merger shows whether customers in one portion of the market utilize banks in 
another part of the suggested geographic market. Surveys, such as, a Uniform Commercial 
Code (‗UCC‘)
70
 filing carried out by organizations providing loans to individuals and 
enterprises placed in the suggested geographic market may show that customers placed on one 
side of the market use banks located on the other side of the market, or simply situated wholly 
outside the market.
71
 Such data may show that banks throughout the suggested geographic 
market may be considered to be relevant options for businesses and consumers situated in 
various other segments of the market. 
 
9.1.5 Position of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency in determining 
geographic markets 
 
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (‗OCC‘) applies effective, advanced methods 
when reviewing a bank merger, with the principal focus of delivering continuous advantages 
for consumers.  As a result, the OCC support almost all bank mergers, which are cleared by 
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the Department of Justice.
72
  The OCC tends to apply any geographic market determination 
that permits a bank merger to proceed, along with application of a de minimis rule
73
 for 
approving a bank merger that seemingly raises competition concerns. 
 
The OCC assumes the service areas of financial institutions involved in a merger 
consistent with the Federal Reserve‘s economic market stance.
74
 However, in cases where the 
Federal Reserve has identified considerable anticompetitive outcomes within its demarked 
market, the OCC has used other approaches to justify its approval of the merger. The OCC 
utilizes the service area method in order to determine the relevant market in cases in which 




It appears that there is credible evidence justifying the use of the OCC‘s de minimis 
approach.  A case in point is the bank merger National Bank and Trust Company of 
Norwich/National Bank of Oxford
76
 in 1983. The OCC accepted the merger because the 
pertinent geographic market was too insignificant to become a ‗section of the country‘.
77
  The 
agency did not clarify the exact meaning of insignificance, which traditionally may be 
considered a county population of around 10,000 or less individuals.
78
   
 
The OCC‘s de minimis theory is based upon the agency‘s reading of the Bank Merger 
Act
79
and on the assumption that the Department of Justice is unlikely to expend resources 
opposing an insignificant bank merger.  
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9.1.6  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s method on geographic  
markets 
 
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (‗FDIC‘)‘s position regarding competition impact 
assessment of a bank merger is included in the agency‘s merger assessment provisions.
80
 





According to the FDIC,
82
 a relevant geographic market includes the areas where the 
banking business that is to be acquired is located, as well as the areas in which that banking 
business generates the most loans, deposits or other banking products and services.  In 
addition, the relevant geographic market contains the areas to which current and possible 
customers impacted by the proposed bank merger would actually go to access alternative 
banking products and services.  In characterizing the relevant geographic market, the FDIC 





The FDIC‘s merger policy statement describes a method, which is somewhat ‗service 
area‘ based and, to a certain degree, ‗customer alternatives‘ based.
84
  In reality, the agency 
appears to appreciate merging banks‘ positions concerning the relevant market.  Frequently, 
the FDIC also applies the Federal Reserve‘s ‗economics markets‘ approach.
85
   
 
While the Federal Reserve predetermines markets for all bank mergers, the FDIC 
defines the market with respect to the particular banks that are merging.  Considering that the 
FDIC does not invest substantial resources in market determination or pre-determination, the 
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agency has greater flexible than the Federal Reserve in altering its market determination
86
 
following information submitted by the merging bank. 
 
9.2  Products 
 
The financial services product market has evolved in recent decades.  At the outset, the Glass-
Steagall Act 1933
87
 brought division between commercial and investment banking.
88
 
Following this demarcation, the US Supreme Court, in Philadelphia National Bank, defined 




Since the Philadelphia National Bank ruling, the product market has transformed 
substantially due, in part, to the rescission of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999.
90
  Banks are now 
permitted to carry out both investment and commercial banking. This signifies a more flexible 
product market in which customers are no longer restricted to commercial banks for 
commercial services and to investment banks for investment services. Besides this important 
development, the Philadelphia National Bank case product-market definition continues to be 
the same.  However, the Philadelphia National Bank decision permits adjustments to reflect 
the actualities of trade. The Court emphasized that commercial banking is an adequately 
comprehensive market so as to be material in relation to trade.
91
 Economic events have 
impacted the ratio of the Philadelphia Bank decision, and it is clear that the ‗cluster‘ of 
services and products provided only by commercial banks in 1963 are rendered by a diversity 
of financial-service institutions today.
92
 Therefore, the product market needs to be identified 
with this in mind, rather than on the basis of separation between investment and commercial 
banking. 
 
 9.2.1  Banking regulators’ approach to the product market 
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The banking authorities continue to rely on outdated banking products determination method.  
The Federal Reserve applies a conventional method, based on the ‗cluster‘ of banking 
products and services that define the market as a bundle of specific products (e.g., various 




In respect of product market determination, the Federal Reserve has conventionally 
found that the suitable product market to examine a bank merger is the ‗cluster‘ of services 
and products provided by financial institutions.
94
 Therefore, the Federal Reserve is inclined to 
include within the product market all products provided by banks, disregarding differences 
between commercial products for enterprises and retail products for consumers. Furthermore, 
the Federal Reserve, typically, ignores differences among the categories of products or 




The Federal Reserve has complied with the ruling in the Philadelphia National Bank 
case, which concerned the inclusion of entire financial services and products utilized by 
businesses and consumers within one market.
96
 However, the Federal Reserve has not 
complied with Philadelphia National Bank‘s assertion that only those competitors that 
produce the whole ‗cluster‘ ought to be included within the market.
97
 For a considerable 
amount of time, the Federal Reserve acknowledged other competitors, especially in those 
situations when a sufficient actual showing of competitive effect is established.
98
   
 
The Federal Reserve applies thresholds to analyse HHI (Herfindahl-Hirchman Index) 
levels, which surpass those utilized for other sectors of economy.
99
 The federal banking 
regulator approach is such that conventional deposit-based HHI computations would not show 
a broad range of limited-cluster, non-bank competitors.   
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In its analysis, the Federal Reserve acknowledges the presence and effect of additional 
competitors. However, the regulator still does not include other competitors in its numeral 
HHI concentration computations. Indeed, the Federal Reserve takes account of the influence 
of other competitors as a supplementary element if HHI measures are not in any other way 




The Federal Reserve treats thrift institutions as bank competitors.
101
 However, in 
reality, the agency continues to consider thrift institutions as partial competitors by 
discounting their deposits by 50 per cent when computing the HHI levels.
102
  In the case a 
thrift institution conducts activities closer in nature to those more typically carried out by a 
bank than a thrift institution; the Federal Reserve considers such institutions to be in complete 
competition with banks.  In this case, the agency weighs the thrift institution‘s deposits at 
more than 50 per cent in computing HHI measures.
103
  To be considered in complete 
competition with banks, a thrift institution needs to obtain commercial and consumer loan-to-
asset ratios that are higher than the national median for thrift institutions.
104
   
 
The Federal Reserve acknowledges competition from other non-bank financial 
services suppliers as a supplemental consideration in deciding whether a bank merger will be 
authorized in relation to the HHI measures, which surpass the parameters utilized by the 
Federal Reserve.
105
 The federal regulator reviews the existence of considerable credit union 
competition especially if the percentage of market deposits by the credit unions is higher than 
the medium figure for credit unions across the country.
106
  The Federal Reserve, also, 
acknowledges the competitive significance of non-depository institutions, especially regarding 
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The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency adopt an expanded approach by looking at the pertinent product market
108
 as 
comprising those products that are specifically provided by the amalgamating banking 
services providers, or are to be provided by the post-merger bank with the practical 
counterpart of such services provided by other kinds of competitors, such as, additional 
depository institutions, finance companies, and securities firms.  For instance, the negotiable 
order of withdrawal (‗NOW‘) accounts
109
 provided by savings institutions are in some aspects 




The banking authorities take a broad-minded approach to determination of the 
geographic market.
111
 Consequently, the authorities may often fail to identify important 
clusters in specific product lines and geographic locations. 
 
 9.2.2.  Department of Justice’s approach to product market 
  
Pursuant to the DOJ Guidelines, the competition authority provides that defining a relevant 
market is useful ‗to the extent it illuminates [a] merger‘s likely competitive effects‘ but 
nevertheless the relevant market ‗is not an end in itself.‘
112
  Accordingly, the DOJ Guidelines 
indicate that the DOJ would ‗normally‘ but not always define a relevant market in merger 
challenges.
113
 Evidently, the DOJ has departed from its previous position, which was, in order 
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The DOJ Guidelines employ the ‗hypothetical monopolist‘ test
115
 for determining 
whether a group of products constitutes a relevant product market. 
 
Specifically, the test requires that a hypothetical profit-maximizing firm, not subject to 
price regulation, that was the only present and future seller of those products (‗hypothetical 
monopolist‘) likely would impose at least a ‗small but significant and non-transitory increase 
in price‘ (‗SSNIP‘)
116
 on at least one product in the market, including at least one product sold 
by one of the merging firms.
117
  For the purpose of analysing this issue, the terms of sale of 
products outside the candidate market are held constant.  The SSNIP is employed solely as a 
methodological tool for performing the hypothetical monopolist test; it is not a tolerance level 




In order to measure the SSNIP, or ‗small but significant and non-transitory increase in 
price‘, the DOJ normally begins with prevailing prices, or the prices that are deemed to 
prevail absent the merger.  This will ‗most often‘ be an increase of five percent.  However, 
that number could differ depending on nature of the industry and the relative positions of the 
merging parties.
119
 The DOJ then implements econometric techniques to ascertain whether 
such a price increase would be profitable by estimating the number of sales, which would be 
lost due to such a price increase. In making this estimate the DOJ would look at historical 
evidence, like how customers have shifted their purchases in the past due to a price change, 
information from buyers, objective information in relation to the costs of switching for 
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 The DOJ Guidelines, also, discuss the likelihood of a narrower market in the event 
there is a recognizable subset of ‗targeted customers‘ who could be mainly vulnerable to a 
price increase.
121
 In other words, the Guidelines define a smaller relevant market in situations 
when the seller is able to price discriminate. 
 
Clearly, the DOJ‘s product market definition does not conform to the Philadelphia 
National Bank ‗cluster‘ determination.
122
 The competition regulator, also, does not include all 
financial services and products within the same product market, nor does it consequently 
contain even certain complete cluster producers in certain product markets. The DOJ separates 
the ‗cluster‘ of financial services and products between at least a market for services and 





The DOJ does not use the Federal Reserve‘s ‗cluster of services‘ product definition.  
Instead, the competition authority focuses on the markets for retail banking services and for 
small enterprise services. The DOJ maintains the position that small enterprise customers are 
usually more limited geographically in where they can turn for banking services and normally 
can receive those services only from commercial banks and not thrift institutions or credit 
unions. Accordingly, thrift deposits are weighted at 100 per cent in the retail banking analysis 
but given no weight in the small enterprise analysis.
124
 Credit union deposits are normally 
given no weight too in the small enterprise market analysis, though the presence of credit 
unions with active commercial lending businesses could be deemed a mitigating factor.
125
 
Moreover, the DOJ looks at information on small enterprise lending in the relevant markets, 
such as, business loans booked at the merging banks‘ branches, small enterprise loan 
originations reported under the Community Reinvestment Act 1977 (‗CRA‘),
126
 and market 
surveys conducted by the merging banks. Since information on small enterprise lending is not 
reported for all market banks at a branch level for their deposit data information, collecting 
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market share data on small enterprise lending can be difficult. Accordingly, a DOJ 
investigation of a bank merger would include document requests from the merging banks, 
such as, pricing surveys, and lost business reports, and interviews with customers and 
competitors.
127
 Often, the DOJ also investigates the effect of bank mergers on middle market 




9.3  Consumer issues 
 
Another important facet of a bank merger situation is its impact on consumers and their choice 
of products.
129
  The concern is particularly stark in the merger of small and medium-sized 
financial institutions and resultant formation of large financial institutions. Moreover, small 
and medium-sized financial institutions are pressed by the federal government or the FDIC   
to protect their deposit accounts by consenting to acquisition by the largest financial 
institutions.  Under these circumstances, customers would have fewer alternatives in the 




 Outcomes creating negative effects on consumers are exactly what the competition 
provisions are intended to prevent. Consumer impact is the main focus in preventing 
monopolistic or anticompetitive conduct.  In the event of major consolidation that erases small 
or medium-sized banks from the range of options available to consumers, the larger financial 




Banks contend that amalgamation generates market efficiencies and economies of 
scale, which eventually benefit consumers in terms of better services and fewer fees.
132
 
Expansion of the bank branching outside the bank‘s home state may provide more flexibility 
to enterprises located across the country and to individuals that travel or commute through 
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different states.  Nevertheless, this substantially increases service costs to bank customers.
133
  
The rapid increase in service fees charged by larger financial institutions on their deposit 
accounts in recent years indicates that market consolidation benefits large financial 
institutions in terms of imposing uncompetitive prices. For instance, a study in 2012 revealed 
that the average monthly fee for noninterest bearing checking accounts increased by 25 per 
cent since 2011, and the minimum balance for free-checking services during the same period 
increased by 23 per cent.
134
 According to study in 2015, fees for utilizing out-of-network cash 





The abovementioned studies demonstrate that large financial institutions in 
concentrated markets are capable of wielding sufficient market power to impose 
uncompetitive prices on deposit accounts.
136
  Furthermore, several big financial institutions 
have indicated that they would prefer customers with small balances in their deposit accounts 




Because of this less than friendly stance of several large financial institutions to 
consumers with small accounts, it is not surprising that consumers normally favour the 
customized service provided by community-based banks.
138
 However, in some urban banking 
markets, a considerable number of local banks are taken over from big out-of-area financial 
institutions.  As a result, customers have relatively few community-based options for banking 
services.
139
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Not all customers are habitually supportive of bank mergers.  For instance, a survey in 
2011 showed that the possibility of customers switching banks increases three times when 
their bank merges with or is absorbed by another financial institution. Generally speaking, 
customers of acquired banks view acquiring banks as much less concerned with customer 




Movement of customers between banks in these circumstances tends to occur within 
the first few months of the merger taking place. 
 
While comparing pre-merger customer satisfaction with subsequent attitudes and 
prospects for improvement following a bank merger situation, insight may be derived from 







 and PNC Financial Services/National City.
144
  Customers‘ 
dissatisfaction regarding a bank merger tends to be due to bad publicity, changes to local 




Consumer protection advocates argue that any increased costs in banking services 
have led to higher fees for consumers, increased bank mergers and market consolidation, and 
a shortage of new bank charters. Consequently, advocates believe such developments to be 




In the event of a bank merger, and in contrast to bank loan terms, consumers have 
limited rights regarding the terms of their credit cards. Banks may change consumers‘ terms at 
                                                        
140
 B Shemeligian, ‗Bank Transition Nearly Complete‘ (October, 2011) 26 Las Vegas Business Press 43, p P5. 
141
 Federal Reserve Board, ‗Order Approving the Merger by Wells Fargo & Company of Acquire Wachovia 
Corporation‘ (12 October, 2008) FRB, available at 
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/orders/20081012a.htm. 
142
 Federal Reserve, ‗Consent Order for Acquisition of Washington Mutual by JPMorgan Chase‘ (8 December, 
2011) FRB, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/enforcement/jpmc-plan-sect5-
compliance.pdf. 
143
 Federal Reserve Board, ‗Order Approving the Acquisition ING Direct by Capital One Financial Corp‘ (14 
February, 2012) FRB, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/orders/order20120214.pdf.  
144
 Federal Reserve Board, ‗Order Approving the Merger by PNC Financial Services Group of National City 
Corporation‘ (15 December, 2008) FRB, available 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/orders/orders20081215a1.pdf. 
145
 P L Felton, ‗Too Big to Manage: A Case for Stricter Bank Merger Regulation‘ (2012) 52 Santa Clara Law 
Review 1081, pp 1083-89. 
146
 E D Cavanagh, ‗Antitrust Law and Economic Theory: Finding a Balance‘ (2013) 45 Loyola University 
Chicago Law Journal 123, pp 124-32. 
293 
 
any time, so long as consumers are notified of any such changes. Consumers possess little 
power in these situations. In the event that a consumer refuses to accept the revised terms of 
credit, his only option is to pay off the remaining balance and close the account. In these 
circumstances, consumers tend to look for better credit card interest offerings, particularly 




The glut of bank mergers in the US has made it easier for new banking giants to 
charge customers higher interest rates on credit cards and mortgages, and competition 
regulators have shown an inability to prevent this happening. The wave of mergers during the 
period from 2006 to 2008 established four large financial institutions, namely JP Morgan 
Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup and Wells Fargo.
148
 Combined, these institutions      




 As the top tier financial institutions become smaller in number but larger in capital and 
scope, it has become easier for them to track prices charged by their competitors.  This makes 
it easier for financial institutions to raise fees and interest rates charged to consumers, who 




Banking and competition authorities ought to revisit their strategies and give future 
merger transactions greater scrutiny than was the case during recent financial crises. 
 
After the Global Financial Crisis, the US Congress created the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (‗CFPB‘)
151
 in order to better safeguard consumers‘ rights in relation to 
services and products provided by banks and other financial institutions.  The purpose of the 
bureau‘s activities is to inform consumers on risks and enhance their understanding of 
                                                        
147
 H Cho, ‗Card Crunch: Limit Consumers‘ Options - And Can Affect Their Bottom Lines‘ (26 April, 2009) 
Baltimore Sun, p 18A. 
148
 M N Bailey et al, ‗The Big Four Banks: The Evolution of the Financial Sector‘ (26 May, 2015) Brookings 
Research Papers, available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/05/26-big-four-banks-mergers-
asset-share-baily. 
149




 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203; 124 Stat. 1391; codified 
to 12 USC 5301 note, effective 21 July, 2010 (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5641) (‗Dodd-Frank‘), 






 Furthermore, the bureau seeks to shield consumers from abusive, 
deceptive or unfair practices and discriminatory conduct, reduce obsolete, redundant or 
excessively onerous regulations, and endorses fair competition by applying the consumer 
protection provisions under the Dodd-Frank Act.
153
 The bureau, also, seeks to encourage 
evolution in the market for consumer financial services and products, to ensure as much as 




Although the CFPB is still a nascent institution, its positive impact in improvement 
and protection of consumers‘ rights with respect to banking products and services has been 
appreciable.
155
 Lobbyists and other interest groups representing the banking sector, and in 
particular the largest banks, are encouraging the US Congress, especially Republican party 
members, to disband the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, or at very least take away or 




Competition provisions provide that banks and other financial institutions are 
prevented from conspiring to fix prices or blocking competitors and, thus, control or dominate 
a substantial part or the entire banking market.  These provisions also ensure that each bank, 
notwithstanding its size and scope in the relevant territory, has an opportunity to compete and 
innovate.  The competition provisions further ensure that consumers retain options.  The 
ability of consumers to make choices creates an optimum environment for competition to 
flourish.
157
  Those banking services and products that consumers prefer most, and which are 
most reasonably priced, will be successful.  Those banking services and products that are not 
as good, or are highly priced, will perform less well.
158
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Public and Private Programs‘  (24 May, 2011) Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of 






9.4  Competitive analysis 
 
The banking authorities have the power to grant or prevent a bank merger.  The Department of 
Justice (‗DOJ‘) advises the authorities on the possible competition consequences of such 
mergers.  As a result, the agency has to carry out its own competition examination.  The 
review of bank merger cases is different than in other industries principally in the quantity and 





 The DOJ utilizes a different competitive analysis for the mergers in banking and 




A bank merger examination process starts with the acquiring bank filing an application 
with its primary banking authority,
161
 which then forwards a copy of the merger application to 
the DOJ.
162
  The DOJ analyses the merger application using a ‗screening process‘.
163
  The 
agency screens about 1,000 bank merger applications each year.
164
 The screening process is 
explained in detail in a 1995 document prepared and adopted by the federal banking agencies 
(the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation) and the DOJ named ‗Bank Merger Competitive Review – Introduction 
and Overview‘ (the ‗US Bank Merger Review Guidelines‘),
165
and the document co-prepared 
by the Federal Reserve and the DOJ and titled ‗Frequently Asked Questions regarding 
applications filed with the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System‘ (the ‗FAQs on 
Antitrust Review of Bank Mergers‘) of 9 October, 2014.
166
  These two documents provide 
practical information relating to antitrust reviews of bank mergers. Generally, they reflect 
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longstanding administrative policies and practices of the competition and banking agencies 
and are a useful compilation of their respective views, including areas where the approaches 
taken by them diverge.   
 
Based on the foregoing documents, there are two screening processes, known as 
Screen A and Screen B, implemented by the banking regulators and the DOJ, respectively, in 




The US banking agencies rely largely on Screen A that looks at competition in 
predefined markets that are developed by the Federal Reserve.
168
 If the calculation provided in 
Screen A does not result in a post-merger HHI over 1800 and an increase of more than 200, 
the banking regulators would be unlikely to carry out further examination the competitive 
results of a bank merger.
169
 If the result of the calculation indicated in Screen A surpasses the 




When filing for merger approval, bank participants are measured against a Screen A 
HHI calculation chart
171
 in relation to three distinct geographic markets, respectively the 
Federal Reserve market,
 
the Ranally Metropolitan Area (RMA) market,
172 





DOJ initially examines merger transactions utilizing data from the banking agencies‘ 
screen, Screen A.
174
 If a proposed bank merger exceeds the 1800/200 threshold in Screen A, 
merging banks should consider submitting the calculations set out in Screen B.
175
  In some 
cases, the DOJ may further review bank merger cases that do not exceed the 1800/200 
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threshold in Screen A.
176
 This is most probable when Screen A does not show completely the 
competitive consequences of the merger case in all relevant markets, especially lending to 
SMEs.  For instance, the DOJ is more probable to review a merger case concerning two 
commercial banks, if the post-merger HHI approaches 1800 and the HHI increase approaches 
200, and screen A includes thrift institutions that are not actively involved in commercial 
lending.
177
 The DOJ is, also, more probably to examine a merger case if the predefined market 
where the merging banks compete is notably larger than the area where small enterprise 
lending competition may exist.  In such a case, merging banks should consider providing the 




Frequently, the DOJ upon analysing the information in Screen B finds no need for 
further examination of the proposed merger. If the calculation specified in Screen B results in 
an HHI over 1800 and an increase of over 200, bank mergers may consider providing 
additional information.
179
  In some particular situations, the DOJ may review a merger case in 
more details even though Screens A and B do not identify anticompetitive issues.
180
 This is 
most probably to happen, if it appears that the Screens‘ market area does not fit the 
transaction. Occasionally the geographic market utilized in the Screens might not be a suitable 
choice for examination of the particular bank merger. For instance, the Screens‘ market area is 
a county, and one merging bank is at the west end of one county and the other merging bank 
is at the east end of the adjacent county. Indeed, the banks could be each other‘s most 
significant competitors, nonetheless, the screens does not reflect that fact. Or the Screens‘ 
market area is too large; nevertheless, the merger involves two banks at the centre of the 
market. Banks at the market area‘s periphery might be very unlikely substitutes for the 
competition that would be lost in the merger transaction. Therefore, the transaction needs to 
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From time to time, the merging banks are competitors for a specialized product and 
few of the banks included in the Screens compete in offering that product.
182
 For instance, the 
Screens likely might not identify a concentrated market for working capital loans to medium-
sized enterprise customers. In the event the market area has many banks nonetheless the 
merging banks are two of only a few banks capable to compete for such business. In such 
situations, merging banks might desire to provide additional information, as discussed in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
The banking regulators and the DOJ are likely to review a bank merger in more detail, 
if it surpasses the 1800/200 threshold in Screen A.
183
 The DOJ is, also, likely to review the 
effect of a proposed merger on competition for commercial loans, in the event the merger case 
surpasses the 1800/200 threshold in Screen B.
184
 In situations in which a screen highlights a 
merger transaction for further examination, the merging banks may provide additional 
information that is not considered in the screen. In situations in which Screen A or Screen B 
highlights a merger case for further scrutiny, additional information may provide further 
clarification of competitive realities in the market. Additional information would be evidence 
that the merging banks do not significantly compete with each other, or evidence that rapid 
economic change has resulted in an obsolete geographic market definition, and as a result 
another market is more appropriate.
185
 Other information would be evidence that market 
shares are not an adequate indicator of the extent of competition in the market e.g., evidence 




Further additional information would be evidence about current loan-to-deposit ratios, 
recent hiring of new commercial loan officers, pending branch applications or important  out-
of-market resources that would be shifted into the market in response to new loan 
opportunities.
187
 Or evidence that a particular institution‘s market share overstates or 
understates its competitive significance; or evidence about entry conditions, evidence of 
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potential entry within the next two years, and expectations concerning likely entry by banks 
not presently in the market area and the reasons for such expectations. In providing the 
necessary information to such a market share table, merging banks could estimate another 
bank‘s commercial lending in a certain market by multiplying the bank‘s overall ratio of 
commercial loans to deposits by its deposits in the relevant market, if market-specific 




In instances in which Screen B highlights a bank merger for further scrutiny, merging 
banks could consider preparing an HHI (Herfindahl-Hirchman Index) worksheet for the 
market area using, instead of deposits, data from the relevant reports on commercial loans 
under $250,000, and between $250,000 and $1,000,000.
189
 Such information can be a 
productive assessment of actual competition for small business lending. Additional 
information that could be pertinent is evidence of competition from sources not included in 
Screen B, or evidence that a credit union has such membership restrictions, or failure of 
restrictions, and offers such services to commercial customers that it should be considered to 
be in the market.  Other information could be evidence of actual competition by out-of-market 
banks for commercial customers, especially competition for loans for business start-up or 
working capital purposes. Further evidence could be actual competition by non-bank 
institutions for commercial customers, especially competition for loans for business start-up 




When the bank mergers deem that Screen B does not correctly reflect competitive 
realities and market concentration in a specific area, they may render additional information to 
support their argument. Their supporting argument should comprise an HHI worksheet that 
shows the geographical area, which should be covered, the banks to be included, the 
calculation method of the market share of each bank e.g., deposits, branches, loans, as well as 
the arguments to base the assertion that this information is preferable to the information 
submitted in Screen B. Inclusion of banks outside the areas identified in Screen B should be 
supported by evidence of actual competition by these banks.
191
 




 US Bank Merger Review Guidelines (n4), p4. 
190
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Pursuant to the FAQs on Antitrust Review of Bank Mergers, the Federal Reserve 
carries out an initial screening for each pre-defined banking market where bank deposits are 
weighted at 100 per cent, and thrift deposits are weighted at 50 per cent.
192 
If in any 
overlapping market the resulting HHI increases by less than 200 points due to the merger or 
the post-merger HHI is less than 1,800, and the post-merger entity does not have a higher than 
35 per cent market share, then the merger will pass the initial screening and be eligible for 
approval by the Federal Reserve.
193
 Any bank merger situation, which exceeds these 
thresholds must be examined by Federal Reserve. Nonetheless, such merger may still be 
approved by the Federal Reserve, based on a closer examination of the markets, and the 




In reference to the DOJ‘s initial screening review, the FAQ on Antitrust Review of 
Bank Mergers
195
 clarifies that the competition authority‘s initial screening analysis is, also, 
done utilizing deposit data. However, the authority does not necessarily use the Federal 
Reserve‘s pre-defined geographic banking markets. While the DOJ‘s decision about 
geographic markets is made on a case-by-case basis, the FAQs note that merging banks ‗may 
wish‘ to also perform HHI calculations for each county in which the applicants have 
overlapping operations. Since the Federal Reserve‘s geographic markets normally are based 
on Metropolitan Statistical Areas (‗MSAs‘)
196
 that normally include multiple counties, 
concentration levels for individual counties can often be higher than for the MSA or Federal 
Reserve‘s banking market as a whole. In addition, unlike the Federal Reserve, the DOJ 
screens for two different product markets, retail banking and small business banking, and 




In relation to the deposit data adjustments for thrift institutions and the credit unions, 
the Federal Reserve initially weights commercial bank deposits at 100 per cent and thrift 
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deposits (other than thrifts owned by bank holding companies) at 50 per cent.
198
 Federal 
Reserve staff will, usually, agree to give 100 per cent weight to deposits of thrifts that are 
actively engaged in commercial lending (often indicated by commercial and industrial loans 
being more than 5 per cent of total assets).
199
 Federal Reserve will, also, include a credit 
union‘s deposits at a 50 per cent weighting, if the credit union has broad field of membership 
requirements that include most or all of a market‘s population and has branches that are easily 
accessible to the public.
200
 In very rare circumstances, the Federal Reserve will give a 100 per 




 On occasion, one of the merging banks may have a branch in an overlapping market, 
which is utilized to book deposits from out-of-market sources e.g., national escrow deposits, 
which distorts its market share. The Federal Reserve has in the past made adjustments to 
exclude such deposits where the bank applicant can show both the out-of-market nature of 
such deposits and that similar adjustments need not be made to branch deposits of other 
market participants.
202
 Since detailed information on deposit source is normally not available 
publicly, obtaining such information for other market participants can be difficult. Significant 
government deposits booked in a particular branch can be addressed in the same manner. 
 
Certain types of specialized depository institutions that source their deposits from 
broader markets, like credit card, Internet banks, and trust companies are normally excluded 




The FAQs on Antitrust Review of Bank Mergers provides clarification about the 
remedies for bank mergers that present important antitrust concerns even after considering 
mitigating factors and any approved deposit adjustments. The typical remedy to obtain 
approval of the bank merger application is a commitment to sell branches in the concentrated 
markets. The Federal Reserve, normally, permits the merging banks to select a package of 
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branches to be sold that will reduce the HHI below the 200/1,800 thresholds and a 35 per cent 
market share.
204
 Practically speaking, due to mitigating factors, the Federal Reserve has often 
accepted smaller divestiture packages. The FAQs document does not address the range of 
permissible market concentrations.  Instead, it notes that ‗there are no general guidelines for 
determining the level of divestiture that would be necessary to allow the [Federal Reserve] to 
approve a potentially anticompetitive application.‘
205
 The DOJ follows a similar approach to 
remedies. However, it has more stringent requirements for several aspects of proposed 
divestitures. Its divestures include the sale of the total customer relationship of the divested 
branch (deposits and loans), and only target bank (not acquirer) branches may be used to meet 
the divestiture requirements. The DOJ must approve each of the divested branches for sale, as 
well as the proposed purchaser (that must be ‗competitively suitable‘), and the package of 




Generally speaking, there is no perfect mechanism to review concentration in the 
banking services and products sector. Many concentration measurement methods fail to 
properly quantify the productivity or capacity of several ‗bundles‘ of financial services and 
products. The concentration methods, also, fail to quantify the competitive influence of 
competitors providing financial services and products. 
 
A concentration of banks‘ deposits, based on a specific geographic market, does not 
include data for all possible competitors. Depending on such data for concentration analysis 
ignores the competitive impacts from out-of-market banks, brokerage firms, credit unions, 
leasing companies, insurance companies, and others who take deposits, issue loans, or 




The DOJ and the Federal Reserve use the HHI market concentration method to review 
the level of concentration in the relevant markets and the increase in concentration that would 
transpire as a result of the bank merger.
208
 Considering that concentration examination is 
intimately linked to market definition, the differences between the DOJ and the Federal 
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Reserve positions on market definition logically results in different stances on concentration 





Even when the 1800/200 safe harbour rule is breached, the Federal Reserve may, 
nevertheless, approve a bank merger, based on other conditions that neutralize any adverse 
competition consequences derived from the merger. These conditions may include quantity 
and strength of competitors, the existence of credit unions representing a larger percentage of 
market deposits than the US average, the presence of robust non-depository competitors, and a 




As for the DOJ‘s approach to market determination, the agency does not rely on a 
single HHI or solely on deposit-based HHIs. The DOJ reviews concentration, based on 
separate examinations for services and products provided to individual consumers and 
enterprises. The competition enforcement agency also considers consumer and commercial 
loans, number of branch offices, as well as other criteria indicating capacity to produce and 





Notwithstanding the intrinsic fallibility of various degrees of concentration 
measurement in financial services and products markets, it is possible to adopt a concentration 
examination for a specific bank merger that mitigates these imperfections. This is achieved by 
improving on the traditionally reported deposit-based HHI calculations and by using HHI 
calculations, based on other kinds of data, which may reflect the competitive environment for 
other financial services and products, particularly loans. 
 
One consideration included addressing the deficiencies intrinsic in the bank and thrift 
reported deposit-based HHI calculations are deposits in credit unions that may be considerable 
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in several markets. Credit unions report data on loans and deposits to the National Credit 
Union Administration
212
 in a comparable way to call reports used by banks and thrift 




Non-depository competitors can indirectly impact a deposit-based HHI calculation 
because the same is meant to function as a substitution for the whole bundle of services and 




The estimated necessary share of non-depository competitors are grounded in 
nationwide statistics, on such competitors‘ share of the supply of financial services and 
products, or based on specific geographic market survey information.
215
  This needs to reflect 
the competition impact of out-of-market financial institutions, which would not be shown in 
deposit data gathered exclusively from branches of banks and thrift institutions in the market. 
 
The goal of concentration examination is to identify the potential market power and 
position of the merging financial institutions vis-à-vis businesses and consumers in that 
specific geographic market. If the analysis includes deposits related to a global, national or 
regional market, their inclusion may distort the examination of market power with respect to 
those businesses and consumers present only in the local market. This could be a serious issue 
for large banks with nationwide and overseas operations. 
 
The above issue may be addressed by adjusting reported deposits in order to produce 
‗core deposits‘ i.e., not including deposits, which are booked at locations within the pertinent 
local market but originated from a global, national or regional market, such as, brokered 
deposits, large in-market corporate demand deposits, sizeable certificates of deposit, and 
foreign deposits. Pursuant to available data on the call reports of in-market banks and thrift 
institutions and examination of the location and nature of the users and sources of merging 
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 an adequate estimate of the ‗core deposits‘ of banks and 
thrift institutions within the market may be identified. 
 
The legal foundation of the ‗core deposits‘ examination approach was initially 
discussed in Philadelphia National Bank,
217
  when recognizing the presence of ‗regional‘ and 
‗national‘ banking markets as well as local customers‘ participation in these markets.  The 
court found that due to the presence of a national market, the reported deposit-related market 
shares of the merging financial institutions could substantially exaggerate their current share 
of the local banking business. Consequently, this could exaggerate the merging institutions‘ 
power in the local market.  As a result, the court decreased the deposit-based market shares of 
the individual merging financial institutions by 6 percentage points (which decreased the then 
existing market share by 16 2/3 per cent) to arrive at ‗core deposits‘ more precisely estimating 
market concentration.
218
 The ‗core deposits‘ examination approach was then discussed and 
applied in significant bank merger cases like US v Provident National Bank,
219
 US v Crocker-
Anglo National Bank,
220
 and US v Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.
221
 Banking authorities 





Since the DOJ examines the effect of the bank merger on overall lending to enterprises 
and in various specific sectors, it seems logical that merging financial institutions would carry 
out their own concentration examination for commercial lending.  Such action ensures that the 
competition authorities receive relevant facts on commercial lending competition, as well as 
on competition from out-of-market banks, insurance businesses, and finance companies.   
 
The competition and banking regulators agree that prospects for market entry are a 
significant relevant factor for reviewing the possible competition consequences of a bank 
merger. Furthermore, there is consensus that showing entry to be straight forwarded, likely, 
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and quickly achievable may neutralize any other issues that would be beyond the safe harbour 
provisions.
223
  However, the nature of the information requested by the DOJ and the Federal 
Reserve differs here. 
 
Various areas of market entry examination are of specific interest to both the Federal 
Reserve and DOJ. These include the presence or absence of legal or regulatory impediments 
to entry or market share enlargement, the market‘s entry appeal, the history, if any, of entry, 




Traditionally, there have been limitations in the capability of financial institutions to 
enter new markets, specifically entry across state lines.  Problems have also been encountered 
in establishing supplementary branches within a particular state or market.  Any entry 





The attractiveness of the market for entry is of particular interest to the Federal 
Reserve. Data showing a greater than average increase in market deposit rates, greater than 
average increase in population rates in the market, higher than average capital income, and 
higher than average individuals to banking office ratios.
226
  Any economic or demographic 
data, which shows an increase in and a large market for consumer and business customers is 
relevant to the Federal Reserve and DOJ examinations. The DOJ and the Federal Reserve 
examine evidence of recent market entry that involves acquisition of in-market financial 




The DOJ‘s method of product market definition in a bank merger case, when 
combined with more comprehensive review, requires the development of additional data to 
ensure that the probability, timing, and prospects of entry are sufficiently demonstrated.   
 
                                                        
223
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224
 PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. (2014) 100 Federal Reserve Bulletin 10. 
225
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226
 Old National Bancorp (5 November, 2014) 100 Federal Reserve Bulletin 5. 
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 Five Star Bank, (December, 2012) 98 Federal Reserve Bulletin 8, p 18. 
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The Federal Reserve concentrates broadly on the market entry of financial institutions 
offering a full spectrum of products, while the DOJ reviews various kinds of entry for 
potential relevance.
228
 Therefore, it is sufficient to establish facts on past and future 
probability, timeframe, and adequacy of market entry by newly formed financial institutions, 
entry by out-of-market banks or thrift institutions and the acquisition of in-market banks by 
out-of-market banks. The DOJ, also, considers entry prospects for out-of-market financial 
institutions to provide specific products like certificates of deposit, business lending, and 
additional services.  In addition, the DOJ considers the entry prospects of out-of-market banks 
offering local loan production, and the expanded presence of new in-market finance 
company.
229
   
 
In relation to entry examination, it is crucial to show that in-market banks would 
become larger following the merger to provide new products or serve new customers.
230
  For 
example, banks providing services to small enterprises would be enabled to expand in order to 
render services to larger, medium-sized enterprises.  Therefore, it is helpful to show that such 
smaller banks will acquire not only the means to expand their activities, but, also, that they 
will begin providing more complex cash management services and additional products that 
the DOJ would deem most likely to be used by medium market enterprises.  This information 
could be significant in persuading the DOJ that there are no adverse competition 
consequences associated with a given bank merger. 
 
Prior to showing that there is no negative unilateral competition effect caused by a 
bank merger, it must be clear that the post-merger market situation does not provide the 
merged banks with an opportunity to increase prices and decrease customer services.
231
 The 
particular factual situation varies market to market.  It is vital to show that the market share of 
the merged bank in the pertinent product market is not so large to allow it to wield market 
power. 
 
                                                        
228
 Fed/DOJ Competitive Effects of Mergers FAQs (n4), paras 22, and 28. 
229
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230
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231
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An important consideration remains the existence of facts demonstrating the ability of 
other market competitors to increase supply (productivity) in response to any attempt made by 
the newly merged bank to either increase prices or decrease supply.  In this regard, it is 
important to show that the financial products or services of the merged banks are not unique, 
and these products or services can be carried out by competitors within the market.
232
  In 
addition those competitors are in a position to increase capacity and supply of products and 
services analogous to those offered by the merged institution. 
 
The possible adverse competition consequences of concern to the DOJ are the 
likelihood of a bank merger making it easier and more probable for banks to collude to 
increase prices and decrease supply (productivity).
233
  To show the DOJ that no such 
outcomes would result from the bank merger, it is necessary to gather facts on a series of 
considerations that provide banks with the incentive and capability to coordinate their efforts 
within the market. 
 
The DOJ may need to look closely at specific products or product markets posing 
particular competition concerns in order to identify potential coordination among financial 
institutions. Some of the issues, which the DOJ need to focus on are: (i) whether there are 
such a number of competitors in the given market that coordination is challenging and 
improbable; (ii) whether there is a small cluster of prominent banks, which could efficiently 
coordinate activities, notwithstanding other competitors; (iii) whether the market is likely to 
encourage entry that is sufficiently simple so that prospective entrants would effectively 
combat any coordination among actual competitors; (iv) whether competitors can increase 
supply (productivity) to counteract any coordination by other competitors in the marketplace, 
including the existence of any nonconformist institutions that are seeking to expand quickly; 
and (v) whether excess volume in the marketplace, in broad terms or for specific competitors, 
provides an incentive to broaden rather than diminish supply (productivity).
234
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Nevertheless, it remains challenging to assume what are the most insightful means to 
show the absence of any potential opposing competitive concerns in a certain bank merger.  It 
is likely that any examination of prospective adverse competition concerns in the retail 
product market would rely principally on evidence regarding the number of competitors and 
expansion magnitude.  However, there is less possibility of showing that such products are 
diverse or that information on pricing and additional product terms is, broadly speaking, 
unavailable to competitors, considering that retail prices and products are generally uniform. 
 
A comprehensive development of the relevant facts is without a doubt essential to the 
Federal Reserve endorsing a bank merger and the DOJ not opposing it.  Merging banks are 
required to prepare extensively for the examination of proposed mergers by developing 
widespread evidence in relation to an extensive array of competitors and geographic and 
product markets in any specific merger transaction. 
 
9.5  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, a comprehensive overview of the agencies involved in the review of bank 
merger cases in the US has been provided, together with an analysis of the methodologies 
employed by those agencies to scrutinize these mergers. As has been explained, crucial to 
consideration of bank merger cases is the identification of the relevant geographic and product 
markets. Beyond these fundamental considerations, agencies now look deeper at the potential 
for mitigation of competition consequences that may otherwise prohibit approval of the 
merger, and the likely post-merger landscape. 
 
As the two principally concerned government agencies, the Federal Reserve and 
Department of Justice (‗DOJ‘) adopt similar yet different approaches to the review of bank 
merger cases. Specifically, the approach taken to the identification of the pertinent geographic 
market diverges, with the Federal Reserve adopting a fixed approach and the DOJ 
incorporating greater flexibility to suit particular circumstances. Disparate approaches taken 
by the agencies, which may lead to contrary analysis results, make the task of preparing for 




prospective merger scrutiny all the more challenging for the relevant banks. In any case, it is 
vital that the institutions, which propose to merge, adhere to the requirements of the DOJ, 
Federal Reserve, and other concerned agencies in terms of providing evidence that the merger 
will not give rise to anti-competitive consequences. The location of customers and branches, 
and particular the preservation of a marketplace in which consumers have a choice between 
competitor banking service providers, are critical considerations. 
 
In the initial screening of the bank applications, similar to the Federal Reserve, the 
DOJ performs HHI analysis.  Nonetheless, unlike the Federal Reserve, the DOJ does not have 
pre-defined geographic markets for screening bank applications, and it examines the 
competitive consequences of each bank merger on a case-by-case basis.  The DOJ may use 
the Federal Reserve‘s pre-defined banking markets in its initial review, but it is not bound by 
those banking markets. The DOJ normally examines the competitive consequences of a 
proposed merger in each of two product markets: (i) retail banking products and services, and 
(ii) small business banking products and services.  The geographic area where a retail banking 
customer is willing to travel for banking services may differ from that of a small business 
customer.  The DOJ has found that retail banking customers usually prefer to bank where they 
live or where they work, but small business customers may be geographically more limited.  
Unlike the geographic market for retail banking customers, the geographic market for small 
business banking may be smaller than the Federal Reserve‘s pre-defined banking markets.  
Consequently, a transaction that satisfies the Federal Reserve‘s HHI delegation threshold still 
may raise concerns in the DOJ‘s examination. 
 
With respect to competition analysis, the Federal Reserve and DOJ both evaluate the 
proposed merger with reference to jointly created merger guidelines, thus, providing some 
level of synergy in the broader process despite the tests applied being different. Whereas 
various factors form part of the respective evaluations, fundamentally the agencies are looking 
to ensure that the market will remain easily accessible to new entrants, if the merger is 
approved. Different forms of organizations both within and beyond the particular markets, 
including thrift institutions and bodies not offering deposit account services, may be 
considered as relevant competitors, in the right circumstances. Ultimately, the DOJ is 
empowered to proceed to litigation in order to prohibit the merger, if it has not been possible 
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for the relevant parties to reach an agreement with respect to measures that may sufficiently 





CHAPTER 10 – GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND COMPETITION IN BANKING  
 
This chapter discusses competition aspects of bank mergers in the UK and US as a result of 
the Global Financial Crisis, and whether ‗too-big-too-fail‘ (‗TBTF‘) status of systemically 
important financial institution(s) in the UK and US creates special competition concerns in 
banking. 
 
10.0  Effect and role of the global financial crisis in bank mergers activities 
 
In early 2008, as several of the largest financial institutions in the US confronted impending 
failure,
1
 the American financial sector completed a series of consolidations different from any 
it had previously experienced.
2
 In order to thwart a systemic collapse and allow the banking 
system to regain its footing, bank mergers between industry heavyweights were being 




Under the increasing risk of a major financial crisis, the American banking agencies 
and the DOJ started giving their blessing to ‗quick-fix‘ bank mergers.
4
 Bank of America 
acquired Merrill Lynch and Countrywide, JPMorgan Chase acquired Bear Stearns
5
 and 
Washington Mutual, and Wells Fargo purchased Wachovia,
6
 all on seemingly accelerated 
timelines of regulatory review. Such unprecedented consolidation among the largest financial 
institutions raised a clear concern for market domination. 
 
The banking and financial industry has a unique place in the global economic structure 
due to the key role it plays in directing capital and facilitating transactions. However, the role, 
                                                        
1
 L Story and E L Andrews, ‗Change Arrives, with a Sense That Wall St.‘s Boom Times Are Over‘ (15 
September, 2008) New York Times.  
2
 H A Shelanski, ‗Enforcing Competition During an Economic Crisis, Symposium: The Effect of Economic 
Crises on Antitrust Policy‘ (2010) 77 Antitrust Law Journal 229, pp 230-35. 
3
 A Foer, ‗Preserving Competition After the Banking Meltdown‘ (December, 2008) American Antitrust Institute, 
Global Competition Policy, available at 
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 D Gross, Dumb Money: How Our Greatest Financial Minds Bankrupted the Nation (New York: Free Press 
2009), p 88. 
5
 Federal Reserve, ‗Bear Stearns, JPMorgan Chase, and Maiden Lane LLC‘ (March 2008) FRB (‗Bear Stearns‘), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_bearstearns.htm. 
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2012), p 405.   
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as it exists today, exposes the industry to the significant interest-rate risk between long-term 
assets and short-term liabilities, as well as the inter-connection amongst financial institutions 
within the interbank market and the payment system. These risks, along with the crises they 
have created, have led banks and financial institutions to be categorized as ‗special‘, in that 





The idea that financial institutions are essentially unlike other types of businesses may 
unusually vindicate governmental involvement in their operations, including mergers and 
acquisitions. The financial sector can create heightened risks of contagion and economic 
collapse compared with other industries.  The failure of a single financial institution can cause 
a waterfall of runs on other financial institutions. Unlike manufacturing enterprises that work 
through inventories and diminish production over weeks and months, substantial liquidity can 
be drained from the financial system in a matter of days - exemplified by the downfall of 




The Global Financial Crisis (‗GFC‘) emerged from the unscrupulous underwriting of 
mortgages, the assignment of inflated credit ratings to mortgage-backed securities, financial 
institutions‘ inadequate risk management systems, and an insufficient and enabling regulatory 
environment. But the enormous global fall-out from these events indicates that the 
complications spurring from subprime mortgages are only a sign instead of the root of the 
crisis.
9
   
 
The notions of ‗too-big-too-fail‘ (‗TBTF‘) and ‗systemic risk‘ emerged as key 
concerns for the banking and financial system. The question was whether by supporting the 
‗quick-fix‘ bank mergers, banking regulators increased the future risks posed by TBTF 
institutions.
10
 By empowering the nation‘s largest financial institutions to combine and 
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achieve unprecedented scale, questions were raised whether the US Government had bypassed 
the requirements of the Bank Merger Act
11
 and the Clayton Act,
12
 which otherwise may have 




The monetary strategies of the Bank of England in the UK and the Federal Reserve in 
the US, among other countries, were excessively lax and overemphasized consumer price 
increases to the neglect of asset price increases. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 and the 
strategies that the International Monetary Fund (‗IMF‘) applied to it instilled in Asian 
governments a more conservative and responsible fiscal policy.
14
 These differences in fiscal 
policy led to significant worldwide distortions, which ultimately accelerated the bursting of 
the bubble. The popping of the toxic mortgage bubble generated massive ambiguity within the 
capital markets.
15
 The uncertainty and volatility during the financial crisis brought into 
question whether government backing was justified and in what way antitrust concerns should 
be upheld and enforced.  
 
The UK and the US faced difficulties in various business sectors as the recession took 
hold. Strains on lenders stemming from capital evaporating from toxic assets forced them to 
tighten lending standards, which in turn created challenges for borrowers trying to obtain 
credit at suitable rates. The severe tumble in consumer demand reduced sales, leading retailers 
to cut inventory, and manufacturers to lose orders and scale back production. Indeed, the 




In the financial sector, UK and the US antitrust authorities slackened enforcement in 
the name of economic stability. Proponents of saving the banks defied antitrust adherents‘ 
beliefs that competition remained part of the answer to benefitting consumers and ultimately 
                                                        
11
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During the GFC, it was suggested that a less strict implementation of antitrust 
oversight was necessary and suitable. Both American antitrust and the UK competition 
regulators were burdened by political pressure to limit competition oversight in the financial 
industry to prop up banks struggling with eroding capital. This pressure included efforts to 
ease considerations of market control and market domination by banks and their acquisitions 
so that they could benefit from decreased competition and greater pricing power. Industry 
friendly policies were developed toward the largest financial institutions. For instance, 





One significant drawback of the adoption and application of anticompetitive attitudes 
is that they can delay economic recovery from the damage caused by banks and other 
financial institutions. Economic analysis demonstrates that the interruption of antitrust rules in 
the US in the 1930s prolonged the Great Depression.
19
 Analogously, studies demonstrate that 
when the UK Parliament constrained competition during the GFC, one result was a 
continuation of the recession in the UK.
20
  One of the key contributing factors to these results 
appears to be that financial meltdowns should generate long-term benefits by easing the exit 
of ineffective banks and enabling the entry of innovative and effective competitors. Allowing 
failing banks to fail can provide a cascade of lasting advantages for a national economy.  It 
ultimately allows new entrants in the marketplace, which in turn continue to provide credit 
and other financial services to consumers and producers who demand and require them.  
 
It remains uncertain whether a moderate method toward market influence can be 
adopted in the banking sector. The supposition that strength concerns supersede competition 
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concerns is staunchly adhered to. The extent to which stability concerns affect policy 
considerations toward market competitiveness needs to be determined.  In light of the GFC, it 
is important to consider whether previous and current competition policy assumes uniform 
and typical market conditions.  It is, also, important to consider whether a given policy is 
being implemented to address the anti-competitive outcomes of individual bank mergers, or to 




The UK and American antitrust regulators were confronted with an enormous 
involvement of political and administrative influence on the financial system. A series of 
actions were undertaken to assist the financial system, such as, steep drops in central bank 
interest rates, modifications to liquidity accounting standards and modifications of collateral 
needs, as well as additional quantitative easing asset purchases, and guarantee arrangements 
sheltering banks‘ liabilities and dealings in the interbank marketplace.
22
   
 
Authorities in the UK and the US were integral to rescue operations, such as, those of 
Northern Rock, West LB, Bear Stearns, AIG, and Merrill Lynch.
23
  These undertakings were 
products of uncertainty about contagion and fear of a systemic catastrophe emanating from a 
loss of confidence in the banking system as a whole. In the UK, the lines of customers seeking 
to withdraw their savings from Northern Rock branches in September, 2007
24
 provided an 
early sign of the impending financial meltdown. For a financial institution, Northern Rock 
was uncommonly reliant upon ad interim capitalization from institutional investors instead of 
individual depositors.
25
 Instead of its loan book deteriorating, it was the shutting off of its 
short-term funding mechanisms that caused Northern Rock to become insolvent. Northern 
Rock was vulnerable and ultimately succumbed to systemic deleveraging as the UK and 
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 The distress had commenced before Northern Rock‘s failure, as demonstrated by 
August, 2007‘s sizable expansion of money market spreads.
27
 Increasingly, events like the 
Federal Reserve‘s easing of the federal funds rate in September, 2007 indicated a distinctly 
intensified awareness of credit risks throughout the financial system. Such developments 
accelerated throughout 2008, with Bear Stearns being bought by JPMorgan Chase in March,
28
 
Lehman Brothers failing in September,
29
 and before long turmoil in the markets for mortgage 
backed securities, credit default swaps, repurchase agreements, money market funds, auction 
rate securities, and short-term credit was threatening the entire financial system.  The collapse 
of asset prices and distressed deleveraging processes was a far-reaching event, with grave 
repercussions for the financial system. Ultimately it transformed a private debt watershed into 




The complexity of the GFC and the magnitude of ‗public‘ intervention by the UK and 
American regulators were nearly unparalleled. Competition regulators were compelled to 
partake in the industry consolidations and rubber-stamp mergers of major industry players. 
Certain practices of ‗public‘ involvement and encouragement of financial industry health 
could be justified considering the special circumstances.
31
 However, the extent to which 
industry consolidation ought to be employed as a means of renewing economic confidence 
must be earnestly scrutinized.   
 
Several experts have contended that competition enforcement should have been 
deferred during the financial meltdown in order to permit authorities to concentrate 
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exclusively on the task of preserving the strength of the financial system.
32
  This perspective 
brings into question the role and value of industry competition during times of systemic stress.  
Other commenters have emphasized the significance of upholding rigorous competition 
provisions during the financial crises to guarantee an equal application of the rules and 
consistent response to the financial crisis, and also to prevent a wasteful subsidy contest 
between the UK and US.
33
   
 
Various characteristics of competition strategy, like the ‗failing firm‘ principal in bank 
merger assessment, can aid in understanding the importance of regulatory rigor in the face of 
economic instability. In terms of enabling the dialogue surrounding competition strategy and 
public involvement, the European Commission issued several communications on state 
support of banks during the GFC meltdown (the ‗Banking Communication‘).
34
 The 
Communication offered specific guidelines for the compatibility of State aid with Article 
107(3)(b) TFEU.
35
 Each of the communications has been a continuation of the response to the 
GFC. They have served as an indefinite and temporary mechanism from the EU, until the 
Commission establishes a permanent statutory regulation for state support of struggling 
financial institutions. They also provide a regulatory framework for coordinated measures in 
support of the banking sector, while lessening distortions of competition between financial 




While acknowledging the aberrant nature of the GFC, the Banking Communication 
identified components of the public support that caused unwarranted alterations of 
competition among banks.
37
 The Communication delineated between structures in support of 
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 Presently the valid ‗Banking Communication‘ is communication from the Commission on the application from 
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specific banks, particularly those of systemic importance, and structures intended to support 
the industry as a whole.
38
 Together the structures in Article 107 TFEU
39
 and the overall rules 
on State aid
40
 for salvaging and reorganizing banks and other financial institutions form a 
useful regulatory framework. Ultimately, these structures explain what State aid is permitted 
to resolve a severe disruption in the economy of a Member State (i.e. UK). 
 
Concerning states backing specific financial institutions, the Banking Communication 
distinguishes between banks with complications stemming from broad marketplace events 
that have affected capital and liquidity industry-wide, from banks that are distressed due to 
their own internal banking practices, business choices, and risk management.
41
 Arrangements 
sustaining the first category are preferable, because they are less likely to generate moral 
hazard and produce negative externalities on society. Such arrangements can recapitalize and 
sustain banks that would be sound under normal conditions, while not encouraging excessive 




While the regulatory position toward all banks in a particular market ought to maintain 
the standards of competition within that market, one concern is the extent to which actions in 
one state will adversely affect markets abroad. Provided the size and worldwide 
interconnectedness of contemporary financial institutions, it is hard to curb the competitive 
consequences of guarantee structures within a given country‘s boundaries. In terms of limiting 
the shifting of competition standards, the Banking Communication includes broad guarantee 
arrangements and the possibility of recapitalization for all banks in a given Member State 
(including the domestic subsidiaries of foreign financial institutions).
43
 The Communication 
requires that the guarantees only cover critical liabilities.
44
 To preserve certainty in the 
financial system, retail and, to a degree, wholesale deposits would be safeguarded. However, 
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The enactment of EU banking communication in 2008 that preceded the present 
Banking Communication was the first concrete measure taken by the Commission, which 
recognized that Article 107 TFEU
46
 allows financial relief to resolve a ‗serious disturbance‘ 
within the financial system of an EU Member State.
47
 The Communication embraces many 
different kinds of aid, including guarantees of banks‘ liabilities, recapitalization of banks that 
were not subject or entitled to the rescue and restructuring aid provisions, the controlled 
shuttering of banks, and central banks‘ provision of certain temporary liquidity supports that 




The Commission differentiates between good and bad banks, specifically, those that 
are ‗illiquid‘ but otherwise primarily sound and those facing challenges from inefficiency or 
‗excessive risk-taking‘.
49
 This difference might not be easy to distinguish in specific 
situations.  However, it can have significant implications. The banks that are categorized 
in the second group would normally be required to endure heightened scrutiny to qualify for 
rescue and reorganization provisions, while banks in the first group would benefit from a more 




 Although the standards set forth in the Banking Communication show the 
Commission‘s conventional view toward State aid, the Communication presents important 
novel components.  One new component is a short timetable - limited to twenty-four hours or 
a single weekend – for the Commission to evaluate and grant aid to banks needing liquidity. 
Another new component of the Communication is its restriction on the lifespan of aid.  The 
standard threshold of six months for emergency financial relief is commonly protracted to 




In late 2008 and early 2009, the Commission endorsed numerous financial recovery 
packages according to the Banking Communication, with the UK executing recapitalization 
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arrangements with HBOS, Royal Bank of Scotland, and Lloyds Banking Group.
52
 Other EU 
Member State‘s imposed similar liquidity injection operations.
53
 However, state ownership of 
financial institutions is not a remedy with respect to competitiveness and efficiency. Although 
a public system has the benefit of not facing liquidity crises of its power to tax, issue 
sovereign debt, and print money, it also presents a greater risk of complacency and 
inefficiency.
54
 This might slow any recovery, or alternatively, encourage excessive risk 
taking. State ownership of financial institutions can limit competition and impede prosperity.  
State-owned financial institutions tend to be motivated by political interests and influence 
rather than commercial and mercantile incentives. Businesses receiving loans from state-
owned financial institutions incur lower borrowing costs than businesses seeking loans from 





The early phases of the GFC were defined by diverse government initiatives by the 
UK and the US intended to sustain their domestic financial markets.
56
  The necessity of a 
harmonized response was quite clear, and was quickly acknowledged by national and EU 
competition authorities.
57
 However, in its efforts to bolster its domestic financial sector, the 




The Commission succeeded in adhering to set competition policies and provisions, 
while permitting flexibility in their enforcement during the financial crisis. The Commission‘s 
approach received approval from the UK competition watchdog that emphasized that 
                                                        
52
 Case N 507/2008 – Financial Support Measures to the Banking Industry in the UK (13 October, 2008) 
Commission decision, paras 9, 13, and 69.  
53
 For example, the Dutch Government bailout package for ING in 2008, and the Danish Government rescue 
scheme for Roskilde Bank in 2008. See, Commission, ‗State Aid: Overview of National Rescue Measures and 
Deposit Guarantee Schemes‘ (14 October, 2008) Memo/08/619. 
54
 J C Rochet and J Tirole ‗Controlling Risk in Payment System‘ (1996) Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 
28, pp 823-60.    
55
 L Porta et al, ‗Government Ownership of Banks‘ (2002) Journal of Finance 57, pp 265-301.  
56
 A G da Silva et al, ‗Antitrust Implications of the Financial Crisis: A UK and EU View‘ (Spring 2009) Antitrust 
Journal, p 31. 
57
 N Kroes, ‗The Thin Line between Regulation and Competition Law: The Interface between Regulation and 
Competition Law‘ (28 April, 2009) Bunderskartellamt Conference on Dominant Companies, p 3, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-09-202_en.htm?locale=en. 
58
 M Reynolds et al, ‗EU Competition Policy in the Financial Crisis: Extraordinary Measures‘ (2010) 33 
Fordham International Law Journal 1670, pp 1671-78. 
322 
 
competition was just as important in difficult economic times as it is in the good times, and 




In 2009, the European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services stated that, ‗the 
[Global Financial Crisis] has required substantial state intervention in financial institutions in 
many Member States‘.
60
 While this may be true, the Commission appeared to lack 
effectiveness in enforcing EU provisions, especially concerning competition and public aid to 
banks. It, also, failed to show the assertiveness necessary to establish calm in the financial 
industry and temper the effect of systemic hazards. 
 
 Although there was an overall reduction in bank mergers during the GFC, the mergers 
that did occur faced less examination review from the Commission. The Commission claimed 
that there was ‗special treatment‘ given to banks that viewed mergers as a solution for financial 
concerns.
61
  The Commission did not see any reason to permit formation of additional banks 
deemed TBTF.
62
  During the GFC, few bank merger cases came under the Commission‘s 
jurisdiction, as the bulk of cases were domestic and not cross-border transactions.
63
  
Nevertheless, the Commission acknowledged that certain bank mergers within Member States 
raised potential competition concerns.  However, it vowed not to create unreasonable hurdles.  
In the end, the Commission decided it was better to not block cross-border bank mergers for 




From October, 2008 through October, 2011, the Commission granted State aid to the 
financial services industry in the sum of €4.5 trillion, which represented about 36.7 per cent of 
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 During the GFC the Commission applied competition policies accommodatingly 
and with sensitivity to the financial environment. A prime example is the bank takeover of 
Alliance & Leicester (‗A&L‘) by the Santander Group (‗Santander‘).
66
  That takeover was 
made public on 14 July, 2008,
67
 was reported to the Commission on August 8
th
, and was 




 The Commission noted that the takeover combined the 
sixth (Santander) and eighth (A&L) largest financial institutions in the UK.
69
 It, also, 
noted that both banks had concentrations in wholesale banking, corporate customer services, 
insurance, and credit cards.  However, within each of these areas, the banks‘ combined market 
share was less than fifteen percent.
70
 As a result, the merged entity would encounter significant 
market competition from a number of UK financial institutions including HBOS, Barclays, 
Lloyds, HSBC, RBS/NatWest, and Nationwide.  The Commission added that, A&L was active 
in cash management and cash sales, while Santander was inactive. Considering the limited 
market shares of A&L and Santander and the lack of concentration in any single line of 
business, the Commission determined that the merger did not raise any competition concerns.
71 
 
Another bank takeover of interest to the Commission during the GFC was Bradford & 
Bingley (B&B) by Abbey in 2008. Following the B&B‘s nationalization due to its failure, 
Abbey, a subsidiary of the Santander Group (BSCH), acquired the deposit book and 
accompanying assets of B&B.
72
 Upon approval of the public bailout of the B&B by the 
Commission under the EU State aid rules,
73
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The Commission noted that Abbey purchased all of B&B‘s wholesale savings account 
deposits, bank branches, and additional key business assets.
75
 Importantly, B&B‘s mortgage 




The Commission noted also that because B&B did not offer a complete variety of 
wholesale banking services prior to the takeover, the acquisition was unlikely to have a 
substantial effect on Abbey‘s pricing power in the wholesale banking business.
77 
The 
Commission based its examination on the supposition that Abbey could re-establish the pre-
takeover position of B&B if it wanted to.
78
  Indeed, B&B‘s established customer relationships 
allowed Abbey to maintain a mortgage lending business comparable to what it pre-takeover 
had. Under these circumstances, the merged bank‘s market share of UK mortgage lending 
stayed below twenty percent, with only a slight increase attributable to the takeover.
79
 
Considering that Abbey would continue to encounter competition from several major banks 
within the mortgage marketplace, the Commission found the takeover of B&B by Abbey did 
not raise significant competition concerns.
80 





Although the UK competition authorities maintain that the GFC did not disturb the 
bank merger review standard
82
 there were significant modifications to merger examination 
processes. The general idea from the competition authorities was that past market structures 




Governments in the UK and US reacted to the financial crunch by underwriting their 
respective banking systems in order to safeguard depositors‘ monies and quell the destruction 
of banks challenged by rapidly evaporating liquidity.  In the EU, most of the rescue measures 
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involved some form of State aid under Article 107 TFEU.
84
  However, such aid is unlawful in 
the event the Commission does not approve it. Under normal circumstances, the approval 
process takes at least a couple of months, but due to the urgency and gravity of the financial 
crisis, government actions were quickly taken without Commission approval.  This decisive 
but unapproved action raised the risk that competition between the UK banks and other 




Government measures including: take overs, extensions of deposit insurance, 
recapitalizations, loans below market rates, and the repurchase of distressed assets could be 
considered illegal without the blessing of the Commission.
86
 The Commission reacted to these 
government initiatives by lowering the requirements for granting approval of such State aid. 
These changes in the standards of administrative review came under the auspices of ‗severe 
instabilities‘ in the financial markets. However, such changes could have major consequences 
for the implementation of EU competition enforcement going forward.
87
    
 
In response to the GFC, the Commission presented a novel and more relaxed 
evaluation and implementation process to allow governmental bailout provisions. Such policy 
shifts can be considered a direct consequence of political pressure to place a moratorium on 
such provisions entirely. From the inception of the GFC, the Commission had in certain 
instances moved swiftly, utilizing its State aid authority. For instance, the Commission 
approved the UK bailout of Bradford & Bingley within a day.
88
 The Commission acted with 
the same speed in approving other Member States‘ bank merger applications, as well.
89
 On one 
hand the Commission‘s accelerated approvals show how its processes had changed. On the 
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other hand, the Commission‘s actions reveal its importance, which had been increasing with 
its involvement in dealing with the meltdown of financial markets.   
 
The Brexit referendum result of 2016 has thrown the UK towards unchartered waters 
in terms of the future relationship between the UK and the EU, including implementation of 
EU provisions and the UK‘s access in the EU market.   However, the foregoing is not part of 
the analysis in this thesis, notwithstanding its importance.  
 
10.1    Response to the ‘too-big-to-fail’ concern 
 
Financial stability decisions are not ‗political‘ in itself without separate interference.  Banking 
markets are naturally, oligopolistic, which cannot be prevented with the objective being to 
ensure that these operate in a safe and stable manner.  Consumers have a right of choice and 
can say no with competition authorities not being entitled to force competition on them.  
International competition is also relevant with countries having a legitimate interest to ensure 
that they have one or more large banks that can compete globally.
90
  The ‗too-big-to-fail‘ 
(‗TBTF‘) was a problem following the Global Financial Crisis (‗GFC‘), although a large 
number of important steps have been taken to correct this since.  To address these criticism, 
the author analyses the responses to the TBTF problem in light of the actions taken by the 
international bodies and national authorities, respectively.
91 
 
One of the key issues addressed by the international financial system was the matter of 
systemically important financial institutions (‗SIFIs‘), or institutions that are TBTF.  
Inadequate systemic risk control had an important role in the GFC.
92
  Dealing with SIFIs and 
the moral hazard associated with them was a key priority of the group of the most 
industrialized countries (so-called the ‗G20‘).
93
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At the Pittsburgh Summit in 2009, G20 leaders called on the Financial Stability Board 
(‗FSB‘) to propose measures to address the systemic and moral hazard risks associated with 
SIFIs.
94
 The TBTF issue occurs, when the threatened failure of a SIFI provides public 
authorities, with the sole choice of bailing it out, utilizing public funds to avoid financial 
instability and economic damage.
95
  This public assistance encourages SIFIs to take 
unwarranted risks and signifies a large implied public subsidy of private financial institutions.  
 
At London Summit, in 2009, the G20 Summit set out priorities of restoring the 
economy that included strengthening financial supervision and regulation and to extend 
regulation and oversight to all systemically important financial institutions.
96
   
 
In 2010, the FSB released a series of recommendations and time lines on reducing the 
moral hazard posed by systemically important financial institutions.
97
  It seeks to improve the 
ability of national regulators to resolve SIFIs in an orderly manner, while allowing these 
institutions to fulfil their key functions in the economy.  The FSB recommends that SIFIs 
have a higher loss absorbency capacity than Basel III requirements, and that SIFIs are subject 
to more intensive supervision and resolution planning.
98
   
 
At Seoul Summit, in 2010, the G20 leaders reaffirmed their view that no financial 
institution should be too big or too complicated to fail and that taxpayers should not bear the 
costs of resolution.
99
  The FSB, at the request of the G20, publishes an annually updated list of 
financial institutions deemed to be globally systemically important financial institutions (‗G-
SIFIs‘).
100
  They are defined as financial institutions, whose distress or failure ‗because of 
their size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would cause significant disruption to 
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the wider financial system and economic activity‘.
101
  They are determined with reference to 
methodology determined by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (‗BCBS‘).
102
   
 
It is precisely due to their global and inter-connected nature that G-SIFIs are difficult 
to deal with at the national level.  It has been argued that finding ‗common ground‘ in relation 
to significant cross-border bank insolvencies could be one of the most difficult missions the 
global financial community may need to achieve in the future.
103
  Concerns remain in areas 
such as, the definition of SIFIs, their regulation and supervision, as well as issues pertaining to 




 The G20 has endorsed a ‗multi-pronged‘ framework for dealing with the TBTF 
concern.  First, this involves establishing a framework, so that banks may be resolved quickly, 
safely, and without destabilizing the wider financial system.
105
  SIFIs should, also, have a 
higher loss absorbency capacity, reflective of the risks they pose to the global financial 
system.  G-SIFIs should, also, be subject to more intensive supervisory oversight.  This policy 
framework should include ‗robust core financial market infrastructure to reduce contagion risk 
from individual failures‘.
106
  This approach acknowledges that G-SIFIs, due to the risk they 
pose to the global financial system, should be subject to specialized rules.  For instance, 
national insolvency rules have been deemed inadequate for the resolution of globally 
important financial institutions, requiring a lex specialis resolution regime.
107
   
 
 Substantial progress is made in implementation of the framework to reduce the moral 
hazard posed by SIFIs.
108
  For instance, methodologies for assessing the global systemic 
importance of banks (G-SIBs) and insurers (G-SIIs) have been issued, and to date, there are 
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designated twenty-eight G-SIBs and nine G-SIIs. Higher loss-absorption capacity, more 





A new strengthened capital regime requiring additional going-concern loss absorption 
capacity for the G-SIBs are has finalized, and in many cases, the G-SIBs have built the extra 
capital ahead of schedule imposed by regulators.
110
 Starting from 2010, the G-SIBs have 
increased their common equity capital by about USD 500 billion, which represents three per 




Recommendations for enhanced supervision and heightened supervisory expectations 





In 2011, the G20 endorsed a report
113
 - ‗Key attributes of effective resolution regimes 
for financial institutions‘ - as a new international standard.  Since then, guidance papers have 
been issued on resolution strategies for G-SIBs.
114
 Approaches for dealing with the resolution 
of financial market infrastructure (‗FMI‘) and insurers, as well as the protection of client 
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Good progress is, also, made in strengthening core financial market infrastructure, 





Financial institutions and markets are adjusting to regulators‘ determination to end the 
TBTF concern.  Where effective resolution regimes are now in place, rating agencies give less 
credit for taxpayer support, and there are signs of financial markets revising down their 
assessment of the implicit TBTF subsidy.
117
  Market prices of credit default swaps for banks 
have become more highly correlated with equity prices, suggesting a greater expectation 




In 2013, the FSB published its report,
119
 ‗Progress and next steps towards ending 
―Too-Big-To-Fail‖‘ (the ‗2013 report‘).  While the FSB acknowledges that progress has 
already taken place in putting together an international policy framework, detailed technical 




 The G20 pushed for the nations‘ commitment to the necessary legislative reforms to 
implement the recommendations made in the 2013 report for all parts of the financial sector 




Reforms in several jurisdictions, including the UK
122
 and the US
123
, demonstrate that 
substantive progress has already been made in the implementation of the 2013 report 
recommendations across the FSB jurisdictions.  
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In the EU, the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD),
124
 which established 
a common approach within the EU to the recovery and resolution of banks and investment 
firms to ensure that the EU effectively addresses the risks posed by the banking system, has 
already in the course of being implemented in the UK.
125
 Its implementation, within a year of 
adoption, is an important step towards implementation of the 2013 report‘s recommendations 




For G-SIFIs, meaningful cross-border co-operation agreements for supervisors and 
resolution authorities are being adopted.  The G20 has empowered domestic authorities that 
regulate G-SIFIs to cooperate among each-others, and to commit to legislative action as 
necessary.
127
  Resolution strategies for G-SIFIs are coalescing around single-point-of-entry 
resolution for globally integrated firms and multiple-point-of-entry resolution for firms with 
multiple national or regional subsidiaries.
128
  In order to make these strategies operational, 
jurisdictions, including the UK and the US,  have put in place the powers and arrangements 
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    Authorities with responsibility for resolution are already sharing firm-specific 
information, both within jurisdictions and cross-border.
130
   
 
    Impediments to resolvability, also, arise from complexities in firms‘ legal, financial 
and operational structures.  National regulators have already entered into a dialogue with 
financial institutions about changes required to their structures and operations to ensure their 
preferred (single- or multiple-point-of-entry) resolution strategy is a realistic strategy for the 
institution.  The resolvability of each G-SIFI is assessed at the national regulatory level within 




    As the SIFI framework recognised, ‗structural measures could reduce the risks or 
externalities that a G-SIFI poses‘, structural reform measures, containing the separation of 
activities, intra-group exposure limits, local capital and liquidity requirements, seek to put 
restraints on excessive risk-taking by SIFIs, and so assist promoting financial stability.
132
  
They can, also, contribute to enhance the resolvability of SIFIs at a country level, therefore, 
lessening the moral hazard of TBTF.  There is a risk that diverging structural measures 
imposed by national regulators could have an impact on integration across national or regional 
markets.  Therefore, these regulators need to monitor the potential cross-border spill-over 
results, which may arise from different approaches.  The same regulators should take account 
the progress on cross-border cooperation, and seek to avoid unnecessary constraints on the 
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The FSB, in collaboration with the IMF and OECD, have assessed the cross-border 





The TBTF problem existed not only for global firms. The SIFI framework, therefore, 
also, extends to domestic SIFIs (‗D-SIBs‘).  The framework for D-SIBs developed by the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (‗BCBS‘) allows for appropriate discretion at 
jurisdictional level to accommodate structural characteristics of domestic financial systems.
135
  
Implementation in each jurisdiction is subject to an international peer review program to 
ensure appropriate adherence to the principles of the framework.  The BCBS along with the 




Effective resolution planning requires financial institutions to enable to produce 
accurate information on time.  It, also, requires efficient processes for sharing that 
information, both within crisis management groups (‗CMGs‘) and with authorities in host 
jurisdictions not represented on CMGs, where the local operations of a G-SIFI are systemic. 
Furthermore, coordinated risk assessment requires banking regulators to share more 




The FSB has developed recommendations for consistent and comparable firm-specific 
information for resolution planning purposes.
138
  The FSB, also, has developed proposals on 
how to strengthen information sharing within CMGs and, in consultation with standard-setting 
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bodies, within core supervisory colleges.
139
  The FSB has, further, developed 
recommendations for cooperation and sharing information with authorities in G-SIFI host 





To avoid the need for a bail-out with public funds, a SIFI needs to have sufficient 
resources to absorb losses in resolution (‗total loss absorbing capacity‘ or ‗TLAC‘).
141
  An 
adequate amount of TLAC already facilitates the implementation of a resolution strategy with 
a recapitalisation at a level that promotes market confidence and, at a minimum, meets going-
concern regulatory capital requirements.  The foregoing is based on the FSB‘s 





G-SIIs is subject to policy measures comprising effective resolution planning, 
enhanced group-wide supervision and higher loss absorbency (‗HLA‘), consistent with the 
requirements of the SIFI Framework.
143
  The International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors (IAIS) has developed implementation details for higher loss absorbency 
requirements, which are built on straightforward, backstop capital requirements applying to all 




    The UK and the US have already carried out policy initiatives in light of the continued 
growth of many TBTF firms in relation to the size of the financial system; concerns of 
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dependence on short-term wholesale funding and increased secured borrowing at banks and 
non-banks; and the adoption or planned adoption of structural measures e.g., separation of 





Several models for structural reforms have emerged.  In the US, the Volcker Rule in s 
619 of the Dodd-Frank Act,
146
 places an outright ban on specific combinations of financial 
activity.  Alternative approaches, associated with the UK‘s ‗Independent Commission on 
Banking‘ (‗ICB‘ or ‗Vickers report‘),
147
 the ‗High-level expert group on reforming the 
structure of the EU banking sector‘ headed by Liikanen,
148
 emphasise, instead, a requirement 
for different types of financial activity to be carried out by separately capitalised subsidiaries.  
Approaches for structural regulation differ in scope and content reflecting the different 




Upon implementation of the financial services reforms in order to tackle the TBTF 
concern, another step to end the TBTF was the ongoing development of a new failure 
resolution regime, including the so-called orderly liquidation authority (‗OLA‘), created by 
the Dodd-Frank Act
150
 in the US.  The OLA directly attacks the TBTF concern by giving the 
US regulators the legal required tools to resolve a systemically important financial institution 
on the brink of failure, in a way that involves no taxpayer funding (shareholders and creditors 
bear all losses), and which mitigates the spill-overs to the broader financial system and the 
economy.
151
  Resolving a complex financial institution, especially in a condition where the 
financial system is in chaos, poses substantial challenges.  However, a great deal has already 
been accomplished.  The single most important development has probably been the 
enunciation by the regulators of the so-called ‗single-point-of-entry‘ strategy,
152
 which 
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simplifies and makes more predictable any intervention in a failing financial institution.  
Other key elements include the extensive planning taking place at the banking regulator level; 
requirements that banks supplement their equity capital with long-term debt, which can be 
converted to equity when needed (‗bail-in-able debt‘);
153
 protections for short-term creditors 
and other measures to forestall runs; and the requirement that banks present plans for their 
own resolutions - so-called ‗living wills‘
154
 - that must be approved by the banking authorities.  
In order to receive approval of living wills, banks have already made structural changes to 





The policy response to end TBTF was necessary.  The international and national 
regulators have made great progress to put the overall international policy framework in 
place.
156
 The application of policies to individual SIFIs, and financial institutions have 
undertaken restructuring necessary in order to make the foregoing institutions resolvable.
157
  
     
The FSB works with standard-setting bodies to agree the necessary refinements to 
regulatory policies, as well as the FSB rigorously monitors implementation to ensure that 
national authorities meet their commitments, including the consistency of national responsive 
measures with agreed international policies towards the TBTF issue.
158
   
 
In conclusion, sufficient action has been taken to remove the worst threats that arise 
with TBTF. 
 
Antitrust is quintessentially addressed to the optimum organization of the nation's 
economy, even if it does not purport to address all aspects of it.  The main issue of 
competition law is economic power and its potential to be misused.  Vast aggregations of 
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economic power in convergence with other phenomena caused TBTF crises.
159
  It, therefore, 
stands to reason that competition ought to be concerned with some aspects of the TBTF 
problem, at least, insofar as the problem stems from aggregated economic size and power. 
Since the TBTF problem is complex, it is unsurprising that competition by itself is not and 
cannot the cure.  However, the competition law could make a difference by controlling certain 




The foregoing considerations lead to a few conclusions and proposals for bringing 
competition into the public policy discussion of preventing or limiting the need for public 
rescues of private financial institutions that are too big, too interconnected and, perhaps, too 
powerful to be permitted to collapse. 
 
10.2  Whether ‘too-big-to-fail’ status of systemically important financial 
institutions creates special competition concerns 
 
Many antitrust experts claim that competition provisions were not rigorously applied 
throughout the GFC, which ultimately exacerbated ‗too-big-to-fail‘ (‗TBTF‘) issue. In 
approving mergers of large banks and other financial institutions, both the UK and American 
regulators managed to increase systemic risk in the long-term, while attempting to battle it in 
the short-term.  
 
 The GFC revealed a number of significant regulatory and central bank failures in the 
US, UK, EU and elsewhere and especially in terms of defective regulation, supervision, 
resolution, support and macro prudential oversight.  A substantial amount of work has been 
undertaken to correct all of these.  It is arguable that sufficient action has been taken to 
remove the worst threats that arise with TBTF. 
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The Financial Stability Board (‗FSB‘),
161
 alongside the International Monetary Fund 
(‗IMF‘)
162
 and the Bank for International Settlements (‗BIS‘),
163
 recognized important 
distinctions of systemic organizations, including: size, lack of substitutability and 
interconnectedness.  Furthermore, the FSB has identified a series of essential factors – 
discussed in the previous section of this thesis - which complement size, lack of 
substitutability, and interconnectedness.  Such factors include leverage, solvency, asset quality 
and the stability of short-term funding mechanisms, each of which can exacerbate external 





The FSB suggests that the degree of systemic risk is a product of individual 
institutional characteristics combined with macroeconomic considerations of 
interconnectedness and the system-wide potential for contagion. The FSB‘s standards 
concerning systemic financial risk result from an evaluation of the central banks in the UK, 
US and other developed economies. Indeed, the FSB standards are similar to the standards 
outlined in the by UK and US financial oversight reform efforts.
165
  These standards comply 
with the characteristics leading experts have identified for systemic financial institutions. 
Ultimately, the FSB‘s standards represent wide-ranging considerations of the fundamental 
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Competition provisions should aim to prevent dominant market behaviour through 
bank mergers. Although the Clayton Act in the US aimed to curb mergers that result in 
significantly increased market control,
167
 there is no regulation specific to banks and financial 
organizations.
168
 Deprived of adequate legislation, competition regulators are restricted in 
terms of what they can do to address TBTF banks. 
 
Prior to the GFC there were numerous financial institutions that could be considered 
TBTF.
169
 The loosening of competition provisions for specific bank mergers during the crisis 
increased the concentration, dominance, and influence of a handful of institutions.  The US 
Treasury Department‘s Troubled Asset Relief Program (‗TARP‘)
170
 in 2006 evidenced the 
fact that many American banks had become TBTF.
171
  The Treasury saved several large and 
dominant financial institutions by spending $700 billion to bail them out.
172
  In doing so, the 
US Government tacitly acknowledged that, by needing enormous capital injections to remain 
solvent, enable lending and facilitate transactions throughout the economy, several domestic 
banks were TBTF. 
 
The large bank mergers and mergers were granted fast-tracked approval due to the 
belief that by mingling a deteriorating bank with a larger, healthier bank, systemic risk would 
be mitigated.  Nonetheless, several of these bank mergers were seen as merely capitulating to 
prevailing popular and political concerns. Some experts went further, concluding that the 
TBTF issue has grown into an even ‗too-bigger-to-fail‘ concern.  They, also, predicted that the 
bank mergers, which occurred throughout the GFC, heightened the risk that the US will have 
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An important issue surrounding the bank mergers of the GFC is the consequence they 
will have on consumers.
174
  The high number of bank mergers in the UK and US has been felt 
by consumers through the pricing and availability of financial products. One problem is that 
small and middle-sized financial institutions have been absorbed by the larger competitors. 
They were persuaded and sometimes forced by regulators to protect deposits by assenting to 
be acquired by larger financial institutions.
175
  As a result of bank consolidation, customers 
were confronted with fewer alternatives and the possibility of higher interest rates, charges, 
and fees for financial products. Such outcomes, wherein consumers face fewer options and 
higher costs, are exactly what the competition provisions are intended to prevent.  
 
Many specialists in the banking sector advocate amending the competition provisions 
to include TBTF considerations.
176
  Competition provisions can certainly be used to constrain 
the size of a bank.  However, contemporary competition concerns don‘t focus on the size of a 
bank, but primarily consider market share and correlating pricing power. Implementing 
several alternatives of a ‗size cap‘ on the largest financial institutions would limit the 
‗systemic risk‘ one big financial institution would pose to the entire economy. A size cap - 




Constraining the possible power and scale of banks would protect not only the 
financial marketplace, but consumers and the economy as a whole.  Restricting the power and 
size of banks via a TBTF examination would limit the systemic threat of individual financial 
institutions and prevent market dominance by any single or small group of competitors.
178
  
Without such processes, the continued occurrence of mergers among large financial 
institutions would continue to substantially lessening of competition. 
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The US tried to address the issue of mega-bank merger review in the Dodd-Frank Act. 
That legislation sought to provide bank regulators the authority to consider and constrain the 
scale of financial institutions. Under the Act, the Federal Reserve is granted the authority to 
intervene in any merger for a bank holding company that has more than $50 billion in assets, 
or for a nonbank financial institution that is found to pose a ‗grave threat to the financial 
stability‘ of the US.
179
 In the event a bank presents a risk to the financial strength of the 
economy, the Federal Reserve can undertake certain measures to constrain its influence. 
 
The Dodd-Frank Act provides US authorities with tools to constrain the influence of 
large financial institutions, and if necessary, to split them up in the event they pose a 
significant threat to financial stability.
180
 Empowering authorities with the ability to break up 
large financial institutions limits the institutions‘ incentive to become TBTF. However, the 
Act does not allow for assistance to specific financial institutions until they are determined to 
have become distressed.
181
 By the time such weaknesses emerge, it may be too late for the 
Federal Reserve to undertake the necessary measures to protect the rest of the financial sector. 
 
In consideration of the transformations that occurred throughout the financial sector 
during the GFC, the competition enforcement authorities in the UK and US must bring a new 
perspective to the banking sector. The collapses of Northern Rock in the UK,
182
 and Bear 
Stearns
183
 and Lehman Brothers
184
 in the US, as well as major bank consolidation in these 
countries, have altered the distribution of market share and competition within the sector.  
How theses transformations have affected the consumer is an essential measure of whether 
more rigorous competition enforcement is required to constrain further consolidation. 
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Some studies have shown that bank mergers can have adverse effects in the short-term 
on the consumer‘s access to credit and the interest rates on loans and deposits, but that such 
effects appear to diminish in the longer-term.
185
 However, such outcomes might be overly 
optimistic. Most of the bank mergers studied in support of that thesis happened within 
‗normal‘ market situations instead of during financial crisis conditions. Consequently, such 
data may not be properly suitable to reach conclusions concerning the impacts of giant bank 




Mammoth mergers are seldom the sole alternative to support distressed banks and 
confront market-wide instability.  Notably, direct public funding can serve as a complement or 
replacement for large-scale mergers. During the GFC, the bank acquisitions of Bear Stearns 
by JPMorgan Chase,
187
 and Merrill Lynch by Bank of America
188
 involved huge sums of 
public financial support in the form of guarantees.  Other bank takeovers involved the 
acquisition of shares by the government, causing the resulting entity to be partially 
nationalized. For instance, in the new Lloyds Banking Group (following the takeover of 
HBOS by Lloyds) and Royal Bank of Scotland, the UK Government effectively assumed an 
84 per cent interest in Royal Bank of Scotland and a 43 per cent interest in Lloyds Banking 
Group.
189
 The effects of these mixed-responses (such as, mergers with partial government 
purchases) are unclear in terms of how they limit competition in the marketplace. Much would 
depend on the government‘s level of involvement and activism in the management and 
ownership of a bank. 
 
It is worth recalling the action taken by the SoS regarding the intended merger 
Lloyds/Abbey in 2001.
190
 That deal was ultimately rejected because of anticipated 
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anticompetitive results arising from the merger. That result starkly contrasts with the takeover 
of HBOS by Lloyds, which showed regulators‘ remarkable concern for immediate economic 





Financial institutions are distinct from other areas of the economy due to their 
exposure to interest rate risks and their control of vast amounts of wealth kept in the form of 
deposits.
192
 Risks can arise from liabilities that are susceptible to runs (primarily demand 
deposits) and systemic crunches (i.e., counter-party risks). Risks can also arise from a bank‘s 
assets, particularly unforeseen risks arising from over-concentration, high leverage, and 
general impairment due to poor risk management.  Such risks are often exacerbated by moral 




Unnerving situations arise when bank customers lose confidence in their bank and 
begin withdrawing deposits.  Under normal conditions, only customers needing funds for 
actual consumption withdraw deposits.  However, in the event that customers fear a bank‘s 
liquidity is endangered, depositors a rush to obtain funds before the bank runs out of cash 
entirely, stops honouring demand deposit requests, or simply decides to close its doors.
194
 
When financial institutions‘ returns are low, as in a recession, customers are more wary of 
market difficulties and more prone to withdraw deposits with little or no notice. As a result, 
basic bank runs are a reaction to interrelated economic conditions, and can accelerate the 




Systemic risk and the safeguarding of depositors are the primary reasons for deposit 
insurance and lender of last resort government safety nets. Deposit insurance can forestall 
runs by retail depositors, but is not a failsafe protection against contagion, because not all 
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bank liabilities are insured. Lender of last resort responses are more comprehensive, in that 
the Bank of England in the UK and the Federal Reserve in the US extend capital to banks, 
which can be used to address a host of liquidity issues.
196
 Although there is an ongoing 
discussion of the optimum form and role of the lender of last resort, there is broad consensus 
that the mechanism should not be utilized in specific bank failure situations, as with the 
actions undertaken by the US in TARP with an overall $700 billion budget.
197
  The TARP 
was a cram down, which required nearly all financial institutions, such as, Bank of America 
took $45 billion, Citigroup received $45 billion, and JPMorgan Chase took $25 billion, to 
accept the US Government‘s monies, even though, had they had the choice, they wouldn‘t 
have.
198
 As a matter of fact, banks that received the government‘s billions through the TARP 
lent less money on average to customers than few banks that did not receive any funds 
through the TARP program.
199
 Similar to the TARP program, the UK Government spent 
£130billion of taxpayers‘ monies to bail out Lloyds, RBS, Northern Rock, and Bradford & 
Bingley during the Global Financial Crisis.
200 
 
Under these public bailout situations, central banks in the UK and US would only lend 
monies to distressed banks at favourable rates, against suitable collateral, in times of 
significant external economic challenges.  However, practically speaking, it is not easy for the 
Bank of England and the Federal Reserve to differentiate illiquidity from insolvency.  
Financial institutions in need of emergency aid are generally at risk of insolvency due to 




Temporary State aid initiatives implemented by the Commission helped UK and other 
EU Member States‘ banks recapitalize throughout the Global Financial Crisis (‗GFC‘).
202
  The 
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Commission failed to mention anything with respect to longer-term consequences for 
businesses or industries that obtain State aid.
203
 But it is clear that the Commission‘s review of 
the restructuring procedures could have serious implications for industry competition in the 
banking sector going forward.  Beneficiary banks of state guarantee and recapitalizations are 
prone to restrictions on their ongoing commercial conduct.  Such restrictions can include bans 
on advertising touting the government‘s support, restrictions on pricing, constraints on market 
share within certain business lines, and possibly limitations on stock options or cash bonuses 
for bank management staff and employees.
204
   
 
Nationalized financial institutions are generally required to remain under 
predetermined market share caps devised to preclude them from using the public‘s support 
and subsidy to undercut competitors.  In the State aid recapitalization of the UK banks Lloyds, 
Royal Bank of Scotland, and HBOS, the beneficiaries were obligated to assent to a series of 
requirements, including: reinstating lending to pre-credit GFC levels, and limiting the bonuses 
of the banks‘ executives and upper management.
205
 Such requirements could assist in 
preventing unfair competition from banks with government support.   
 
However, bailouts can cause adverse outcomes. In the event that a salvaged 
financial institution is obligated to lower deposit interest rates or raise mortgage rates, it may 
produce distortions and imbalances in the marketplace and hurt consumers and competitors.  
The issue is more complex where financial rescues take place on an industry-wide level, such 
as, with the TARP situation.
206
 In the event that several financial institutions in a given 
market obtain financial relief and are subjected to market share caps, there could be an 
amplified risk of cooperation and coordination between those firms.
207
  Therefore, the 
restrictive measures imposed on bailed out banks by the UK and American authorities, 
especially those of large size, can be more damaging than letting the market guide their 
behaviour.    
                                                        
203
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Competition provisions would not have prevented the GFC, or eliminated TBTF, 
because they are not made with the essential tools to avoid the occurrence of financial 
crises.
208
 Modern competition provisions are not in place to homogenize the size of banks and 
other financial institutions.  They are applied only to forbid dominant conduct, and to stop 
bank mergers in the event of heightened pricing power and market influence. 
 
The method and structure of large bank bailouts employed by the UK and American 
regulators, along with other banking authorities and the Commission, has had consequences 
across the UK and US financial industries. The GFC required extreme measures by banking 
regulators in order to save big banks and other transactional and lending institutions 
underpinning the economy. Many of the actions taken by the authorities have proven 




Permitting large financial institutions to become larger only increased the future risk 
of contagion and the threat posed to the economy by individual institutions.
210
 For instance, 
by permitting Bank of America to acquire Countrywide and Merrill Lynch, the US 
Government allowed a much larger institution to emerge from three that had already 




Through the Dodd-Frank Act,
212
 US lawmakers endeavoured to create a more 
regulated banking and financial sector, establish stability and transparency, and put an end to 
TBTF.
213
 S 121 of the Act granted banking authorities the power to prevent big bank 
mergers.
214
  It, also, granted them the ability to split up banks considered to present systemic 
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risks to financial stability.
215
 US regulators have, also, recognized the value of incorporating 




Some nonbank financial institutions in the US,
217
 have defied the US Government‘s 
legislative and regulatory reaction to the financial meltdown. For example, MetLife, one of 
the largest US nonbank financial institutions by assets, sued the US Government
218
 for 
designating it as a ‗systemically important financial institution‘ (‗SIFI‘).
219
 Once a nonbank 
financial institution is classified as a SIFI, the US banking agencies, including the Federal 





MetLife has been a forceful challenger of SIFI classification, claiming that the 
classification could place it at an unfair disadvantage to competitors.
221
 Its legal action is the 
first test of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (‗FSOC‘), established by the Dodd-
Frank Act,
222
 it consists of the US Treasury Secretary, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve 
and the Chairman of the SEC. Other US nonbank financial institutions, including: Prudential 
Financial, General Electric Capital and AIG, have previously been classified as SIFIs by the 
FSOC, and are presently supervised by the Federal Reserve.
223
  Among these institutions, only 
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Prudential Financial appealed the FSOC‘s decision.
224
 However, Prudential only pursued 




 Unlike US financial reform legislation, which did not employ competition provisions 
to tackle systemic risk, the UK, through the EU financial reform, argued for considering 
competition implications during any merger evaluation.  Similarly, the TFEU acknowledged 
that State aid could influence markets by granting an unjust advantage to recipients.
226
 The 
Treaty also highlighted the inconsistent undertakings used to tackle the GFC, like the mergers 




During the GFC, the Commission acknowledged that the bank bailouts could be 
viewed as both a solution and a problem.
228
 The Commission admitted that were it not for the 
financial rescue provisions, there was a risk that EU governments would have undertaken an 
exorbitant and harmful funding contest, spending billions of taxpayer monies on domestic 
efforts rather than coordinating their funding wherever it was most required.
229
 Going 
forward, the Commission required that large banks present restructuring proposals as a 
prerequisite to receiving public funds.
230
 Requiring such proposals is important for the 
improvement of competition within the financial industry.  Such proposed restructurings of 
large banks may include divestments of assets and broad undertakings to minimize barriers to 
entry.  However, the beneficial effects of bank generated restructuring proposal are yet to be 
seen.  
  
The GFC carried new challenges for competition provisions, the banks that are 
accountable to them and the regulators that enforce them. The UK Government‘s remarkable 
                                                        
224
 D Douglas, ‗Prudential Enters Unchartered Legal Realm by Appealing Its Regulatory Label‘ (3 July, 2013) 
Washington Post. 
225
 D Schwarcz and S L Schwarcz, ‗Regulating Systemic Risk in Insurance‘ (2014) 81 University of Chicago 
Law Review 1569, pp 1570-5. 
226
 TFEU (n41), arts 107(1), and 107(3)(c). 
227
 Ibid, art 107(2)(b). 
228
 Commission, ‗Bank Recovery and Resolution Proposal: FAQs‘ (6 June, 2012) MEMO, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-416_en.htm. 
229
 H Ungerer, ‗State Aids 2008/2009-Twelve Months of Crisis Management and Reforms‘ (14 May, 2009) 
Keynote Address at the 7
th
 Experts‘ Forum on New Developments in European State Aid Law, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2009_05_en.pdf. 
230




measures in the HBOS/Lloyds
231
 bailout reveal how competition law can be disregarded for 
broader considerations of financial stability, systemic stress, and economic peril. In that 
instance, the competition and banking authorities‘ attention was narrowly focused on 
immediate systemic considerations instead of the long-term concerns arising from the 
formation of a new UK banking giant.
232
 Such setting aside of competition considerations 
during the financial crisis might have raised the importance of competition analysis in the 
banking industry going forward.  
 
The Brexit referendum result of 2016 has thrown the UK towards unchartered waters 
in terms of the future relationship between the UK and the EU, including implementation of 
EU provisions and the UK‘s access in the EU market.   However, the foregoing is not part of 
the analysis in this thesis, notwithstanding its importance.  
 
 In conclusion, the UK, US, and other national and international bodies implemented 
various initiatives to address the GFC, TBTF concerns, and the systemic risk of contagion. 
The GFC revealed a number of significant regulatory and central bank failures in terms of 
defective regulation, supervision, resolution, support and macro prudential oversight.  A 
substantial amount of work has been undertaken to correct all of these.  It is arguable that 
sufficient action has been taken to remove the worst threats that arise with TBTF.  
 
10.2  Conclusion 
 
The notions of TBTF and ‗systemic risk‘ emerged as key concerns for the banking and 
financial system.  The question was whether by supporting the ‗quick-fix‘ bank mergers, the 
UK and the US regulators increased the future risks posed by TBTF institutions.  By 
empowering the Anglo-American countries‘ largest financial institutions to combine and 
achieve unprecedented scale, questions were raised whether the governments in the UK and 
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the US had bypassed the requirements of competition provisions, which otherwise may have 
prevented many of these mergers from taking place. 
  
During the GFC it was suggested that a less strict implementation of antitrust 
oversight was necessary.  Both the UK competition and American antitrust regulators were 
burdened by avoiding collapse of the financial system in order to limit competition oversight 
in the financial industry to prop up banks struggling with eroding capital.  The foregoing 
measure included efforts to ease considerations of market control and market domination by 
banks and their acquisitions so that they could benefit from decreased competition and greater 
pricing power. Industry friendly policies were developed toward the largest financial 
institutions. For instance, the largest banks in the UK and the US that already controlled 
significant deposit market-share were permitted to merger large competitors.  
 
Competition provisions were not rigorously applied throughout the GFC that 
eventually, among others, exacerbated TBTF issue.  In approving mergers of large banks and 
other financial institutions, both the UK and American regulators managed to avoid the spread 
of the systemic risk throughout the economy.  
  
 The collapses of Northern Rock in the UK, and Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers in 
the US, as well as major bank consolidation in both countries, have transformed the 
distribution of market share and competition within the industry.  How these transformations 
have affected the consumer is an essential undertaking of whether more rigorous competition 
enforcement is required to constrain further consolidation. 
 
The post GFC enactments of the modernization of financial services legislations in the 
UK and the US, respectively, provided banking and competition regulators with the power to 
prevent big bank mergers.  It, also, granted them the ability to split up banks considered to 
present systemic risks to financial stability. Regulators have, also, recognized the value of 
incorporating systemic risk considerations in competition legislation.  
  
The GFC carried new challenges for competition provisions, the banks that are 
accountable to them and the regulators that enforce them.  The UK Government‘s 
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remarkable undertakings in the takeover of HBOS by Lloyds reveal how competition law 
can be disregarded for broader considerations of financial stability, systemic stress, and 
economic peril. In that instance, the competition and banking authorities‘ attention was 
narrowly focused on immediate systemic considerations instead of the long-term 
concerns arising from the formation of a new UK banking giant. Such setting aside of 
competition considerations during the GFC might have raised the importance of 
competition examination in the banking industry going forward.  
 
Competition provisions would not have prevented the GFC, or eliminated TBTF, 
because they are not made with the essential tools to avoid the occurrence of financial crises. 
Modern competition provisions are not in place to homogenize the size of banks and other 
financial institutions.  They are applied only to forbid dominant conduct, and to stop bank 
mergers in the event of heightened pricing power and market influence.  
 
In relation to the response to the TBTF concern, banking markets are naturally, 
oligopolistic that cannot be prevented with the objective being to ensure that these operate in a 
safe and stable manner. Consumers have a right of choice and can say no with competition 
authorities not being entitled to force competition on them. International competition is also 
relevant with countries having a legitimate interest to ensure that they have one or more large 
banks that can compete globally. The TBTF was a problem following the GFC, although a 
large number of important steps have been taken to correct this since.  To address these 
criticism, the author analyses the responses to the TBTF problem in light of the actions taken 
by the international bodies and national authorities, respectively. 
 
Post the GFC, the national and, especially, international bodies released a series of 
recommendations and time lines on reducing the moral hazard posed by systemically 
important financial institutions. These recommendations seek to improve the ability of 
national regulators to resolve SIFIs in an orderly manner, while allowing these institutions to 
fulfil their key functions in the economy.  SIFIs have now a higher loss absorbency capacity 





International regulators have reaffirmed their view that no financial institution should 
be too big or too complicated to fail and that taxpayers should not bear the costs of resolution.  
 
The policy response to end TBTF was necessary.  The international and national 
regulators have made great progress to put the overall international policy framework in place. 
The application of policies to individual SIFIs, and financial institutions have undertaken 
restructuring necessary in order to make the foregoing institutions resolvable.  
     
Sufficient action has been taken to remove the worst threats that arise with TBTF. 
 
Antitrust is quintessentially addressed to the optimum organization of the nation's 
economy, even if it does not purport to address all aspects of it.  The main issue of 
competition law is economic power and its potential to be misused.  Vast aggregations of 
economic power in convergence with other phenomena caused TBTF crises. It, therefore, 
stands to reason that competition ought to be concerned with some aspects of the TBTF 
problem, at least, insofar as the problem stems from aggregated economic size and power. 
Since the TBTF problem is complex, it is unsurprising that competition by itself is not and 
cannot the cure.  However, the competition law could make a difference by controlling certain 








CHAPTER 11 - DIFFERENCES AND RECOMMENDATION IN ANGLO-AMERICAN 
BANK MERGER COMPETITION ASPECTS 
 
This chapter discuses competition considerations confining Anglo-American bank mergers; 
approaches taken by the UK and US to tackle competition matters arising in bank mergers; 
and what is necessary to be improved, changed, or adopted in the UK and US competition 
systems affecting bank merger situations. 
 
11.0  Competition concerns surrounding Anglo-American bank mergers 
 
Bank mergers policies in relation to competition in the UK and the US have evolved in time.   
 
In the US, the ruling that governs the business of banking as pronounced by the court 
in the Philadelphia National Bank case
1
 is no longer practically applicable to the financial 
services market, which banks and other (non-bank) financial institutions participate 
nowadays. The Philadelphia National Bank case‘s reliance on demand deposits to 
differentiate commercial banks from other financial entities
2
 is, consequently, a relic in the 
existent banking and financial system in the US. 
 
‗Non-bank financial institutions‘ (‗NBFIs‘),
3
 like the insurance companies, credit 
unions, have already entered into other product markets previously controlled by commercial 
banks.  In the event of credit needs, enterprises could simply reach out to finance companies, 
trade credit, leasing companies, and commercial mortgage entities.
4
 Similarly, individuals 
could contact thrift institutions, commercial finance companies, credit unions and credit cards 
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Since the Philadelphia National Bank case, in 1963, non-bank competitors have 
moved into markets previously exclusively dominated by banks, and banks have entered into 
markets in which they did not have a prior presence.
6
 In addition, banks are providing 





Taking a reposition from local markets approach, banks during the pre-Philadelphia 
National Bank era marketed a variety of their traditional products throughout US state 
borders. In the post-Philadelphia National Bank era, lending services units started to permit 
banks to offer loans in geographic territories where banks could not take bank account 
deposits.
8
  In the mid to late 1990s, the liberalization of intrastate bank branching and the 
repeal of the essential parts of the Glass-Steagall Act
9
 by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
10
 
removed the boundaries in the market among the business of banking, securities, and 
insurance.  As result, banks formed financial holding companies where they began to offer 
banking, securities, and insurance products and services beyond their local territory. Taking 





The foregoing developments undermine the conventional view that commercial banks 
are cloistered from competition as they are the exclusive providers of specific products. At 
present, businesses and consumers can at their liberty elect to engage either banks or non-bank 
financial institutions in markets that were previously exclusive to banks and markets in which 
banks did not have a prior presence either because they were prohibited from participating or 
simply overlooked by banks.
12
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 W Busch and J P Moreno, ‗Banks‘ New Competitors: Starbucks, Google, and Alibaba‘ (20 February, 2014) 





Therefore, the Philadelphia National Bank approach,
13
 which continues to be taken by 
the US banking and competition agencies, is outdated due to legislative changes that permit 
both banks and other financial institutions to offer banking products and services.  Moreover, 
the rapid expansion of electronic (online) banking, following the rapid and continuous 
development of software and online technology innovation, have facilitated banks and non-
bank financial institutions to provide online banking products and services not only to local 




Under these circumstances, the US needs to review its current standard as set out in 
the Philadelphia National Bank case to bring the competition parameters of bank mergers in 
line with the reality in the financial market.  The responsibility to set out the new standard 
should be borne by the US courts. 
 
In the UK, issues related to competition in bank mergers have evolved as time 
progresses and in particular with the opening up of the banking industry during the Big Bang 
reform under the bank deregulation undertaken by the Government of Prime Minister 
Thatcher in the 1980‘s.
15
  At that time, large banks acquired smaller financial institutions in 
order to consolidate their position in the market and increase their profits.  However, the 
Government and the banking and competition authorities, including its EU counterparts, failed 
to take measures necessary to address the anticompetitive effects that these acquisitions 
imposed on the financial markets and consumers.
16 
As a result, the operations and size of 
these banks have expanded to a scale that the UK Government and the relevant authorities 
were unable to monitor their activities adequately.  The danger of these banks being ‗too-big-
too-fail‘ (‗TBTF‘) was exposed in the Global Financial Crisis (‗GFC‘). The crisis compelled 
the UK banking and competition authorities to undermine competition laws, with the support 
of the EU competition enforcer, and allow large UK banks to merge with other UK banks that 
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had gone or were on the verge of being insolvent.
17
  By rendering special treatment to certain 
bank mergers in the UK in the name of avoiding a complete meltdown of the financial market, 
despite knowing that these mergers would give rise to anticompetitive concerns in the banking 
and financial industry, the UK Government and the relevant UK and EU authorities have 




The current situation in the UK demonstrates that permitting bank mergers despite 
obvious competition concerns was not the proper measure to enhance the competitiveness in 
the banking sector.
19
  Other attempts have been taken to lessen the effect of the crisis, such as, 
the bank regulators increasing the leverage ratio to big UK banks in order to minimize the 
systemic risk in difficult financial situations; however, they do not tackle the anticompetitive 
issues in the UK that were brought by the special treatment to large bank mergers.  As a result 
of these anticompetitive concerns, the confidence of the British population in banks have 
decreased as recorded by the British Social Attitudes Survey where some 90 per cent of voters 





The Brexit referendum result of 2016 has thrown the UK towards unchartered waters 
in terms of the future relationship between the UK and the EU, including implementation of 
EU provisions and the UK‘s access in the EU market.   However, the foregoing is not part of 
the analysis in this thesis, notwithstanding its importance.  
 
11.1 Approaches taken by the United Kingdom and United States to address 
competition issues arising in bank mergers 
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In the US, the courts are the primary organ to interpret anticompetitive rules that are 
applicable to bank mergers.
21
 The relevant authorities and private claimants may bring 
proceedings to the courts; indeed, most cases have been brought by private claimants.  Unlike 
the UK, which has barely any recorded cases on bank mergers before the courts and the 
Competition Appeal Tribunal,
22
 the US has established a long and rich history of judicial 
proceedings in which bank mergers have gone under close scrutiny.  The American federal 
district courts along with the Supreme Court, over the last five decades, have dealt with a 
number of competition cases involving bank mergers.
23
   
 
The last two decades following the Philadelphia National Bank court ruling
24
 saw the 
most active period of the American courts‘ review of bank definition and its local scope of 
products and services provider in the context of a bank merger.
25
  Thereafter, the number of 
reviews by the judiciary has dropped.
26
  The banks that wished to engage in a merger were 
discouraged by the stringent interpretation of the standard of review by the courts. In 
particular, it became clear to the banks that there was little room to challenge any merger 
decision averse to the banks‘ wishes. As a result, rather than bringing a case to the court, the 
merging parties turned to the competition authorities and banking regulators to reach a 
preliminary compromise and then proceeded to merge. A market practice was developed: the 
merging parties would first divest some of their operations in order to meet the required 
threshold that the merger would not give rise to anticompetitive concerns, and then move 
ahead with the merger.
27
       
 
In UK, the Competition and Markets Authority (‗CMA‘)
28
, in close cooperation with 
the banking regulators, is responsible for bank merger decisions, which are then subject to 
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appeal to the courts, such as the Competition Appeal Tribunal, and the relevant appeal court.
29
 
However, relatively fewer cases to date have been private actions. Banks in the UK generate 
considerable profits from the provision of services to their corporate and individual customers.  
One of the major concerns in relation to the banking markets is their exclusivity and 
concentration, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises (‗SMEs‘) banking.  There 
appears to be a failure to provide relevant information to individual customers and SMEs. 
Customers face substantial obstacles to switching current accounts.
30
 In addition, banks are 
largely in charge of the money transmission. Another issue concerns banking services such as, 
producing barriers to entry, dissatisfactory service standards, excessive charges, and 
innovation failure.
31
 While the competition and banking regulators and the UK Government 
recognize these issues and attempts have been made to address them,
32
 there have been no 
substantial improvement and the issues remain unresolved. Similar problems continue to arise 
and increase in many banking markets. These problems comprise of concentrated markets in 
which both new entry and increase in market shares by contenders proved to be difficult; 
compound and impervious pricing and small degrees of bank account switching, as well as 




 With respect to the issue of concentrated markets, the largest four UK financial 
institutions (Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group, and Royal Bank of Scotland) possess a 
robust and embedded place within the market.
34
 Market researches indicate that in the past 
decade the respective market shares of these established institutions and the ‗challenger‘ 
banks remain almost unchanged.
35
  In particular, two important observations emerged in the 
bank mergers throughout the GFC, especially the takeover of HBOS by Lloyds.
36
   The first 
concern was in relation to the HBOS losing a key position of competition in the market.
37
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The second related to Lloyds‘ larger share of the market, which could encourage the bank to 
concentrate on growing margins from current customers instead of obtaining new customers.
38
  




On bank account switching, annual switching rates remain quite low in the personal 
current account market and higher for small and medium size banking and savings accounts.
40
  
While they were a lot higher for mortgages and credit cards, there has been a considerable 
drop in mortgage switching after 2008.
41
 In relation to the personal current account market, 
the competition and banking regulators have acknowledged issues to the switching process of 
these accounts.
42
 Regulators agree that the bank account switching service process requires 
further enhancement to make it function more efficiently and become less costly for 
consumers.
43
 It is insufficient to simply make it convenient to switch accounts.  Customers in 
addition require the right stimulations in order to carry out their choice of bank provider.  
Consumers within banking markets often encounter problems in comprehending the factual 
cost of managing their bank accounts and paralleling offer packages from other bank 
providers.
44
  It can be frequently observed that financial institutions do not provide sufficient 
care for their consumers in sectors where these institutions generate great revenues. This 
largely reflects the reality in the personal current account market.  Large financial institutions 
may continue to generate revenues from present customers instead of offering appealing 




A concern, also, exists in relation to payment systems.
46
 Payment systems continue to 
remain in banks‘ control. Barriers to entry continue to exist due to access to payment 
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  The UK regulators failed to take an active role in addressing the entry issue. It 
would be fair to question whether the existing UK regulation on overseeing payments would 





The structures of the regime monitoring and overseeing bank mergers in the US and 
the UK differ. First, the US has an established multi-tiered process for reviewing bank 
mergers by the relevant competition authorities and bank regulators. The competition 
authorities and the bank regulators, however, are independent of each other.
49
  The UK, on the 
other hand, has a more flexible reviewing process that allows room for more discretion on the 
part of the relevant authorities.
50
 Moreover, in relation to competition authorities, the federal 
competition authorities in the US hold the highest regulatory power subject to review of the 
courts,
51
 while their UK counterparts are, in addition to review by the courts, subject to the 
decisions of the Commission.
52
 The competition authority and bank regulators in the US may 
utilize the public interest standard when analysing a bank merger,
53
 while in the UK only the 
UK Government, through the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills, may raise 
such standard.
54
 Second, the judicial structures involved in bank mergers decisions in the two 
nations also differ. In the US, generally courts are the ultimate independent competition 
authorities, where any relevant party could lodge an appeal in court on the decision of the 
federal competition authorities.
55
 In the UK, the equivalent judicial counterpart is the 
Competition Appeal Tribunal, whose decisions are rarely appealed to higher court.
56
 Third, 
the US has in place specific laws governing bank mergers,
57
 while in the UK the broader 
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merger provisions apply to bank mergers, and to other business sectors of the economy.
58
 
Under the US law, bank mergers are analysed based on local geographic territory where the 
‗cluster‘ of banking products are provided,
59
 while in the UK, the competition watchdog, 
often, applies a somehow broader relevant geographic territory based on a ‗relevant merger 
situations‘ factors.
60
 As a result, there are currently no discussions in the US concerning the 
reform of competition policies in relation to bank mergers. On the other hand, there is an on-
going effort in the UK to reform the same in the financial services sector.
61
  However, the 




In the US, laws have been passed after the financial crisis as an attempt to prevent 
systemic risk in future financial crisis.
63
 These laws consist of measures that, among others, 
tighten the oversight of banking activities to ensure a better and more organized banking 
market, as well as measures that aim to prevent future bail-outs from the taxpayers‘ monies.
64
 
However, these measures did not generate the expected results. Banks operate in a scale larger 
than what they were previously and continue to find ways to enter into high risk operations, at 
times even through a concerted effort among themselves to generate more profits without 
regard to the competition provisions. For instance, the latest initiative from numerous 
congressmen in the US Congress to revise the Dodd-Frank Act
65
 was quickly rejected by their 
majority colleagues in the Congress.
66
 In this initiative, the Republicans put forward 
numerous changes comprising of the release of up to 30 banks from strict Federal Reserve 
supervision; enhancing the regulators‘ responsibility towards systemic risk exposures; easing 
up on rules about mortgage lending; as well as amplifying the openness of Federal Reserve 
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 On the other hand, the Democrats supported amendments that could dilute 
regulations concerning small community banks and improve the authority of the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau, which is an agency established after the Global Financial Crisis 





Notwithstanding the foregoing, any substantial reforms of the existing laws do not 
seem to be plausible in the foreseeable future. Moreover, banks in the UK and the US, 
especially the large ones, continue to circumvent competition provisions.
69
 In some cases, 
these banks have even cooperated among themselves to generate profits illegally, including 
through the use of avenues, such as, the banking businesses of the foreign exchange markets 
and the interbank lending rates, also known as the London Inter-Bank Offer Rate (‗LIBOR‘)
70
 
rates. In 2015, six worldwide financial institutions paid approximately $5.6bn in order to 
resolve claims that these institutions rigged the markets of foreign exchange that implicated 
criminality to a large extent.
71
  This situation was deemed to be one of the largest instances of 




 During the period 2007 through 2013, traders at Royal Bank of Scotland, Barclays, 
JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, and UBS AG - labelling themselves as ‗the Cartel‘ - made use of 
an exclusive online chatroom and a set of secret code in an attempt to influence the 
benchmark exchange rates with the aim to make more profits.
73
  The US competition 
authorities, led by the Department of Justice, imposed fines on the banks involved and 
considered such fines would be sufficient to deter market players from advancing their own 
interests while disregarding compliance with the relevant laws or consumers‘ interest.
74
  
However, these measures do not bring about the expected deterrence effect. It is clear from 
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 Department of Justice, ‗Five Major Banks Agree to Parent-Level Guilty Pleas‘ (20 May, 2015) Release (‗DOJ 





established precedent that as soon as a bank pays a fine or penalty for engaging in wrongful or 
unlawful activity, it could continue engaging in such activity without further penalization. It 
is, thus, evident that the US approach is counterproductive, especially towards the 
applicability of fairness and lawfulness of competition in the banking system.   
 
The total settlement fines and criminal penalties paid by major UK and US banks to 
the relevant authorities from 2008 to date amounted to approximately $160bn, a staggering 
sum of monies.
75
 For example, in 2015 Royal Bank of Scotland, Barclays, Citigroup, 
JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America and UBS paid billions of pounds and dollars to resolve 
claims that their traders attempted to rig interbank lending rates.
76
 These banks paid to the 
regulators over $10bn with respect to the foreign exchange manipulative activities (the so-
called ‗forex scandal‘), surpassing the $9bn paid by them to settle the LIBOR rigging 
allegations.
77
 Barclays alone paid to the authorities roughly $2.3bn since 2008, rendering it 
the largest penalty paying bank in the UK. Indeed, the FCA fined Barclays £4284m, which is 




The lack of deterrent effect by the imposition of fine is also evident in the UK.  In 
2015, in response to the increased scrutiny and stricter regulations imposed by the UK 
banking and competition authorities, the British Bankers‘ Association (‗BBA‘), pressured by 
major UK financial institutions, appointed an independent team of expert to review the 
competitiveness of UK banks on behalf of the sector.
79
  This step was also taken in response 
to anticipated further tightening of the regulatory and fiscal clampdown from the re-elected 
conservative government in the May, 2015 election.
80
 The appointment was made upon 
warning from UK banks that they have begun shifting their investment and assets outside the 
UK as a result of the tightening of the UK banking regulatory regime and higher bank levy. 
The major UK banks along with the BBA opined that UK has gone ahead of other nations to 
implement restrictive measures in order to guarantee to the British people that they would not 
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be required to bail out banks and other financial institutions again.
81
 Moreover, the UK banks 
complained that the latest increase in the bank levy as a punitive measure has made it more 
strenuous to compete in international markets.
82
 As a result, some leading UK banks with a 
global operation are considering to move activities out of the UK or to stop investing in the 
country.  After the release of the Budget in 2015, where the HM Treasury increased the rate of 
the bank levy for the ninth time since 2011 to a historic high of 0.21 per cent of worldwide 





The independent review commissioned by the BBA was focused on the issue of 
whether the UK banking industry has lost its edge due to the UK Government tightening 
regulation of the banking business since the GFC.  The independent commission released a 
report in late 2015, issuing recommendation for reconsideration of the government‘s present 
position of escalating measures that restrict banks operations.
84
 Other than corporate and 
personal taxation issues, the report looked into regulation governing other aspects of banks 
operations, such as, the requirement for banks to ring-fence their retail activities from other 
operations, and the uncertainties related to the projected referendum in 2016 of the British 
people to exit the EU.
85
  The report found that the UK Government needs to act urgently to 
address issues about its regulatory and tax environment if London is to remain a global 
financial centre and if banks located in the UK are to remain competitive internationally.
86
  
The report noted that regulatory overhauls put in place after the Global Financial Crisis had 
reduced banking returns globally, and that policy and regulatory decisions in the UK, 
especially, had ‗begun to reduce the attractiveness of the UK as a location for international 
banking and hinder UK wholesale banks‘ ability to compete internationally‘.
87
  According to 
the report, the total amount of banking assets in the UK had dropped 12 per cent since 2011, 
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but that it had increased 12 per cent in the US, in the same period.
88
  The report found that the 
UK Government should carry out a review of the recent financial reform regulations to 
identify ‗unintended consequences and areas where objectives are not effectively met‘, 
ensuring that the threshold for ring fencing is ‗inflation-proof‘, so that smaller banks are not 
stifled by having to comply with the new rules.
89
 
 In the 1960s, like in the US, where banking was contingent on the competition law, in 
the EU, the Commission, around the same time, took the necessary steps to regulate mergers, 
national protectionism, price agreements, State aid, and dominant abusive conduct.
90
 In 
relation to the competition aspects of bank mergers, the Commission has contributed to the 
control of the distortions formed by public bailout due to its unique position, within the EU 




Prior to the GFC, the EU State aid control in relation to banking was mainly based on 
two incidents. One case involved Crédit Lyonnais in France concerning costs up to 2.5 per 
cent of the gross domestic product
92
, and the second case was on the state guarantees in 





Upon the occurrence of the GFC, the Commission has handled several banking aid 
cases. For instance, during the year of 2008 the competition authority took twenty-two 
decisions, and by the end of 2009 it took eighty-one decisions out of which seventy-five of 
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The EU competition authority imposes conditions for the recapitalization or 
guarantees from the state: non-discriminatory entry to state assistance in order to maintain an 
equal opportunity among financial institutions and banking sectors; assistance needs to be 
restricted in time and scope with handouts from the private sector; and suitable market-
designed remuneration for recapitalization or support.
95
 In addition, beneficiary financial 
institutions must comply with specific conduct rules.
96
  Enticements must be provided for 
eventual termination of the state capital injection. A differentiation needs to be drawn between 
banks that have a solid presence but possibly distressed due to contagion on the one hand, and 
other distressed banks with recapitalizations solely for financial institutions that have a solid 
presence, on the other.
97
 The conditions are realistic because they attempt to lessen the 
distortions brought together by public assistance, especially for financial institutions that do 
not have a solid presence. 
 
The regulatory instruments utilized are of a structural nature given the divestitures and 
balance sheet cutbacks. These instruments are also of a behavioural nature given the 
limitations on pricing, publicity, or staff and employees‘ compensation. For instance, 
Northern Rock bank was compelled to distinguish between a ‗good‘ bank that had an opening 
balance sheet of about 20 per cent of the pre-GFC level and a continuation of taking deposits 
and mortgage lending, and a ‗bad‘ bank that held most of the aftermath mortgage loans of 
Northern Rock bank.
98
 Northern Rock was not permitted to carry out price leadership or to 
publicize any public assistance.
99
 At another instance, the Royal Bank of Scotland was 
directed to sell its operations in some retail activities, commodity-trading, and insurance.
100
  It 
is worth noting that the EU competition authority expressed concern over concentration in 
retail and corporate banking for SMEs to the Royal Bank of Scotland, and, with regard to 
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commodity-trading and insurance activity, the authority stated the benefits of the divestments 




Various courses of actions undertaken by the Commission could be seen as efforts to 
reduce competitive distortions of the Member State assistance, and others to examine moral 
hazard in the foreseeable future.
102
 In essence, the goal of the EU, the UK, and the US 
competition authorities should be to sustain competition, instead of curbing moral hazard, 
which is the role of the banking regulators. A significant consideration for maintaining the 
separation of roles is that even the measures directed solely at competitive distortions would 
cause an effect on expected incentives because a bank would be aware of the fact that, in 
event of trouble, aid would arrive with the imposition of particular restrictions. This is 
relevant to institutions being TBTF due to the fact that the notion of competitive distortion 
could include competition contingent on the advantage of the institution being TBTF. The 
limitations on the boundaries of operations outside the regulated basic banking activities could 





A significant benefit of the State aid control is the restrictions on the bankers‘ 
incentives to undertake unwarranted risk in the anticipation of a bailout in the event that 
anything goes wrong. More specifically, it tackles the TBTF concern. Competition authorities 
in the UK, US, and the EU should take into consideration the fact that a failing bank receiving 
help could potentially distort competition. Restricting the integral size of a bank after it 




The engagement of the EU competition authority raises the issue of competitive 
balance with US banks that were recapitalized from the government without divestiture 
undertakings. This could become particularly important in the banking business involving 
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global competition. The US Government advocated restrictions on the size and scope mainly 
with regard to the proprietary trading activities carried out by banks in order to avert the 




The difference in approach between the US, on one hand, and the UK and EU, on the 
other hand, is that while the UK and the EU competition authorities attempted to resolve the 
issues through State aid control, their US counterpart opted to deal with the matter by 
regulations. 
 
The US is pursuing another course in which the TBTF issue is not tackled directly as 
an antitrust issue. The 2010 Dodd-Frank Act
106
 presented a moderate variant of the 
restrictions on proprietary trading activities (the Volcker Rule)
107
 carried out by banks and 
reinforced some restrictions on size by extending the Riegle-Neal Act 1994.
108
 This forbids 
any bank merger or acquisition that could lead to the combined banking organization 
controlling above ten per cent of domestic deposits in the US of all kinds of depository 
institutions.
109
 It also introduces a restriction of concentration towards any consolidation of 




Size and scope limitations are direct instruments to address the TBTF matter.  Controls 
on size can become complex due to the fact that interconnectedness and line of business 
specialty are deemed more significant than size of the institution for systemic risk.  As for the 
scope of the operations of banking institution, conflict of interest results in possible market 
failure and can be the basis for potential scope restrictions.  Greater capital and insurance fees 
for systemically important financial institutions along with effectual resolution procedures 
could be a preferable method of confronting with the problem.  This needs to be coupled with 
careful consideration of conflicts of interest in financial conglomerates. Considering the 
restrictions of behavioural regulation, structural limitations become warranted.  The result is 
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that the UK and the US competition authorities, fulfilling their task of regulating competition, 
should have a part to play in the TBTF matter. Their initiatives need to be harmonized with 
the banking regulators in their respective countries. The prospect of competition policy to 




The move from the US Government seems to be resonant of the 19
th
-Century 
competition practice of distrusting big banks and other financial institutions due to the power 
concentration, often exercised in an imprudent manner, they can sustain.
112
  Competition 
policy later progressed towards market power in a specific market in which size was not 
deemed an offense.  The impact that the investment banks created on the financial 
intermediaries‘ deregulation and the safeguarding of vast rise in leverage culminating with the 
GFC has backfired in the last decade. Currently, the banking markets are situated within the 
territory of political economy and the challenge consists of finding the proper instrument to 




Bank mergers have followed two particular trends in the UK and the US, one through 
voluntary mergers and the other through mergers arranged by the respective governments to 
resolve the assets and liabilities of banks in distressed financial conditions. Voluntary bank 
mergers peaked in the late 1980‘s until the mid-1990s when economies in the UK and the US 
enjoyed steady and strong economic growth, high interest rates, and deregulation.
114
  




In relation to the consequences of boosted more dynamic bank dimension and 
concentration for numerous characteristics of sector performance, banks grow bigger and 
engage in a broader span of operations across those, which have traditionally been left with 
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 Moreover, systemic risk, such as, the prospect that adverse 
economic situations would have a ripple effect of reactions with grave consequences on the 
economy may grow quickly and uncontrollably. Those banks that grow as TBTF need 
financial assistance from their supervisory institutions under the orchestration of the 
government, which is inconsistent with the notion of a free market.  The outcry from the 
public that followed the US Government‘s TARP in 2008 and 2009 was a clear example of 
the reaction to government aid granted to large banks.
117
 Although the US Government 
marketed the aid as a temporary relief warranted under the extraordinary circumstances in the 
financial market, the government‘s intervention created substantial moral hazard risks, 
indirectly allowing banks to become less prudent of the investments they undertake and, for 
this reason, exasperating the danger of future financial crises.
118
  Offering risk reduction to the 
failing large banks, while not offering the same level of protection to small banks, creates 
unfair and unequal treatment the small banks.  Such treatment could also lead to reduced 
borrowing cost for large bank in comparison to the borrowing costs for small banks.  This cost 





It is also likely that the foregoing approach could increase the prominence of the 
largest banks to attain elevated profits and prices as a result of the economic power sustained.  
The increase of concentration of the banking markets through bank mergers may potentially 
lead to a rise in profitability to the merged institution(s). Consequently, and ultimately, such 
concentration and profitability could create a monopoly in favour of these merged institutions 
in the banking and financial markets. This should not be allowed to happen. Competition 
authorities along with the banking regulators in the UK and US must coordinate their efforts 
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to prevent banks from merging in a way that would create absolute sizes within the banking 




The GFC compelled the occurrence of numerous bank mergers in the UK and the US 




In the UK, the takeover of HBOS by Lloyds
122
 was rubber-stamped against the 
competition authority‘s recommendation regardless of a 30 per cent market share of the 
merged institution in mortgages and the current accounts, as well as competition issues with 
regard to the SMEs banking services in Scotland.
123
  Ironically, in 2001, the UK Government, 
following the advice from the then competition authorities that the deal was to operate against 
the public interest, did not permit Lloyds to take over Abbey.
124
 Lloyds negotiated with the 
Commission some divestment measures due to the fact that in the merger process the bank 
received from the UK Government a State aid.
125
  It appears that the UK Government used a 
broad interpretation of the ‗failing firm‘ (or ‗exiting firm‘) defence doctrine.
126
 Under this 
doctrine, a merger with a failed firm cannot produce competition concerns since the assets of 
the entity would depart the market in the event of failure, to permit anticompetitive mergers to 
strengthen the financial system.
127
   
 
In the US, due to several consolidation transactions during and after the GFC, Bank of 
America, JPMorgan Chase, and Wells Fargo combined to date counted for over 30 per cent of 
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the national market share deposits in the country.
128
 This created a serious concentration of the 
market share deposits in selected major banks. Such concentration created potential effects 
towards the lessening of the competition in the market share deposits with the likelihood of a 
negative impact on consumers‘ costs and the quality of banking services.
129
   
 
Large banking groups have grown market power and sustained a lower cost of capital 
due to the public bailout and the fact that they are TBTF. Bank merger policy impacts the 
level of competition and effective incentives. The merger of a failed financial institution could 
potentially remunerate an incumbent with temporary monopoly sway. The risk would be that 
the incumbents could grow their market power and other (smaller) financial institutions could 
be shielded from entry.
130
   
 
A merger competition policy throughout the banking sector needs to be drawn in 
consideration of a long-term view. All the more in a financial crisis condition, like the GFC, 
such policy must facilitate the most favourable level of concentration in the sector, compelling 
incentives for foresight of incumbents, and the ease of entry. The consolidation of the banking 
sector as a result of the GFC would less likely be seen as problematic if the grown market 
power of the merger banks were a temporary benefit for previous prudent conduct that would 
likely disappear with new entry. However, in the event that the market power is consolidated 
due to the obstacles to entry into banking, investors and consumers would suffer the 




In the EU, there is an additional latent contradiction between financial stability and 
merger control. The EU would demand any pertinent information and documentation from the 
UK and other national competition and banking authorities in bank mergers in the banking 
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industry of the EU dimension. However, pursuant to the ECMR, Member States have the right 
or the ‗legitimate interest‘ to block a merger in order to safeguard financial stability within the 
domestic market.
132
 Unlike the UK competition and banking authorities, their EU national 
counterparts have utilized the merger regulation to keep at bay foreign banks.
133
  This raises 
the issue of whether individual Member States need to be permitted to put into action this 
exception that allows countries to preserve their leading national banks and other financial 
institutions. 
 
The Brexit referendum result of 2016 has thrown the UK towards unchartered waters 
in terms of the future relationship between the UK and the EU, including implementation of 
EU provisions and the UK‘s access in the EU market.   However, the foregoing is not part of 
the analysis in this thesis, notwithstanding its importance.  
 
 Merger activity was a key contributor to the increase in combined concentration in the 
US banking sector, especially from the mid-1980s until the time of occurrence of the GFC.
134
  
For example, between 1985 and 2010, the share of assets controlled by the ten largest US 




 Broadly speaking, advising on the financial characteristics of mergers is oligopolistic.  
Meanwhile, various banks cooperate among themselves to render the desired advice. There 
appears to be indications that banks work together instead of at distance, separately and 
autonomously.  In instances when banks cooperate in a significant and profitable activity, like 
the merger advice, they develop cooperative approaches concerning the pricing of their 
services. This is a fundamental element for resolving the oligopoly pricing issue, which 
produces supra-normal profits.
136
 Overwhelming evidence of cooperation on pricing issues 
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 The market share - oligopoly perceptions are supported by following facts.  The major 
credit rating agencies, like Moody‘s, Standard & Poor‘s, and Fitch, control the business of 
rating securities in the UK, US, and globally.  Five US banks appear to write about 97 per cent 
of credit default swaps.
138
  The four prominent US banks covered approximately 91 per cent 
of the conceptual nominal value of derivatives outstanding in 2012.
139
 Five banks appear to 
control American and European trading in over the-counter derivatives.
140
 The four biggest 
US banks issue nearly two-thirds of all credit cards in the country.
141
 Four banks account for 
approximately two-thirds of mutual fund holdings in the US.
142
 Four financial institutions 
originated closely half of corporate debt issues in the US.
143
 The picture in the UK is similar 
to the US. The ‗oligopoly‘ of established players as Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds and Royal Bank 
of Scotland remains an unchallenged and worrisome reality.
144
 These banks still provide more 





 Evidence of tight oligopoly can be found in the fragments of the banking sector, 
served largely by the biggest banks and other financial institutions. However, systematic 
information about specified financial services market structures is incomplete. The public 





 US President Theodore Roosevelt, who undertook the initiative to fix the 
vacuum, remarked to the Congress that,  
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[t]he first requisite [for tackling the antitrust issue] is knowledge, full and complete - 




A research conducted during the period 1985 through 2010 found that 10,321 commercial 
bank mergers were registered in the US.
148
 During this period, no anti-merger cases were 
reported for 22 years; in other words, no merger transactions were challenged by consent 
settlement or review by the judiciary.
149
  In the seven reported bank merger consent decisions, 
of which two related to debit card or cash machine network combinations instead of bank 
branches,
150
 a total of 46 units were demanded to undertake divestures.
151
  This apparent lack 
of formal litigation is due to the lack of room for a different interpretation of the rules laid 
down by the US Supreme Court in Philadelphia National Bank case.
152
  In the event of 
litigation, the risk of deal-breaking will be delayed by an automatic stay and a temporary 
injunction against a bank merger, and the merger parties would often bring their merger plans 
to their regulators beforehand.  In this situation, the merger parties and the regulators would 
negotiate voluntary settlements in order to avoid the federal or state competition authorities 
filing a formal complaint with the appropriate court.  In fact, the Department of Justice has not 




 Under normal situation, nearly all bank merger reviews in the UK and US are 
concluded with proposals for divestiture of one or more branches of the merger banks.
154
  The 
existing evidence shows that the competition authorities in these jurisdictions remain in a 
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powerful bargaining position due to the government‘s powerful (decision making) voice in the 
UK and the judicial precedents in the US. The Anglo-American regulators have made use of 
their leverage to negotiate the divestiture of particular branches that present risks to 
competition from merging banks, which tend to have a more overwhelming influence in the 
merger and hold a considerably larger number of branches. In the process of conducting 
research for this paper, there are only a modest number of publications that demonstrate a 
clear understanding on how the bargaining process between the regulator and the merging 
banks functions.  It can, thus, be fair to assume that would-be merger banks negotiate with the 
government and attempt to do everything possible to keep their branches divestures, which 
surrenders minimal competitive advantage.  
 
11.2 What needs to be improved, changed, or adopted in the Anglo-American 
competition systems towards bank mergers and consolidations? 
 
Going beyond emergency measures to stabilise the financial markets, the GFC revealed the 
need to reconsider the purpose of competition policy and Anglo-American competition 
authorities in these markets in the medium and long run.  Improvements in regulations and 
institutions would also be welcomed in order to ensure adequate enforcement of merger and 
competition provisions following consolidations and nationalisations in the banking 
industry.
155
 Any possible changes to the framework of competition policy in order to enhance 
the resolution of crisis conditions would require a thorough analysis of the roots of the 
financial meltdown, including an overview of its competitive outcomes in the medium and 
long run.
156
  A substantial amount of work has been undertaken to correct all of the 
deficiencies that occurred during the GFC.  However, it is arguable that sufficient action has 
been taken to remove the worst threats that arise with TBTF.  
 
Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, competition policy in the UK and the US has 
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shifted towards a more effective implementation in the banking industry.
157
 This echoed the 
shift in the theoretical foundation that competition is no longer seen as being necessarily 
disadvantageous to stability, and that banking regulators could obtain additional tools to 
monitor bank stability, for instance, the rules about the capital requirements under the Bank 
for International Settlement‘s Basel accord (‗Basel III‘).
158
 To a certain extent, the 
consolidation of competition supervision in the financial industry has been positive when 
comparing anticompetitive conducts and possible anticompetitive bank merger situations.
159
           
Notwithstanding this approach, Anglo-American systems allow for significant 
exemptions from the framework of the competition provisions that regulate the banking 
industry and of the regulators responsible to implementing them.  The assessment of a bank 
merger case by the competent agencies may be halted or an adverse ruling could be inverted 
by reason of stability disquiets.  The ‗stability‘ justification could be raised by the Secretary of 
State for Business, Innovation and Skills, in UK, and the Federal Reserve, in the US.
160
   
 
The starting point is that the rapport between financial stability and competition is to 
be assessed on a case-by-case basis, or, better still; concerns with regard to competition are to 
be conditioned to the goal of achieving financial stability, when in conflict. In general, a 
government regulator should form a balanced and objective view, and make a decision based 
on the particular situation in relation to a banking regulator. However, the assessment can be 
convoluted and can depend on the reputation of the banks concerned and the stages of 
responsibility, or regulatory enforcement.  In respect of the UK structure, the financial 
stability specification would be applied through a supra-national institution rather than the UK 
authorities, provided that the depth of assimilation of financial markets and the supra-national 
concerns a bank merger reviewed by the Commission. This relates to whether an EU banking 
authority is required to step in, which in turn depends on whether the UK and other Member 
States have made use of the stability factor to create artificial barriers to the integration of the 
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Some important observations can be made after a closer look at these specifications 
concerning the financial stability.  Assuming that certain restrictions in the enforcement of 
competition provisions imposed on the banking industry are necessitated, the crux of the 
matter is whether more systematic effort and positive steps must be taken in order to prevent 
financial meltdowns, rather than merely using exceptions in mechanisms, which are more 
traditionally utilized in crisis administration like a bank mergers and the public backing.  It 
would be advisable to narrow down unwarranted competition through, for instance, effective 





In relation to the broader goals of the competition policy in bank merger, the issue is 
whether the competition review should pay attention particularly to consumer prosperity, or to 
follow additional goals, such as, systemic stability and the broad economic progress. Different 
approaches could be taken. One way could be to specifically integrate goals other than 
consumer prosperity in the institutional structure of competition review.  Another possibility 
would be to allow competition agencies to focus on consumer prosperity and allow another 
agency or governmental authority to assess and address the detrimental effect of consumer 




It is difficult to determine, which approach is better suited and more practical in 
extending the goals of competition policy in the banking and financial industry.  However, the 
financial stability and preventing systemic risk should take priority towards any competition 
concerns.  Expanding the goals of competition agencies outside of the consumers‘ wellbeing 
has the advantage of maintaining probable rapport between competition issues and additional 
issues within the same financial institution, with the benefit that financial stability, as shown 
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from the events of the GC, has a higher priority.
164
 Competition agencies may not be in the 
best place to judge the macro-economic consequences of a concentration, a collusive 
agreement, or proper understanding. As a result, there is a need for a certain kind of 




A relevant concern relates to the need for competition agencies to constantly 
familiarize themselves with the ever-changing and evolving banking and financial markets.  
Financial modernization and other novelties within the framework of markets have not been 
always taken into consideration in previous actions and decisions.  For example, in a bank 
merger the matter of control between the merging banks remains rather concentrated on the 
consequences of consolidation in retail banking and, in particular, about deposits and 
providing loans to SMEs.
166
  Although this is reasonable because of the existence of switching 
costs and relationship lending, it is also important to acknowledge the increasing prominence 
of the online and electronic banking and other types of modernization, which might alter the 
framework of retail banking.  In this regard, it would be likely for competition policy to aim 
and influence the structure of the banking and financial systems by, for instance, eradicating 
impediments to entry or making easier the switching of depositors.  Nevertheless, one related 
concern would be that the increase in convenience of switching could create considerable 
instability. This is because depositors would be motivated to take out their monies by the 





Another concern relates to competition regulators placing more emphasis on the risks 
perceived by banks, particularly during the GFC. Taking into consideration the characteristics 
of financial services, prices might not be a distinctive feature of the competitive circumstances 
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in the financial markets when placed in isolation. A bank rendering high deposit rates, low 
lending rates, or easy option to credit ought to undertake significant risks about its assets, 




Apart from the financial services reforms taken in the UK and the US, it is also 





Extraordinary situations call for extraordinary actions. Nevertheless, while the 
financial markets attain stability, extraordinary actions to maintain liquidity in the markets and 
to preserve solvency of financial institutions will no longer be required in order to meet 
important initiatives taken by the UK and the US governments. These governments would 
thereafter turn their attention to remove anti-competitive practices, which was what might 




Without such exit strategies or stimulus, banks might, in reality, become accustomed 
to the UK and US government bailouts, and competitive distortions might be compound in the 
near future.  In the event that the UK or the US government aid is valued under a just market 
rate, including situations of markets equilibrium, banks would likely forge ahead to ask for 
public bailout.  As a consequence, banks might receive an unjust competitive edge.  Exit plans 




At times bank mergers that likely harmed competition happened with the blessing of 
the UK or American government. Instances are mega bank mergers, where banks with more 
sound balance sheets were amalgamated with weaker banks. It is worth looking into the 
analysing and crafting of the exit policies with regard to anti-competitive mega bank mergers, 
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considering that they are better structured than other configurations of financial crisis 
undertaking.
172
  On this subject, nationalizations are desirable to super bank mergers due to 
the fact that they establish less market power and render a firmer solvency guarantee. 
Nevertheless, nationalizations are designed to disproportionate government course throughout 





It is perhaps inadvisable to build policies that would clearly and directly render for exit 
from anticompetitive bank mergers. The most unswerving undertakings, such as, 
fragmentation in the event of mega bank merger(s), could bring unsettling result about other 
more beneficial financial institution mergers.  Competition authorities in the UK and the US 
are generally unwilling to assume reflective confronts towards bank mergers due to these 
unsettling results and the apprehension that it is unjust to contest bank mergers, which have 
previously been effectuated, especially considering that the competition authority has 
endorsed the merger prior to its contesting.
174
 Previously, financial institutions were permitted 
to collaborate more freely or to take on behaviour that would constraint entry or expansion by 
new financial institutions as part of efforts to act upon the systemic crises.  However, 
permitting financial institutions to take on anticompetitive behaviour, like the abuse of 
dominance in financial markets, could cause sudden harmful results towards consumers and 
the economy as a whole. Consumers would miss opportunities of better and more products at 
more reasonable prices.
175
  The economy would not benefit with regard to development and 
long-standing productivity. The UK and the US governments ought to remain rightly 
unswerving to the prosperity of competition. 
 
In the preeminent conditions, exit policies should be considered in the course of 
rehabilitation and rescue operations. A series of pro-competitive exit policies deserve 
consideration.  Some were previously implemented in the actions taken during or post GFC.
176
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However, their implementation is less than comprehensive and the means utilized, such as, 
pricing interferences, depend substantially on the UK and the US, forming probable 
comprehensive distortions in competition, which deserve additional review. A policy that has 
failed to bring sufficient attention and review relates to the safeguarding of competition in a 





There are a number of exit policies that promote competition.  
 
In relation to the exit from the UK and US governments‘ measures, one option is the 
sale of public stakes in nationalized banks and other financial institutions for a period of time, 
which is realistic, clear, and predictable to restrict the time where there are possibilities of 
competition distortions. The sale should be in line with competition provisions to guarantee 
that government divestments would not lessen market competition. The sale should also 
warrant that any structural competition concerns existent, such as, from excessive market 




The exit strategy of both governments‘ actions should be for granting capital or other 
specific bailout monies that are considered suitable, whilst offering incentives, especially 
financial benefits, which would motivate the benefitting banks to favour private funds.  
Governments should also frequently reassess the necessity of public guarantees and funding, 
including whether public guarantees and funding are delaying a prompt return to ordinary 
market situations.   
 
In addition, these governments should subject the bailout monies to non-financial 
businesses on restructuring to warrant a sustainable future business strategy. They should limit 
the degree, which the UK and US governments‘ subsidies would be utilized for reasons that 
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were not intended by the respective governments.
179
 An important aspect is the curbing of the 
function of the respective governments in daily business aspects of the supported financial 
institutions, and to ensure that financial incentives are available for the banks obtaining 




The UK and American governments should decrease anticipation of capital or other 
particular backing for the banks and other financial institutions in the event that the systemic 
distresses could be less existent, banks have more liquidity and are solvent, and loaning 
monies to the economy has gotten back to status quo. 
 
Both jurisdictions across the Atlantic should also undergo an evaluation process of the 
financial market policies and regulatory configurations in relation to eliminate existing 




Exit strategies from anticompetitive private measures should be in place in order to 
evade anticompetitive business frameworks by favouring transnational bank acquisitions of 
domestic banks in which domestic acquisitions threaten mounting market force. 
 
To the extent that anti-competitive extra-large bank mergers have taken place, 
facilitating new entry would lessen competitive issues of such bank mergers by diminishing 
regulatory obstacles to entry to banking in formal practice and regulation. Another option 
would be to raise the availability of credit-rating information obtainable of the SMEs and 
individual consumers. A policy could also be in place to warrant that switching costs of bank 
accounts are at some degree of limitation, for instance, by effectuating a system that decreases 




 The UK and their American counterparts should consider, at a transnationally or 
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bilateral synchronized level, whether structural separation would be compulsory for 
investment banking activities, which are positioned in a bank or within a financial holding 
institution.  In the event that no structural fence is placed, investment banking could most 
probably obtain entry to low cost lines of credit provided by the Bank of England in the UK 
and the Federal Reserve in the US.  In addition, the same investment banking could gain 
access to guarantees absent to independent banks and other financial institutions.   
 
Permitting investment banks to function within a bank in order to profit from a bank‘s 
low interest rates largely alters competition with independent investment banking and 
produces a possibly ambiguous motivation for precarious undertakings to be concealed and 
lacking in transparency within bigger, less hazardous entities.   
 
One probable measure in order to prevent the formation of a ‗Glass-Steagall‘
183
 on 
both sides of the Atlantic could be an endorsement of a non-operating holding company 
configuration. Under this company structure, the divisions of financial institutions involving 
investment banking and commercial banking operations are subsidiaries of a non-operating 
parent and would borrow capital under their name with no remedy to the parent or other arms 
of the group. 
 
Following the recent enactment of the financial services legislative reforms (including 
implementation of the Vickers‘ Report)
184
 and investigation inquiries taken by the regulators, 
the UK is proceeding to tackle concerns about the market concentration of banks and other 
financial institutions.  In the US, the Dodd-Frank legislation
185
 forbids a financial institution 
from acquiring or merging with alternative business if it results in an institution in excess of 





Evaluating competition concerns in the banking industry remains a multifaceted 
process. In general, the support of competition is founded on cost reduction and apportioned 
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efficiency in the banking sector. Nevertheless, the standard competitive threshold might not 
function completely due to reasons including unbalanced data and information in corporate 
interactions, switching costs, as well as in retail banking networks.
187
 The most noticeable 
effect could be that competition does not constantly uphold effectiveness in financial markets. 
 
In relation to the asymmetric information, one of the principal functions of financial 
institutions is to monitor and screen investment projects. This establishes significant 
informational unbalances among financial institutions and possible borrowers and financial 
institutions. Competition impacts these informational unbalances, thus, altering the group of 
borrower‘s banks issue loans.  For instance, when borrowers vary in quality, competition in 
the credit markets would aggravate the ‗winner‘s curse‘ problem due to higher loan rates 
leaning towards the exacerbation of the quality of businesses taken on the loan, thereby 
lowering the quality of borrower. Raising the loan rate above that of the competitor could 
cause two opposite consequences on the profit of the deviating bank.  Its profit would peak 
throughout the typical price aftermath, while it exacerbates the quality of businesses that 
receive the loan and thereby cutting down its profit. The business receiving a loan from a bank 
that provides a higher loan rate has low credit ability on average. This establishes impediment 
to entry, which in turn creates an oligopolistic
188
 build-up of the industry, and could throw 




Credit ratings could assist the finding of a solution regarding the issue of unbalanced 
data and information. They hold an important position in consumer lending, SMEs lending, 
asset-backed securities and corporate debt problems. In the UK and the US, limited credit 
rating data is accessible for SMEs and consumers. One outcome is that financial institutions 
would face the issue of opposing selection. Consumers and SMEs, which allow their home 
bank and other financial institutions to seek for credit elsewhere, might have been initially 
denied credit by their home bank and other financial institutions that obtain the most itemized 
data about the client‘s credit ability. Other banks would for that reason be cautious of new 
customers and would justly set a credit premium for such customers.  Guaranteeing that fine-
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grained credit rating data about SMEs and consumers would largely be accessible could boost 
to surmount this asymmetric data issue and step up the readiness of financial institutions to go 




For securities ratings, like asset-backed securities and corporate debt, globally 
acknowledged credit rating organizations remain a central role. Competition regulators have 
examined certain business practices of credit rating institutions.
191
 Competition between credit 
rating organizations frequently does not function in the interest of rendering balanced and 
precise ratings. As the credit rating institutions compete actively among themselves for the 
business of securities issuers, such competition could drop the quality of ratings from the 
investor‘s viewpoint by functioning as competition to inferior parameters and forming a 
financial favouritism in favour of over-high ratings. The US prerequisite that credit rating 
organizations become nationally acknowledged statistical rating agencies created a 
considerable obstacle to entry for new credit rating organizations in the US.
192
  From the time 
of modification in the regulatory method in 2007, more credit rating organizations have been 
able to attain the status of nationally recognized statistical rating organizations (‗NRSROs‘) 
status
193
 in the US, which receive payment merely from investors.  Nevertheless, persuading 
investors to obtain ratings from smaller agencies is not an easy task.  It can also be a challenge 
to sway issuers to offer information to credit rating organizations agencies, which are not 
compensated by the issuer as issuers purportedly prefer maintaining a client rapport with 
credit rating organizations. 
 
In the US, the SEC has spoken openly in favour of competition
194
 by suggesting the 
removal of some regulations that provide the applicability of ratings by an authorized agency, 
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considering that more attention in implementing ratings reassures better outcomes from 
competition among credit rating organizations. The EU Commission has set forth several 
propositions.
195
 However, these proposed measures would be inadequate to facilitate new 
entry and would vigorously impair new entry by outlawing unsolicited ratings as well as 
possibly introducing a prominent criterion about registration of credit rating organizations as 




In relation to the issue of switching costs, customer mobility and option are 
fundamental to encouraging competition in retail banking. In spite of this, the amount of 
customer mobility is small, while the durability of customer and bank interactions remains 
extensive. One factor, which could justify the limited level of the current accounts‘ switching, 
is the fact that both the economic and non-economic costs of switching remain relatively 
substantial. In transferring from one bank to another, consumers sustain costs related to the 
actual move of accounts, allocations of bill payments, or failure of data.  Similarly, mental and 




 Switching costs, thus, represents a pivotal basis of market control in the area of retail 
banking.
198
 There are two main characteristics in the competitive aspect of switching costs.  
First, the switching costs facilitate the exercise of market control after financial institutions 
have ascertained a customer base that continues to be confined.  Second, the switching costs 
create tough competition to expand the customer base. On this subject, there is a robust 
characteristic of competition for the market. Hence, switching costs would prompt financial 
institutions to provide high deposit rates primarily to entice customers, and to decrease them 
once consumers are locked in. This arrangement is consistent with pragmatic approaches and 
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Legislators in the UK and the US could enable switching costs in several respects.  
First, they could assist the endorsing of better financial knowledge and consumer education 
with regard to financial options by, for instance, providing more information concerning 
prices and accountability. Second, they could promote the implementation of a self-regulatory 
coordination among financial institutions for the implementation of ‗switching packs‘.
200
 This 
aims to streamline the administrative stages for switching, and, therefore, would lessen the 
costs. Third, legislators could uphold the usage of account number portability, while this has, 
until now, created a series of issues in relation to the likelihood of high installation costs, the 
failure of non-discriminatory entrance to the payment system, and the possibility of losing the 
aptitude to detect financial institutions throughout the account numbers. 
 
Concerning the contribution of electronic payments networks, it similarly influences 
the level of competition as it presents components of non-price competition in the dealings 
among financial institutions.  For instance, the prospect of financial institutions to take part in 
cashpoint networks could be used as a strategic variable to influence price competition 
concerning the deposit market and dissuade latent entry.
201
 Competition in networks is 
likewise linked to competition in markets on both sides.  For instance, in the milieu of credit 
cards, merchants would make use of card acceptance to foster customer base and reduce price 
competition. This, however, is subject to the condition that the system has to draw two aspects 




Competition in banking is characteristically inadequate and several resistances and 
obstacles to entry would cause concentration of the market within a selective number of large 
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 This would, in turn, bring potential distort of an efficient banking system and the 
unreasonable costs of the banking services to fall on the consumers. In corporate banking, 
formed lending dealings and uneven data provide a bank with handful market power regarding 
both businesses and investors. Electronic banking also challenges the traditional lines of the 





 An imperative, and relatively unsettled, issue relates to the connection between 
stability and competition. Before the 1990s, the predominant view among academic writings 
and policies was that competition had a negative impact on stability.
205
 Specifically, 
concentrated competition was alleged to support disproportionate risk bearing and hence 
resulting in a higher risk of the collapse of a financial institution, and regulation was 
perceived to alleviate the impact of competition on such risk. The basis was that, by 
minimizing financial institutions‘ charter values; better competition would raise the 




Recently, the matter concerning a latent trade-off between stability and competition 
has moved towards the direction of equilibrium. Research demonstrates that panic runs tends 
to happen separately on the level of competition in the market, while by increasing deposit 
rates, more competition could worsen the harmonization within depositors
207
 and upsurge the 
likelihood of runs.
208
 Additionally, the adverse rapport about competition and stability does 
not need to be vigorous, when the option of the risk of the investment undertakings is 
examined more closely.  For instance, once entrepreneurs, and not financial institutions, select 
the risk of the investment project, higher competition in the loan market decreases business‘ 
motivations to take risks, thus, suggesting sounder portfolios for banks.
209
 Ample empirical 
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findings show that less regulatory constraints, namely lower barriers to bank entry and less 
boundaries about bank operations that nurture competition, creates a reduced amount of 
banking instability.  
 
It appears conceivable to anticipate that while a particular threshold is attained, a rise 
in the degree of competition would likely increase motivation of risk-taking and the likelihood 
of bank collapse. This propensity would be confined by reputational effect, the existence of 
private costs of fiasco for managers, and / or by regulation. Nonetheless, the focus of the 
discussion continues to be the level of market power that should be permitted in banking and 
the competition policy that should be adopted in banking, considering the particularity of the 
industry. Moreover, it is significant to address the degree of competition, which could have 
been a factor contributing the formation of a bubble in housing prices and the enormous 
expansion of loans to subprime borrowers during the GFC, and more generally the aggressive 
quest by financial institutions for higher monetary prospects for example, securitization and 
structured products. 
 
In the EU level, the Commission of the Financial Stability, Financial Services and 
Capital Markets Union
210
 along with the Commission have contributed in diminishing 




In the EU Member States, like the UK, the pattern of competition strategy in banking 
sector is considerably developed and various exceptions are taken out.
212
  For instance, since 
2005 the competition strategy in banking system in Italy is no longer regulated by the Central 
Bank of Italy.
213
 Rather, it is regulated by a competition agency,
214
 which also enforces 
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competition concerns in other areas of the economy besides banking. In the Netherlands, since 
2013 the competition aspects in banking are regulated under its national competition 
watchdog.
215
 Also, in France, in 2003 as a result of a ruling from the Conseil d‘Etat (French 
Supreme Court for administrative justice) on the bank merger case Credit Agricole/Credit 





Notwithstanding these changes, several significant particularities about the rapport 
between competition and stability persist in the institutional pattern of competition strategy in 
banking.  As provided in Article 21(4) of the ECMR,  
 
Member States may take appropriate measures to protect legitimate interests other than 
those taken into consideration by the EC[MR] (…).  Public security, plurality of the 




This clause indicates that, at least in merger control, concerns over stability could override 
competition. In the UK and US, a merger of banks might not be subject to the competition 
requirements if the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills in the case of the 
UK and the Federal Reserve in the case of the US certify that it is in the best national interest 




The UK competition watchdog has the authority to examine a pertinent merger case 
and evaluate if it has or could predictably be ensued in a significant diminishing of 
competition in the financial market. In spite of the continuous discussion of the qualified 
values of the voluntary system, UK merger control provisions to date do not maintain a 





                                                        
215
 Authority for Consumers and Markets (‗Autoriteit Consument & Markt‘), available at www.acm.nl/en/. 
216
 Conseil d‘Etat (16 May, 2003) Bulletin Rapide de Droit des Affaires 2003/10, p 9; see, also, E Carletti et al, 
‗The Economic Impact of Merger Control Legislation‘ (2008) FDIC Centre for Financial Research Working 
Paper No 2008-12 .  
217
 ECMR (n132), art 21(4). 
218
 Dodd-Frank (n63), ss 604(d) & (e); see, also, Enterprise Act 2002, c.40 (‗EA02‘), s 58. 
219
 Competition and Markets Authority, ‗Mergers Guidance: How to Notify the CMA of a Merger‘ (15 April, 
2015) CMA, available at https://www.gov.uk/guidance/mergers-how-to-notify-the-cma-of-a-merger. 
392 
 
The UK competition authority maintains the authority to inspect non-notified 
qualifying bank mergers
220
 and would bar transactions or enforce remedies comparable to the 
various compulsory-filing systems globally. This presents a supplemental aspect into UK 
merger control advice for customers, such as, whether to advise review of the bank merger 
cases for clearance before consummation, or to undertake the risk that the competition agency 




There is a continuous initiative from the UK Government to meliorate the switching 
system with respect to redirection for small and individual business bank accounts.
222
  This 
measure could offer consumers with a unified switching service free of charge and without 
risk.  This should be accompanied by undertakings to improve limpidity, such as, allowing the 
consumers to make educated selections concerning the banking services, which would best 
suit their necessities. 
 
The UK is in the process of implementation a robust and flexible ‗ring-fence‘ division 
between the retail and investment banking.
223
 A ‗ring-fenced‘ financial institution would be 
able to supply the main domestic retail banking services of taking deposits from consumers 
and SMEs and offering these customers with overdrafts.
224
 ‗Ring-fenced‘ financial institutions 
would not be able to get into the business of trading, derivatives besides hedging retail risks, 
markets business, supply services to international customers, services besides the payments 
services, which would bring in vulnerability to financial companies. Bank activities like 
lending to large domestic non-financial businesses would be permitted each side of the 
‗fence‘.
225
  Implementation of the ‗ring-fence‘ provisions are expected to be a challenge.  
Regulators should prepare for an eventual backlash that would probably be expressed through 
political channels.   
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As a part of the enhancement of their rapport of collaboration, the UK and the US 
authorities and the representatives from major banks in the two countries, in October, 2014, 
organized the first transatlantic simulation of a financial crunch about big sized financial 
institutions.
226
 It is an indication of a growing conviction among the regulators in both 
countries to prepare themselves in addressing the failure of big financial institutions.
227
 All the 
principal and participating banks in the 2014 stimulation program that could be involved in 
the collapse of a financial institution, namely the Bank of America, HSBC, Barclays or 
Goldman Sachs, got together to ensure these financial institutions would know the measures 




The move is another indicator that the regulators are moving close to cracking the 
TBTF issue, even for cross-border financial institutions, outside an all-out system-broad 
predicament. 
 
The simulation did not imitate any specific bank.  Instead, the UK and the US 
regulators went through the procedures they could pursue in the event a big sized UK bank 
with activities in the US collapsed and those situations for a considerable US bank with 
operations in the UK.
229
  This is in response to a lesson learnt in the GFC. During the latter, 
the UK and American regulators fell out about Lehman Brothers,
230
 both before it collapsed 
and thereafter throughout the messy bankruptcy situation that resulted.  During the foregoing 
crisis, the rapport within the UK and US governments and authorities did not work adequately 
and efficiently. 
 
During the period 2008 to 2009, taxpayers in the UK spent 10.5 per cent of national 
income in order to sustain the banking sector.
231
 Consequently, the taxpayers have recuperated 
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 US Congress, ‗The Effect of the Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy on State and Local Governments‘ (5 May, 
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approximately a quarter of that money. In comparison, the American‘s support summed to 4.5 
per cent of the country‘s gross domestic product, while it has recovered the lot.
232
 There 
should be a race-against-time approach that would shield the UK and US taxpayers from 
bearing the costs of the collapse of systemically significant banks. It requires the banking 
regulators, competition authorities, and the relevant government institutions in both countries 
to press for a well-capitalized financial institution in order to acquire the troubling business by 
a decided bank merger. This mechanism of financial crisis management would no longer be 
applied, levitating issues concerning the Anglo-American regulators and governments‘ ability 
to stabilise the financial system in a financial crisis. 
 
This is demonstrated by the fact, for example, that Bank of America paid $16.7 billion 
in 2014 to settle claims that it misinformed investors in its mortgage-backed securities.
233
 This 
was a peculiar type of justice. The claims stemmed mainly from the activities of Merrill 
Lynch and Countrywide that Bank of America took over in 2008.
234
 Unquestionably, in the 
event the rules of the game were established by the US banking and competition authorities, 
these pre-merger wrongdoings would not have been disciplined – this would, in turn, raise 
different questions concerning justice or its failure. Considering that the US authorities had 
the opportunity to place their regulatory power in this possibly profitable holder, the rules 
adhered to a different rationale. The message to the banking industry – similar to the 
disciplining of JPMorgan Chase for the misconduct of Washington Mutual prior to being 
acquired by the larger financial institution in 2008
235
 – is that proper thoroughness on a crisis 
merger would now take a long time to be feasible. 
 
The same pertains in the UK, nevertheless for different purposes.  The experience with 
Lloyds‘ takeover of HBOS
236
 demonstrated how the hasted merger with a weak financial 
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institution would obliterate a robust acquirer.  Royal Bank of Scotland was likewise impaired 




Similarly, significant is the concern about financial institutions that are not TBTF, but 
rather too big to salvage due to their liabilities are so large that the UK and the US 
governments would have shortage of the fiscal ability to support them.  The damage produced 




Big bank mergers in the UK and the US are dead. Subsequent to the downfall of 
Lehman Brothers in 2008,
239
 the negative effects of banks insolvency to the financial markets 
have been altogether apparent. In the US, the Dodd-Frank Act
240
 has nearly forbidden 
government bailouts. Therefore, alternative types of finance have to be created in order to 




In the event governments in the UK and US would worry about a financial crunch 
accelerating a depression, they would create means of restoring to previous public aid 
practices. 
 
The present compromise is that this would originate from ‗bailing in‘ creditors who 
consequently partake about the losses, though methods for arranged resolution or winding 
down are set in order. The creditors who would confront larger risk could claim a greater 
return or put funds with financial institutions by way of deposits so as to be protected from the 
bail-in. To thwart this, regulators in the UK and US would likely permit banks to hold a 
necessary cushion of loss-soaking up capital in excess of and beyond their equity.  Clearly, the 
issue would be what could occur if the cushion of loss-soaking up debt is exhausted. 
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Empowered by the post GFC legislations, the UK and the US banking regulators have 
refused as insufficient the ‗living wills‘
242
 of the largest and qualified UK and US financial 
institutions that carry out activities in respective countries.
243
  These would be an essential 
instrument concerning the methodical resolution of financial institutions that do not survive in 
a financial crisis. Notwithstanding the EU‘s effort to head towards a banking union, its 
resolution instrument provides extensive saying to UK regulators. 
 
An irony at the core of this method to systemic crises is the fact that bailing in 
creditors would likely cause across-the-board results considering that, contrary to a bailout, it 
could shift losses to other systemically significant banks. The Dodd-Frank Act
244
 demands the 
banking sector to satisfy any losses in addition to its equity and debt, and to have the ability to 
soak up. This will likely be a formula for panic. 
 
If the governments in the UK and the US are concerned that a systemic crisis might 
trigger a depression, they could seek alternatives to come back to the previous bailout 
behaviours. During the GFC, that proved to be chaotic. However, the futility of the arranged 
bank mergers in the UK and the US and the untested regulatory framework indicates that 




The UK and the US authorities and central banks are creating the world‘s first actual 
plans to safeguard the comprehensive financial system in the case that any of the largest cross-
border financial institutions were to fail. Regulators in both sides of the Atlantic have worked 
on ‗resolution plans‘ with the main focus on ‗top-down bail-in‘ actions. These would see the 
regulators in both countries taking control of a failing financial holding company and forcing 
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its shareholders and bondholders to absorb losses despite the maintaining of critical operations 
within the group open. These regulators argue that if they can come up with resolution 
strategies for financial institutions in their respective jurisdictions, this may persuade other 




The purpose of the top-down bail-in would be to prevent a recurrence of the 2008 
collapse of Lehman Brothers,
247
 in which the sudden failure of the American parent left the 
UK operating division completely broke and incapable to remunerate employees and cover 
essential costs. Even the Bank of England admits that top down bail-in could render a 
sustainable approach for the resolution of multifaceted large banks or big financial 
institutions, which cross numerous markets, currencies, and jurisdictions.
248
 The bank 
cooperates jointly with other authorities in the UK and in the US in order to ensure in what 




The pilot project, according to the UK and the US regulators, is based on the ‗living 
wills‘ prepared by the financial institutions.
250
 Moreover, it includes a step-by-step and 
thorough examination of the respective means, consecutive actions, or measures to be taken 
by the UK and US governments, which could unfold (finish) realistically and legally on both 




This may assist to define the changes necessary to take place in financial institution 
structures, contracts, and possibly the UK and American laws. 
 
However, UK and the US authorities are more eager than their counterparts in other 
nations to show that it would work to the cynics in Europe and elsewhere. In 2015, the 
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Financial Stability Board (‗FSB‘),
252
 a global financial regulator, issued the final ‗total loss-
absorbing capacity‘ (‗TLAC‘) standard for ‗global systemically important banks‘ (‗G-
SIBs‘).
253
 The TLAC standard is designed for failing G-SIBs to have sufficient loss-absorbing 
and recapitalization capacity available in resolution for authorities to implement an orderly 
resolution that minimises impacts on financial stability, maintains the continuity of critical 
functions, and ensure that the cost of a giant bank‘s failure will be borne by its investors, not 
taxpayers.
254
  Under the plan, large lenders will have by early 2019 to hold a financial cushion 
of at least 16 per cent of their risk-weighted assets in equity and debt that can be written off.
255
  
The minimum total loss absorption capacity requirement will gradually increase, reaching 18 
per cent of assets weighted by risk by 2022.
256
   
 
Like in the US, the UK political and business governing classes have been for 
decades rotten to the bones by greed and hypocrisy. Their patriotism and sense of 
responsibility are strictly driven by their personal ambitions for power and money.
257
 The 
competition in the Anglo-American banking sector is not functioning in favour of the 
consumers. The sector is at a critical moment. There are two significant derivations of 
possible weight for a more eloquent response to the tenacious competition concerns. These 
hails from prospects for new competition approach in retail banking and arising out of a new 
reach to regulation.   
 
In connection with new competition, there have already been the entries of new banks 
as a result of the acquisition transactions. Also, major banks‘ divestment process projected to 
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establish actual ‗challenger‘ financial institutions.
258
 More profoundly, new technology could 
render scope for augmented competition arising out of outside the customary banking pattern, 
for instance, through the on-line and mobile payments or additional technological 
innovation.
259
   
 
The new bank competitors confront effective challengers in order to become 
prosperous. The largest hurdle to entry and expansion is likely to be consumer inaction, for 
the most part in the essential current bank account market.
260
 The automatic redirection 
service should take note of a progress in dropping issues from the switching of business and 
personal bank accounts. In this regard, more should be done to stimulate accountability.
261
  
For instance, downloadable online access of bank account transaction histories could allow 
more customized comparisons and information on interest relinquishment could turn out to be 




Nevertheless, customers are required to become more proactive with services and 
products offered by their banks. In the event that the customers continue to identify their 
banking as free, or to use a different charging pattern when the ‗free if in credit‘ model
263
 





It is also imperative that regulatory practices in the UK and the US do not function as 
obstacles to entry. Competition and banking regulators must show commitment for 
examination of the application of prudential prerequisites in order to safeguard that new 
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entrants and smaller banks would not be unreasonably adversely affected, such as, provisions 
to keep more capital than present (larger) banks. Competition from outside the conventional 
banking pattern could likewise lead to the questioning of the process of issuing authorization.  
It is vital that competition and banking authorities on both sides of the Atlantic do not unjustly 
inhibit competition by taking the business pattern of existing and conventional financial 
institutions as the base for the model of new rules in means, which could place innovative 
financial institution providers and new technologies at a disadvantage.
265
   
 
In terms of regulation, a likely basis of change in the banking industry is the role of 
competition and banking regulators in the UK and the US establishing different methods from 
the past in relation to the regulation of the behaviour of banks and other financial institutions.  
It remains crucial for these regulators to have an exceptional goal to stimulate competition and 
to make use of their influence to facilitate a properly functioned market for consumers.  It is 
also crucial to ensure that regulation of financial institutions does not establish rules that 
constrain stagnant or vigorous regulation, and that the authorities do not look at banking 
incumbency safeguard or weaker competitiveness as means to attain financial stability.  
Competition and financial stability can coexist, on condition that there is suitable regulation to 
address disproportionate risk-taking.
266
   
 
Several problems that competition and banking regulators in the UK and the US 
confront originate from a failure of ‗customer focus‘ on the part of the providers.
267
  Placing 
the customer experience at the centre of regulation and considering the benefits of potent 
market change over competition provides an opportunity for the regulators to use its rule-
making power and influence to take on the enduring issues in the market. 
 
New competition and a readjusted direction and focus to regulation would result in a 
new direction in banking. This would signify change on the bank providers‘ side.  
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Competition and regulation are required as catalysts for a more ‗customer focused‘ way from 
bank and other financial institutions.
268
   
 
Previously banks would only announce initiatives to address any existing problems if 
the competition and banking authorities put pressure on them. These initiatives should by now 
be carried out by banks. It does not require a major complaint for banks to supply coherent 
information to consumers on apparent matters like the interest rate paid over the saving 
account or the charges consumers pay upon utilizing their cards overseas.
269
   
 
In the event banks and other financial institutions do not make concrete changes, a 
more fundamental reformatory method must be considered. There cannot be a continuation of 
working with business on cumulative change, in case this will not deliver any satisfactory 
outcome. The UK and US banking and competition regulators can take a fresh and 
comprehensive approach at a market, having certain structural and conduct remedies at its 
disposition, not excluding any break-up action towards existing banks. 
 
The UK competition authorities should consider two basic criteria, which must be 
satisfied in making a market investigation reference in Phase 2 in relation to a bank merger 
examination. The first criterion focuses on the need for a sensible basis to suspect that 
‗characteristics‘ of the market thwart, curb, or alter competition.
270
 Traditional concerns of 
concentrated markets, low degrees of switching, and accountability and failure of innovation 
normally direct vis-à-vis such characteristics.  The second criterion involves the fact that the 
authorities must appropriately exercise their discretion in order to make a bank merger 
reference for Phase 2 examination,
271
 taking into account the possibility that characteristics 
will carry on and the undertaking by other regulators. 
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Changes are materializing and designed to upturn bank accounts switching and 
decreasing entry hurdles, along with State aid divestments, new entry, and a fresh look to 
regulation by the UK authorities.  Banks must expect these changes instead of responding to 
them unprepared. The regulators must sustain and encourage the banks to implement these 





The Brexit referendum result of 2016 has thrown the UK towards unchartered waters 
in terms of the future relationship between the UK and the EU, including implementation of 
EU provisions and the UK‘s access in the EU market.   However, the foregoing is not part of 
the analysis in this thesis, notwithstanding its importance.  
 
The bank sector needs to change.  There is yet to be seen any evidence that would 
show the market underlying forces of entry and that consumers benefit from better and 
cheaper banking services and products providers, bringing more resilient customer-concerned 
competition. Without this, the apparent issue remains whether the concentrated market 
configuration of the banking could be the problem.  The best approach to examine this issue is 




This chapter engages in an analysis of competition-related problems faced by the UK and the 
US and examines possible ways to solve the problems. In the US, the traditional approach laid 
down in the Philadelphia National Bank case
273
 is no longer applicable to the current situation 
in the financial market. Banks and financial institutions have ventured into new spheres of 
operations and begun providing services beyond their local territories as technology advances. 
In the UK, banks have acquired other financial institutions to consolidate their positions in the 
market since the 1980s when bank deregulations were undertaken by the UK Government. As 
a result of the failure to address the anticompetitive effects brought about by these mergers, 
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the operations and sizes of these banks have expanded to a scale that was too large for the 
government to adequately monitor.  
 
While the UK and the US have in place respective systems to monitor and address 
issues related to competition, the problems became full-blown during the GFC. In particular, 
the crisis highlighted the problem of these banks being TBTF. Many large banks were on the 
verge of insolvency and, as emergency measures, the governments took steps to save the 
banks through, among others, approving mergers in order to prevent a total collapse in the 
economy. These measures, however, aggravated the oligopoly situation in banking system.  
 
Notwithstanding the oligopolistic structure of banking system, such structure does not 
necessarily mean that it does not lead to competitive outcomes.   
 
Competition provisions would not have prevented the GFC, or eliminated TBTF, 
because they are not made with the essential tools to avoid the occurrence of financial crises. 
Modern competition provisions are not in place to homogenize the size of banks and other 
financial institutions.  They are applied only to forbid dominant conduct, and to stop bank 
mergers in the event of heightened pricing power and market influence.  
 
Banks and other financial institutions are required to adopt the changes and financial 
reforms undertaken from their regulators in post-GFC, and they (banks) should take initiatives 
to comply with the relevant policies and regulations in place. Ultimately, a healthy and 
competitive financial market can only be established and maintained with the cooperation 
among the relevant authorities, regulators, and market players.  
 
The bank sector needs to change.  There is yet to be seen any evidence that would 
show the market underlying forces of entry and that consumers benefit from better and 
cheaper banking services and products providers, bringing more resilient customer-concerned 
competition. Without this, the apparent issue remains whether the concentrated market 
configuration of the banking could be the problem.  The best approach to examine this issue is 




The GFC presented a series of significant regulatory and central bank failures in the 
US, UK, EU and elsewhere and especially in relation to defective regulation, supervision, 
resolution, support and macro prudential oversight.  A substantial amount of work has been 
done to correct all of the foregoing.  However, it is arguable that sufficient action has been 
taken to remove the worst threats that arise with TBTF.  The GFC has reminded us that 





CHAPTER 12 - CONCLUSION 
 
The scope of this thesis is a comparative analysis of the competition law system regulating 
bank mergers in the UK and the US, identifying what needs to be improved in each or both of 
these jurisdictions in order to enhance the Anglo-American bank merger regime. 
 
The thesis is principally structured in four parts. 
 
The first part of this thesis, chapters two through five, focused on the competition 
aspects of bank mergers in the UK, including applicability and implementation of EU relevant 
provisions to UK related bank mergers.  
 
The present UK legislation, including the recent reforms on the financial services do 
not necessarily alter the substance of competition law in its application to banks, 
notwithstanding institutional changes to the enforcement of competition law, and the 
promotion of competition in the UK banking industry.  
 
Having more UK regulatory bodies enforcing competition law in the banking industry 
and requiring them to give specific consideration to applying competition law may increase 
the number of competition investigations and scrutiny in bank merger applications. However, 
unanswered questions remain as to whether this will lead to an increase in the imposition of 
competition law enforcement orders. Civil fines would depend on whether the industry takes 
notice of the warnings inherent in the changes made in the regulation of the banking and 
financial services, ensuring compliance with competition law.  
 
An open question remains whether UK banking regulators are expected to have much 
greater knowledge of the banking and financial industry than competition authorities.  So far, 
in essence, the newly created competition and financial watchdogs in the UK appear to be a 
continuation of their predecessor institutions. Their recent initiatives in investigating 
competition in banking sector do not seem to go deep enough, notwithstanding some signs of 
improvements made in the retail banking activities for SMEs, and bank account‘s switching 




There are both structural and result related similarities between the UK national and 
EU mechanisms for reviewing competition concerns associated with bank mergers. In both 
cases, there appears to be a considerable improvement in cooperation and coordination of 
their efforts in assessment of banking cases.  Yet, more work remains to improve synergize 
between the UK and EU regulators in cases that give rise to issues that can properly be 
divided and addressed together without unnecessarily duplicating work.  
 
The Brexit referendum result of 2016 has thrown the UK towards unchartered waters 
in terms of the future relationship between the UK and the EU, including implementation of 
EU provisions and the UK‘s access in the EU internal market.   However, the foregoing is not 
part of the analysis in this thesis, notwithstanding its importance.  
 
The courts‘ involvement in the review process of bank merger in the UK has been 
nearly nonexistent. With the exception of a few case laws dealing with certain aspects of 
banking, the courts, unlike their US counterparts, have not played an active and leading role in 
enhancement of the completion in bank mergers.  However, slowly but steadily, the courts and 
watchdogs specialized in the area of competition regulatory matters have taken up on issues 
related to competition in banks. UK courts should consider viewing banks as special 
institutions, especially when reviewing competition aspects of their mergers and acquisitions. 
There is an increasing tendency by the courts and competition authorities to look at certain 
aspects of banking products and services, such as, overdraft charges, credit/debit cards fees, 
and fees for switching bank accounts, or other banking issues from a competition point of 
view, rather than taking a broad and complete look at the situation of competition in the 
banking system starting with preservation and enhancement of competition in bank 
consolidation cases in the UK.  Courts ought to play a better and more proactive role to 
preserve competition in bank merger situations.   
 
The GFC saw an increasing and active involvement by the EU courts and the 
European Commission in dealing with competition issues of bank mergers in the UK, and 
across the EU territory. However, the overall perception is that both the Commission and the 
UK competition watchdog have somewhat compromised the strict applicability of competition 
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provisions in bank mergers during the financial crisis. These mergers were largely dictated by 
the consequences of the systemic risk threats and the financial collapse, despite evidence that 
several of these mergers would have likely resulted in a substantially lessening of competition 
in the relevant markets.  
 
During the GFC, the Commission managed to assist Member States, including the UK, 
avert a banking meltdown, and to avoid significant distortions of competition in the Internal 
Market, while sustaining the State aid rules in place. The Commission‘s central position was 
substantially reinforced by the Member States‘ realization that traditional national 
protectionist policies could be extremely dangerous in the present level of economic 
integration.  
 
 In the banking sectors, the Commission has acted autonomously, under its ‗classical‘ 
position in the State aid area, pursuant to Articles 107-109 TFEU; developed its approach 
pragmatically through non-binding Communications, setting out its intended approach under 
the fundamental EU Treaty provisions; and it made maximum use of the flexibility inherent in 
the Treaty, especially the ‗derogations‘ permitted in Article 107(3) (a)-(c); as well as it has 
successfully avoided reaching decisions Member States and concerning financial institutions 
economic would have felt forced to refer to judicial review in the European Courts. The 
Commission decisions in response to the State aids given from the Member States to their 
banks has shown transparency, comparability and consistency.  
 
The Commission considers certain criteria in its evaluation of a bank‘s application for 
‗failing firm defence‘ such as, the failing bank shall exit the market in the foreseeable future 
due to its financial difficulties; there is no less anti-competitive alternative purchase that could 
occur in place of a merger; and in the absence of a merger, the assets of the failing firm (bank) 
would inevitably exit the market. The high burden of proving that the foregoing criteria are 
satisfied lies on the merging banks, which must show the proposed merger would lead to a 
less anti-competitive outcome than a counterfactual scenario in which the firm and its assets 




Despite regulatory improvements and harmonization at the UK and EU levels, 
competition problems still remain in the banking sector. A combination of the GFC, effects of 
regulatory developments and consumer behaviours means that SMEs find still challenging to 
enter the banking and finance market, notwithstanding recent initiatives and concrete actions 
to improve the situation. Challenges remain in terms of achieving the desired objective, being 
a competitive market for banking in the UK.  Developments that have taken place have 
principally advantaged banks seeking to merge, through improved process transparency and 
flexibility, without full attention to consumers‘ benefits. In fact, dominant market players 
exploit consumer ignorance, mis-sell products, and offer services that are inferior to those 
limited other options in the marketplace, but without negative consequence to their market 
shares.  
 
Generally speaking, banking system presents oligopolistic fabric.  However, it does 
not, necessarily, mean such system do not lead to competitive results. Some of the broadest 
approaches that define and evaluate competition in banking are the structure-conduct-
performance model; contestability - centres on conduct dependent on latent entry; and price 
responsiveness to cost shifts.  
 
The UK Government has acknowledged the fact that competition in banking was 
harmed during the GFC in the name of preservation of the financial stability.  A substantial 
amount of work has been undertaken to correct all of the deficiencies occurred during the 
crisis.  However, it is arguable that sufficient action has been taken to remove the worst 
threats that arise with TBTF.   
 
The personal account market in the UK is found particularly concentrated, 
notwithstanding latest initiatives to tackle such concern. Significant competition problems, 
also, exist in product markets, where there are a greater number of participants, such as, 
personal loans and credit cards. Notwithstanding the obvious requirement for banks to be 
more transparent with their customers, it must be asked whether this alone will be sufficient to 
remedy consumer apathy towards switching bank accounts, a continued problem. Apart from 
the UK competition watchdog investigation into the foregoing issues, its conclusive 




When all is said, and done, and whilst acknowledging laudable intentions in all of this, 
it is difficult to say that the cornerstone objective of providing for healthy competition in the 
market for banking products and services in the UK has been fully achieved. 
 
The second part of this thesis, chapters six through nine, dealt with the competition 
aspects of the bank mergers in the US. 
 
  The analytic framework that the US banking and competition regulators apply when 
they review possible competitive effects of a bank merger goes back to the Philadelphia 
National Bank in 1963.
1
  This case law utilized product and geographic markets, based on the 
‗cluster‘ method that defines the relevant product market as the ‗cluster‘ of products (different 
kinds of credit) and services (checking and debit accounts) denoted by the term ‗commercial 
banking‘ in a local market.
2
  Such method is outdated due to expansion of numerous banking 
products and services, for instance, credit/debit cards, mortgage financing, real estate 
financing. The services and products provided by banks and other financial institutions have 
expanded both vertically and horizontally: not only have new services and produces emerged, 
the services and products traditionally provided by one type of financial institutions have 
begun to be available at other types of financial institutions. Banking regulators risk in 
overlooking concentrations especially in product lines and particular geographic areas because 
they define markets locally.  The common remedy in allowing bank merger applications has 
been divestiture of certain products or services from the merging bank(s) in a local banking 
market.  
 
There is a long due need to further enhance and harmonize the bank merger review 
policies in the US. A step in the right direction would be for the US Supreme Court to revisit 
its decision in Philadelphia National Bank
3
 to look at factors arising after its ruling. Such 
factors include broader market locations that exceed the local market of ‗clusters‘ of banking 
products, inclusion of non-bank activities in banking, and the entrance of new banking 
products and services due to technological innovation. 
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Nevertheless, whatever the future analytical framework for evaluating proposed bank 
mergers might be, the last thing it should be is dutiful devotion to stare decisis merely for the 
sake of not offending a half-century of established doctrine. To remain as a key player in the 
field, courts must, thus, strike a balance between upholding the spirit of precedents and 
recognizing the ever-evolving circumstances in the modern financial world. The US Congress 
and the regulators can play an important role in this striking this balance as well.   
 
Perception of the future on bank merger antitrust enforcement is understandably 
difficult to make.  However, before peering into the future, the foundation is laid by 
considering past and present bank merger enforcement in the US.  In this regard, the approach 
in the US antitrust of bank mergers is expected to alter very little in that the geographic scope 
of the relevant market for important banking services is and appears to remain local for the 
foreseeable future.  
 
The third part of this thesis, chapter ten, concluded that the UK and the US authorities 
took bank consolidation actions arguably necessary and perfectly justifiable on regulatory and 
financial stability grounds.  
 
The GFC revealed a number of significant regulatory and central bank failures in the 
UK, US, EU and elsewhere, and especially in terms of defective regulation, supervision, 
resolution, support and macro prudential oversight.  A substantial amount of work has been 
done to correct all of these.  It is arguable that sufficient action has been taken to remove the 
worst threats that arise with TBTF. 
 
During the GFC, a less strict implementation of antitrust oversight was necessary and 
suitable. Both the UK and American regulators were burdened by the spread of systemic risk 
and financial collapse to prop up banks struggling with eroding capital. In approving mergers 
of large banks and other financial institutions, both the UK and American regulators managed 
to control systemic risk. The large bank mergers in the UK and US were granted fast-tracked 
approval due to the fact that by mingling a deteriorating bank with a larger, healthier bank, 




Competition provisions would not have prevented the GFC, or eliminated TBTF, 
because they are not made with the tools required to avoid financial crises. Modern 
competition provisions are not in place to homogenize the size of banks and other financial 
institutions. They are applied only to forbid anticompetitive conduct, and to stop bank mergers 
in the event of heightened pricing power and market influence. 
 
In relation to the response to the TBTF concern, banking markets are naturally, 
oligopolistic, which cannot be prevented with the objective being to ensure that these operate 
in a safe and stable manner.  Consumers have a right of choice and can say no with 
competition authorities not being entitled to force competition on them.  International 
competition is, also, relevant with countries having a legitimate interest to ensure that they 
have one or more large banks that can compete globally. The TBTF was a problem following 
the GFC, although a large number of important steps have been taken to correct this since.  To 
address these criticism, the international bodies and national authorities, including the UK and 
US, took actions to better regulate TBTF concern. 
 
The policy response to end TBTF was necessary. The international and national 
regulators have made great progress to put the overall international policy framework in place. 
The application of policies to individual SIFIs, and financial institutions have undertaken 
restructuring necessary in order to make the foregoing institutions resolvable.  
 
Antitrust is quintessentially addressed to the optimum organization of the nation's 
economy, even if it does not purport to address all aspects of it.  The main issue of 
competition law is economic power and its potential to be misused.  Vast aggregations of 
economic power in convergence with other phenomena caused TBTF crises. It, therefore, 
stands to reason that competition ought to be concerned with some aspects of the TBTF 
problem, at least, insofar as the problem stems from aggregated economic size and power. 
Since the TBTF problem is complex, it is unsurprising that competition by itself is not and 
cannot the cure.  However, the competition law could make a difference by controlling certain 




The fourth (last) part of this thesis, chapter eleven, concluded that while the UK and 
the US have in place different systems to monitor and address issues related to competition, 
problems remain in both countries, and became full-blown during the GFC. In particular, the 
crisis highlighted the problem of these banks being TBTF. Many large banks were on the 
verge of insolvency and, as emergency measures, the governments took steps to save the 
banks through, among others, approving mergers in order to prevent a total collapse in the 
economy.  
 
Large banking groups have grown market power and sustained a lower cost of capital 
due to the public bailout and the fact that they are TBTF. The financial reforms legislation in 
the UK (such as, the Vickers‘ Report,
4
 Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013
5
), the 
EU (such as, the Liikanen Report,
6
 the European Banking Union directives
7
), and US (like, 
the Volcker Rule,
8
 the Dodd-Frank Act
9
) have also met opposition from political parties and 
market participants.  These statutes are very long, highly complex, and most likely will ever 
be fully implemented.    
 
A lesson learnt from the GFC is that pro-competitive exit policies should be 
considered in the course of rehabilitation and rescue operations. There is also a need for the 
relevant competition authorities and banking regulators to step up their effort and make use of 
their respective power and influence over banks and other financial institutions.  Ultimately, a 
healthy and competitive financial market can only be established and maintained with the 
cooperation among the relevant authorities, regulators, and market players.  
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The post-GFC interest in looking at competition in the banking industry is not an 
unexpected turn of events. Governments and legislators have shown similar interest in the 
past, especially during international and national financial crisis. Under such extraordinary 
financial situations, regulators approved bank mergers in the name of financial stability, 
superseding, therefore, any competition concern.  
 
The GFC presented a series of significant regulatory and central bank failures in the 
US, UK, EU and elsewhere, and especially, in relation to defective regulation, supervision, 
resolution, support and macro prudential oversight.  A substantial amount of work has been 
done to correct all of the foregoing.  However, it is arguable that sufficient action has been 
taken to remove the worst threats that arise with TBTF.   
 
The GFC has reminded us that regulatory and supervisory frameworks need constant 
updating as new products, markets and interlinkages emerge. 
  
The policy response to end TBTF was necessary.  The international and national 
regulators have made great progress to put the overall international policy framework in place. 
The application of policies to individual SIFIs, and financial institutions have undertaken 
restructuring necessary in order to make the foregoing institutions resolvable.  
 
Prospects for independent and adequate regulatory review of the merger situations in 
banking and competition policies will continue to depend on preservation of financial stability 
and markets free from threats to the competitive process; while the competition laws will be 
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